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Abstract 
China has well-established Old-Age Pensions policies for the different segments of its 
population, both as part of the current welfare policies framework as well as continuing 
a long established tradition of care for the elderly. Urban Old-Age Pensions policies are 
growing in importance in the increasingly urbanised economy of the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC). 
The PRC government continued with tradition in the policies that led to the enactment 
of the Social Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China5, and promised to fully 
fund Urban Old-Age Pensions. A common theme reported in the prevailing literature 
is that the PRC government does not have the ability to sustainably fund Urban Old-
Age Pensions, citing both substantive and administrative causes of the short fall, and 
calling for changes to the Social Insurance Contributions policies to make the Urban 
Old-Age Pension schemes more sustainable. The prevailing literature, however, 
neglected the Chinese tradition that includes government policies to look after the 
elderly, and misconstrued the Social Insurance Contributions as insurance premiums. 
This thesis investigated whether changes to funding policies are needed in order to meet 
the stated obligation of fully funding Urban Old-Age Pensions. The thesis investigated 
the sources of funding by collating all sources of fiscal revenue and then calculating 
whether this sum collected would successfully fund the required level of disbursed 
Urban Old-Age Pensions.  
This thesis concludes that at current Urban Old-Age Pension replacement rates6, the 
PRC’s fiscal structure can adequately fund Urban Old-Age Pensions at present benefit 
levels. Current studies on the sustainability of funding need to consider the data 
gathered and arguments made in this thesis so that they incorporate all sources of 
funding before stating that short falls in funding and lack of funding sustainability exist, 
or suggesting reform proposals.   
                                                 
5 Above note 2. 
6 The Old-age Pension replacement rate is taken to be the rate Old-age Pensions is paid at as a percentage of 
National Average Wages Levels. 
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Chapter I Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) began, in 2009, a process of enacting the Social 
Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China (Social Insurance Law). 8  This 
legislation was the result of many years of reform to re-establish social welfare in the 
PRC after the 1978 Open Door Policies9 were in place. Its promulgation collated the 
PRC’s social security policies into the Social Insurance Law10 welfare framework.  
The Social Insurance Law 11  entrenched in law the requirement that the PRC 
government provides five types of social security support for its people: Old-Age 
Pensions, Healthcare, Workers Compensation, Parental leave, and an unemployment 
safety net. These five forms of benefits are partially funded by compulsory Social 
Insurance Contributions made towards the Social Insurance Fund.  
The PRC government’s welfare policies in the Social Insurance Law 12  welfare 
framework were formulated in reaction to economic and social developments as the 
result of the 1978 Open Door Policy. 13  Instead of focusing on providing welfare 
                                                 
8 《中华人民共和国社会保险法》Social Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China 2010 (Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress). 
9 《中国共产党第十一届中央委员会第三次全体会议公报》Communiqué of The Third Plenum of the 
Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 1978 (The Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China); 人民网, 《中共党史上的 80 件大事（65）党的十一届三中全会》, People’s net, ‘80 
Important Events in the History of the Communist Party of China’, people.cn, 13 June 2001, 
<http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5301/5302/20010613/488120.html> (21 Feb. 2016); and 新华网, 
《中共十一届三中全会（１９７８年）》, Xinhua Net, ‘The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of China (1978)’, Xinhua Net, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-
01/20/content_697755.htm> (21 Feb. 2016). 
10 Above note 8. 
11 Above note 8. 
12 Above note 8. 
13 《中国共产党第十一届中央委员会第三次全体会议公报》Communiqué of The Third Plenum of the 
Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 1978 (The Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China); 人民网, 《中共党史上的 80 件大事（65）党的十一届三中全会》, People’s net, ‘80 
Important Events in the History of the Communist Party of China’, people.cn, 13 June 2001, 
<http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5301/5302/20010613/488120.html> (21 Feb. 2016); and 新华网, 
《中共十一届三中全会（１９７８年）》, Xinhua Net, ‘The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee 
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through its role as an employer in the form of the public service or State Owned 
Enterprises, the government is providing welfare to its people as citizens through its 
fiscal policies.  
The Urban Old-Age Pensions policies in this welfare framework signify that the PRC 
government is returning to tradition to look after its urban elderly. Urban Old-Age 
Pensions are no longer part of employment remuneration received by a State employee. 
The recent policy announcements14 to merge the Old-Age Pensions policy for public 
servants and government agency employees, and enterprise employees, further 
symbolises that the PRC government is shifting to a model based on the concept of 
urban employees as citizens, not as employees working for the State. 
Policies on Social Insurance Contributions for Old-Age Pensions are the most 
developed in the Social Insurance Law15 welfare framework, especially the policies 
for the urban population. Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance policies, however, 
have also received the most criticism. One major criticism of Urban Old-Age Pensions 
Social Insurance policies is that the PRC government does not have the ability to 
sustainably fund Urban Old-Age Pensions. The prevailing research into sustainability 
of Old-Age Pensions was published from 1997, when the reforms to establish a welfare 
policy framework that included Social Insurance Contributions were first put in place. 
Up till 2014, the criticism and presumptions in that research have not changed.  
This is surprising in that, since 1997, the legal institutions and fiscal structure in the 
PRC have changed significantly. With the importance of Old-Age Pensions and given 
                                                 
of the Communist Party of China (1978)’, Xinhua Net, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-
01/20/content_697755.htm> (21 Feb. 2016). 
14 李金磊 ,《养老金并轨进入实质启动阶段 多地公布实施办法》, Li J, ‘The Track Merge of Old-Age 
Pensions Schemes is Coming to the Implementation Stage – Many Places are Announcing Implementation Rules’ , 
China News Net, 5 March 2015, <http://www.chinanews.com/cj/2015/08-05/7447764.shtml> (5 Mar. 2015). 
15 Above note 8. 
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the lack of updated research in this area, it is appropriate to re-analyse the ability of the 
PRC’s government to sustainably fund Urban Old-Age Pensions.  
Urban Old-Age Pensions as part of urban welfare policies in the PRC will become 
increasingly dominant in the PRC’s Social Insurance Law 16  welfare framework, 
because since the Open Door Policy reforms, especially after 1997, the PRC has also 
experienced increased rates of urbanisation. In 2014, the national urbanisation rate was 
54.77%, and several developed cities – Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen 
were experiencing urbanisation levels similar to that of developed countries.17  
This thesis takes this opportunity to re-evaluate Urban Old-Age Pensions policies in the 
PRC, the possible sources of funding for those policies, and to suggest that in order to 
evaluate the sustainability of funding Urban Old-Age Pensions in the PRC, models 
should take into consideration the broader fiscal revenue structure. 
This chapter identifies the research question, methodological approach and the structure 
of the research.  
1.2 Research Question 
This thesis asks the question: 
In order to meet the requirements of the Social Insurance Law of the People’s 
Republic of China 18  to fully fund Urban Old-Age Pensions, does the 
government of the People’s Republic of China need to make further 
considerations about the funding sustainability of its Urban Old-Age Pensions 
policies?  
                                                 
16 Above note 8. 
17 黄映川、广东省统计局,Huang Y & Statistics Bureau of Guangdong Province《广东人口城镇化发展状况浅
析》, ‘A Brief Analysis of the Urbanisation of the Population of the Guangdong Province’, Guangdong Statistics 
Net, <http://www.gdstats.gov.cn/tjzl/tjfx/201411/t20141110_184244.html>(24 Jul. 2015); and World Bank 
Database, Online <http://data.worldbank.org/topic/urban-development> (18 Apr. 2016). 
18 Above note 8. 
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In this thesis, Urban Old-Age Pensions policies refer to Old-Age Pensions policies 
under the Social Insurance Law 19  that cover urban employees. Urban employees 
include public servants and government agency employees, and enterprise employees. 
Public servants and government agency employees are collectively referred to as 
government employees in this research.  
The urban population in the PRC includes more than those who have urban residence 
registration (Hukou)20, it also includes workers who migrated from rural areas to urban 
areas to seek employment, that is, migrant workers. The coverage of the Urban Old-
Age Pensions policies include migrant workers.  
Funding sustainability has the same meaning as that in the prevailing literature, for 
example, as referred to in Yang’s model. 21  Sustainability refers to the long term 
viability of the policy.  
1.3 Demographic Reasons for Focusing on the Urban Old-Age 
Pensions Scheme 
This thesis examines the Urban Old-Age Pensions scheme in the PRC. There are two 
material reasons for focusing on the urban population. One of the reasons relate to the 
general ageing population debate, and the perspective taken on this debate for the 
purposes of this research. Another reason is that the PRC is experiencing increasing 
rates of urbanisation, therefore urban social welfare policies will continue to increase 
in significance in the PRC’s Social Insurance Law22 welfare framework. 
                                                 
19 Above note 8. 
20 《中华人民共和国户口登记条例》Resident Registration Regulation of the People’s Republic of China 1958 
(National People’s Congress). 
21 杨晓茜, 《中国城镇居民养老保险体系的可持续性研究》, Yang X, ‘A Study of the Sustainability of the 
Urban Old-Age Pensions Insurance System in China’, (2014) 238 International Economics and Trade (4) 147. 
22 Above note 8. 
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1.3.1 Demystifying the “Ageing Population” Problem 
The Old-Age Pensions literature often refers to the “ageing population” problem, the 
literature on the present Old-Age Pensions reform in the PRC is no exception.23 The 
issue at the centre of this problem is the increasing old age dependency ratio. The old 
age dependency ratio is a ratio of the number of retirees per 100 persons of working 
age.24 Persons of working age often refers to people between 15 and 64 years old.25 
The general view is that the increase in old age dependency ratio in the population 
means the cost of maintaining the retired population will increase, thereby increasing 
the burden on the welfare state. Based on national data from the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, the old age dependency ratio in the PRC was 13.7 in 2014,26 which 
was much lower than Germany – 32, Australia – 22, the USA – 22, and the UK – 28.27  
Apps and Rees in their book Public Economics and the Household28 and many other 
publications, 29  concluded that the “ageing population” problem is a myth, and 
associated solutions of promoting the birth rate may not lower the burden on the welfare 
state. Their conclusion was reached by using a different model to look at the 
relationship between demographic changes, public good provision, productivity growth 
and cost of welfare. Instead of using the individual as the data unit, their research 
considered the nuclear family (parents and dependant children). In their research, they 
                                                 
23 For example, see Hu N & Yang Y, ‘The Real Old-Age Dependency Ratio and the Inadequacy of Public 
Pensions Finance in China’, (2012) 5 Journal of Population Ageing 193; and the critique of the literature in Apps 
P, Rees R, & Wood M, ‘Population Ageing, Taxation, Pensions and Health Costs’, (2007) 10 Australian Journal 
of Labour Economics 79. 
24 Ibid. 
25 See OECD Database, Online <https://data.oecd.org/pop/working-age-population.htm> (6 Sep. 2015); and 
World Bank Database, Online <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.DPND> (6 Sep. 2015). 
26 Database of the National Bureau of Statistics of China (Chinese Version) Online <http://data.stats.gov.cn/> (25 
Aug. 2015), please also see Appendix A and B. 
27 World Bank Database, Online <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.DPND> (6 Sep. 2015).  
28 Apps P & Rees R, Public Economics and the Household, (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
29 For example, Apps P & Rees R, ‘Australian Family Tax Reform and the Targeting Fallacy’, (2010) 43 
Australian Economic Review 153; Apps P, ‘The High Taxation of Working Families’, (2004) 5 Australian Review 
of Public Affairs (December) 1; and Apps P, Rees R, & Wood M, ‘Population Ageing, Taxation, Pensions and 
Health Costs’, (2007) 10 Australian Journal of Labour Economics 79. 
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weighed the cost of bringing up a child (who has never paid tax) and the cost of 
maintaining a retired person (who has paid taxes during their working life); and the 
impact on economic growth made by productivity growth caused by technical advances. 
In their research the years as a child and life expectancy of a person after retirement is 
assumed to be similar.30 
This research utilises the conclusion made by Apps and Rees, therefore it does not take 
the “ageing population” as a factor that requires further analysis. The much lower old 
age dependency ratio in the PRC than that of Australia and Germany (the data set in the 
research of Apps and Rees31) further makes allowances for not considering this problem.  
1.3.2 Urbanisation in the PRC 
Urbanisation in the PRC is gradually increasing, and increasing at a faster rate. The 
increasingly urbanised population means urban social welfare policies will continue to 
increase in significance, as they will cover a larger proportion of the population as the 
economy continues to grow.  
Post 1978 economic reforms mean the PRC is now in the post Open Door Policy era.32 
It has returned to treating welfare policies as policies for the whole population. In 
regards to Old-Age Pensions, this is returning to the Chinese policy tradition of looking 
after the elderly by the State. The major difference between the days when that tradition 
developed to the contemporary policies is that the demography of the country has 
changed significantly. The policies in ancient China were targeted at a very agricultural 
population. The contemporary policies are focused on the urban population. Economic 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
31 Apps P & Rees R, Public Economics and the Household, (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
32 Above note 9. 
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developments and urbanisation trends meant it has become increasingly important for 
the nation to gradually reorganise the economy from the dual urban-rural planes into a 
uniformed economy.33  
Although the rural population still accounted for 50.32% of total population34 when 
this research began; as identified by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 2009, 
rural GDP would account for less than 10% of total GDP by 2010.35 Urbanisation is a 
key policy objective of the Twelfth Five-year Plan.36  
Table 1-1 following is an empirical illustration of urbanisation in the PRC. The urban 
population is taken to be people who habitually live in urban areas,37 it is not the same 
as the number of people who hold urban Hukou.38 The data used are from the National 
Data database of the National Bureau of Statistics of China.39 
Table 1-1 illustrates the relationship between urbanisation and economic development 
in the different provinces. In 2014, the national GDP average in the PRC was 
approximately RMB 2.2 Trillion,40 the national urbanisation rate was 54.77%, and the 
national average of urbanisation growth rate was 1.331 percentage points per annum.  
  
                                                 
33 白永秀,《由“前改革时代”到“后改革时代》, Bai Y, ‘From the “Pre-reform” Era to the “Post-reform” Era’, 
(2010) 40 Journal of Northwest University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition) (No.2) 5, at 5-6. 
34 中华人民共和国国家统计局,《2010 年第六次全国人口普查主要数据公报[1]（第 1 号）》, National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, Important Data of the 6th National Census 2010 No 1; 
<http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/rkpcgb/qgrkpcgb/t20110428_402722232.htm> (19 Feb. 2012). 
35 中国新闻网,《社科院：明年农业产值占 GDP 比重下降到 10%以下》Chinanews, ‘The Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences: Agricultural GDP Will Account for Less Than 10% Of Total GDP Next Year’, Chinanews, 21 
December 2009, <http://www.chinanews.com/cj/cj-gncj/news/2009/12-21/2028674.shtml> (17 Oct. 2012). 
36 新华社,《授权发布：中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要》, Xinhua Press, 
‘Authorised Publication: A Compendium to the Twelfth Five-year Plan of Economic and Social Development of 
the People’s Republic of China’, Xinhua Net, 16 March 2011, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2011-
03/16/c_121193916.htm> (19 Sep. 2012), at ch 1. 
37 常住人口. 
38 户籍人口. 
39 Database of the National Bureau of Statistics of China (Chinese Version), Online <http://data.stats.gov.cn/> (25 
Aug. 2015). A limited English version of the data are available at: <http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/>. Data 
assessed for this research came from the Chinese version. 
40 RMB 2,207.31 Billion. This is approximately AUD 441.46 Billion. 
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Table 1-1 Provincial Urbanisation Rate Ranked by Annual GDP 2014 
Locality GDP (RMB 
Billion) 
GDP 
Rank 
Urbanisation 
rate 
Urbanisation 
rank 
Average 
Growth 
rate41 
National42 63,436.73  54.77%  1.331 
Provincial 
Aggregate43 
68,426.75     
Guangdong 6,779.22 1 68.00% 4 0.804 
Jiangsu 6,508.83 2 65.21% 6 1.786 
Shandong 5,942.66 3 55.01% 13 1.112 
Zhejiang 4,015.35 4 64.87% 7 1.090 
Henan 3,493.94 5 45.20% 27 1.607 
Hebei 2,942.12 6 49.32% 21 1.301 
Liaoning 2,862.66 7 67.05% 5 1.050 
Sichuan 2,853.67 8 46.30% 24 1.505 
Hubei 2,736.70 9 55.67% 12 1.556 
Hunan 2,704.85 10 49.28% 22 1.304 
Fujian 2,405.58 11 61.80% 8 1.469 
Shanghai 2,356.09 12 89.57% 1 0.102 
Beijing 2,133.08 13 86.34% 2 0.313 
Anhui 2,084.88 14 49.15% 23 1.520 
Inner Mongolia 1,776.95 15 59.52% 10 1.431 
Shaanxi (陕西)44 1,768.99 16 52.58% 18 1.356 
Tianjin 1,572.25 17 82.27% 3 0.885 
Jiangxi 1,570.86 18 50.22% 19 1.471 
Guangxi 1,567.30 19 46.00% 26 1.398 
Heilongjiang 1,503.94 20 58.02% 11 0.547 
Chongqing 1,426.54 21 59.61% 9 1.643 
Jilin 1,380.38 22 54.83% 14 0.200 
Yunnan 1,281.46 23 41.73% 28 1.397 
Shanxi(山西） 1,275.94 24 53.78% 16 1.356 
Xinjiang 926.41 25 46.08% 25 1.001 
Guizhou 925.10 26 40.02% 30 1.536 
Gansu 683.53 27 41.68% 29 1.289 
Hainan 350.07 28 53.82% 15 0.935 
Ningxia 275.21 29 53.63% 17 1.299 
Qinghai 230.11 30 49.74% 20 1.306 
Tibet 92.08 31 25.79% 31 0.447 
Detailed statistical calculation was performed on EViews. 45  See Appendix A for 
detailed results on the urbanisation and economic development of the PRC and its 
                                                 
41 Percentage points taken to 3 decimal points. Please see Appendix A for calculations. 
42 Above note 39. 
43 Note that the aggregate differs slightly from the National figure. Overlap may occur when provinces collect data 
independently from the National Bureau of Statistics. 
44 The provinces of Shannxi and Shanxi are distinguished by spelling because their Pinyin is the same. The 
pronunciation in Mandarin differs only in tone.  
45 EViews is a quantitative analysis software. 
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provinces. The statistics showed a rough positive correlation between GDP rank and 
urbanisation rank, but no correlation between GDP rank and urbanisation growth. This 
is because the highly urbanised areas are areas that are already more developed at the 
beginning of the data period, that is, in 2005.  
The three provinces ranked highest by urbanisation rank were Beijing, Shanghai and 
Tianjin. These three provinces are the original Municipalities Directly under the Central 
Government.46 All three are cities directly controlled by the central government, and 
which always had a small rural population. The correlation between urbanisation and 
economic growth are less significant for these three cities.  
The urbanisation ranking of the Guangdong and Jiangsu provinces correlate positively 
to their GDP levels, therefore the urbanisation level and economic growth for the two 
most developed provinces in the PRC are aligned.  
It is also worth noting Guangzhou and Shenzhen as prefecture level cities. Guangzhou 
is the capital city of the Guangdong Province. Shenzhen is one of the earliest special 
economic zones in the PRC, and it is also located in the Guangdong Province. Along 
with Beijing and Shanghai, these two cities are considered as the most developed in the 
PRC, and their urbanisation rates are at developed economy levels47 (above 80%). 
Guangzhou’s urbanisation rate was 85.27% in 2013. Shenzhen’s urbanisation rate was 
100% since it became a city without a rural area on 29 June 2004,48 that is, Shenzhen 
no longer has locals with rural Hukou. The urbanisation statistics for the four most 
                                                 
46 直辖市. See above note 954, Arts 95 & 97. Chongqing as a central, industrial and highly populated city that is 
important for defence purposes was added later in 1997. 
47 Above note 17. 
48 胡谋、范勤学著,陈健编,《深圳成为全国首个无农村无农民的城市》Hu M & Fan Q in Chen J ed, 
‘Shenzhen Becomes the First City in China that does not Have Villages and Rural Residents’, people.cn, 29 June 
2004, <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/14562/2605584.html> (6 Sep. 2015); and 《深圳市宝安龙岗城
市化土地管理办法》Shenzhen Baoan & Longgang Urban Land Management Rule 2004 (Shenzhen Prefecture 
Government). 
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developed provinces in the PRC illustrated that as the economy in the PRC continues 
to grow, urbanisation of its population will continue to grow.  
Figure 1-1 is reproduced from Figure A-1 of Appendix A. It illustrates the urbanisation 
growth trend in the PRC and a few representative provinces in the 10 years from 2005 
to 2014. Detailed calculation of that trend is reported in Appendix A.  
Figure 1-1 10 year Average Urbanisation Growth Rates (in percentage points) of 
the PRC and a few Representative Provinces 2005-2014. 
 
Figure 1-1 only reported on the urbanisation trend of representative provinces. 
Provinces that exhibited similar traits to the representative provinces had similar 
urbanisation trends.  
The representative provinces were selected based on the following criteria: GDP level, 
nature of the economy, whether there is a dominant industry, urbanisation rate, whether 
the province is a major contributor of migrant workers to the more developed provinces, 
and whether the province has a dominant minority ethnic group. The representative 
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provinces chosen are Guangdong, Jiangsu, Tibet, Jilin, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Henan, 
and Sichuan.  
Guangdong was chosen because it had the highest GDP in 2014. Its GDP was much 
higher than the national average of RMB 2.2 Trillion. Its urbanisation rate was 68% 
and ranked 3rd nationally in 2014. Its 10 year urbanisation growth trend was 0.804 
percentage points per annum, slower than the national urbanisation growth trend.  
Jiangsu was chosen because it was the second richest province and it exhibited the 
highest urbanisation growth, at a 10 year urbanisation growth trend of 1.786 percentage 
points per annum. Its urbanisation growth was 0.455 percentage points faster than the 
national average of 1.331 percentage points per annum. Its urbanisation rate was 65.21% 
and ranked 4th nationally in 2014.  
Tibet was chosen because it was the poorest province. Its main residents are from the 
Tibetan ethnic group, and its urbanisation rate was the lowest. Its urbanisation growth 
was very slow, but its population size was only 0.234% of the national population in 
2014, which is negligible for the purposes of this research. Its 10 year urbanisation 
growth trend was 0.447 percentage points per annum. 
Jilin was chosen because it is one of the old industrial areas,49 its economy moves at a 
very slow pace, its GDP of RMB 1.38 Trillion50 in 2014 was only approximately 62.5% 
of the national average of RMB 2.2 Trillion. Its urbanisation growth was also very slow. 
Its 10 year urbanisation growth trend was 0.200 percentage points per annum. 
                                                 
49 An old industrial area is one that is accounted for as an industrial area before 1949. The Thirteenth Five-year 
Plan targets these old industrial areas as one of its thematic policy goals. 网易财经,《十三五”规划最全梳理》, 
163 Money, ‘The Most Comprehensive Summary of the Thirteenth Five-year Plan’, 163 Money, 
<http://money.163.com/15/1015/13/B5VK7HFR00253B0H.html> (2 Nov. 2015). 
50 RMB 1,380.38 Billion. This is approximately AUD 276.08 Billion. 
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Inner Mongolia was chosen because it is a western province. The central government 
directs beneficial development policies towards western provinces. Inner Mongolia has 
a large population of the Mongolian ethnic group. It is also a relatively rich western 
province. Its 10 year urbanisation growth trend was 1.431 percentage points per annum. 
Shanxi was chosen because it is a relatively poor western province. It has difficult 
corruption problems, especially with regard to the coal mining industry. Since the 
current leadership began to crack down on corruption, Shanxi is one of the provinces 
that had the most corruption investigations and convictions. Its 10 year urbanisation 
growth trend was 1.356 percentage points per annum. 
Henan was chosen because it is one of the provinces in central China that exhibit the 
following characteristics: large population size, source of rural emigrant workers, lower 
urbanisation rates (nationally, Henan ranked 24 in 2014) and a source of the higher 
urbanisation rates of the wealthier provinces. Other similar provinces are Hebei, Hunan, 
Hubei and Shandong. Henan had the highest GDP out of these provinces in 2014, 
nationally, its GDP ranked No. 5. Its 10 year urbanisation growth trend was 1.607 
percentage points per annum. 
Sichuan was chosen because it is a south western province that exports many rural 
migrant workers, its population is mainly of the Han majority ethnic group. Other 
similar provinces are Yunnan, Chongqing, Guizhou, and Guangxi. Chongqing is a 
provincial level Municipality Directly under the Central Government. Yunnan, 
Guizhou and Guangxi have large populations of people of minority ethnic groups. 
These south western provinces differ from the population mix of the rest of the PRC 
because more beneficial development policies are directed towards these provinces. 
Sichuan’s 10 year urbanisation growth trend was 1.505 percentage points per annum. 
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Internationally, the urbanisation rate of developed economies is approximately 80%.51 
Beijing and Shanghai were chosen because they are developed, and they have a very 
high urbanisation rate. As urbanisation continues to increase in the PRC, the Old-Age 
Pensions policies for the urban population will grow in importance in the PRC’s welfare 
state. Consequently, the scheme for the rural population will decrease in importance.  
As urbanisation gradually increases in the PRC, more people will be covered by the 
Urban Old-Age Pensions scheme. Therefore, it is increasingly important to understand 
the policy structure and sustainability of the Urban Old-Age Pensions Scheme.  
1.4 Outline of the Thesis  
The Social Insurance Law52 represents the PRC government’s promise to fully fund 
five social security benefits, including Old-Age Pensions. This thesis examines the 
fiscal considerations for sustainable public funding of Urban Old-Age Pensions.  
Chapter II briefly outlines current laws that regulate Urban Old-Age Pensions in the 
PRC. This discussion contextualises Urban Old-Age Pensions in the Social Insurance 
Law 53  welfare framework, and explains the regulations for the administration of 
benefits, and the funding of these benefits by Social Insurance Contributions and 
subsidies from consolidated revenue. 
Chapter III reviews the arguments in the prevailing literature in relation to the lack of 
sustainability in the funding of Urban Old-Age Pensions. This literature suggested 
reasons for the lack of sustainability and possible solutions. Some of the solutions are 
substantive, others are administrative. This review prosecutes the case that the 
                                                 
51 World Bank Database, Online <http://data.worldbank.org/topic/urban-development> (18 Apr. 2016). 
52 Above note 8. 
53 Above note 8. 
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presumption in the literature that contributed to the conclusion of unsustainable funding 
is flawed, and many gaps exist in the literature. Before filling these gaps, it would be 
difficult to make a conclusive argument that the Urban Old-Age Pensions policies in 
the Social Insurance Law54 welfare framework are not sustainable. 
Chapter IV is the first step in this research to reconsider Urban Old-Age Pensions 
policies in the PRC. It explains the Chinese policy tradition of looking after the elderly 
by the government. This chapter also reports on historical policies that looked after 
people’s livelihoods, emphasising on looking after the elderly. It also offers an analysis 
of what constitutes as law in ancient China55, in order to suggest that, although the 
historical policies were not promulgated as law in the western sense, they indeed had 
the force of law. This chapter provides the basis for arguing that the PRC government 
is returning to policy tradition in the Social Insurance Law56 framework, and that its 
promise to fully fund Urban Old-Age Pensions is made based on the government 
making a promise to its citizens. 
Chapter V is the second step in the research. It analyses the institutional developments 
in the PRC since 1949. Urban Old-Age Pensions policy developments are reviewed as 
part of the analysis. The chapter argues that up till the Open Door Policy in 1978, the 
PRC’s Urban Old-Age Pensions policies were administered as if they were employment 
remuneration for urban enterprise employees. At the time, the majority of the working 
age population in urban areas were working for the government, either as government 
employees, or employees of State Owned Enterprises. 1997 was identified as the year 
when major reform happened to Urban Old-Age Pensions policy that returned 
                                                 
54 Above note 8. 
55 In this research, the term “China” is used to refer to the geographical area that shared history, culture and the 
written language. It is not used to refer to a particular sovereign State. 
56 Above note 8. 
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enterprise administered employee welfare to social welfare provided for and 
administered by the State. From 1997 onwards, the PRC has developed a practicable 
set of institutions, including the legal system that supports the provision of Urban Old-
Age Pensions to beneficiaries. This institutional framework also supports the 
implementation of laws that regulate revenue collection, part of that collected revenue 
funds Urban Old-Age Pensions as a public good. Prior literature did not include these 
new institutional developments which results in a gap in that literature.  
Chapter VI and VII form the third step in the research. Chapter VI is a fiscal study that 
analyses the funding of Urban Old-Age Pensions as a public good by the PRC’s fiscal 
revenue structure. It analyses the revenue collected according to different types of fiscal 
laws, and concludes that non-earmarked formal tax revenue could be sourced to 
subsidise the funding of Urban Old-Age Pensions.  
Chapter VII is a static feasibility study that tests the funding ability of the Urban Old-
Age Pensions scheme against three funding pools from the PRC’s fiscal structure. The 
analysis is performed with respect to the generational contracts model of funding Old-
Age Pensions.57 That is, the current generation of working age people contribute to 
fund the retirements of current retirees. The purpose of the static study is to illustrate 
the changes to the ability of the PRC to fund Urban Old-Age Pensions when more 
sources of funds are taken into account as allowed by the Social Insurance Law.58  
Chapter VIII concludes this research and identifies areas for future research. Chapter 
VIII also discusses challenges arising from the conclusions of this research. 
                                                 
57 For a full static analysis, see for example, Verbon HAA, ‘Explaining Pay-as-you-go Financed Public Pensions 
Systems’ (1988) 28 Economics Letters 181, at 184-185. 
58 Above note 8. 
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1.5 Methodological Note 
This research is interdisciplinary 59  in nature, and the chapters utilises different 
methodology to contribute to answering the research question. It follows a pragmatist 
research paradigm,60 where the research problem is more important than the choice of 
methods. The disciplines contributing to this research are history, law, economics and 
sociology.  
When governments make fiscal policy, the process often begins by identifying a social 
or economic problem that needs to be regulated, the government then studies the 
problem to create social and economic policy. Once the policy is made, a cost and 
benefits analysis is made, then laws are drafted to be presented to the legislature. During 
the implementation of the law, the policy is re-examined for the purpose of necessary 
reforms. This research contributes to the policy re-examination process for Urban Old-
Age Pensions in the PRC.  
Chapter II is an outline of the legal requirements for the Urban Old-Age Pensions 
scheme in the PRC. The chapter reports results from a textual legal study of the Social 
Insurance Law61 and associated regulations.  
Chapter IV reports on a historical study of China’s traditional welfare state. The chapter 
applies historical-comparative research methods 62  to identify that historically, the 
sovereign in China had the responsibility to provide social welfare to their people, and 
there were real policies to look after the elderly. This is a single nation, past time, 
                                                 
59 Repko AF, Newell WH, & Szostak R, Case Studies in Interdisciplinary Research, (Singapore: Sage, 2012), 8-
11. 
60 Creswell JW, Research Design Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches, 2nd ed, (Los 
Angeles: Sage Publications, 2003), at 11.  
61 Above note 8. 
62 Neuman WL, Social Research Methods - Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, (Sydney: Pearson 
Education, Inc., 5th ed, 2003), at 39. 
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qualitative data type historical-comparative study 63  that compares policies in the 
different dynasties. It also compares the function of Li rules, which is an important 
element in ancient China’s governance structure, to the functions of modern laws, in 
order to give context that the traditional policies to care for the elderly had the force of 
law. 
Chapter IV treats ancient Chinese theories on people’s livelihoods and the importance 
of filial piety as having the force of law. The force of law is analysed by applying 
Weber’s core interpretative sociology concetps64 to analyse the functions of the ancient 
policy documents, and drawing a comparison between Fuller’s understanding of the 
Rule of Law65 and those identified functions. The method of the analysis is explained 
as part of the analysis in Chapter IV.  
The chapter then reports the results of content analysis66 on qualitative data. For the 
ancient period, the data is in the form of ancient Chinese court documents and official 
readings for the different dynasties. Those documents help gain an understanding of 
ancient policies to look after the elderly.  
Chapter V reports on an analysis of the changes in the PRC’s institutional framework. 
The chapter reports results of content analysis of qualitative data.67 The data is in the 
form of Communist party policy documents, the Twelfth Five-year Plan, 68  and 
                                                 
63 Id, at 405-407. 
64 Weber M, Economy and Society an Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Roth G & Wittich C, eds, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1978). 
65 Fuller LL, The Morality of Law, (New Haven: Yale University Press, revised ed, 1968), at 46-91. 
66 Above note 62, at 36-37. 
67 Above note 62, at 36-37. 
68新华社,《授权发布：中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要》, Xinhua Press, 
‘Authorised Publication: A Compendium to the Twelfth Five-year Plan of Economic and Social Development of 
the People’s Republic of China’, Xinhua Net, 16 March 2011, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2011-
03/16/c_121193916.htm> (19 Sep. 2012). 
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regulatory documents in the periods that are significant for the development of Urban 
Old-Age Pensions policies.  
Chapter VI contains the analysis of the possible sources of funding for Urban Old-Age 
Pensions. It first briefly analyses the PRC’s budget and tax system structure to 
understand the PRC’s fiscal revenue structure. It then builds an income tax model to 
study the incidence of Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions. The 
next step is an income tax analysis within a welfare economics framework.69 The actual 
methodology contributes to answering the research question, it is explained in Chapter 
VI itself. 
Chapter VII is a feasibility study of the ability of the PRC’s public revenue structure to 
sustainably fund Old-Age Pensions for the urban population. This feasibility study is a 
case study.70 Detailed study methodology is contained in that chapter.  
                                                 
69 Kaplow L, The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2008). 
70 Yin R, Case Study Research Design and Methods, (Thousand Oaks CA: Sage, 4th ed, 2009), at 14. 
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Chapter II The PRC Government’s Promise 
2.1 Introduction 
Inherent in the Chinese culture is the obligation to care for the elderly. The laws of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) capture this promise. These laws are the result of 
years of reform of welfare policies in the PRC, cumulating in the core piece of 
legislation, the Social Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China,71 which took 
effect in 2010. This chapter outlines the legal provisions that establish the basis upon 
which the PRC fulfils the promise to look after its urban elderly. 
The Social Insurance Law72 welfare framework contains requirements for funding 
Urban Old-Age Pensions. Section 2.2 explains the different forms of law-documents in 
the PRC, each of which, regardless of their appararent importance, has legal standing 
when they perform regulatory functions. Section 2.3 outlines the legal provisions in 
relation to Urban Old-Age Pensions within the Social Insurance Law 73  welfare 
framework. Section 2.4 concludes the chapter.  
2.2 Sources of Law in the PRC 
The laws of the PRC arise in different forms. This research refers to them collectively 
as law-documents. These law-documents include, in decreasing order of priority: 
                                                 
71 《中华人民共和国社会保险法》Social Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China 2010 (Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress). 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
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Legislation, 74  Administrative Regulation, 75  Local Regulation, Autonomous 
Regulation, Separate Regulation and Rules,76 and Ministerial Rules.77 
Legislation78 in the PRC refers specifically to the laws made by the National People’s 
Congress or its Standing Committee.79 There are two types of Legislation in the PRC. 
Basic Laws are made and amended by the National People’s Congress in its full session. 
They regulate issues of national importance and issues that relate generally to the people, 
such as the criminal law, civil law and laws of the government organs. Specific Laws 
are laws that are usually made by the National People’s Congress’s Standing 
Committee. The Social Insurance Law80 is a specific law. 
Administrative Regulations are law-documents made by the State Council according to 
the Constitution81 and the Legislation Law.82 Orders issued by the State Council are 
Administrative Regulations.  
Local Regulations, Autonomous Regulations, Separate Regulations and Rules are made 
by People’s Congresses and their Standing Committees at local government areas. 
These law-documents regulate the implementation of the national level law-documents 
at the local government area.  
Ministerial Rules are made by the functional ministries in relation to their 
administrative functions. Article 2 of Chapter 1 of the Administrative Procedure Law 
                                                 
74 《中华人民共和国立法法》Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China 2015 (National People’s 
Congress), ch II. 法律. 
75 Id, ch III. 行政法规. 
76 Above note 74, ch IV, s1. 地方性法规、自治条例和单行条例. 
77 Above note 74, ch IV, s 2. 规章.  
78 《中华人民共和国宪法》The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China 2004 (National People’s 
Congress), Art 58. 
79 The roles and how laws can be made by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress are 
regulated by the Constitution in ch III, s 1. Above note 78. The procedural rules of law making by the National 
People’s Congress and its Standing Committee are regulated by above note 74 in ch II, ss 2 & 3 respectively.  
80 Above note 71. 
81 Above note 78. 
82 Above note 74. 
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of the PRC83 specifically includes these Rules in relation to administrative procedures, 
that is, citizens and legal persons in the PRC could sue a government organisation when 
they have not performed their functions according to the Rules made by themselves.  
Regardless of its priority as law-documents, each source of law has valid standing in 
court and are relevant to any analysis of the PRC’s legal system. For the purposes of 
analysing funding Urban Old-Age Pensions, all forms of law-documents are considered 
for their content. 
2.3 The Law Regulating Urban Old-Age Pensions in the PRC 
The Urban Old-Age Pension in the PRC is a social welfare scheme partially funded by 
a Social Insurance scheme. The law in the PRC regulates the nature of the scheme, the 
collection and administration of Social Insurance Contributions, the payment of 
pensions and the entitlement of participants. The discussion is divided into what is 
provided and how it is administered, collected and disbursed. Section 2.3.1 presents an 
account of the PRC’s welfare framework under the Social Insurance Law.84 Section 
2.3.2 explains the legal requirements for the collection, and administration of Social 
Insurance Contributions; as well as the payment of pensions and participant 
entitlements.  
2.3.1 The Welfare Framework under the Social Insurance Law85 
The Social Insurance Law 86  regulates the PRC’s Social Insurance based welfare 
policies. There are five types of Social Insurances corresponding to five types of social 
                                                 
83 《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》Administrative Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China 2014 
(Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress).  
84 Above note 71. 
85 Above note 71. 
86 Above note 71. 
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security programmes. These are Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance,87 Health Social 
Insurance,88 Workers Compensation Social Insurance,89 Parental Social Insurance90 
and Unemployment Social Insurance.91 
2.3.1.1 Non Old-Age Pensions Social Insurances 
While the Social Insurance framework is the PRC government’s promise to look after 
its people in all areas of welfare, policies and laws have only developed sufficiently in 
the Old-Age Pensions area. The other welfare areas lack formal laws, however, a 
comprehensive welfare framework exists that is partially funded by Social Insurance 
Contributions.  
2.3.1.1.1 Health Social Insurance 
Health Social Insurance in the PRC covers both public health and the healthcare 
previously covered by the Workforce Insurance Regulation of the People’s Republic of 
China (Administrative Regulation)92 that began in the 1950s. The current Health Social 
Insurance policy is regulated by the Decision by the State Council on Establishing a 
Basic Healthcare System for Urban Enterprise Employees.93 It remains in place after 
the Social Insurance Law94 came into effect and acts as Administrative Regulation that 
supplements the Social Insurance Law.95 The Health Social Insurance is a funds system, 
where the individual and employer share contributions with payment of benefits made 
                                                 
87 Above note 71, ch 2. 
88 Above note 71, ch 3. 
89 Above note 71, ch 4. 
90 Above note 71, ch 6. 
91 Above note 71, ch 5. 
92 《中华人民共和国劳动保险条例》Workforce Insurance Regulation of the People’s Republic of China 1951 
(Previously Ministry of Government, now State Council).  
93 《国务院关于建立城镇职工基本医疗保险制度的决定》（国发[1998]44 号）Decision by the State Council 
on Establishing a Basic Healthcare System for Urban Enterprise Employees (Guofa [1998]No 44) 1998 (State 
Council). 
94 Above note 71. 
95 Above note 71. 
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by Health Social Insurance administrators. These administrators are often third parties 
such as financial institutions. Events that trigger these payments include visiting doctors, 
hospitalisation and filling out a prescription.96 
2.3.1.1.2 Parental Social Insurance 
The Parental Social Insurance in the PRC covers parental leave payments and the health 
costs during pregnancy and at childbirth, as well as family planning costs. The current 
Parental Social Insurance is regulated by several law-documents, including: the Labor 
Law of the People’s Republic of China,97 which is legislation made by the National 
People’s Congress; the Pilot Implementation Rules of Enterprise Employee Parental 
Insurance (Ministerial Rule);98 and the Female Employee Work Protection Regulation 
(Administrative Regulation made by the State Council). 99  These law-documents 
remain in place after the Social Insurance Law100  came into effect. The Parental 
Insurance Pilot 101  and the Female Employee Work Protection Regulation 102 
supplement the requirements in the Labor Law103 and the Social Insurance Law.104 
2.3.1.1.3 Workers Compensation Social Insurance 
The coverage of Workers Compensation Social Insurance in the PRC includes injury 
recovery, healthcare of occupation related diseases, and income for the employee and 
their family during injury recovery. Workers Compensation Social Insurance in the 
                                                 
96 Above note 93. 
97 《中华人民共和国劳动法》Labor Law of the People’s Republic of China 1994 (National People’s Congress). 
98 《企业职工生育保险试行办法》(劳部发[1994]504 号）Pilot Implementation Rules of Enterprise Employee 
Parental Insurance (Laobufa [1994] No 504) 1994 (Previously Ministry of Labor, now Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security).  
99 《女职工劳动保护规定》（国务院令第 9 号）Female Employee Work Protection Regulation 1988 (State 
Council Order No. 9). 
100 Above note 71. 
101 Above note 98.  
102 Above note 99. 
103 Above note 97.  
104 Above note 71. 
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PRC is regulated by the Labor Law;105 the Pilot Implementation Rules on Enterprise 
Employee Workers Compensation Insurance (Ministerial Rule);106 and the Workers 
Compensation Regulation (Administrative Regulation made by the State Council).107 
These law-documents remain in place after the Social Insurance Law108 came into 
effect. The Workers Compensation Pilot, 109  and the Workers Compensation 
Regulation110 supplement the provisions in the Labor Law111 and the Social Insurance 
Law.112 
2.3.1.1.4 Unemployment Social Insurance 
Unemployment Social Insurance in the PRC only covers urban employees. It is a 
system to provide an income stream for the unemployed during their temporary 
unemployment. Unemployment Social Insurance in the PRC is regulated by the 
Unemployment Insurance Regulation (Administrative Regulation made by the State 
Council).113 The Regulation remains in place after the Social Insurance Law114 came 
into effect and supplements the requirements of the Social Insurance Law.115  
Of note in the PRC’s Unemployment Social Insurance is that it began by covering a 
special group of urban employees116 – those who became unemployed due to the post 
Open Door Policy structural reform of State Owned Enterprises117. For these employees, 
their original employer continues to be required to contribute Social Insurance 
                                                 
105 Above note 97.  
106 《企业职工工伤保险试行办法》Pilot Implementation Rules on Enterprise Employee Workers Compensation 
Insurance 1996, (Previously Ministry of Labor, now Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security). 
107《工伤保险条例》Workers Compensation Regulation 2003 (State Council). 
108 Above note 71. 
109 Above note 106. 
110 Above note 107. 
111 Above note 97.  
112 Above note 71. 
113 《失业保险条例》Unemployment Insurance Regulation 1999 (State Council). 
114 Above note 71. 
115 Above note 71. 
116 刘翠霄, 《社会保障法史》, Liu Cuixiao, History of Social Security Laws: 
<http://www.iolaw.org.cn/showArticle.asp?id=2874> (02.Feb.2012), ch 10. 
117 下岗职工(Xiagang Zhigong). This is literally translated as enterprise employees who lost their position. 
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(including Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance) on their behalf.118 As these people find 
employment or pass retirement age, this scheme will phase out in the PRC’s economy.  
2.3.1.2 Old-Age Pensions Social Insurances 
Historically, post 1949 China had different Old-Age Pensions policies for its rural119 
and urban residents. Urban residents can be categorised into three groups depending on 
their employment activities. Two of the groups are exclusively from the urban 
population: government employees who are either public servants or employees 
working for government agencies (collectively referred to as government employees), 
and enterprise employees. The third group is military personnel, made up of both urban 
and rural residents, who have their own social security policies.120 Urban Old-Age 
Pensions policies therefore need to cover enterprise employees and government 
employees.121  
2.3.2 Legal Requirements for the Urban Old-Age Pensions Scheme 
As at February 2016, the PRC has two different Social Insurance schemes for its two 
types of urban employees – enterprise employees, and government employees – 
although there are moves to combine them.122 There have been discussions to combine 
                                                 
118 Above note 116. 
119 Above note 71, Arts 20, 21. 
120 《军人抚恤优待条例》Military Personnel Priority Treatment and Compensation Regulation 1988 (State 
Council and the Central Military Committee);《革命残废军人优待抚恤暂行条例》Temporary Implementation 
Rule on Priority Treatment and Compensation for Disabled Military Personnel 1950 (Ministry of Internal 
Affairs); 《革命工作人员伤亡褒恤暂行条例》Temporary Regulation for the Compensation of Revolutionary 
Workers 1950 (Ministry of Internal Affairs, by Authorisation from the Previous Ministry of Government, now 
State Council); 《民兵民工伤亡抚恤暂行条例》Temporary Implementation Rule on Priority Treatment and 
Compensation for Militiaman 1950 (Ministry of Internal Affairs);《革命军人牺牲、病故褒恤暂行条例》
Temporary Implementation Rule on the Compensation for Death of Military Personnel 1950 (Ministry of Internal 
Affairs); and《革命烈士家属、革命军人家属优待暂行条例》Temporary Implementation Rule on Priority 
Treatment of the Families of Military Personnel 1950 (Ministry of Internal Affairs). 
121 The rural sector has its own Old-Age Pensions scheme. See《国务院关于开展新型农村社会养老保险试点
的指导意见》State Council Recommendations on Applying a New Style Rural Old-age Pensions Social Insurance 
Pilot 2009 (State Council); and above note 71, Arts 20 and 21. 
122 Above note 71, Art 13. 
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the two systems,123 with recent changes in relation to merging the two Urban Old-Age 
Pensions schemes occurring in January 2015, when the State Council issued its 
Administrative Regulation – Decision on Reforming the Old-Age Pensions Social 
Insurance System of Public Servants and Employees of Government Agencies 
(Administrative Regulation).124 As at August 2015125 the merging of the two schemes 
has begun to occur. When the merger of the two schemes is completed, the resulting 
scheme will have the same provisions as the Urban Employee Old-Age Pensions 
scheme. The analysis in this thesis is performed by assuming that the merger has 
completed, with current Urban Employee Old-Age Pensions policies applicable to all 
urban employees. Hereafter, the merged scheme is referred to as the Urban Old-Age 
Pensions scheme. 
The State Council Decision 2015 126  supplements the requirements in the Social 
Insurance Law127 in relation to having separate provisions for public servants and those 
who are governed by the Public Servant Law.128 Those who are governed by the Public 
Servant Law129 refer to all government employees. The issuing of the State Council 
Decision 2015130 means that all urban employees are now captured into one Old-Age 
Pensions Scheme.  
                                                 
123 宋晓梧, 《养老保险并轨其实是个利益问题》Song X, ‘Social Insurance Policy Merge is in Reality a 
Question about Interests’, Economic Reports of the 21st Century, website of China Society of Economic Reform, 16 
March 2011, <http://www.cser.org.cn/index.php/2011-03-16-06-27-31/3952-2011-03-16-06-31-25> (12.Feb. 
2012). 
124 《国务院关于机关事业单位工作人员养老保险制度改革的决定》Decision on Reforming the Old-age 
Pensions Social Insurance System of Public Servants and Employees of Government Agencies 2015 (State 
Council). 
125 李金磊 ,《养老金并轨进入实质启动阶段 多地公布实施办法》, Li J, ‘The Track Merge of Old-Age 
Pension Schemes is Coming to the Implementation StAge – Many Places are Announcing Implementation Rules’ , 
China News Net, 5 March 2015, <http://www.chinanews.com/cj/2015/08-05/7447764.shtml> (5 Mar. 2015) 
126 Above note 124. 
127 Above note 71, Arts 10 and 13. 
128 《中华人民共和国公务员法》Public Servant Law of the People’s Republic of China 2005 (Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress). 
129 Ibid.  
130 Above note 124. 
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Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance that is regulated by the Social Insurance 
Law131 is one of the three tiers in the PRC’s retirement welfare policy framework. The 
other two tiers are the Civil Benefits and private pension insurances. The Civil 
Benefit132 is the safety net in the PRC that includes supporting the elderly who had not 
participated in Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance schemes;133 and the private tier of 
voluntary urban pension insurances134 is available for urban residents who are self-
employed or otherwise not employed.  
The changes introduced by the State Council Decision 2015135 standardises the Urban 
Old-Age Pensions scheme for the two types of urban employees – urban enterprise 
employees and government employees. The Social Insurance Law136 regulates the 
provisions for enterprise employees. It is supplemented by the Implementation Rule to 
the Social Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China (Ministerial Rule);137 and 
the State Council Decision on Unifying the Enterprise Employee Basic Old-Age 
Pensions Social Insurance Systems (Administrative Regulation made by the State 
Council).138  
The State Council Decision 2005139 broadens the implementation of the earlier Pilot 
Proposal on Improvements to the Urban Social Security System 2000 (Administrative 
                                                 
131 Above note 71. 
132 《城市居民最低生活保障条例》Regulation of Urban Resident Low Income Safety Net 1999 (State Council); 
《国务院关于在各地建立城市居民最低生活保障制度的通知》Announcement on Establishing Systems of 
Urban Resident Low Income Safety Net by Local Government Authorities 1997 (State Council); and 《国务院关
于开展城镇居民社会养老保险试点的指导意见》Guiding Opinion of the State Council on Carrying out the 
Pilot Program of Old-Age Pension Insurance for Urban Residents 2011 (State Council), Art 2. 
133 《完善城镇社会保障体系试点方案》Pilot Proposal on Improvements to the Urban Social Security System 
2000 (State Council). 
134 《国务院关于开展城镇居民社会养老保险试点的指导意见》Guiding Opinion of the State Council on 
Carrying out the Pilot Program of Old-Age Pension Insurance for Urban Residents 2011 (State Council). 
135 Above note 124. 
136 Above note 71. 
137 《实施〈中华人民共和国社会保险法〉若干规定》Implementation Rule to the Social Insurance Law of the 
People’s Republic of China 2011 (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security). 
138 《国务院关于完善企业职工基本养老保险制度的决定》(国发[2005]38 号) State Council Decision on 
Unifying the Enterprise Employee Basic Old-age Pensions Social Insurance Systems (Guo Fa [2005] No. 38) 2005 
(State Council). 
139 Above note 138, especially Art 2. 
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Regulation made by the State Council)140 to the rest of the country and to all enterprises 
(including private enterprises). The detailed provisions remain in the 2000 Pilot,141 and 
the State Council Decision on Unifying the Enterprise Employee Basic Old-Age 
Pension Insurance Systems (Administrative Regulation made by the State Council) in 
1997.142 The State Council Decision 2015143 sets out mirror provisions for government 
employees. 
The Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance is a mixed defined benefits, defined 
contributions scheme144 that has two types of accumulation accounts – the centrally 
administered basic social pooling account145 and an individual account146 for each 
participant. Urban retirees receive a defined benefit as a basic pension, and an annuity 
as a result of the contributions into their individual accounts.147 Article 10 of the Social 
Insurance Law148 sets out the two types of accounts for enterprise employees, and 
Article 2 of the 2000 Pilot149  details the nature of the accounts. For government 
employees, Article 3 of the State Council Decision 2015150 mirrors those provisions. 
Social pooling of contributions of Old-Age Pensions 151  is a system that collects 
contributions into a centrally administered Old-Age Pensions Fund. This fund is 
                                                 
140 Above note 133. 
141 Above note 140. 
142 《国务院关于建设统一的企业职工基本养老保险制度的决定》State Council Decision on Unifying the 
Enterprise Employee Basic Old-Age Pension Insurance Systems 1997 (State Council). 
143 Above note 124. 
144 Hu N & Yang Y, ‘The Real Old-Age Dependency Ratio and the Inadequacy of Public Pension Finance in 
China’, (2012) 5 Journal of Population Ageing 193, at 197. See also Feldstein M, ‘Social Security Pension Reform 
in China”, (1999) 10 China Economic Review 99. 
145 Also can be translated as “social contribution” in policy documents. The two terms are used interchangeably in 
this research.  
146 《国务院关于深化企业职工养老保险制度改革的通知》（国发〔1995〕6 号）Circular from the State 
Council on Deepening the Reform of the Urban Enterprise Employee Old-Age Pensions Insurance System (Guofa 
[1995] No 6) 1995 (State Council), see also the introduction to above note 142. 
147 Above note 144. 
148 Above note 71. 
149 Above note 140. 
150 Above note 124. 
151 劳动保障部,《什么是退休费用社会统筹?》, Ministry of Labor, What is Retirement Insurance Centralised 
Social Contribution? : <http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-06/14/content_6394.htm> (2 Feb. 2012). Note that the 
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security is the current name of the Ministry of Labour. 
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operated by third party financial institutions, but administered by the Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security and the Departments of Human Resources and 
Social Security at lower level governments.152 
The individual accounts are administered in the same way as the basic social pooling 
account, but the funds are earmarked153 for the particular employee.154 The amounts 
in the individual account cannot be withdrawn in advance because it is only 
accumulated for the purposes of retirement.155 
The contributions mechanism is outlined in Article 12156  of the Social Insurance 
Law.157 Employers should contribute a certain percentage of total payroll as Old-Age 
Pensions Social Insurance, with another portion to the employee’s earmarked 
individual account. The administrative mechanism for the two portions are different. 
The portion going to the social account is calculated before the employer discharges 
their Individual Income Tax withholding duties. The portion going to the individual 
account is calculated after the employer discharges their Individual Income Tax 
withholding duties.158 Although Social Insurance Contributions by the employer and 
by the employer on behalf of the employee are administered in separate accounts, they 
are part of the same funding source for Old-Age Pensions. They come from the same 
contributions base – the wages or salary of urban employees. 
                                                 
152 Ibid.  
153 Earmarking refers to government revenue that is collected for a particular type of expenditure. The discussion 
on the tax system structure of the PRC in Chapter VI further explains this term. 
154 Above note 151. 
155 Above note 142. 
156 Above note 71. 
157 Above note 71. 
158 Individual Income Tax withholding by the employer is a common tax administration tool used by governments 
to ensure that Individual Income Tax is collected. This arrangement diverts the burden of proofing income tax 
liability onto the employee, when they fill out their tax returns at the end of the income year. 
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The employer contributes 20% of its total payroll to the social pooling account for Old-
Age Pensions Social Insurance159 on behalf of all of its employees. The employee 
contributes 8% of the individual’s wage income to the individual’s personal Old-Age 
Pensions Social Insurance account.160 
Centralised Social Insurance Contributions administration and final payment of pension 
benefits occur at the provincial level. This means centralisation of administrative and 
funding responsibilities has increased from the prefecture level to the provincial 
level.161 The law-documents provide that Urban Old-Age Pensions funds can be from 
multiple sources, including government subsidies.162 These multiple sources signify 
the PRC government’s promise to fully fund Urban Old-Age Pensions to look after its 
urban elderly. 
Employees need to have participated in the scheme for 15 years before they receive a 
monthly Basic Old-Age Pension.163  A monthly pension is paid based on the total 
amount in the individual account divided by 120, multiplied by the number of years 
participated; plus 20% of the monthly average wage level in the province. 164 
Employees who have not participated for more than 15 years will receive the amount 
in the individual account as a lump sum.165 To ensure all employees can equitably 
receive an Urban Old-Age Pension, there are policies to enable contribution of 
                                                 
159 Total payroll = total cost of the wAges and salaries of employees in the organisation. 
160 Above note 124, Art 3; and note 140, Art 2. 
161 人民网-财经频道, 《人社部：目前全国 31 个省区市已出台养老保险省级统筹办法》, People’s Net 
Finance and Economics Channel, ‘Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security: 31 Provincial Level 
Governments Now Have Provincial Level Centralisation Rules for the Administration of Contributions of Old-age 
Pensions Social Insurance’, people.cn, <http://finance.people.com.cn/n/2015/1027/c1004-27745507.html> (4 Nov. 
2015); above note 138, Art 8; and 《国务院关于实行企业职工基本养老保险省级统筹和行业统筹移交地方管
理有关问题的通知》Circular from the State Council on the Administration of Provincial and Industry 
Centralisation of Employee Old-age Pensions Social Insurance Contribution Collection by Local Governments 
1998 (State Council). 
162 Above note 71, Arts 65 & 71.  
163 Above note 124, Art 4; and note 142, Art 5. 
164 Above note 142.  
165 Above note 142.  
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additional amounts into the Social Insurance Fund, that is equivalent to 15 years of 
normal contributions. These policies are for employees who began their working life 
before the implementation of the State Council Decision 1997, 166  and whose 
employers delayed their participation in the scheme.167 
Basic Urban Old-Age Pensions benefits are to be calculated168 based on an average of 
the average monthly wages of the workforce and the indexed average of the individual’s 
monthly wages. Each full year of contributions leads to an increase in benefits by 1% 
of that Urban Old-Age Pension average. Urban Old-Age Pensions from the individual 
accounts are calculated by total savings in the account divided by expected months of 
entitlements. Expected payment months are calculated based on factors such as the life 
expectancy of the urban population at the time of the employee’s retirement, the 
employee’s retirement age and market interest rates. Article 14 169  of the Social 
Insurance Law170 prohibits drawing from the individual account before the retirement 
age. This ensures that the compulsory contributions are made only for the purposes of 
Old-Age Pensions. 
There are domestic migrant workers who participate in urban employment in the PRC. 
Within the PRC, a migrant worker is one who either moves between provinces, or 
moves from rural areas to cities. It is important that these migrant workers are able to 
enjoy the benefits of the Urban Old-Age Pensions scheme should they end their 
working life in a city. The scheme allows for the continuation of Old-Age Pensions 
Insurance relationships. The Temporary Implementation Rule on the Transfer of Old-
Age Pensions Social Insurance Relationships by Urban Employees of Enterprises 
                                                 
166 Above note 142. 
167 Above note 138.  
168 Above note 138, especially Art 6. 
169 Above note 71. 
170 Above note 71. 
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(Ministerial Rule)171 makes provisions for people who move provinces during their 
working life, that is, during their 15 or more years of contributions to the Urban Old-
Age Pensions Social Insurance.   
An example best illustrates this. Wu is a migrant worker from a rural area in Hubei 
Province. He graduated from a University in Shanghai with an engineering degree in 
1992 and found work in Shanghai as an assistant engineer in October of the same year. 
His employer immediately began to contribute towards his five Social Insurances, 
including Urban Old-Age Pensions. Wu moved to Wuhan in January 2005 to be closer 
to his family. He found employment in May and his employer began to contribute 
towards his five Social Insurances. Wu then continues to work in Wuhan until his 
retirement. His Old-Age Pensions are calculated based on 12 years and 2 months in 
Shanghai, combined with time worked in the Hubei Province. The four months that he 
was out of employment does not impact on the continuation of his contribution period. 
When he retires, the benefits are paid according to a formula that takes into 
consideration the payment standards of Shanghai and Hubei according to the time he 
spent earning income in those provinces. This provision alleviates the obstacles to 
workforce mobility and allows for national centralised administration of Old-Age 
Pensions Social Insurance Contributions and payments. 
The Pilot 2000172 specified that the administration of the collection of contributions 
and payment of benefits should be independent, and suggested that provinces could 
choose to use tax authorities to collect the contributions in their local areas. Article 11 
                                                 
171 《城镇企业职工基本养老保险关系转移接续暂行办法》Temporary Implementation Rule on the Transfer of 
Old-age Pensions Social Insurance Relationships by Urban Employees of Enterprises 2009 (Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security and Ministry of Finance). 
172 Above note 133, Arts 7(3) & 7(4). 
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of the Temporary Regulations on the Collection of Social Insurance Contributions173 
specified the mechanisms for the tax authorities to collect Social Insurance 
Contributions. In reality, most provinces now choose to have the Local Tax Bureau 
collect Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions.174 
2.4 Conclusion 
The promulgation of the Social Insurance Law 175  is the result of the continuous 
development in the PRC’s social welfare policies. The Urban Old-Age Pensions 
scheme in the Social Insurance Law176 welfare framework covers all urban employees 
on whose behalf Social Insurance Contributions have been made for an equivalent of 
15 years. The scheme has policies that allow retirees to receive a pension if they have 
retired to a location different to their employment location. Urban Old-Age Pensions 
Social Insurance schemes are part of the PRC government’s promise to look after its 
urban elderly, and this promise is supported by legal requirements that allow the 
government to source funds from general revenue.  
                                                 
173 《社会保险费征缴暂行条例》Temporary Regulations on the Collection of Social Insurance Contributions 
1999 (State Council). 
174 For example, 《广东省劳动和社会保障厅、广东省地方税务局关于印发广东省社会保险费地税全责征
收实施办法（暂行）的通知》Circular to Issue the Temporary Implementation Rule of Administration and 
Collection of Social Insurances by Local Tax Bureaus in the Guangdong Province 2008 (Guangdong Provincial 
Department of Labor and Social Security and Guangdong Provincial Local Tax Bureau). 
175 Above note 71. 
176 Above note 71. 
34 
 
Chapter III The Funding Unsustainability Arguments 
Relating to the PRC’s Urban Old-Age Pensions 
3.1 Introduction 
The current Urban Old-Age Pensions policies in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
are regulated within the Social Insurance Law177 welfare framework. This framework 
represents the PRC’s contemporary welfare state. The reforms associated with the 
developments of the current Urban Old-Age Pensions laws and policies have attracted 
attention from researchers who have written from different perspectives. One common 
theme from the literature is the argument that the PRC’s Urban Old-Age Pensions is 
underfunded for the country’s ageing population, and the scheme is not sustainable.  
The prevailing literature began to be published around 1997, when scholars started to 
write about the Urban Old-Age Pensions reforms in relation to the State Council 
Decision on Unifying the Enterprise Employee Basic Old-Age Pension Insurance 
Systems (Administrative Regulation made by the State Council),178 and identified the 
causes of the lack of sustainable funding for the Urban Old-Age Pensions scheme at the 
time. Some of the issues identified were substantive, others were administrative. Later 
research continues to treat the causes as problems that require solutions. Models were 
built to analyse the causes and suggest proposals to solve the problems.  
                                                 
177 《中华人民共和国社会保险法》Social Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China 2010 (Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress). 
178《国务院关于建设统一的企业职工基本养老保险制度的决定》State Council Decision on Unifying the 
Enterprise Employee Basic Old-Age Pension Insurance Systems 1997 (State Council). 
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This chapter reviews the prevailing literature on this common theme. The prior research 
discussed in this chapter was performed within a welfare economics and welfare state 
research paradigm.   
Section 3.2 is a brief discussion of what is a welfare state, in order to provide a context 
to the reviewed literature. Section 3.3 reviews literature that identified the causes of the 
lack of funding sustainability. Most of this literature was written at the time of issue of 
the State Council Decision 1997.179 Section 3.4 reviews the subsequent literature that 
identified issues that required further reform. Section 3.5 reviews the literature that 
analysed those issues and suggested solutions. Section 3.6 summarises the flaws in the 
literature that argues about the lack of sustainable funding for Urban Old-Age Pensions 
in the PRC. Section 3.7 identifies other relevant issues raised in the literature. Section 
3.8 summarises the gaps and funding issues raised by prior scholars that will be 
investigated throughout the remainder of this thesis. 
3.2 Contextualising Welfare State 
The New Oxford Companion to Law180 defines a welfare state as  
“the institutional framework under which the state assumes responsibility for 
the basic welfare of citizens and applies policies, operationalized via legislation, 
to that end. Social security, health, housing, and education are its main areas of 
provision. It is particularly associated with the meeting of basic needs; and it 
thus operates as a redistributive mechanism for the inequalities that occur under 
a market economy”. Welfare state refers to a way governments apply policy, 
when comparing the concepts of welfare state and welfare society, Skillen 
emphasised that “the welfare state is not just a system of personal insurance but 
an expression of community, of concern for our fellows. It places some things 
beyond the question of purchasing power”.181  
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The welfare state represents the direct provision of public goods by the government. 
The funding of those public goods is supplied in the government budgeting process, 
and the funding methods could be from earmarked taxes or directly from consolidated 
revenue.  
In practice, Bismarck’s Germany was regarded as the first “welfare state”,182 when it 
passed the first “social legislations” in 1883 and 1884.183 These legislations were the 
beginning of a perception of social welfare, that it is a form of social security funded 
by social insurance schemes in the European social welfare tradition.184 
The term welfare state185 was allegedly coined by Sir William Temple in the UK in 
1941. This welfare state in the UK emerged as a result of the pension and 
unemployment insurance before World War I186 and the reforms that arose from the 
Beveridge Report.187 The Beveridge Report188 advanced the principle that welfare 
should be provided “from cradle to grave”, through universal social insurance, family 
allowances and a national health service,189 in order to combat the five “giant evils” of 
squalor, ignorance, want, idleness, and disease.190   
There are different typologies of welfare states: whether it is a minimal welfare state or 
maximal welfare state;191 whether it is an “institutional” or “residual” welfare state;192 
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and as according to Esping-Andersen, whether it is conservative, liberal or social-
democratic.193 Esping-Andersen’s typology represents  
“different ways of ‘decommodification’ of labour in a capitalist economy, 
empirically measured by the replacement rates and contribution periods of 
benefits, and the financial arrangements.” These typologies were created 
according to “level of expenditure, institutional arrangements of distribution 
(…entitlements, compensation levels, the public/private mix of provisions), 
features of taxation, the initial need structure and the final distributive outcome, 
the historical tradition and actors, and present day partisanships”.194 
The minimal welfare state is also called the liberal welfare state or the competition 
state,195 where the foundation principle is that the government should provide to the 
members of society that are in dire need of support, but not provide more than the 
necessities – here the focus is on securing the safety net.  
The maximal welfare state is currently practiced by Nordic countries. It is characterised 
by a proactive government making cradle to grave provisions.196 Often, these policies 
are funded by a high level of taxes.  
The institutional welfare state is similar to the maximal welfare state, but the state does 
not play such a proactive role. Institutional welfare states are where “the state assumes 
a responsibility to ensure a reasonable standard of living for all and confers universal 
rights.”197 The more conditional those rights and the weaker and less redistributive the 
framework of protection, the further the welfare state is from the institutional model.198  
A residualist welfare state is similar to a minimal welfare state, but the policy 
framework is more structured.  
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“A ‘residualist’ welfare state steps in when other sources of welfare, including 
privately purchased provision, the family, and the voluntary sector, are inadequate. 
Thus it makes minimal or highly selective provision and places greater onus on the 
individual to make contingency arrangements, for example through insurance”.199  
Welfare state policies are analysed within a policy framework bridging social and 
economic policies.200 Modern social policies take into consideration social progress, 
and what contributes to a “good society”.201  Two concepts in this policy mix are 
sustainability – whether people can maintain their current material and non-material 
living conditions; and the consequences of policies on people’s social relations.202  
Sustainability is an aim of both social and economic policies. 203  In welfare state 
policies, it plays the role to link social policies and economic policies. Social policies 
are those policies that “rests on value judgements”,204 and that aims for an outcome 
that is a political process. Economic policies are policies that ask and answer more 
technical and less normative questions.205 Social policies thereby can be viewed as the 
step before developing economic policies to fulfil certain governmental value 
propositions.206  
The social policy aim of any welfare state is to absorb social tensions by way of specific 
policies to redistribute income to disadvantaged members of the society,207 including 
the sick, the disabled and the elderly.  
“The idea of the welfare state builds on a conception of social rights guaranteed 
to all citizens... Social rights are an extension of democratic rights, defining 
welfare rights monitored on the political arena by collective decision-making. 
Social rights are usually expressed with explicit reference to equality and social 
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inclusion. The right to employment (supported by labour market policy), to safe 
working conditions (labour protection regulation), the right to education (tax-
based mass schooling), poverty relief (transfers) and general public health care 
are all widely accepted in Europe in all political camps. ”208  
The majority of specific income redistribution policies relate to income support 
provided by the government to those weaker members of the society.209 Support by the 
government takes two forms: directly as an income transfer, or indirectly as services to 
assist those of employment age to access employment. There are also two types of 
schemes – earnings-related benefits under social insurance schemes; and means-tested 
transfers under social assistance schemes. The former maintains income, and the latter 
aims to alleviate poverty.210 
Welfare economics211 and public economics212 provide the economic policy choices 
to meet this social aim. Along with negotiations between different interest groups that 
ascertain the different social tensions, and regulatory instruments that aim to change 
behaviours, these economic policies often rely on taxes and its redistributive effects – 
where taxes give rise to public revenue to be spent on these “cradle to grave” 
programmes.  
3.3 Preparation for Reform 
At the time of the issue of the State Council Decision 1997,213 researchers performed 
thorough analysis of the existing pension structure and identified that the Old-Age 
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Pensions scheme in the PRC was not sustainable. They identified the causes of the lack 
of sustainability, and areas for reform with possible reform directions.  
Phillon’s paper Chinese Welfare State Regimes214 was an example of an overview of 
the history of Urban Old-Age Pensions policies before 1997. Selden and You’s paper 
The Reform of Social Welfare in China215 identified the broad scope for research to 
address the lack of funding sustainability. West’s paper Pension Reform in China: 
Preparing for the Future 216  summed up the aim of the research at the time and 
contributed to planning for reform. Feldstein’s paper Social Security Pension Reform 
in China 217  took a diagnostic approach. Gui’s paper 218  represented research that 
considers the demographic needs for Old-Age Pensions.   
West’s paper219 identified the causes for the lack of funding sustainability, and so the 
reasons for the reform in 1997 were: “declining workers-to-retirees ratio”, 220 
“reduction in coverage”,221  “rising enterprise burden”,222  and “erosion of pension 
benefits”. 223  She identified major issues for future reform to be pension 
“affordability”224 and increasing “level of pooling”.225 “Affordability” issues were 
due to changes faced by enterprises during the marketisation process after the Open 
Door Policy reforms, such as enterprises facing financial difficulties arising from the 
structural change.226 West identified the plausibility of moving from the Pay-as-you-
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go system to a fully funded model. 227  The “level of pooling” refers to the 
administrative issue of pooling contributions. This is the same issue as raised by later 
research, which was referred to as increasing the level of centralisation for contributions 
of Social Insurance. 
Feldstein’s paper228 sets out a framework to analyse whether to identify the PRC as a 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pensions insurance system, or a fully funded insurance system. 
It represented literature that performed analysis on the problems of the gap in funding 
within the framework of prevailing pensions social insurance theories. 
Gui’s paper229 was a discussion on the two main stresses of the PRC’s Urban Old-Age 
Pensions policy. The first stress is the gap between economic development and the 
rapidly growing aging population problem. The second stress is the reducing size of 
families.230 These two problems increased the difficulty for the younger generations to 
support their parents, and therefore, a reliable public system of Urban Old-Age 
Pensions is necessary. Gui suggested that the public Urban Old-Age Pensions should 
include an individual deposit mechanism and there should be considerations on fund 
administration.231 Gui’s paper was a classic example of considering family size and the 
ageing population together for Old-Age Pensions reform suggestions. The literature 
does not offer reasons for linking these two different demographic trends. 
This relatively early literature was written at a time that unemployment from the 
systemic changes to State Owned Enterprises, and reemployment by the private sector 
materially changed the nature of the post 1949 welfare state in China. Scholars were 
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contributing to making initial reform suggestions. The Urban Old-Age Pensions policy 
at the time was administered and paid by employers. These employers were either the 
public service or government agencies, or State Owned Enterprises. The government 
was the employer in that Urban Old-Age Pensions scheme. 
This body of literature suggested changes according to the US model of funding Old-
Age Pensions. It viewed “pension insurance contributions” as the only legitimate source 
of funding for Urban Old-Age Pensions in the PRC. This view informed the argument 
in the later literature that transfer payments from consolidated revenue should not be 
made to subsidise payments of Urban Old-Age Pensions.  
3.4 Issues for Further Reform 
As reforms progressed from 1997, scholars continued to contribute to the reform by 
identifying issues for further reform and their solutions. Many of the reform issues were 
the same as those identified by scholars who wrote at the start of the 1997 reform. 
Scholars quantified the large gap in the funding of the PRC’s Urban Employee Old-
Age Pensions scheme. They continued to comment that the scheme is not sustainable, 
that the ageing population is adding to the funding pressure, and that there are problems 
with the ability of a retiree to access pension benefits if they retired to a different local 
government area.232 Solutions suggested included increasing the level of centralisation 
of the administration of Old-Age Pensions insurance contributions to ease the funding 
pressure and to solve the “historical Old-Age Pensions insurance debt”233 problem. 
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The literature also critiqued the government’s practice of making transfer payments 
from consolidated revenue to subsidise Urban Old-Age Pensions.  
Four years after the release of the State Council Decision 1997,234 Liu analysed the 
position of the reform process. In her paper The Current Status and Problems of the 
Old-Age Pension Insurance in China,235 she suggested that: the coverage of the Old-
Age Pensions insurance should be expanded as well as sugesting that the centralisation 
of the administration of Old-Age Pensions insurance needed to gradually increase. She 
also suggested increases to the contribution rate, that the government should be 
identified as the party that bears legal liability of the “historical Old-Age Pensions 
insurance debt” and a multi-tier Old-Age Pensions social security model should be 
developed. Further there needed to be clarifying of the management responsibilities of 
Old-Age Pensions insurance and improvement of the management and investment of 
the Old-Age Pensions insurance fund.  
The scale of the cumulative funding gap was reported in 2012 as RMB 76.7 Billion,236 
which was approximately USD 11 Billion at the time. One important reason identified 
for the gap’s existence was that the employees’ individual Old-Age Pensions insurance 
accounts were actually “empty” so that there is insufficient funds in the Social 
Insurance Fund237 to pay pensions.  
The cause identified in the literature for the empty individual accounts problem was 
that the funds contributed on behalf of current employees were being used to fund the 
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Old-Age Pensions of current retirees. For example, Wang commented that, by 
identifying the PRC’s Old-Age Pensions insurance as a PAYG system, it was argued 
that there is a gap in the funding for Old-Age Pensions in the PRC due to the problem 
of “empty individual accounts”.238 
There was a very weak voice in the counter argument to this complaint, represented by 
the Ministry of Finance in its 2013 comment,239 where the Ministry of Finance opined 
that its calculations from budget and national accounts data showed that the funding 
gap did not exist. This section focuses on discussing the literature on the causes and 
suggested solutions to the so called “empty individual accounts” problem. 
3.4.1 The Empty Individual Accounts Problem 
There are two main bodies of research that look at the problem of the “empty individual 
accounts”. Individual accounts refer to the individual accounts in the Social Insurance 
Fund that houses the contributions by individuals. For a time, before the individual 
accounts and social pooling accounts were separately set up, it was hard to differentiate 
from which pool of funds Old-Age Pensions benefits were paid.  
The two bodies of literature focused respectively on the “historical Old-Age Pensions 
Insurance debt” problem, which was argued as one of the causes of the so called “empty 
individual accounts”; and centralisation of the administration of contributions, which 
was viewed as a potential solution for the so called empty individual accounts problem.  
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Most of the research on the “historical Old-Age Pensions insurance debt” problem 
focuses on the causes of the problem, the social impact of the problem, and the 
identification of legal liability for this debt.  
Liu’s paper The Historical Old-Age Pensions Insurance Debt Problem in China240 is 
one of the most significant analysis by a Chinese scholar on this issue. She argued that 
the major cause of the problem was the transition between the pre 1997 programme and 
the post 1997 programme that utilises Old-Age Pensions insurance contributions to 
fund Urban Old-Age Pensions. The identified problem was that the retirement of the 
older generation is required to be funded by the current generation of workers, and those 
workers, at the same time, are saving for their own retirement.241  
Liu criticised the fact that the funds in the individual Old-Age Pensions insurance 
accounts could not be attributed to distinct proprietorship, therefore, although the 
participant had an individual account, there was no entity that bears the legal liability 
to pay a pension when the participant retires.242 She argued that the government should 
be identified as the entity with the debt liability in relation to the individual accounts.243 
She also argued that social problems arise from this lack of clarity on legal liability, 
such as social trust issues,244 and urban poverty in old age.245  
The solutions Liu suggested for this problem were similar to those stipulated in her 
earlier paper:246 in order to receive more contributions, amend the law to broaden the 
coverage of Urban Old-Age Pensions insurance; increase the retirement age; increase 
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the centralisation level of contributions management, thereby allowing cross 
subsidisation between local government areas; and ascertaining the liability of Old-Age 
Pensions insurance debt.247 She also analysed the plausibility of repaying the debt,248 
and suggested that the funds in the social pooling account should be the only source of 
public revenue used to repay Old-Age Pensions insurance debt;249 but other earmarked 
sources of funds could be raised, such as selling State owned assets,250 or issuing 
special purpose debentures;251 and indicating a time line for repayment.252  
Tan’s paper253 and Liu and Fang’s paper254 added suggested solutions to the problem, 
including separate administration of the funds in the individual accounts and funds in 
the social pooling accounts; 255  and legislating to determine the nature and 
responsibility of the “debt”.256 
Increased administrative centralisation of Old-Age Pensions insurance contributions in 
the literature was treated as a solution to the “empty individual accounts problem”. 
Zheng’s paper in 2007257 and Xi and Lei’s paper in 2011258 are representative in this 
area of the research. 
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Zheng259 identified the importance for increased administrative centralisation of Old-
Age Pensions insurance contributions in the PRC, especially to the provincial level. Xi 
and Lei 260  analysed the supporting conditions for increasing administrative 
centralisation of Old-Age Pensions insurance contributions to the national level. The 
two papers argued that at the time of their paper, Enterprise Employee Old-Age 
Pensions Insurance 261  had became society’s insurance. Both papers took the 
perspective of equality in providing Old-Age Pensions across the country. The authors 
noted the geographical developmental disparity in the PRC as an area of difficulty in 
implementing administrative centralisation. 
Xi and Lei262  in their analysis also emphasised that the Urban Old-Age Pensions 
insurance systems in the PRC were established along with the tax sharing fiscal 
structure.263 The reality of different levels of economic development in geographical 
areas meant economic development affected the development of Old-Age Pensions 
provision across the country. The pilot Old-Age Pensions insurance programmes chose 
different models according to the economic situation of the local area. Even in different 
administrative areas of the same province, the Old-Age Pensions insurance and benefits 
model can differ substantially. Increased centralisation of pensions administration 
became necessary for the fair provision of Old-Age Pensions in the PRC.  
Xi and Lei264 observed that Old-Age Pensions administration centralisation in the PRC 
differed across provinces. Some have achieved provincial central administration of 
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Old-Age Pensions insurance contributions, including the Guangdong province. 265 
Some continued to lag at the prefecture, even worse, at the county level. 266  This 
complexity meant the revenue from Old-Age Pensions insurance belongs to different 
levels of local governments. 267  The local level governments would not have the 
motivation to remit the revenue to be administered by the higher level government.  
Xi and Lei268 argued that there were three major concerns in relation to increased levels 
of centralisation of contributions.269 They argued that these three concerns arise from 
the difference in the administration of revenue and expenditure in the PRC, where there 
is no matching of funds administration levels to payment administration levels. The 
independence and complexity of tax administration were suggested as the reasons for 
the lack of matching.  
These three concerns are first,270 the fate of the Old-Age Pensions insurance funds that 
were originally administered by local governments becomes questionable after national 
centralisation. Theoretically271 there are three options: remit all to central government, 
partial remittance to central government, and keep everything at the different local 
government levels. Second, 272  after national centralisation, the requirements for 
funding and the method of benefit payment are unclear. According to Xi and Lei,273 
this can be calculated according to the national aggregate of wages and salaries or 
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national consumption levels. Third,274 the source of funding for Old-Age Pensions 
insurance after administrative centralisation of contributions is also unclear. According 
to Xi and Lei,275 this may come from contributions by employers, central government 
fiscal subsidies and distinctive national social insurance funds.  
It was unclear how the authors drew the correlation between administrative 
centralisation and the tax sharing structure to arrive at their policy proposals.276 One 
possible reason is that because the Old-Age Pensions payments are administered by 
Departments of Human Resource and Social Security at local government areas, and 
Local Tax Bureaus of the State Administration of Taxation collect revenue types that 
are to fund expenditure administered by local governments. By increasing the level of 
centralisation for the administration of funds will enable easier matching of funding 
needs to revenue sources. The authors may have assumed that the PRC still does not 
have a comprehensive formal institutional framework that included a practicable fiscal 
revenue structure.  
Two other issues were identified by Zheng277  and Xi and Lei278  as significant in 
implementing administrative centralisation. One major problem of the Old-Age 
Pensions insurance system in the PRC was the piecemeal nature of the system. Some 
participants in the system had contribution certainty, for example, urban enterprise 
employees. Other participants had benefits certainty, for example, public servants.  
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A second issue is a concern that the individual accounts resemble ordinary private 
insurance accounts. Take Xi and Lei’s paper279 as an example. They believed that the 
lack of funds in these individual accounts directly contributed to the lack of 
sustainability in funding Old-Age Pensions in the PRC.  
The authors did not provide reasons as to why in order to solve the funding 
sustainability issue, they were drawing the link between the piecemeal nature, and the 
resemblance of individual accounts to ordinary private insurance accounts; as well as 
their contribution to solving the “empty individual accounts” problem.  
One possible reason is that the authors continued to believe that the Old-Age Pensions 
are the liability of enterprises, and individual accounts should act as the mechanism to 
guarantee that funds are available to pay pensions for urban enterprise retirees, as 
enterprises used to budget for Old-Age Pensions specifically for each retiree. The 
authors did not distinguish the role of the government as employer, with the role of 
government as the administrator of social welfare policies. 
Other scholars have considered the empty individual accounts as a problem that leads 
to a lack of funding for future generations,280 because funds in the Social Insurance 
Fund that are attributable to the individual were transferred to pay the Old-Age Pensions 
of current retirees. This argument is only feasible within a private insurance 
framework,281 where premium payments correlate with benefits. 
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Wang and Zheng282 considered the empty individual accounts issue as reflecting the 
failure by Chinese policy makers to introduce individual accounts properly into its 
social society funding structure. Their concern about empty individual accounts being 
a problem was based on considering contributions on behalf of the individual as the 
only proper source of funding, and dismissing the government “subsidies” coming from 
consolidated revenue as a legitimate funding source. Wang and Zheng283 also argued 
that reforms to ascertain funds in the individual accounts are not necessary, as there is 
enough funds in the PRC’s fiscal structure to fund Urban Old-Age Pensions in the PRC. 
The authors did not explain how they arrived at the conclusion that there was enough 
funds in the fiscal structure to fund Urban Old-Age Pensions, leaving a gap in the 
literature. 
Following the arguments from the research that contributed to initial policy reform, this 
body of literature presumed that pensions insurance contributions were the only 
legitimate source of revenue for funding Urban Old-Age Pensions. It did not consider 
the institutional changes in the PRC, especially that the Urban Old-Age Pensions were 
no longer administered by State Owned Enterprises as employers, but the government 
is administering pensions as a public authority. It also mixed the analysis of 
administrative problems arising out of the Urban Old-Age Pensions reform, and the 
substantive question of whether the PRC could sustainably fund Urban Old-Age 
Pensions. The increased centralisation of Urban Old-Age Pensions insurance 
contributions is an administrative solution that will assist in the management of existing 
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funding, it is not a solution for the lack of sustainable funding, if it is proven that there 
is insufficient funding of the policy. 
3.5 The Lack of Sustainable Funding and Suggested Solutions 
This section reviews the literature on the suggested solutions to solve the lack of 
sustainable funding problem in the PRC’s Urban Old-Age Pension policies. 
Researchers have utilised empirical data and economic models to suggest policy reform. 
The common assumptions in this body of research are: the funds in the Social Insurance 
Fund pertaining to Old-Age Pensions is the only legitimate source of public revenue to 
fund Urban Old-Age Pensions; and that the empty individual accounts problem 
continues to be a real problem.  
In Yuan and Feng’s paper,284 the authors argued that the three-pillar pensions system 
introduced in 1997 that included the Basic Old-Age Pension Insurance, the private tier 
of Old-Age Pensions insurances and the safety net was unsuccessful. While many 
scholars in the field considered that the reason of the failure was due to the nature of 
the PAYG system, and some suggested that the fully funded pensions system is better 
for the PRC,285 in their paper, Yuan and Feng argued that the fully funded system is 
neither an efficient system in the current time period nor likely to be a good one in the 
future. They performed efficiency analyses to compare a PAYG system and a fully 
funded system in the PRC by using a wide range of historical data to show the outcome 
of the Old-Age Pensions system’s performance in the last two decades, and suggested 
that a mandatory PAYG system is still more suitable for China’s national 
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circumstances.286 From the model, they also concluded that the PAYG system is more 
sustainable in comparison to the fully funded system.287 
In Wang, Beland and Zhang’s paper, 288  they first reviewed the PRC’s Old-Age 
Pensions developments since 1978.289 They then set up an evaluation model to analyse 
the fairness of the current scheme. 290  In this model, pension income, pension 
contribution, pension demand and pension generation gap are chosen as variables. The 
results showed that “the pension system is generally unfair in the view of pension 
income and pension contribution when pensions for civil servants are excluded from 
the analysis”.291 They concluded that the PRC’s fragmented Old-Age Pensions system 
was fundamentally unfair. They proposed to establish an integrated and more 
egalitarian Old-Age Pensions system. 
Lu, He and Piggott292 in their paper discussed the necessity of building up a society-
wide Old-Age Pensions system that also captured the rural population. The authors’ 
main focus was on the government’s fiscal cost burden, and therefore, the cost for the 
population. The size of the pensions recipient population was the key in the 
discussion.293 Specifically, they listed the potential size of the aging population and the 
related cost in the future, and plotted the data against the PRC’s Old-Age Pensions 
structure.294 They concluded that the society-wide Old-Age Pensions system is not 
feasible in the PRC, because fiscal income could not cover the population. The flaws 
of this paper are that the authors discussed population issues as “costs”, but there was 
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no direct link drawn between fiscal income and those “costs”; they also did not consider 
the full scale of the PRC’s fiscal revenue structure.  
Feng, He and Sato in their paper295 recognised the 1997 reform as building up a PAYG 
system and linked the effect of that reform to a concept of “pension wealth” that they 
defined as the discounted value of future pensions benefits.296 They built a model to 
explain the effects of “pension wealth” changes to household savings. In their model, 
they provided detailed information on the population data on age and gender. Their aim 
was to distinguish the differences in changes to household savings when income level 
changes differently due to age and gender. 297  They ran regression models on the 
different scenarios to illustrate the relationship between household income, saving and 
the “pension wealth” and concluded that there is correlation between the variables.298  
Yang’s paper299 analysed the sustainability of funding Old-Age Pensions from the 
perspective of life expectancy. Yang used population data from different local 
government areas and gender as variables to calculate the expected Old-Age Pensions 
expenditure based on life expectancy. He concluded that the current Old-Age Pensions 
payment structure regulated by the PRC’s law-documents does not reflect actual life 
expectancy of the PRC’s population, and the pool of Old-Age Pensions recipients will 
continue to enlarge.300 The paper argued that the Old-Age Pensions structure should 
be adjusted by the increases in life expectancy to balance expenditure needs.301  
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Liu’s paper302 focused on the Old-Age Pensions replacement rate and pointed out that 
the Old-Age Pensions replacement rate is decreasing significantly. This decrease 
lowers the quality of life for the Old-Age Pensions recipient. The author suggested a so 
called self-automatic adjustment system that is able to adjust the level of Old-Age 
Pensions to ensure a relatively stable replacement rate. The variables in the self-
automatic adjustment system are increases in wage levels and the price index. It was 
concluded that such a self-automatic adjustment system could effectively ensure the 
quality of life for people with lower income.303 A major flaw in this paper is that the 
author did not recognise the Urban Old-Age Pensions that is partially funded by a 
compulsory Social Insurance is different to the previously enterprise employer funded 
and administered Old-Age Pensions. 
Yang304 built regression models on population growth and the growth of payment levels 
for Urban Old-Age Pensions. The purpose of the models was to measure the 
sustainability of the existing Urban Old-Age Pension policies. Key variables in the 
models included: the age of the working force (20-58) and the upper limit of life 
expectancy (100), average return on pensions re-investment (5.97%), the average 
amount of contributions to the pension fund, the population cover percentage of the 
Urban Old-Age Pensions, the average wage growth rate, the effective tax rate, and the 
replacement rate of the Urban Old-Age Pensions. Note that the chosen range for age of 
the working force was different to the working age population age used by the National 
Statistics Bureau of China, which is 15-64. 305  Yang’s was one of the more 
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comprehensive models in the literature to measure sustainability. One key variable, 
however, is missing; that is, the size of fiscal revenue that could be sourced to fund 
Urban Old-Age Pensions.  
Gu306 pointed out that the shortfall on Urban Old-Age Pensions payments is the key 
element that is obstructing the reform of the Old-Age Pensions system. He concluded 
that the cause of the shortfall was the lack of system construction. As a result, he 
suggested that the level of contributions on behalf of the individual, that is, funds that 
are contributed to the individual account, should increase. He also suggested delaying 
retirement as a solution.307 
Chen’s 2014 paper308 analysed the ratio between social security expenditure and total 
expenditure, the ratio between the types of social security expenditure, the ratio 
between the social security expenditure for the different population groups – urban vs 
rural and people in different geographical areas. He identified unbalances in Pension 
Fund income and payment, in payment for different purposes, in different areas and 
between rural and urban areas.309 Chen concluded that currently there is still a need for 
general reform to Old-Age Pensions as an element of social security.  
Yu and Chen310 identified reasons for the lack of sustainable funding to include: a large 
funding gap, intergovernmental transfer difficulties, high costs of reform, population 
aging, and unbalance between localities.311  They identified reasons other than the 
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empty individual accounts problem. The solution provided, however, was still mainly 
focused on centralisation of contribution administration.312  
Wang, Xu, Wang, and Zhai’s paper313  provided a very rough general equilibrium 
analysis of the PRC’s Urban Old-Age Pensions reform. Their basic assumption was 
based on three sets of variables: macroeconomic variables (such as GDP, Investment 
and trade balance), pensions system characteristics (such as assumption of a PAYG 
system) and government fiscal closure issues (such as government expenditure and 
assumption of tax rates). The authors did not provide reasons for making these 
assumptions. One possible reason is that they were seeking to build a broad model, so 
considered a wide-range of variables. 
3.6 Flaws in the Literature on Lack of Sustainable Funding 
for Urban Old-Age Pensions 
The prior body of literature directly addressed the problem of the lack of sustainable 
funding for Urban Old-Age Pensions in the PRC. Spanning more than twenty years, it 
continued to assume that the funds in the Urban Old-Age Pensions insurance fund is 
the only legitimate source of funding. The reason for making this assumption is that the 
authors made a mistake by analysing Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance 
Contributions as pensions insurance, therefore performing analysis within an insurance 
framework.  
The wrong choice in analytical framework meant the prior literature is 
methodologically flawed. Instead of applying a public economics research paradigm, 
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where Urban Old-Age Pensions funding is analysed as an element of public expenditure 
that is funded by general revenue; the analysis was performed by viewing retirement as 
a risk that requires insurance. On the revenue side of this public economics paradigm, 
Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions as a social insurance is a 
compulsory levy, which is very different to insurance premiums which are results of 
actuarial calculations. 
The literature also did not pay attention to the PRC’s promise in the Social Insurance 
Law314 to fully fund Urban Old-Age Pensions, and that the Social Insurance Law315 
allows subsidies to be made from consolidated revenue to supplement the funding of 
Urban Old-Age Pensions. The promise resulted in the PRC’s Urban Old-Age Pensions 
becoming a public good within the budgeting process. 
3.7 Other Relevant Issues 
Other researchers added to the literature on the funding of Urban Old-Age Pensions 
from alternative perspectives. The alternative perspectives included identifying the 
government’s responsibility in providing welfare, which is an attempt to legitimise 
government subsidies; 316  identifying Social Insurance Contributions as a tax; and 
proposals to utilise the financial market to grow the funding pool. This section briefly 
reviews the limited literature on contributions as a tax, and those on investment to grow 
the funding pool. 
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3.7.1 Contributions as a Tax 
Yang317 and Pang318 distinguished the fiscal nature of Urban Old-Age Pensions Social 
Insurance Contributions in the PRC, and have correctly referred to them as Social 
Insurance Contributions. Their papers are contributions to a small body of literature 
that took into consideration the growing maturity of the PRC’s fiscal revenue structure 
as part of post Open Door Policy institutional developments, where the legal and tax 
system are better able to support government administered provision of public goods.  
Yang 319  identified Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contribution as an 
earmarked tax and the different ways that tax manifested itself. To Yang,320 Social 
Insurance Contributions is a tax and the Social Insurance tax is a payroll tax that is 
levied to fund social securities, including Old-Age Pensions. Social Insurance 
Contributions exhibits the four basic characteristics of taxes: compulsory levy, non-
compensating, certainty and equity. According to Yang321, since contributors can see 
the returns from Social Insurance Contributions, contributors (taxpayers) are more 
willing to contribute, the administrative cost thereby is relatively low, and the Social 
Insurance Tax is a simple and efficient tax.  
To Yang, Social Insurance Taxes of different countries have common characteristics:  
1) The taxpayers of the Social Insurance Tax are employees and employers. Some 
countries specify that all Social Insurance should be paid by the employer, for 
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example Australia; and some countries include the self-employed into the social 
insurance tax net. 
2) The tax objects of the Social Insurance Tax are wages and salaries, that is, it is 
a payroll tax. Any income other than wages and salaries such as investment 
income, capital gains, etc are not included. As the tax base, wages and salaries 
include cash paid by the employers, and in kind receipts and other receipts that 
are convertible to cash. 
3) There is often a cap for payroll taxable wages and salaries. Although the social 
insurance tax of each country has the above common characteristics, the actual 
tax system designs are very different.  
Pang322 suggested that the PRC should treat the Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance 
Contributions as a tax, and to take away the earmarked nature of the tax. Taking away 
the earmarked nature makes Social Insurance Contributions a part of the general 
funding pool to fund Old-Age Pensions. She argued that this is more reflective of the 
economic nature of the Social Insurance Contributions. 
3.7.2 Investment of Funds 
There is also literature that addresses how investment mechanisms may be utilised to 
boost funding in the Social Insurance Fund.323 This part of the literature represents an 
alternative approach to address the lack of sustainable funding for Urban Old-Age 
Pensions. These scholars did not address the funding problem from the contributions 
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side of the policy. This alternative is to take the funds contributed into the Old-Age 
Pensions Fund as given, and consider how to grow the funding pool. 
Feldstein’s 1999 paper324 already raised the point about the benefits the PRC could 
gain from running an investment-based system, where investments of the pool of funds 
in the Social Insurance Fund could add to the funding pool. 325  Jame’s paper 326 
attempted to suggest ways the PRC’s Old-Age Pensions scheme could interact with the 
financial market reform. 
3.8 Conclusion and Gap in the Research 
The prevailing literature has consistently argued that there is a lack of sustainable 
funding for Urban Old-Age Pensions in the PRC. The literature overlooks that the 
PRC’s institutional structure has developed significantly from the time of the State 
Council Decision 1997,327  a time when researchers first analysed the PRC’s then 
employer administered Urban Old-Age Pensions scheme. Those earlier researchers 
contributed to initial reform by suggesting policy elements that would suit an Urban 
Old-Age Pensions scheme that is administered by the government.  
The argument about the lack of sustainable funding is based on two major conclusions, 
that the funds in the Social Insurance Fund pertaining to Old-Age Pensions are the only 
legitimate source of public revenue to fund Urban Old-Age Pensions; and the empty 
individual accounts problem continues to be a real problem. Researchers have set up 
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models testing these two conclusions as hypotheses, and concluded that the PRC’s 
Urban Old-Age Pensions scheme is indeed not sustainable.  
There is a literature that chose to analyse the sustainability of funding Urban Old-Age 
Pensions from a different perspective. The researchers focused on the funds that are in 
the Social Insurance Fund, and how to grow those funds. The main focus was 
investment solutions utilising the financial market.  
There are many gaps in the literature on the sustainable funding of Urban Old-Age 
Pensions in the PRC. These gaps relate to the nature of the Urban Old-Age Pensions 
reform itself, the prevailing view, and the nature of Social Contributions in the PRC’s 
fiscal revenue structure. 
In relation to the reform itself, the Social Insurance Law 328  now requires the 
government to fully fund Urban Old-Age Pensions and allow subsidies from 
consolidated revenue as supplement funding. There is almost no literature on the 
reasons behind that policy decision, therefore, the prevailing literature continues to 
argue that the contributions accumulated in the Social Insurance Fund should be the 
only source of funding for Urban Old-Age Pensions.  
There is also little research on the impact increases in urbanisation in the PRC has on 
the development of Urban Old-Age Pensions policies. This increase in urbanisation 
means the urban scheme will cover a larger proportion of the population.  
The PRC’s old age dependency ratio is much lower than the OECD, 329  thus the 
literature did not consider whether the much lower old age dependency ratio in the PRC 
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as compared to that of OECD countries make a difference to the policy design of Urban 
Old-Age Pensions in the PRC. 
In relation to the prevailing views that are the presumptions for models to analyse 
funding sustainability, that is, funds in the Social Insurance Fund pertaining to Old-Age 
Pensions are the only legitimate source of public revenue to fund Urban Old-Age 
Pensions; and the empty individual accounts problem continues to be a real problem, 
the gaps in the literature include:  
 Whether the institutional changes in the PRC from the Open Door Policy in 
1978 make a difference to the assumption that public funding for Urban Old-
Age Pensions could only be sourced from the Social Insurance Fund; 
 Whether these institutional changes affect the perspective on the “historical 
Old-Age Pensions debt” problem; 
 The reasons for arguing that funds in the individual accounts have to be 
accounted for separately; and 
 When treating Urban Old-Age Pensions as a public good, considerations of 
other possible sources of funds in the PRC’s fiscal revenue structure. 
In relation to the nature of Social Insurance Contributions, there is a small literature 
that identified Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Contributions as a tax that 
contributes to the general fiscal structure of the PRC. This literature did not go far 
enough to suggest that the tax nature of the Social Contributions impact on the PRC 
government’s ability to sustainably fund Urban Old-Age Pensions. This research 
also notes Wang and Zheng’s argument330 that there is no lack of funding in the 
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PRC’s fiscal structure. The researchers did not provide an analysis of how they 
reached this conclusion, leaving a gap in the literature.  
This research aims to address some of these gaps in the literature. It suggested that the 
reason the government mandates subsidies is that China has a long tradition of policies 
where the government looks after the elderly in the population. It argues that the 
institutional reforms change the assumption that the accumulated contributions are the 
only source of funding for Urban Old-Age Pensions. It also argues that the PRC could 
source subsidies from the whole of its fiscal revenue structure to fund Urban Old-Age 
Pensions as a public good in its budgeting process. These arguments will contribute to 
changing the assumptions for the models that were developed in the existing literature 
to test the funding sustainability of the PRC’s Urban Old-Age Pensions scheme.  
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Chapter IV The Chinese Policy Tradition of the State 
Looking after the Elderly  
大道之行也,天下为公,选贤与(jǔ)能,讲信修睦。故人不独亲其亲, 不独子其子, 
使老有所终, 壮有所用, 幼有所长, 鳏、寡、孤、独、废疾者皆有所养, 男有分, 
女有归。货恶其弃于地也,不必藏于己；力恶其不出于身也,不必为己。是故谋闭
而不兴, 盗窃乱贼而不作, 故外户而不闭, 是谓大同。 
《礼记·礼运篇》331 
“When the great Tao was in practice, the world was common to all; men of talents, 
virtue and ability were selected; sincerity was emphasized and friendship was 
cultivated. Therefore, men did not love only their own parents, nor did they treat as 
children only their own sons. A competent provision was secured for the aged till their 
death, employment was given to the able-bodied, and a means was provided for the 
upbringing of the young. Kindness and compassion were shown to widows, orphans, 
childless men, and those who were disabled by disease, so that they all had the 
wherewithal for support. Men had their proper work and women had their homes. They 
hated to see the wealth of natural resources undeveloped, [so they developed it, but this 
development] was not for their own use. They hated not to exert themselves, [so they 
worked, but their work] was not for their own profit…This was called the great unity.” 
 ‘Li Yun’, in Book of Rites332  
4.1 Introduction 
As outlined in Chapter III, the existing academic analysis of Old-Age Pensions funding 
in the PRC argued that the public funding of Urban Old-Age Pensions is unsustainable 
from several perspectives. This previous analysis stated and found causes for the 
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unsustainability, some found issues for further reform, and others built models to 
suggest solutions to the problem. In each case, the analysis was based on an assumption 
that contributions to the Social Insurance Fund was the only legitimate source of 
funding.   
Owing to the unique history of the PRC, this assumption of single legitimate source of 
funding is not accurate. The remainder of this chapter through a detailed historical 
analysis demonstrates that long standing Chinese tradition, where the State uses public 
policy tools funded through general revenue to meet its obligations in respect of elder 
care, must also be considered. If the PRC has continued this policy tradition it will open 
up further revenue sources that must be considered in any analysis of sustainability in 
funding Old-Age Pensions in the PRC.  
China has a long established tradition of supporting the different social groups by the 
sovereign or government. The quote translated at the start of this chapter demonstrated 
an ideal society within this tradition. The welfare tradition involved governments 
paying for social welfare programmes from fiscal revenue. Of clear importance is 
looking after the weaker members of society in China. Historically, the ideal society is 
one where these weaker members received their sustenance from ancient China’s 
sovereign centric society. Amongst policies that assisted people’s livelihoods, those 
that aimed to look after the elderly have always been more important. This arose due to 
the pivotal role played by filial piety in Confucian thought,333 which is the branch of 
Chinese philosophy that greatly informed governance.  
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Loosely termed, the policy tradition that looked after the weaker members of society is 
a welfare state tradition, in the sense that a welfare state is: 
“the institutional framework under which the state assumes responsibility for 
the basic welfare of citizens and applies policies, operationalized via legislation, 
to that end. Social security, health, housing, and education are its main areas of 
provision. It is particularly associated with the meeting of basic needs; and it 
thus operates as a redistributive mechanism for the inequalities that occur under 
a market economy”.334 
This chapter identifies and analyses the underpinnings for the welfare policies in 
ancient China that provided for the elderly. The chapter provides examples of actual 
government policies that have the effect of law in the different dynasties and periods. 
Section 4.2 identifies the sources of the theoretical discussion in China’s Confucian 
literature.  
Section 4.3 makes the case that policies made according to the Confucian governance 
philosophies of looking after the elderly performed the functions of laws. The policies 
formed part of the traditional Chinese “institutional framework”.335 These policies 
were in the form of Li rules, and in this section the function of Li rules within the ancient 
Chinese governance framework were compared to those of the western connoation of 
law through a simple constructive exercise. The exercise takes into consideration the 
core concepts originally developed by Weber 336  to aid the understanding of the 
function of Li rules as an unfamiliar concept. Section 4.4 explains the role of the 
Sovereign in the traditional Chinese “institutional framework”.  
                                                 
334 Cane P and Conaghan J, ‘Welfare State’, The New Oxford Companion to Law, 
<http://www.oxfordreference.com.ezproxy1.library.usyd.edu.au/view/10.1093/acref/9780199290543.001.0001/acr
ef-9780199290543-e-2323> (23 May 2014). 
335 Above note 334.  
336 Weber M, Economy and Society an Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Roth G & Wittich C, eds, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1978).  
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Section 4.5 focuses on the discussion of filial piety as a principle in the Li rules and 
presents examples of policies in the tradition of government provided welfare for the 
elderly. Filial piety is the principle that regulated looking after the elderly, and it played 
the pivotal role in establishing the Chinese policy tradition where the State looks after 
the elderly. Section 4.6 concludes this chapter showing that this traditional basis still 
exists within the PRC, which means that funding from general revenue could be utilised 
to fund Old-Age Pensions. 
4.2 Theoretical Sources Informing the Chinese Tradition for 
the Government to Look after the Elderly  
The Confucian literature that forms the theoretical framework of the Chinese policy 
tradition to look after the elderly by governments is discussed in this section. It also 
introduces the historical records reviewed to gather policy examples on looking after 
the elderly in this tradition. 
The texts reviewed are: the Book of Rites,337 History of the Han Dynasty338 and History 
of the Later Han Dynasty,339 Book of Songs,340 Mencius,341 Confucian Analects,342 
Xunzi, 343  Guanzi, 344  Bai Hu Tong Yi, 345  Book of Filial Piety, 346  Zhou Rites, a 
                                                 
337 《礼记》Book of Rites, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_23.aspx> (2 Nov. 2015).  
338 《汉书》History of the Han Dynasty, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_40.aspx> (2.Nov 2015). 
339 《后汉书》History of the Latter Han Dynasty, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_41.aspx> (2.Nov 2015). 
340 《诗经》Book of Songs, <http://so.gushiwen.org/gushi/shijing.aspx> (2.Nov 2015). 
341 《孟子》Mencius, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_11.aspx> (2.Nov 2015). 
342 《论语》Confucius, Analects, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_2.aspx> (2 Nov.2015). 
343 《荀子》Xunzi, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_30.aspx> (2.Nov 2015). 
344 《管子》Guanzi, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_34.aspx> (2.Nov 2015). 
345 《白虎通义》Bai Hu Tong Yi, <http://www.zwbk.org/MyLemmaShow.aspx?lid=108203> (2.Nov 2015). 
346 《孝经》Book of Filial Piety, <http://www.zwbk.org/MyLemmaShow.aspx?lid=76030> (2.Nov 2015). 
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collection of Qin wooden tablets and bamboo strips that recorded Qin Dynasty laws,347 
and a collection of Han Dynasty bamboo strips that recorded Han Dynasty laws.348 
The Book of Rites349 is a Confucian work written by Confucius’ students in the Warring 
States period (475 – 221 BC). The book has forty-nine chapters that describe and 
explain the rites and rituals in existence before the Qin Dynasty, including social norms, 
political organisations, ethics, politics and religion. It is a collection of Li rules, which 
are essential rules for the sovereign to regulate people’s behaviour in China. The Book 
of Rites350 is one of the books officials were required to read before they could pass351 
the public service exams. In most dynasties, it was a component of the essential 
readings that were part of the books of governance in ancient China’s Li framework. 
The chapters from the Book of Rites352 analysed for this research are Conveyance of 
Rites (Li Yun),353 Meaning of Sacrifices (Ji Yi),354 Patterns of the Family (Nei Ze),355 
Black Robes (Zi Yi),356 Royal Regulations (Wang Zhi),357 Summary of the Rules of 
Propriety (Qu Li),358 King Wen as Son and Heir (Wen Wang Shi Zi),359 and Meaning 
of the Drinking Festivities in the Districts (Xiang Yin Jiu Yi).360 Out of these chapters, 
                                                 
347 髙恒, 《秦汉简赎中法制文书辑考》, 北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 2008 年. Gao H, Collected and 
Annotated Documents on the Legal System from Qin and Han Dynasty Bamboo Strips, (Beijing: Social Sciences 
Literature Press, 2008); and 睡虎地秦墓竹简整理小组, 《睡虎地秦墓竹简》, 北京: 文物出版社, 1978 年. 
Shuihudi Qin Tomb Bamboo Strips Cleaning Team, Shuihudi Qin Tomb Bamboo Strips, (Beijing: Antiques Press, 
1978). 
348 朱红林, 《张家山汉简〈二年律令〉集释》, 北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 2005 年. Zhu H, Collected and 
Annotated Zhangjiashan Han Dynasty Bamboo Strips (Second Year Codes), (Beijing: Social Sciences Literature 
Press, 2005); and 髙恒, 《秦汉简赎中法制文书辑考》, 北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 2008 年. Gao H, 
Collected and Annotated Documents on the Legal System from Qin and Han Dynasty Bamboo Strips, (Beijing: 
Social Sciences Literature Press, 2008). 
349 Above note 337. 
350 Above note 337.  
351 A student could sit the exams, but there were non-exam record keeping mechanisms to make sure they have 
read the required readings before they could pass the exams. Without reading them, examinees received 
conditional passes. 
352 Above note 337. 
353 《礼运》, ‘Li Yun’ in above note 337.  
354 《祭义》, ‘Ji Yi’ in above note 337.  
355 《內则》, ‘Nei Ze’ in above note 337. 
356 《缁衣》, ‘Zi Yi’ in above note 337.   
357 《王制》, ‘Wang Zhi’ in above note 337.  
358 《曲礼上》、《曲礼下》, ‘Qu Li I & II’ in above note 337.   
359 《文王世子》, ‘Wen Wang Shi Zi’ in above note 337.  
360 《乡饮酒义》, ‘Xiang Yin Jiu Yi’ in above note 337. 
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Li Yun361 details the Confucian governing ideals and the Confucian perception of 
history; Ji Yi362 contains worship rituals; Nei Ze363 regulates the role of women and 
the family; and Wang Zhi364defines the role of the sovereign and identifies systems on 
how the sovereign should behave. 
The History of the Han Dynasty365 and the History of the Later Han Dynasty366 were 
court histories of the Han Dynasty. They serve as an authoritative source in relation to 
the nature of the policies on looking after the elderly that existed in the Han Dynasty 
(202 BC – 220 AD).  
The Han was the first dynasty in which a formal written history of important events 
was kept. This court history contains four types of history books: Annals (Ji),367 
Chronological Tables (Biao),368 Treatises (Zhi),369 and Biographies (Zhuan).370 The 
Annals are histories of an emperor’s reign; the Chronological Tables list the important 
people and events of different periods. The Treatises detail the different laws in the 
different Chinese forms, that is, Li, Fa, Xing and Zhi.371 Biographies are histories of 
the lifetime of a famous person, usually this person was a high level government 
minister or general.  
Later dynasties continued the tradition began in the Han dynasty of recording formal 
histories. Two Treatises featured prominently in most court histories. They are the 
                                                 
361 《礼运》, ‘Li Yun’ in above note 337. 
362 《祭义》, ‘Ji Yi’ in above note 337. 
363 《內则》, ‘Nei Ze’ in above note 337. 
364 《王制》, ‘Wang Zhi’ in above note 337. 
365 Above note 338. 
366 Above note 339. 
367 纪. 
368 表. 
369 志. 
370 传. 
371 礼、法、刑、制. See 陈剩勇, 《法、礼、刑的属性(上)——对中国“法律”史研究方法论的一个反思》, 
Chen S, ‘The Character of Fa, Li, and Xing (I) – Reflections on the Methodologies for Researching the History of 
“Law” in China’, (2002) Zhejiang Social Science (5) 49; and 陈剩勇, 《法、礼、刑的属性(下)——对中国“法
律”史研究方法论的一个反思》, Chen S, ‘The Character of Fa, Li, and Xing (II) – Reflections on the 
Methodologies for Researching the History of “Law” in China’, (2002) Zhejiang Social Science (6) 56. 
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Treatise on Food and Money (Shi Huo Zhi),372 and the Treatise on Punishment and 
Law (Xing Fa Zhi).373 The Treatise on Food and Money records the economic and 
agricultural policies of their time. The Treatise on Punishment and Law (Xing Fa Zhi)374 
are records of the laws and punishments of their time. 
The Book of Songs375 is the oldest collection of songs and poems, and it was written 
between the western Zhou Dynasty (1046 – 771 BC) and the Spring and Autumn and 
Warlords periods (770 – 221 BC). The songs and poems collected were folk songs, 
court songs or religious songs, and are important because they record how people lived 
at the time.  
The Confucian Analects376 is a summary of guiding Confucian Li principles written by 
the students of Confucius.377 The book records, posthumously, the discussions between 
Confucius and his students on a variety of topics. They have become part of the Li rules 
of ancient China, covering morality, individual and family ethics, politics, ceremony 
and rules of governance. Contemporary Chinese legal scholars go as far as saying that 
the Li rules in the body of Confucian literature represent the “Constitution” of ancient 
Chinese dynasties.378 Confucius and his students proposed that a gentleman379 firstly 
should improve his morals380 and learn to be benevolent;381 secondly he should control 
                                                 
372 《食货志》, ‘Shi Huo Zhi’ in above note 338. 
373 《刑法志》, ‘Xing Fa Zhi’ in above note 338. 
374 《刑法志》, ‘Xing Fa Zhi’ in above note 338. 
375 Above note 340. 
376 Above note 342. As a record of dialogue, the book was written in spoken style, making it lively and interesting 
to read. 
377 Confucius (551-479BC). 
378 For example, 张千帆, 《传统与现代：论“礼”的宪法学定性》, Zhang, Q ‘Confucianism and 
Constitutionalism: A Characterization of Li as a Constitution of Society’, (2001) Jinling Law Review 119. 
379 君子 (Junzi, pronounced as j’oon zzz). “Gentleman” is the English word that is the closest to the meaning of 
the Chinese term. There is an additional layer of meaning in Junzi, he is a learned man who behaves according to 
Confucian principles. 
380 修身. 
381 仁. 
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and teach his family well;382 finally, when governing, he should give the country 
fairness according to Confucian Li rules.383 
Mencius384 is a collection of anecdotes and conversations of Mencius (372-289 BC), a 
Confucian thinker, and one of Confucius’385 later students.386 The book focuses more 
on the major governance issue at the time of Mencius’s life – how a sovereign should 
behave benevolently. This governance issue was vital for the sovereigns in each of the 
ancient Chinese periods, especially after DONG Zhongshu387 convinced Han Emperor 
Wu (157 – 87 BC) to select Confucian method 388  as the governance philosophy. 
Confucian method means that the governing principles and contents of the laws are 
Confucian, but they are implemented according to legalist methods. Legalist methods 
refer to how laws should be implemented according to the legalist school of thought, 
which focused on the importance of the black letter of the law - Fa, and that they should 
be strictly implemented.389 
Mencius opined that the most important thing in a nation is its people, then the nation 
itself, and the least important thing is the sovereign.390 Mencius believed the sovereign 
was the sovereign because the people gave him their collective decision making 
                                                 
382 齐家. 
383 治国,平天下. 
384 Above note 341. 
385 Confucius (551 – 479 BC). 
386 In the ancient Chinese tradition, “student” means more than the direct teacher-student relationship. It is a 
relationship similar to that between father and son. It refers to a tradition of generations within a school of thought, 
where the student may be a student of the original master’s student, his student’s student, his male descendant’s 
student, etc. 
387 Dong Zhongshu (179 -104BC) was a courtier in the Han Dynasty. By his suggestion, the Han Emperor Wu 
decided to “Dismiss the hundred schools, revere only the Confucian method” (罢黜百家, 独尊儒术). After that, 
the Confucian method became the dominant political system in ancient China. 
388 儒术. 
389 For a discussion of the Legalist school, see Chen J, Chinese Law: Context and Transformation, (Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), at 14-16; and Fung Y, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy – A Systematic 
Account of Chinese Thought From Its Origins to the Present Day, Bodde D, ed, (New York: The Free Press, 
1976), at 155-165. 
390 民为贵,社稷次之,君为轻. 
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rights,391 so the sovereign needed to act in a righteous392 way. This was the earliest 
idea of highlighting the people’s opinions as part of governance ideology in ancient 
China, where the sovereign had to consider and follow the will of the people in order 
to successfully prosecute his reign.  
Xunzi393 is a book written by XUN Kuang,394 a Confucian scholar after Mencius. In 
addition to Mencius’s earlier assumption that people were born good, XUN Kuang 
argued that men may have inborn sinful tendencies that needed to be curbed through 
education and rituals. He believed that ethical norms rectified the wants, hates and lusts 
that are part of human nature,395  and suggested that humans should obey natural 
regulation by the heavens.396 As a result, besides the importance of benevolence and 
righteousness, Li and Fa397 are also necessary as regulations.  
Guanzi398 is the collected works of GUAN Zhong (725 – 645 BC), who was a courtier 
in the Spring and Autumn period. GUAN Zhong’s Book of Filial Piety399 is a book on 
the importance of filial piety, and how filial piety was to be practiced. These proposed 
filial piety practices were part of the civil laws of all dynasties.  
The Zhou Rites400 is a book on the roles and functions of officials, detailing what each 
type of official did or should be doing. It was influential to the policy design of all later 
dynasties.  
                                                 
391 Up to this point, Mencius’s view on sovereign is similar to that of Hobbes in Leviathan. Hobbes T, Leviathan, 
Gutenberg EBook of Leviathan: <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm> (26 Oct. 2015). 
392 义. 
393 Above note 343. 
394 313-238 BC. He was a Confucian thinker after Mencius. 
395 生而有好利焉、生而有疾恶焉、生而有耳目之欲,有好色焉. Above note 343. 
396 天行有常. Above note 343. 
397 法 
398 Above note 344. 
399 Above note 346. 
400 《周礼》Zhou Rites, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_24.aspx> (2.Nov 2015). 
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4.3 The Legal Functions of Li Rules that Regulated Caring for 
the Elderly in China 
The ideal of looking after the elderly is an aspect of governing according to Li rules in 
ancient China. Li is the set of governance principles used by ancient Chinese emperors 
since the Han Emperor Wu (157 – 87 BC) adopted DONG Zhongshu’s401 suggestion 
to govern strictly according to Confucian methods.  
The Li rules were the general rules people had to follow according to their status in 
society. Governing according to Li rules is a governance philosophy based on 
Confucian ideals and legalist methodology – Fa as the method to implement the 
philosophy. Two essential concepts of this governance philosophy are: 
1) The requirement that people (including the sovereign) need to act according to 
their station in life, if not, there are sanctions; and  
2) There are standards of behaviour for each person.  
Station in life refers to two things – status in society and status in the family. In this 
governance philosophy, the sovereign needs to behave according to his station in life.  
4.3.1 Li as Described in Ancient Chinese Literature 
In the Chinese dynasties, Li was a systematic body of rules presented by the sovereign 
that the people complied with.402 It reflected the benevolent governance philosophy in 
Confucian thought.403 Li does not just have a cultural aspect, it attracted sanctions. For 
                                                 
401 《孝经》Book of Filial Piety, <http://www.zwbk.org/MyLemmaShow.aspx?lid=76030> (2.Nov 2015). 
402 王礼湛、贺国锋,《“礼治秩序”与现代社会控制》, Wang L & He G, ‘The Order under the Rule of Li and 
Modern Social Control’, (1995) 28 Journal of Zhejiang University (6) 52. 
403 Ibid.  
75 
 
example, in each dynasty, the welfare policies to look after the elderly attracted 
sanctions when they were not complied with, with the harshest penalty being death.404  
The Confucian school proposes to govern a country according to Li, where Li is 
promulgated by the sovereign. According to Xunzi,405 the reason for Li to exist is that 
people have wants, and those wants might not be satisfied; if not satisfied, people will 
seek satisfaction. 406  If there is no restraint in the search, then people compete. 
Competition leads to chaos, and chaos leads to poverty.407 The making of Li allows for 
order, where people may seek satisfaction according to order.408 
In ancient China, Li is a system of order.409 It regulates the morals in society, customs 
in the community, relationships, conflict resolution, education, governance of the 
                                                 
404 See 《户律》, ‘Hu Lv’ in 朱红林, 《张家山汉简〈二年律令〉集释》, 北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 2 0 
0 5 年. Zhu H, Collected and Annotated Zhangjiashan Han Dynasty Bamboo Strips (Second Year Codes), 
(Beijing: Social Sciences Literature Press, 2005), at 211; “奚诟詈之, 罚金一斤” 《敦煌悬泉汉简贼律》, ‘Dun 
Huang Xuan Quan Han Bamboo Strip Zei Lv’ in 高恒, 《秦汉简赎中法制文书辑考》, 北京: 社会科学文献出
版社, 2 0 0 8 年. Gao H, Collected and Annotated Documents on the Legal System from Qin and Han Dynasty 
Bamboo Strips, (Beijing: Social Sciences Literature Press, 2008), at 45; 《李杜列传》, ‘Li Du Lie Zhuan’ in 
above note 339; 《告律》, ‘Gao Lv’, in 朱红林, 《张家山汉简〈二年律令〉集释》, 北京: 社会科学文献出
版社, 2 0 0 5 年. Zhu H, Collected and Annotated Zhangjiashan Han Dynasty Bamboo Strips (Second Year 
Codes), (Beijing: Social Sciences Literature Press, 2005), at 100; 《法律答问》, ‘Q & A on Laws’in Qin Tomb 
Bamboo Strips Cleaning Team, Shuihudi Qin Tomb Bamboo Strips, (Beijing: Antiques Press, 1978), at 111; and 
《贼律》, ‘Zei Lv’ in 朱红林, 《张家山汉简〈二年律令〉集释》, 北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 2 0 0 5 年. 
Zhu H, Collected and Annotated Zhangjiashan Han Dynasty Bamboo Strips (Second Year Codes), (Beijing: Social 
Sciences Literature Press, 2005), at 38-39 & 43; [唐] 杜佑撰, 王文锦校: 《通典》, 北京: 中华书局, 1 9 8 8 
年. [Tang Dynasty], Du Y, Tong Dian, Wang W, ed, (Beijing: Zhonghua Press, 1988), at 4288;《奏谳书》, ‘Zou 
Zian Shu’ in 朱红林, 《张家山汉简〈二年律令〉集释》, 北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 2 0 0 5 年. Zhu H, 
Collected and Annotated Zhangjiashan Han Dynasty Bamboo Strips (Second Year Codes), (Beijing: Social 
Sciences Literature Press, 2005), at 31; 《宗室四王三侯列传》, ‘The Four Kings and Three Dukes of the Royal 
Family Zhuan’ in above note 339; and 《奏淑书》, ‘Zou Shu Shu’ in 朱红林, 《张家山汉简〈二年律令〉集
释》, 北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 2 0 0 5 年. Zhu H, Collected and Annotated Zhangjiashan Han Dynasty 
Bamboo Strips (Second Year Codes), (Beijing: Social Sciences Literature Press, 2005), at 227;《奏淑书》, ‘Zou 
Shu Shu’ in 朱红林, 《张家山汉简〈二年律令〉集释》, 北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 2 0 0 5 年. Zhu H, 
Collected and Annotated Zhangjiashan Han Dynasty Bamboo Strips (Second Year Codes), (Beijing: Social 
Sciences Literature Press, 2005), at 227;《秦始皇本纪》, ‘Records of Emperor Qin Shi Huang’s Reign’ in in 
《史记》Records of the Grand Scribe, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_5.aspx> (2 Nov. 2015)404； “七十
以上告子不孝, 必三环之。三环之各不同日而尚告, 乃听之”《贼律》, ‘Zei Lv’ in 朱红林, 《张家山汉简
〈二年律令〉集释》, 北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 2 0 0 5 年. Zhu H, Collected and Annotated Zhangjiashan 
Han Dynasty Bamboo Strips (Second Year Codes), (Beijing: Social Sciences Literature Press, 2005), at 38-39. 
405 “礼起于何也? 曰：人生而有欲,欲而不得,则不能无求,求而无度量分界,则不能不争。争则乱, 乱则穷。
先王恶其乱也,故制礼义以分之,以养人之欲,给人之求。……是礼之所起也。” , 《王制》, ‘Wang Zhi’ in 
above note 343. 
406 “礼起于何也? 曰：人生而有欲,欲而不得,则不能无求,” ,《王制》, ‘Wang Zhi’ in above note 343. 
407 “…求而无度量分界, 则不能不争。争则乱,乱则穷。”, 《王制》, ‘Wang Zhi’ in above note 343. 
408 “…先王 恶其乱也, 故制礼义以分之, 以养人之欲, 给人之求”, 《王制》, ‘Wang Zhi’ in above note 343. 
409 “礼者, 人 道之极也”；“夫礼, 天之经也, 地之义也, 民之行也。”, 《礼论》, ‘Li Lun’ in above note 343. 
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country, keeping of armies, behaviour of officials and worship.410 Therefore Li is the 
standard of behaviour between people. It covers three areas: system, morality, and 
rituals and etiquettes. The Li system includes some criminal laws (especially on what 
amounts to criminal behaviour and how to identify crimes)411 and other governing 
rules applied by the sovereign to govern the country, which cannot and should not be 
changed easily.412 It covers rules on naming a family, property, feudal relationships 
and establishing official responsibilities; 413 ancestor worship rituals of the sovereign 
and of the people;414 economic policy415 and many other areas of policies.416  
The Li system also established a judicial process. There were five hearing processes, 
eight discussion processes, three questioning processes, three defences and three 
pardons.417 These processes were applied differently to different types of criminal and 
civil proceedings, depending on the person’s relationship to the suit and status in society.  
Li as morals focus more on the side of society that is covered by civil law in western 
countries. These are regulations on people’s behaviour depending on their status in 
society and their relationship between each other. It supports the self-regulation of one’s 
                                                 
410 “道德仁义, 非礼不成；教训正 俗, 非礼不备；分争辩讼, 非礼不决；君臣上下、父子兄弟, 非礼不
定；宦学事师, 非礼不亲；班朝治军、莅官行法, 非礼威严不行；祷祠祭祀、供给鬼神, 非礼不诚不庄”, 
《曲礼》, ‘Qu Li’ in above note 337. 
411 The more specific written criminal law are detailed in Xing, as penal codes. 
412 “礼以体政, 政以正民, 是以政成而民听, 易则生乱。”, 《桓公二年》, ‘Second Year of Duke Heng’ in 
《左传》Zuo Zhuan, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_19.aspx> (8 Nov. 2015); and “礼, 经国家, 定社稷, 
序民人, 利后嗣者也。”《隐公十二年》, ‘Twelfth Year of Duke Yin’ in《左传》Zuo Zhuan, 
<http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_19.aspx> (8 Nov. 2015). 
413 “惟王建国, 辨正方位, 体国经野, 设官分职, 以为民极。乃立天官冢宰,使帅其属而掌邦治,以佐王均 邦
国。治官之属……” in《周礼》Zhou Rites, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_24.aspx> (2.Nov 2015). 
414 “王者諦共祖之所自出夕以其祖配之而立四廟……礼不王不禘。”, 《丧服小记》, ‘Sang Fu Xiao Ji’ in 
above note 337. 
415 “冬, 京师来告饥。公为之请成籴于宋、卫、郑,礼也。”《隐公六年》, ‘Sixth Year of Duke Yin’ in《左
传》Zuo Zhuan, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_19.aspx> (8 Nov. 2015); and “凡侯伯救患、分灾、讨 罪, 
礼也。”, 《僖公元年》, ‘First Year of Duke Xi’ in《左传》Zuo Zhuan, 
<http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_19.aspx> (8 Nov. 2015). 
416 For more detail, please see above note 420. 
417 “《周官》有五听、八议、三刺、三宥、三赦之法。五听：一曰辞听, 二曰色听, 三曰气听, 四曰耳听,
五曰目听。八议：一曰议亲, 二曰议故, 三曰议贤, 四曰议能, 五曰议功, 六曰议贵, 七曰议勤, 八曰议
宾。三刺：一曰讯群臣, 二曰讯群吏, 三曰讯万民。三宥：一曰弗识, 二曰过失, 三曰遗忘。三赦: 一曰幼
弱, 二曰老眊, 三曰蠢愚”, 《刑法志》, ‘Xing Fa Zhi’ in above note 338. For more detail, please see above note 
420. 
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behaviour and for one to regulate others, in order to follow the behaviour patterns set 
for that person in their station in life. The earlier discussion of benevolence and filial 
piety fall into this meaning of Li. Social sanctions and sanctions in other forms are 
prescribed in relation to each type of ritual or relationship.  
Li as rituals deals with rituals in relation to every event in a person’s lifecycle and events 
in the country’s calendar, and the changes to a person’s role in their lives. These rituals 
formalise standards of behaviour, with sanctions if not fulfilled.418 The events included 
worshiping of ancestors, starting of battles, farming, education, birth, weddings, death, 
etc. Depending on the person’s station in life, rituals differ; the higher the station in life, 
the more rules a person was required to follow.419  
4.3.2 The Legal Function of Li Rules that Regulated Looking after the 
Elderly 
There were different bodies of rules that performed the function of modern laws in 
ancient China,420 and Li421 was one of these bodies of rules. The other bodies of rules 
were Fa, Xing and Zhi.422  
When translating and introducing De I’Esprit des Lois by Montesquieu,423 YAN Fu,424 
a famous Chinese scholar and translator of the early 20th Century, warned the Chinese 
legal community that “law” in the west includes the meaning of Li, Fa, Xing and Zhi.425 
                                                 
418 《大宗伯》, ‘Da Zong Bo’ in《周礼》Zhou Rites, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_24.aspx> (2.Nov 
2015). 
419 Ibid.  
420 陈剩勇,《法、礼、刑的属性(上)——对中国“法律”史研究方法论的一个反思》, Chen S, ‘The Character 
of Fa, Li, and Xing (I) – Reflections on the Methodologies for Researching the History of “Law” in China’, (2002) 
Zhejiang Social Science (5) 49, at 50. 
421 礼。 
422 法、刑、制。 
423 Above note 420.  
424 Above note 420. 
425 礼、法、刑、制。 
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In essence, YAN Fu’s warning was that what the west regards as law is captured in all 
four bodies of rules. Each alone did not paint a full picture. Fa means the different 
forms of written laws,426 such as rules, codes, regulations, customs, and methods. Xing 
means punishment. Zhi is system, especially legal system. 427  The meaning and 
functions of Li are more nuanced as evaluated below.  
The Li rules, philosophical in nature, functioned as laws, the requirements from the Li 
rules meant that the rules regulating people’s behaviour according to their station in life 
are their legal obligations. A brief social construction analysis428 supports this point. 
The meaning and function of Li rules are compared to the western conception of law 
and its functions, showing that the meaning and function of Li rules that regulated 
looking after the elderly performed the functions of laws in the ancient Chinese formal 
institutional framework.  
4.3.3 Constructive Methodology to Understand the Function of Li Rules 
The function of Li rules is an unfamiliar concept. Often the starting point of 
understanding an unfamiliar concept is to find a point of reference in the form of a 
familiar concept. Social scientists usually apply constructivist/interpretivist 429 
qualitative methodologies to understand unfamiliar concepts as phenomena. 430 
Whether the Li rules performed the functions of law in the ancient Chinese formal 
institutional framework is a question that has received much attention. This section 
                                                 
426 舒国滢主编, 《法理学导论》, Shu G, ed, Introduction to Jurisprudence, (Beijing: Peking University Press, 
2006). 
427 Above note 420, at 51. 
428 Creswell JW, Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design, Choosing Among Five Approaches, 2nd ed, (US: Sage 
Publications, 2007). 
429 Ibid, 47-48. 
430 Id, 60-62 & 78-81. 
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illustrates the more generally accepted431 funcitons of Li rules through a simple social 
construction exercise that takes into consideration the core elements important to Weber 
when he first developed his interpretive sociology.432  
This social construction exercise is by no means comprehensive and sociological 
research in relation to the law that are based on Weber’s theories have evolved 
extensively. Weber’s original core concpets are however still useful to illustrate the 
similarities between concepts in comparative studies. These core concepts are 
Verstehen, social action, meaning, and ideal type. 433  They contribute 434  to 
understanding meaning of an unfamiliar concept by setting a familiar term as 
benchmark to construct or interpret meaning of that unfamiliar concept. These four 
concepts are also relatively less contentious when applied to understanding legal 
concepts. 435  In this exercise, the familiar concept used as the benchmark is the 
functions of the western connotation of “law”. 
The first concept in this social construction exercise is “Verstehen”. When translated 
into English, Verstehen means understanding. It is an analytical and methodological 
tool436 Weber used to interpret social action through ideal types.  
There are two types of understanding:437 
                                                 
431 For example, Peerenboom R, ed, Judicial Independence in China: Lessons for Global Rule of Law Promotion, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Peerenboom R, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
432 Above note 336. 
433 Above note 336. 
434 For example, Luhmann N & Behnke K, ‘The Modernity of Science’, (1994) 61 New German Critique (Winter) 
9; Dessler D, ‘Constructivism within a Positivist Social Science’, (1999) 25 Review of International Studies (1) 123. 
435 See Roger Cotterrell, The Sociology of Law, An Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 1992) 149, where 
Cotterrell considered it to be Weber’s attempt to “Combine a positivist conception of law, in harmony with the 
general view of German jurists of his day, with an insistence on the notion that sociology’s concern is with 
understanding social action – that is, action subjectively meaningful to the actor and oriented to or taking account of 
the behaviour of others”. 
436 See Oakes G, ‘The Verstehen Thesis and the Foundations of Max Weber’s Methodology’, (1977) 16 History 
and Theory (February) 11; and Tucker WT, ‘Max Weber’s “Verstehen”’, (1965) 6 The Sociological Quarterly 
(Spring) 157. 
437 Above note 336, at 8. 
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1) “the direct observational understanding of the subjective meaning of a given act 
as such, including verbal utterances”. To Weber, both rational facts and emotive 
feelings are observable, therefore can be objectively understood; 
2) “explanatory understanding”, whereby the motive of the actor is ascertained. 
The second concept is “social action”. Weber viewed social action as something that 
the “acting individual” is able to attach to his behaviour a subjective meaning. This 
subjective meaning could relate to the behaviour overtly, covertly, by omission or by 
acquiescence; the Self constructs this subjective meaning by internalising his/her 
surroundings.438 This surroundings include the environment and other people. The 
social action for this exercise is the unfamiliar concept – the functions of Li rules, 
especially when they are applied in regulating the behaviour of people in the ancient 
Chinese dynasties. 
Weber devised four ways to understand social actions. 439  Instrumentally rational 
(zweckrational in German) understanding is  
“determined by expectations as to the behaviour of objects in the environment and 
of other human beings; these expectations are used as ‘conditions’ or ‘means’ for 
the attainment of the actor’s own rationally pursued and calculated ends”. 440 
The actor understands their surroundings with reference to other things, and takes action. 
Value-rational (wertrational in German) understanding is  
“determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, 
aesthetic, religious, or other form of behaviour, independently of its prospects of 
success”. 441  
                                                 
438 Above note 336, at 8. 
439 Above note 336, at 24-25. 
440 Above note 336, at 24-25. 
441 Above note 336, at 24-25. 
81 
 
The actor understands their surroundings independently through their own value/belief 
systems, then takes action. Value may be assumed when pragmatists perform analysis. 
Affectual rational understanding is “determined by the actor’s specific affects and 
feeling states”.442 This could be viewed as taking into consideration emotions. The 
actor understands their surroundings through feeling, and acts intuitively.  
Traditional understanding is “determined by ingrained habituation”. 443  The actor 
understands and acts according to habit. 
The third concept is “meaning”.444 It is a concept that links Verstehen and social action. 
Weber defined meaning in two ways:445 
1) “the actual existing meaning in the given concrete case of a particular actor” or 
“the average or approximate meaning attributable to a given plurality of actors”;  
2) “the theoretically conceived pure type of subjective meaning attributable to a 
hypothetical actor or actors in a given type of action”. 
The first type of meaning is observable, and could be empirically tested. The second 
type of meaning is abstract, requiring the Self to construct according to his or her 
surroundings.  
The fourth concept is “ideal type”.446 Weber used ideal types to analyse social actions. 
The “ideal type” is a construction of a “purely rational course of action” which “has the 
merit of clear understandability and lack of ambiguity”.447 The researcher conveniently 
takes away the emotionally emphatic or irrational out of the social action, in order to 
                                                 
442 Above note 336, at 24-25. 
443 Above note 336, at 24-25. 
444 Above note 336. 
445 Above note 336, at 8. 
446 Above note 336. 
447 Above note 336, at 6. 
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perform their analysis. 448  Weber does not place actual predominance of rational 
elements in human life, 449  therefore, the ideal type takes into consideration the 
objective elements of a social action. The “ideal type” is the benchmark to understand 
the unfamiliar concept. For this exercise, it is the regulatory functions of the western 
connotation of “law”. 
This section aims to evaluate the meaning and functions of Li rules in the governance 
of ancient Chinese dynasties, against the meanings and functions of the modern 
meaning of “law” in the west. The social action to be understood is the function of Li 
rules, and an ideal type of “law” needs to be constructed. 
4.3.4 Comparing the Funcitons of Li Rules to Laws 
For the purposes of this research, there are three elements of the ideal type of “law”. 
These elements are: Weber’s sociological concept of law, a comparison between the 
meaning of the English word “law”, and its closest Chinese translation “法” (Fa), and 
Fuller’s450 conception of the Rule of Law.  
4.3.4.1 Weber’s Sociological Concept of Law 
When conceptualising law, Weber distinguishes between the legal and sociological 
question, hence establishing that law in society is a relationship between law and 
economics.451 The legal question is: “what is intrinsically valid as law?”, and this is a 
normative question of “what meaning ought to be attributed in correct logic to a verbal 
pattern having the form of legal proposition?”.452 The sociological question is: “what 
                                                 
448 Above note 336, at 6. 
449 Above note 336, at 7. 
450 Fuller LL, The Morality of Law, (New Haven: Yale University Press, revised ed, 1968), at 46-91. 
451 Above note 336, at 311. 
452 Above note 336, at 311-312. 
83 
 
actually happens in a group owing to the probability that persons engaging in social 
action, especially those exerting a socially relevant amount of power, subjectively 
consider certain norms a valid and practically act according to them, in other words, 
orient their own conduct towards these norms?”.453  
The legal question is an “ought” question in relation to norms, the sociological question 
relates to an “is” question relating to a sense of positivity.454 The sociological question 
in essence asks about the functions of law. This research focuses on the sociological 
question to identify the functions of Li in the ancient Chinese society. 
To Weber, as long as coercion or a coercive apparatus is able to enforce compliance 
with some legal norms, those legal norms can be considered as “law”.455 Prima facie, 
because the sovereign and other members of the state are educated according to Li 
classics, the other three types of rules - Fa, Xing, and Zhi were made according to the 
Li concepts, and the Li rules attracted sanctions, the Li rules were coercive, and the 
available judicial procedure456 meant Li rules were enforceable.  
In Weber’s own understanding of law, the ideal type represent “guaranteed laws”.457 
Here the coercion may be “physical or psychological”, “direct or indirect in their 
operation”, and “maybe directed” “against the participants in the consensual group”, 
the organisation, or the institution, within which the “order is empirically valid, or they 
may be aimed at those outside”. 458  Legal coercion by violence to Weber is the 
monopoly of the State,459 this is a way for the State to ensure enforcement of its 
                                                 
453 Above note 336, at 311-312. 
454 Burger T, ‘Max Weber, Interpretive Sociology, and the Sense of Historical Science: A Positivistic Conception 
of Verstehen’ (1997), 18 The Sociological Quarterly 165. 
455 Above note 336. 
456 See above note 417. 
457 Above note 336, at 312-315. 
458 Above note 336, at 313. 
459 Above note 336, at 314. 
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authoritative decisions through applying penalties and sanctions to those who do not 
comply. 460  The State can make and enforce laws through any of its organs. The 
administration of Li rules in ancient China accords with this means of coercion.  
When applying the ideal type to understand Li, it could be seen that Li rules were 
promulgated through the volitions of the sovereign – the sovereign being the emperor461, 
not a parliament such as that in the Westminster tradition. 462  The Li rules were 
intelligible to the people, as they understood their station in life, therefore they knew 
which rules apply to themselves. Since the people understood their station in life, the 
rules were able to avoid impossible demands and frequent changes – the Li rules were 
collected in books that were the basis of a person’s education,463 and they don’t change. 
There were institutions and persons to administer these rules – ancient China had a 
sophisticated system of public servants to help maintain rules of order, Li being one 
element of those rules. The dynasties had Li Ministries, which were in charge of rituals 
and educating how people should behave according to their social status. 
Legitimacy is another concept in Weber’s ideal type of law. To Weber, legitimacy is 
acquired in relation to domination. Before considering domination, it is necessary to 
consider the term “legitimate order” in relation to social action.464 In a typology of this 
legitimate order, Weber distinguishes between Convention and Law.465 An order is a 
convention “so far as its validity is externally guaranteed by the probability that 
deviation from it within a given social group will result in a relatively general and 
                                                 
460 Wallner J, ‘Legitimacy and Public Policy: Seeing Beyond Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Performance’, (2008) 
Policy Studies Journal 421, at 423. 
461 Or the other forms of noblemen, such as the Duke for a Dukedom. 
462 ‘Westminster system’ in Nygh PE, & Butt P, eds, Butterworths Australian Legal Dictionary, (Sydney: 
Butterworths, 1997), at 1265.  
463 The fundamental books are: the Book of Rites, Zhou Rites, and Etiquette. Above notes 337, 400 and《礼仪》, 
‘Etiquette’ in above note 339. 
464 Above note 336, at 31. 
465 Above note 336, at 33-34. 
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practically significant reaction of disapproval”. An order is a law “if it is externally 
guaranteed by the probability that physical or psychological coercion will be applied 
by a staff of people in order to bring about compliance or avenge violation”.466 The 
Ministries in the ancient Chinese dynasties and the officials in the civil service had the 
power to administer Li rules and apply sanctions accordingly, therefore Li rules 
exhibited characteristics of law, not those of customs. 
The legitimacy of regulation by Li can be guaranteed467 if it could be guaranteed 
according to the value-rational sense of legitimacy – “determined by the belief in the 
absolute validity of the order as the expression of ultimate values of an ethical, esthetic 
or of any other type”;468 and where the expectation of specific external effects or 
interest situations469 are considered. Since Li rules were part of the Confucian method 
and a major component in the education of officials, their absolute validity can be 
ascertained in the Confucian belief and political system. 
The specific external effects that can be expected here is the expected compliance and 
administration of Li rules. As Weber considers dominance as the basis for legitimacy,470 
the sovereign who proclaimed the importance of Li did dominate in ancient Chinese 
society, giving Li rules legitimacy.  
The next step in the Weberian functional analysis of Li rules is to examine whether it 
had legal authority. To Weber, legal authority rests on the acceptance of the validity of 
“mutually inter-dependent ideas”.471 The Li rules were established by imposition by 
the sovereign through the Confucian method of governance. They were established on 
                                                 
466 Above note 336, at 34. 
467 Above note 336, at 33. 
468 Above note 336, at 33. 
469 Above note 336, at 33. 
470 Above note 336, at 215-216. 
471 Above note 336, at 217-218. 
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grounds of value-rationality, and they could claim the obedience of the people through 
the Confucian belief and political system.  
The Li rules were a consistent system of abstract rules contained in the Li books 
mentioned in the literature review. They were intentionally established by the sovereign. 
The administration of the Li rules were by self-regulation and the regulation of others 
(including by the sovereign through his court and the system of officials). This self-
regulation and regulation of others equated to consistent administration of Li rules. The 
rules of administration were also part of the Li rules.  
As the sovereign himself had to behave like the sovereign according to Li rules, 
therefore he was “subject to an impersonal order by orienting his actions to it in his own 
dispositions and commands”. The clear distinction of people’s stations in life allowed 
people to obey Li rules as individual members of the society. What they obeyed were 
the rules, and the sovereign as an entity, not a particular person. Therefore Li rules 
certainly had legal authority. Accordingly, since Li exhibited characteristics of the 
identified ideal type of “law”, it is legitimate and had the force of law. 
The type of legal authority exhibited by Li rules was rational legal authority.472 With 
reference to Li, four categories are relevant: 
1) “a continuous rule-bound conduct of official business”. Li as a body of rules 
meet this criteria. 
2) “A specific sphere of competence” – jurisdiction: 
                                                 
472 Above note 336, at 218. 
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a) “a sphere of obligations to perform functions which has been marked off 
as part of a systematic division of labor” – here, the officials administered 
Li rules. 
b) “the provision of the incumbent with the necessary powers” – the 
sovereign had powers.473  
c) “The necessary means of compulsion are clearly defined and their use is 
subject to definite conditions”. There is an “administrative organ” or 
“agency” which exercises authority organised in this manner. In the case 
of Li, this is the ancient Chinese civil service system. 
3) “The organization of offices follows the principle of hierarchy”, “there is a 
right to appeal and of statement of grievances from the lower to the higher”. 
The judicial process in relation to Li rules followed this process.  
4) “the rules which regulate the conduct of an office may be technical rules or 
norms”. This was met for Li. The officials had their own rules of Li according 
to their stations in life.  
Finally, Weber also stressed the importance of looking at legal authority through 
examining monocratic bureaucracy, which is the purely bureaucratic type of 
administrative organisation, 474  where the two “spirits” of rational bureaucracy – 
formality and from a utilitarian point of view, the exercising of their functions by 
officials, contribute to understanding rational legitimacy.475 It is not difficult to see, 
that rational authority existed in the texts of the body of Li rules.  
                                                 
473 As discussed earlier with regard to sovereignty as argued by Hobbes. 
474 Above note 336, at 223-226. Also see an analysis of Weber’s legitimacy in relation to constitutions in Fallon 
RH Jr., ‘Legitimacy and the Constitution’ (2005)118 Harvard Law Review 1787, at 1795-1796 & 1843 – 1844. 
475 Above note 336, at 226. 
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It is clear, according to Weber’s own conception of law, Li rules performed the social 
functions of “law” in ancient China.  
4.3.4.2 The Dictionary Meaning of “Law” vs “法” (Fa) 
YAN Fu’s warning476 about the scope of “law” in the west illustrates the importance 
of a functional understanding of Li and the other three types of rules in China. The 
second element of the ideal type of law to evaluate the meaning and functions of Li in 
China is to identify the difference between the meaning of “law” in English, and its 
closest Chinese translation “法” (Fa). 
A modern dictionary meaning of “law” in the west is provided by the Macquarie 
Dictionary:477 
“noun 1.the principles and regulations emanating from a government and 
applicable to a people, whether in the form of legislation or of custom and 
policies recognised and enforced by judicial decision. 
2.any written or positive rule of conduct, or collection of rules, prescribed 
under the authority of the state or nation, whether by the people in its 
constitution, as the organic law, or by the legislature in its statute law, or by 
the treaty-making power, or by municipalities in their ordinances or by-laws. 
3.the controlling influence of such rules; the condition of society brought 
about by their observance: to maintain law and order. 
4.the institutions and persons collectively responsible for the administration of 
the legal rules, or an agent that helps maintain the rules. 
5.a system or collection of such rules. 
6.the department of knowledge concerned with these rules; jurisprudence: to 
study law. 
7.the body of rules and legal principles concerned with a particular subject or 
derived from a particular source: commercial law; the law of torts. 
8.an act of the supreme legislative body of a state or nation, as distinguished 
from the constitution. 
9.the principles applied in the courts of common law, as distinguished from 
equity. 
10.the profession which deals with law and legal procedure: to practise law. 
11.legal action; litigation. 
                                                 
476 Above note 420. 
477 Macquarie Dictionary, Online, <https://www-macquariedictionary-com-
au.ezproxy2.library.usyd.edu.au/features/word/search/?word=law&search_word_type=Dictionary> (09 Apr. 
2014). 
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12.any rule or principle of proper conduct or collection of such rules. 
13. Aboriginal English Aboriginal customary law. 
14. (in philosophical and scientific use) 
 a.a statement of a relation or sequence of phenomena invariable under  the 
same conditions. 
 b.a mathematical rule. 
15.a commandment or a revelation from God. 
16. (often upper case) a divinely appointed order or system. 
17. Bible the five books of Moses (the Pentateuch) containing this system and 
forming the first of the three Jewish divisions of the Old Testament 
18. the preceptive part of the Bible, especially of the New Testament, in 
contradistinction to its promises: the law of Christ…” 
This definition takes consideration of the different understanding of what law is. The 
first nine items and items 11 and 12 contribute to an understanding of what the law is 
from the perspective of positive law.478 Positivist theories look at the lowest common 
denominator of what law is. They treat legislation as created without regard to cultural 
norms, nor religious or ethical bias.479 Bentham began the argument480 by presenting 
a utilitarian view of law: 
 “a law may be defined as an assemblage of signs declarative of a volition 
conceived or adopted by the sovereign in a state, concerning the conduct to be 
observed in a certain case by a certain person or class of persons, who in the 
case in question are or are supposed to be subject to his power: such volition 
trusting for its accomplishment to the expectation of certain events which it is 
intended such declaration should upon occasion be a means of bringing to pass, 
and the prospect of which it is intended should act as a motive upon those whose 
conduct is in question”.481 
The essence of this argument is that laws are signs of the sovereign’s volition in relation 
to conducts of people in his/her reign. The connotation of sovereignty differs in 
different legal and political traditions, but the existence of a sovereign482 is always 
required for the positivists. Bentham’s utilitarian argument was furthered by John 
                                                 
478 Freeman MDA, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 8th ed, 2008). 
479 Himma, K, ‘Legal Positivism’, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Online, 
<http://www.iep.utm.edu/legalpos/> (3 May. 2014). 
480 Bentham J, excerpt of ‘Of Laws in General (Hart ed (1970))’ in above note 478, at 273 - 291. 
481 Above note 478, at 273. 
482 See Above note 520 and associated discussion.  
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Austin,483 who pursued the view that it was a sovereign body that created laws, which 
are commands that were supported by sanctions. This created a society whereby, so 
long as the majority of individuals followed the commandments, the sovereign reigned.  
The definition of Fa could be found in the writings of the legalist thinkers.484 The 
legalist school of thought485 focused on the more rigid side of Fa, that people needed 
rules to regulate their activities.486 Fa has three levels of meaning.  
First, Fa means standards and methods the sovereign could apply in order to take 
ownership of the land and govern the country.487 To Mozi488-- a representative of the 
Legalist school,489 there are methods and standards to do everything, including how to 
be a minister or a general and how craftsmen produce their craft. 490  When these 
methods and standards are not followed, people will argue, resulting in the loss of 
productivity, the same happens when the sovereign governs the country not according 
to methods or standards. 491  Guanzi also talked about Fa as the standards and 
measurements that one should follow492, and it is how nature behaves, just like the 
seasons rotate, the stars do not change and the sun rises in the morning.493  
                                                 
483 Austin J, excerpt of ‘The Province of Jurisprudence Determined’ in above note 478, at 291-303. 
484 Above note 389. 
485 法家. 
486 For example, 《任法》, ‘Ren Fa’ in above note 344. 
487 准则,法仪。 
488 Circa 479—381BC. 
489 See above note 389 
490 “天下从事者不可以无法仪, 无法仪而其事能成者无有也。虽至士之为将相者,皆有法,虽至百工从事者,
亦皆有法。百工为方以矩, 为圆以规, 直以绳, 正以悬。无巧工不巧工,皆以此四者为法……”, 《法仪》, 
‘Fa Yi’ in 《墨子》Mozi, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_29.aspx> (2 Nov. 2015); “法者, 天下之仪
也。”, 《禁藏》, ‘Jin Zang’ in above note 344; “法者, 天下之程式也, 万事之仪表也。”, 《明治》, ‘Ming 
Zhi’ in above note 344; and “如四时之不忒, 如星辰之不变, 如宵如昼如阴如阳如日月之明曰法。”, 《正》, 
‘Zheng’in above note 344. 
491 “……今大者治天下, 其次治大国, 而无法所度, 此不若百工, 辩也。”, 《法仪》, ‘Fa Yi’ in《墨子》
Mozi, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_29.aspx> (2 Nov. 2015). 
492 “法者, 天下之程式也, 万事之仪表也。”. Here measurements means how a person measures his or her 
conduct according to the behaviour standards of their station in life. See《明治》, ‘Ming Zhi’ in above note 344.  
493 “如四时之不忒, 如星辰之不变, 如宵如昼, 如阴如阳, 如日月之明, 曰法。”. 《正》in above note 344. 
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Second, Fa is the legal system and measures that give the sovereign the authority to 
rule.494 Rules, codes and processes together form a system that the sovereign can apply 
to control his people. To GUAN Zhong, laws are the ultimate reasons that allow the 
sovereign to rule the people and the sovereign makes these laws to give the people rules 
to follow.495 These rules allow the sovereign to stop foul play in the reign, and give the 
people a behaviour standard.496  
Third, it is the actual laws, the rules, codes, procedures themselves, which are 
established by the sovereign and the people together.497 Often, Fa is also taken to mean 
punishments or criminal law. This should be the meaning of Xing, which is included in 
Fa.498  
Fa is an important element of positive law in ancient China, but it is only the methods 
to govern the reign, it is more procedural. The scope of “law” in the English dictionary 
meaning also covers two other types of rules in ancient China, Xing, which were the 
penal codes, and Zhi, which is the form of the legal system.  
In relation to this element of the ideal type, Li rules were the content and spirit of the 
law in ancient China, sohey also performed the function of laws. 
4.3.4.3 Fuller’s Formal Approach to the Rule of Law 
There has been a lengthy debate on whether the Rule of Law exists in China. In recent 
times, the consensus appears to be that the thin or formal notion of the Rule of Law 
                                                 
494 法度. 
495 “法者, 天下之至道也。……法者, 上之所以 一民使下也。”. 《任法》, ‘Ren Fa’ in above note 344. 
496 “法度者, 主之所以制天下而禁奸邪也。”, 《明法》, ‘Ming Fa’ in 344; and “法度者, 万民之仪表也”, 
《形势》, ‘Xing Shi’ in above note 344. 
497 法令. “畏法令也。”, 《曲礼上》, ‘Qu Li I’ in above note 337; and “法令者, 君臣之所共立也。”《七臣七
主》, ‘Seven Rules for the Servant and Seven Rules for the Master’ in above note 344. 
498 Above note 420; and 陈剩勇, 《法、礼、刑的属性(下)——对中国“法律”史研究方法论的一个反思》, 
Chen S, ‘The Character of Fa, Li, and Xing (II) – Reflections on the Methodologies for Researching the History of 
“Law” in China’, (2002) Zhejiang Social Science (6) 56-62. 
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does exist.499  The notion of the Rule of Law is not important for evaluating the 
functions of Li rules in ancient China. The elements that contributed to the meaning of 
law in the Rule of Law however contribute to the ideal type of law in the west. Fuller’s 
theory500 is taken to be a formal approach to the Rule of Law, that is, a “monist” 
approach that does not distinguish the Rule of Law as a political ideal with reference to 
the meaning of the law.501 This research considers the eight elements established by 
Fuller, 502  namely, Generality, 503  Promulgation, 504  Prospectivity, 505  Clarity, 506 
Consistency,507 Practicable,508 Stability509 and Congruence.510 
Fuller’s Generality is a very broad concept, it is the lowest common denominator in “a 
system for subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules” – that “there must be 
rules”.511 Whether the rules were fair or not is not important. 
As to Promulgation, Fuller considers “marginal utility”.512 Promulgation of laws are 
essential, and “law” needs to be distinguished from “generally shared views of right 
and wrong”513, this requirement is more easily met in common law systems due to the 
coincidence of these terms. Also, if the law corresponds closely with the morals of 
                                                 
499 See the numerous books and articles written by Randall Peerenboom and Albert Chen. For example, 
Peerenboom R, ed, Judicial Independence in China: Lessons for Global Rule of Law Promotion, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010); Peerenboom R, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002); Chen AHY, ‘The Discourse of Political Constitutionalism in Contemporary 
China in Chiu A& Xu Z, eds, World Chinese Legal Philosophy Congress 2013, (Hong Kong: Red-Publish, 2013) 
18; and Chen AHY& Ginsburg T, eds, Public Law in East Asia (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013).  
500 Above note 450, at 46-91. 
501 Bennett M, ‘‘“The Rule of Law” means literally what it says: the Rule of the Law’: Fuller and Raz on formal 
legality and the concept of law”’, (2007) 32 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 90, at 90-92. 
502 Above note 450, at 46-91. 
503 Above note 450, at 46-48. 
504 Above note 450, at 49-51. 
505 Above note 450, at 51-62. 
506 Above note 450, at 63-65. 
507 Above note 450, at 65-70. 
508 Above note 450, at 70-79. 
509 Above note 450, at 79-81. 
510 Above note 450, at 81-91. 
511 Above note 450, at 46. 
512 Above note 450, at 49. 
513 Above note 450, at 50. 
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society, promulgation becomes less important. For there to be promulgation, it is not 
necessary for all citizens to know and read them, the law just needs to be knowable.  
Fuller’s view on Prospectivity, 514  or not having retrospective laws is based on 
distinguishing three aspects: pure retrospective laws that make yesterday’s lawful act 
unlawful today (especially in the criminal sense), those laws that are retrospective to 
cure a wrong, and retrospective decision making by judges. The last two forms of 
retrospectivity are less internally amoral. 
Fuller distinguishes clarity and the use of ordinary language. 515  For example, the 
standards of “good faith” “due care” or “reasonableness” are clear to Fuller, because 
they are generally understood in their context. 
Consistency, or in Fuller’s own words “contradictions in the laws” 516 depends on the 
context or extrinsic circumstances. Fuller distinguishes logical contradictions, 
incompatible requirements, and repugnant laws – those that “fight each other”, and 
“inconvenient laws”. Law needs to be practicable and stable are self-explanatory. To 
Fuller “Congruence between official action and declared rule” 517  depends on 
interpretation and the role of the judiciary. 
The core concept of the rule of Li is that people, including the sovereign, needed to act 
according to their stations in life; and there were penal codes in relation to not 
complying with these Li rules.  
Li rules were certainly rules in a system of governance. They were properly 
promulgated, because they were knowable. Li rules were also closely aligned with 
                                                 
514 Above note 450, at 50. 
515 Above note 450, at 50. 
516 Above note 450, at 65. 
517 Above note 450, at 81. 
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proper behaviour, because they act as behaviour guides. The penal codes were the only 
rules that changed, so Li rules themselves were stable. They are clear because there 
were Li classics every educated man or official were required to learn as part of their 
education. The adjudicating bodies interpreted the rules and applied the penal code 
accordingly, therefore there was congruence. The Li rules themselves were prospective, 
because they regulated future behaviour. It is worth noting that their stability meant Li 
rules were part of the social fabric in ancient China. Sometimes the penal codes could 
be retrospective in all three different ways discussed by Fuller. The Li rules were also 
practicable, because they had been stably in practice through history. Consistency is the 
element that requires more caution. Education, examination and wars meant social 
mobility was possible in ancient China, this meant when the person’s station in life 
changed, Li rules and their penal codes were less consistent for the person and their 
family, until they readjusted to their new station in life. Li rules had the social functions 
of laws in ancient Chinese society. 
4.3.4.4 Summary 
Li rules formed the majority of rules that regulated filial piety and looking after the 
elderly in the Chinese dynasties. The ideal type of “law” was used to evaluate the 
meaning and functions of Li rules in the Chinese governance regime. Weber’s concept 
of law, the comparison between the scope of “law” in English and Fa in the legalist 
writings, and Fuller’s elements of the Rule of Law were taken to be elements in the 
ideal type. Comparing Li rules to the ideal type makes the case that the Li rules that 
regulated filial piety and looking after the elderly performed the functions of laws. The 
Chinese tradition of looking after the elderly by the State was part of the institutional 
framework that governed ancient China. It was not just a philosophical tradition.  
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4.4 The Role of the Sovereign in the Li Rules that Regulated 
Care for the Elderly 
In the ancient Chinese tradition of the State looking after the elderly, the Li rules 
regulating the Sovereign played a significant role.  
4.4.1 The Sovereign’s518 Standard of Behaviour  
The standard of behaviour for the sovereign in the ancient Chinese dynasties was 
“benevolence”.519 The sovereign was obliged to behave accordingly, as his status in 
society was that of the sovereign.  
4.4.1.1 Defining “Sovereign” 
In this research, the choice of the word “sovereign” was made with reference to the 
meaning Hobbes attributed to the word in his Leviathan.520 In the Confucian literature 
on looking after the people, the reference to the ruler was nearly identical as the 
Hobbesian connotation of “sovereign”. By placing the meaning of sovereignty in its 
international law context, Krasner 521  identified three elements of sovereignty, 
“International legal sovereignty”, “Westphalian/Vattelian Sovereignty” and “domestic 
                                                 
518 The word “sovereign” has a neutral connotation. The thinkers referred to in this research wrote at different 
times. Their sovereign could be emperor, king, duke or nobleman of lesser titles. In the reign of Empress Wu 
Zetian (690 – 705) in the Tang Dynasty, the sovereign was an Empress. She was the only generally accepted 
female sovereign in Chinese history.  
519 仁. This Chinese character has been translated as benevolence, kindness and perfect virtue. For the purposes of 
identifying the standard of behaviour of the sovereign, benevolence is a better translation. Confucius (551 – 479 
BC) in the Analects talked about benevolence as loving others by controlling the self to behave according to Li 
rules, “樊迟问仁。子曰：‘爱人’。”又“克己复礼为仁。一日克己复礼, 天下归仁焉。”. 《颜渊》, ‘Yan 
Yuan’in 《论语》, Confucius, Analects, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_2.aspx> (2 Nov.2015). Confucius 
also taught that the sovereign is one who has good morals and is benevolent, “以德行仁者王”. 《雍也》, ‘Yong 
Ye’ in 《论语》, Confucius, Analects, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_2.aspx> (2 Nov.2015). 
520 Hobbes T, Leviathan, Gutenberg EBook of Leviathan: <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-
h.htm> (26 Oct. 2015). 
521 Krasner SD, ‘The Hole in the Whole: Sovereignty, Shared Sovereignty, and International Law’, (2003-2004) 
25 Michigan Journal of International Law 1075, at 1075-1077. 
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sovereignty”. Hobbes’ account in Leviathan was one of the earlier western accounts of 
domestic sovereignty.  
Hobbes in Chapter XVIII of Leviathan522 identified twelve elements of the sovereign 
of a Commonwealth523 with reference to sovereign powers. People who assembled at 
the time of the institution of the State conferred these elements of sovereign powers 
onto the sovereign.  
First, because people have covenanted, they cannot change the form of government.524 
This covenant meant that automatically, the decisions made by the sovereign is law that 
all people have agreed to and are required to comply with. As people gave up 
sovereignty – the free will to do what they wanted to their body and possessions, these 
people agreed to be punished according to the laws; if the law is broken, they would be 
punishing themselves.525  
Second, “sovereign power cannot be forfeited”.526 This is to say that the sovereign is 
unable to give up the power to make decisions for the people as a whole because the 
people have covenanted to give him these powers, regardless of his will.527  
Third, “no man can without injustice protest against the institution of the sovereign 
declared by the major part”.528 Individuals who belong to the group that covenanted to 
institute the Commonwealth have given the sovereign the power to make decisions in 
the form of laws, so they have tacitly consented to the laws made by the sovereign. It 
doesn’t matter whether this particular individual disagrees with the choice of sovereign, 
                                                 
522 Above note 520. 
523 Above note 520. “Commonwealth” is the term used by Hobbes in Leviathan. This research hereon uses the 
words “commonwealth” and “state” interchangeably. 
524 Above note 520, in ch XVIII. 
525 Above note 520, in ch XVIII. 
526 Above note 520, in ch XVIII. 
527 Above note 520, in ch XVIII. 
528 Above note 520, in ch XVIII. 
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or disagrees with the laws made, he has agreed to be bound by these laws. Otherwise 
he would be “left in the condition of war he was in before”.529 In modern terms, he 
would have broken the law. 
Fourthly, “the sovereign’s actions cannot be justly accused by the subject”.530 The 
sovereign embodies the will of the people when making decisions concerning the 
subjects of the state. The subjects may be harmed by the sovereign’s decisions, but 
since it is the same as the subjects making decisions regarding themselves, the 
sovereign would not have been unjust when making those decisions. Harm to the 
subjects is a physical fact, unjust is a logical relationship between the sovereign and his 
subjects.  
This fourth point is very similar to the obligations of the sovereign in ancient China 
within its Li system. The sovereign needed to act benevolently, and to his best ability 
govern in a way that does not harm his subjects. He did not need to consider whether 
his actions are just, because as sovereign he has behaved according to the Li rules.  
Following from the logic of the fourth element, fifth, “whatsoever the sovereign doth 
is unpunishable by the subject”.531 Individuals cannot punish the collective will that is 
embodied in the sovereign, because they will be punishing themselves. 
Sixth, the sovereign makes judgement about the doctrines that his subjects are taught.532 
To Hobbes,533 actions proceed from opinion, therefore the content of the education of 
the subjects is important. Making decisions on what doctrines are to be taught meant 
the sovereign makes decisions regarding the ideology of the state, which in turn shapes 
                                                 
529 Above note 520, in ch XVIII. 
530 Above note 520, in ch XVIII. 
531 Above note 520, in ch XVIII. 
532 Above note 520, in ch XVIII. 
533 Above note 520, in ch XVIII. 
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the predominant culture in the state. In ancient China, the emperors as sovereign chose 
to govern according to Li. Therefore Confucian principles were the contents of the 
people’s education. 
Seventh, “the right of making rules, whereby the subjects may every man know what 
is so his own, as no other subject can without injustice take it from him”.534 The 
sovereign makes laws in relation to ownership and the distribution of wealth. These 
laws stop people from fighting for possessions. In ancient China, the sovereign was the 
ultimate owner of property.535 
Eighth, the sovereign has the “right of judicature and decision of controversy”.536 This 
right to make judgment takes away the necessity for private individuals to think about 
self-preservation.537 In ancient China, this “right of judicature” was represented by the 
different civil and criminal procedures that needed to be followed when matters were 
brought in front of an official or family elder. 
Ninth, the sovereign has the power to “make war, and peace, as he shall think best”.538 
The sovereign therefore is the head of the military, and has the monopoly on coercive 
power.539 
Tenth, the sovereign is the person who chooses “counsellors and ministers, both of 
peace and war”.540 These people help the sovereign govern the country by performing 
specific tasks.541  
                                                 
534 Above note 520, in ch XVIII. 
535 Above note 340. 
536 Above note 520, in ch XVIII. 
537 Above note 520, in ch XVIII. 
538 Above note 520, in ch XVIII. 
539 Above note 520, in ch XVIII. 
540 Above note 520, in ch XVIII. 
541 Above note 520, in ch XVIII. 
99 
 
Eleventh, the sovereign has the power to reward and punish in a way that he sees fit.542 
These rewards and punishments should in the best way encourage people to serve the 
Commonwealth. As discussed in Chapter XVII of Leviathan,543 humans are different 
from other social animals because honour is important to them, therefore the sovereign 
needs to consider honour or “ignominy”544 when deciding on the measure of rewards 
and punishments.  
Last, directly on the point of honour, the sovereign has power to bestow honours and 
orders on subjects.545  
In ancient times, the Chinese sovereign had the sovereign powers described by Hobbes. 
“All the land below heaven belongs to the Sovereign; all the people on the land are the 
Sovereign’s servants” 546  summed up the governance relationship between the 
sovereign and the people in ancient China. Note that the saying described what 
happened at the time – the ultimate power held by the sovereign as described became 
the State governance tradition in China. This mentality gave rise to governance 
philosophies that centred on the importance of the people – their livelihoods547 and 
their wishes.548 The sovereign had to look after his subjects during his reign, in order 
to behave according to the benevolence behaviour standard that he was subjected to.  
                                                 
542 Above note 520, in ch XVIII. 
543 Above note 520, in ch XVII. 
544 Above note 520, in ch XVIII. 
545 Above note 520, in ch XVIII. 
546 “普天之下, 莫非王土。率土之滨, 莫非王臣” .《小雅·谷风之什·北山》, ‘Xiao Ya · Gu Feng Zhi Shi · Bei 
Shan’ in《诗经》, Book of Songs, <http://so.gushiwen.org/gushi/shijing.aspx> (2.Nov 2015). 
547 民生. The concept of minsheng (people’s livelihoods) was first formally discussed as part of the benevolence 
teachings in the writings of Confucius and Mencius. Whereas Confucius taught about benevolence in general, 
Mencius taught specifically about looking after people’s livelihoods. 
548 民主. 
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4.4.1.2 The Philosophical Ideal Role of the Sovereign 
Looking after the elderly is an element of looking after People’s Livelihoods. Looking 
after People’s Livelihoods is an important aspect of benevolence as the standard of 
behaviour for the sovereign. These standards were part of the Li rules, therefore the 
sovereign’s behaviour standard of looking after the elderly were the sovereign’s legal 
obligations. That is, the policy tradition in China for the sovereign to look after the 
elderly through publicly funded programmes equated to a tradition of sovereign 
obligations to look after the elderly. 
The policy tradition to look after the people’s livelihoods in China started at least from 
the Zhou Dynasty (1024 – 249 BC), where policies and laws assisted the elderly, the 
poor, and people in times of famine. 
There is a clear philosophy behind looking after the population by the sovereign, who 
was the head of the government. Confucius referred to Da Tong549 - “the great unity”, 
and Xiao Kang550 – “well to do”. His student, Mencius, later addressed Minsheng551 – 
“the people’s livelihoods”. These three ideals represent the philosophical beginnings of 
the policy tradition to look after people’s livelihoods in ancient China. 
The great unity is a picture of a perfect world painted by Confucius – orderly and 
respectful.552 The social order in the picture was Chinese, but the orderly nature in this 
picture is not dissimilar to that painted by Sir Thomas More in Utopia,553 nor Plato’s 
                                                 
549 大同. Above note 331. 
550 小康. Above note 331. 
551 民生.  
552 Above note 332.  
553 More T, Utopia, Baker-Smith, trans, (London: Penguin Books, 2012). 
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Republic.554 The great unity is an ideal that even Confucius himself argued was not 
attainable. 
The sage described another ideal world that was attainable, since it was attained in the 
reigns of Emperors Yu555 and Tang556 in the myths and the Kings Wen,557 Wu,558 
Cheng559 and Duke Dan560 of the Zhou Dynasty.561 These six reigns were considered 
to be virtuous and saintly in the writings of ancient Chinese thinkers. This attainable 
ideal is Xiao Kang. Xiao Kang establishes:562 
Now the great Tao is in hiding, the world belongs to one family. Therefore, men 
loved only their own parents, treated as children only their own sons, exerted 
themselves only for their own gain and guarded their own wealth. The nobility 
passed down their titles, and this became Li to be followed, and towns were 
fortified. Etiquettes, rituals, orders and punishments were established as rules 
of standard behaviour, thereby the relationship between monarch and minister 
is formalised, father and son loved each other, brothers are friendly and husband 
and wife are harmonious, there are established systems, fields and land are 
divided, those who are brave and virtuous are respected, and merits were sought 
for the self. Therefore strategies are learnt and wars began. Yu of Xia, Tang of 
Shang, the Kings Wen, Wu and Cheng of Zhou and Duke Dan of Zhou are the 
best in their revered times. These six great wise men were virtuous at following 
Li. They exemplified the connotations of the Li system, and used them to check 
the trustworthiness of the people and their wrongful behaviour, issue 
punishments and rewards accordingly, and educated the people. When someone 
doesn’t follow the rules of Li, even if they are powerful, they are punished and 
the people know to view their behaviour as wrong. This is called Xiao Kang. 
This is a world of order according to the rules of Li. 
                                                 
554 Bloom A, trans, The Republic of Plato, (Sydney: HarpersCollins Publishers, 1968). 
555 禹. Emporor Yu lived in the mythical times in China’s history. He was the first sovereign of the Xia Dynasty 
(circa 21st Century – 16th Century BC). 
556 汤.Emperor Tang lived in the mythical times in China’s history. He was of the first sovereign of the Shang 
Dynasty. (Circa 1670 – 1587 BC).   
557 1152 – 1056 BC. 周文王. 
558 Circa 1087 – 1043 BC. 周武王. 
559 1055 – 1021 BC. 周成王. 
560 周公旦.Born circa 1100. 
561 1046 – 771 BC. 
562 Author’s translation. “今大道既隐, 天下为家。各亲其亲,各子其子,货力为已。 大人世及以为礼,域郭沟
池以为固,礼义以为纪,以正君臣,以笃父子,以睦兄弟,以和夫妇,以设制度,以立田里,以贤勇知,以功为已。 故
谋用是作,而兵由此起。禹、汤、文、武、成王、周公由此其选也。 此六君子者,未有不谨于礼者也。以着
其义, 以考其信, 着有过, 刑仁讲让, 示民有常。 如有不由此者,在埶者去,众以为殃。是谓小康”. 《礼
运》, ‘Li Yun’in 《礼记》Book of Rites, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_23.aspx> (2 Nov. 2015). 
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The concept of minsheng563 (people’s livelihoods) was first formally discussed as part 
of the benevolence teachings in the writings of Confucius and Mencius. Whereas 
Confucius taught about benevolence in general, Mencius taught specifically about 
looking after people’s livelihoods.  
Confucius opined that people should treat the sovereign as the heart of the reign, and in 
turn the sovereign should treat the people as the body of the reign. To Confucius, as the 
court songs recorded -- there were days when the sovereign was honourable and spoke 
clearly, so the nation was peaceful, towns were built and the people lived well.564 If 
one wanted the nation to be built, one would not dare be dishonourable and work his 
people too hard. This personification of the relationship between the sovereign and the 
people meant that benevolence by the sovereign was in the best interest of the sovereign. 
As Mencius pointed out, the sovereign should govern with policies that were beneficial 
to the people to gain their support. 565  Later on, GUAN Zhong summarised the 
importance of people’s livelihoods in Confucian thought -- the people needed to be 
materially satisfied before they could be taught Li.566 
Policies that give people relief from hardship were very important to secure their 
livelihoods.567 The idea of people’s livelihoods as part of benevolent policies included 
four types of policies: “securing the people’s basic living standards”,568 “giving wealth 
                                                 
563 民生. 
564 子曰：“民以君为心,君以民为体。心庄则体舒, 心肃则容敬, 心好之身必安之。君好之,民必欲之。心以
体全, 亦以体伤。君以民存,亦以民亡。诗云：‘昔吾有先正,其言明且清。国家以宁, 都邑以成, 庶民以生。
谁能秉国成,不自为正,卒劳百姓……”.《缁衣》, ‘Zi Yi’, in above note 337. 
565 孟子曰：“得天下有道：得其民,斯得天下矣；得其民有道：得其心,斯得民也；得其心有道：所欲与之
聚之,所恶勿施,尔也。” .《离娄上》, ‘Li Lou I’ in above note 341. 
566 “仓廪实而知礼节, 衣食足而知荣辱”. Above note 344. 
567《离娄上》, ‘Li Lou I’ in above note 341. 
568 保民. 
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to the people and hiding wealth with the people”,569 “educating the people”,570 and 
“having fun with the people”.571 
To secure people’s basic living standards,572 the sovereign should make sure that the 
people have enough seeds in spring for a sufficient harvest in autumn, if not the 
government should offer supplements.573 To allow people to have enough when they 
were living and when they die,574 the sovereign should give the people production 
advice -- planting their crop in the right seasons (for food and clothing), farming fish, 
and collecting timber at the right time (so they have enough timber for coffins)575, 
thereby allowing the sovereign to look after the people in their old age and at other 
times of need.576 A continuation of these policies should allow the sovereign to give 
wealth to the people and hide wealth with the people.577 Hiding wealth with the people 
refers to allowing the people to accumulate wealth that leads to the building of a tax 
base for the sovereign to collect extra fiscal revenue, when the need arises. 
One policy proposal by Mencius to give wealth to the people and hiding wealth with 
the people was the square fields system to allow for private and public food 
                                                 
569 富民, 藏富于民. 
570 教民. 
571 与民同乐. 
572 《梁惠王上》、《梁惠王下》, ‘King Hui of Liang I’ & ‘King Hui of Liang II’ in above note 341. 
573 “春省耕而补不足, 秋省敛而助不给”.《梁惠王下》, ‘King Hui of Liang II’ in above note 341.  
574 Death is traditionally an important aspect of a person’s life in China. The ancient Chinese believed in an 
afterlife, ancestor worship is part of this belief. A person needed to be buried with respect. Most of the time, 
coffins were built out of timber, it was therefore important to plan for the timber and other burial ritual necessities 
when one is alive. Ancient Chinese governments accounted for death in their welfare polices targeted at the 
elderly. 
575 “不违农时, 谷不可胜食也；数罟不入夸池, 鱼鳖不可胜食也；斧斤以时入山林, 材木不可胜用也。谷
与鱼鳖不可胜食,材木不可胜用,是使民养生丧死无憾也。养生丧死无憾, 王道之始也。”.《梁惠王上·寡人
之于国也》, ‘The role of the monarch to the nation in King Hui of Liang I’ in above note 341.  
576 “五亩之宅, 树之以桑, 五十者可以衣帛矣。鸡豚狗彘之畜,无失其时,七十者可以食肉矣。百亩之田, 勿
夺其时, 数口之家, 可以无饥矣；谨庠序之教, 申之以孝悌之义, 颁白者不负戴于道路矣。七十者衣帛食
肉,黎民不饥不寒,然而不王者,未之有也。狗彘食人食而不知检, 涂有饿莩而不知发, 人死, 则曰: ‘非我也, 
岁也’。”; and “是何异于刺人而杀之, 曰: ‘非我也, 兵也?’ 王无罪岁, 斯天下之民至焉。”. 《梁惠王上·寡
人之于国也》,‘The role of the monarch to the nation in King Hui of Liang I’ in above note 341.  
577 《梁惠王上·寡人之于国也》,‘The role of the monarch to the nation in King Hui of Liang I’ in above 
note341.  
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production.578 This was a farming and irrigation system where each piece of farmland 
was divided into nine squares, with the harvest from the middle square taken as taxes.579 
Farmers were obligated to farm the public land first, then farm their private land. This 
requirement meant necessary irrigation works were the obligation of the sovereign. As 
farmers needed to farm the public land collectively, it is likely that they would farm 
each other’s land together, allowing for the possibility of a harvest that leads to 
savings.580  
Educating the people included teaching them the importance of Li and morals.581 
Having fun with the people to Mencius was a simple ideal that referred back to the 
times of the six great wise men,582 where the sovereign shared with the people their 
entertainment.583  
XUN Kuang continued this Confucian tradition when advising sovereigns to look after 
their reign and ascertain people’s livelihoods. He described the sovereign as a boat, and 
peasants as water. The water can float the boat, it can also sink the boat.584 A real king 
gives wealth to the people. A dominating lord only gives to officials; a barely surviving 
country gives only to the powerful; and a country going to ruin gives only to the ruling 
family’s purse.585 If the sovereign only kept wealth in their own purse, the people will 
                                                 
578 “夫仁政必自经界始, 经界不正, 井地不均, 谷禄不平, 是故暴君汙吏必慢其经界。经界既正,分田制禄,
可坐而定也。... 方里而井,井九百亩,其中为公田。八家皆私百亩, 同养公田, 公事毕, 然后敢治私事”. 
《滕文公上》, ‘T’ang Wan Kung’ in above note 341.  
579 《滕文公上》, ‘T’ang Wan Kung’ in above note 341. “夫仁政” 
580 《滕文公上》, ‘T’ang Wan Kung’ in above note 341.   
581 “善政不如善教之得民也。 善政,民畏之；善教,民爱之。善政得民财, 善教得民心。” 《离娄上》, ‘Li 
Lou I’ in above note 341. 
582 “贤者亦乐此乎？”.《梁惠王上·与民同乐》, ‘Having fun with the people in King Hui of Liang I’ in above 
note 341. 
583 “孟子见梁惠王。王立于沼上,顾鸿雁麋鹿,曰：‘贤者亦乐此乎？’”. For more detail, please see《梁惠王
上·与民同乐》, ‘Having fun with the people in King Hui of Liang I’ in above note 341. 
584 “君者, 舟也；庶人者, 水也。水则载舟,水则覆舟。”.《王制》, ‘Wang Zhi’ in 343《荀子》Xunzi, 
<http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_30.aspx> (2 Nov. 2015). 
585 “故王者富民, 霸者富士, 仅存之国富大夫, 亡国富筐箧, 实府库。”.《王制》, ‘Wang Zhi’ in 《荀子》
Xunzi, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_30.aspx> (2 Nov. 2015). 
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be poor; when both ends of the reign “leaks”, the people could neither defend, nor attack; 
the country would soon collapse.586  
XUN Kuang made it very clear that the sovereign needed to look after the people for 
the success of his reign, not just those close to him. His book Xunzi587 also included 
the metaphor that the relationship between the sovereign and the people is one of a 
water stream.588 The sovereign is the source, and the people form the stream. If the 
source is clear, the stream is also clear; if the source is muddy, the stream is also muddy. 
If the sovereign in power is not able to love the people and be benevolent to the people, 
but still asks for the people to love him, it is impossible to achieve. If the people do not 
love the sovereign, but the sovereign wants to use the people or wants the people to die 
for him, it is impossible to achieve. If the people cannot be used by the sovereign, or 
will not die for the sovereign, but the sovereign asks for a powerful army or a strong 
fort, it is impossible to achieve. If the army is not powerful, nor is the fort strong, but if 
the sovereign still asks for the enemy not to arrive, it is not possible to achieve. If there 
is nothing to stop the enemy when they come, but the sovereign asks for the reign to 
not come to an end, it is not possible to achieve.589 The sovereign needed to look after 
his people for his own success. 
To XUN Kuang, a person who is governing a country should aim to gain three things 
from the people – energy, life and good fame. The energy from the people will lead to 
wealth, the lives of the people will lead to strength, and good fame from the people will 
                                                 
586 “筐箧已富, 府库已实, 而百姓贫, 夫是之谓上溢而下漏, 入不可以守, 出不可以战, 则倾覆灭亡可立而
待也。” .《王制》, ‘Wang Zhi’ in 《荀子》Xunzi, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_30.aspx> (2 Nov. 
2015). 
587 Above note 343. 
588 “君者, 民之原也, 原清则流清, 原浊则流浊。故有社稷者而不能爱民,不能利民,而求民之亲爱己,不可得
也。民不亲不爱, 而求为己用, 为己死, 不可得也。民不 为己用,不为己死,而求兵之劲,城之固,不可得也。
兵不劲, 城不固, 而求敌之不至, 不可得也。敌至而求无危削,不灭亡,不可得也。”. 《君道》, ‘Jun Dao’ in 
above note 343. 
589 《君道》, ‘Jun Dao’ in above note 343. 
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lead to honour.590 Gaining these three things from the people meant the sovereign has 
behaved as the sovereign should, and all that is beneath heaven would belong to him. 
The reign would go to ruin if he has not gained these three things from the people.591 
4.5 Promotion of Filial Piety – Looking after the Elderly 
The promotion of filial piety and its associated policies were part of the Li rules 
framework in the governance by the sovereigns of the dynasties. Filial Piety is the 
central Confucian idea that informed the policy tradition in China to look after the 
elderly. It played a pivotal role in policy formation in the dynasties.  
The concept of filial piety was an important component of both the Li and Fa rules of 
the dynasties -- Li as a system of rituals that had binding force in relation to civil matters; 
and Fa as a system of codes that had binding force and attracts criminal sanctions. Filial 
piety policies were important people’s livelihoods policies of each dynasty, 
contributing significantly to the ancient Chinese welfare framework. 
In ancient China, many esteemed Confucian scholars have written about filial piety -- 
Xiao592 (pronounced see’ao) by treating it as a focal point of State governance. These 
writers were informed by the practices in the Zhou Dynasty,593 as two of the earliest 
Confucian books, the Zhou Rites and the Book of Rites were written through idealising 
Zhou practices.  
                                                 
590 “用国者, 得百姓之力者富, 得百姓之死者强, 得百姓之誉者荣。三得者具而天下归之,三得者亡而天下
去之；天下归之之谓王,天下去之之谓 亡。” 《王霸》, ‘Wang Ba” in above note 343. 
591 《王霸》, ‘Wang Ba” in above note 343. 
592 孝. 
593 1046 – 256BC. 
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4.5.1 Western Zhou Policies to Look After the Elderly 
Real government policies that looked after the elderly began from the Western Zhou594 
era, where the welfare system for the elderly was based on a patriarchal bloodline that 
promoted the idea of “emphasising the parents and the elderly”. 595 These policies 
informed the writings of Confucius and thinkers in the Confucian tradition, including 
GUAN Zhong.  
The Western Zhou government promoted etiquettes and rituals (Li) in relation to 
looking after the elderly. These Li rules included dietary programmes for those who 
were above fifty, sixty, seventy, eighty and ninety respectively, 596  whereby the 
government promoted keeping better quality food for the elderly, and other rituals and 
etiquettes to support the elderly in their daily lives.597 
Practical government policies to look after the elderly were also in place. These policies 
included tax and forced labour598 policies, political priority policies and education 
policies. Yi was the levying of forced labour by Chinese governments. This was a non-
monetary form of per-capita taxation levied up till 1949. People, usually men, were 
required to perform compulsory labour, mostly to build infrastructure. The compulsory 
nature is similar to compulsory conscription, and during times of war, forced labour 
could mean conscription.  
In terms of tax and forced labour policies, the government exempted forced labour and 
taxes from the elderly at the age limit of sixty for those who lived in cities, and sixty-
                                                 
594 Circa 11th Century BC to 771 BC. 
595 “贵亲而尚齿”, 《祭义》, ‘Ji Yi’ in above note 337. 
596 “五十异粮, 六十宿肉, 七十戴膳, 八十常珍, 九十饮食不离寝。”《内则》, ‘Nei Ze’ in above note 337. 
597 《內则》, ‘Nei Ze’ in above note 337. For example, when a person reached ninety, the Li rules required that 
he should not need to leave the bed for meals. For those who were over seventy, there should be better clothing to 
keep them warm. The elderly should not carry heavy things when they travel. 
598 役, Yi pronounced “yee”. 
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five for those who lived in rural areas. 599  In terms of forced labour (including 
conscription), there were also policies to exempt the forced labour of sons of the elderly. 
For example, if the elderly person was over seventy, one son’s forced labour was 
exempted; if over eighty, two sons; over ninety, the whole family.600 
In relation to political priority, the government had mechanisms to raise the status of 
the elderly, such as giving honourable/noble titles to men who were over fifty.601 Also, 
the sovereign must visit his land, and during that visit, he must ask the elderly about 
their daily lives, this was part of the rituals to pay respect to the elderly and to alter their 
weaker social positions.602 There were already preferential policies for elderly officials 
in the Western Zhou era, including returning their posts603 and related policies.  
Returning the post was the ability for an official to request returning their duties to the 
emperor when they reached a certain age, for example, seventy.604 When these officials 
returned their posts, they were not entirely free from politics. The emperor often asked 
for their counsel when there were important events, as well as giving them titles (which 
included property for them to receive income) or an ex-gratia payment in-kind.605 
Other related benefits involved special provisions for those elderly officials who were 
still needed for active duties, such as rewards in gifts and providing them with 
conveniences such as seats, crutches, servants and carriages.606 
                                                 
599 “国中自七尺以上及六十, 野自六尺及六十有五, 皆征之” 《地官·乡大夫》, ‘Di Guan · Xiang Dai Fu’ in 
above note 400. 
600 “年七十以上, 一子无征”, “八十以上, 二子无征”, “九十以上, 尽家无征” 《入国》, ‘Ru Guo’ in above 
note 344. 
601 “五十而爵” 《王制》, ‘Wang Zhi’ in above note 337. 
602 《祭义》, ‘Ji Yi’ in above note 337. 
603 致仕或致政, meaning the returning of duties by officials to the emperor. 
604 “七十致政”《王制》, ‘Wang Zhi’ in above note 337. 
605 赏赐. 
606 “若不得谢, 则必赐之几杖, 行役以妇人, 安车适四方” 《曲礼上》, ‘Qu Li I’ in above note 337. 
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The criminal laws also had special treatment for the elderly because they have lived to 
that ripe old age.607 For example, the criminal law exempted the elderly from sentences 
that directly injured the body,608 any person over seventy would not be punished to 
slavery,609 and people above eighty were not sentenced.610 There were officials whose 
jobs were just to oversee cases involving the mistreatment of the elderly.611 Those who 
mistreated the elderly would be criminally punished, and officials who did not 
administer these punishments were also punished.612 
Education was an important part of social policy in ancient China. As early as the 
Western Zhou era, education as a means to promote looking after the elderly was 
already important. Policies included rituals and mass education campaigns. An example 
of rituals was when the emperor visited any school, the emperor had to perform a ritual 
that emphasises his respect to the elderly.613 This ritual included sacrifices made to 
earlier great teachers of the Confucian tradition,614 and banquets that included seats for 
the elders of the local area.615 The ritual that was performed most in the Western Zhou 
era was the village drinking ritual, where the treatment for people of different age 
groups were distinctively different, thereby teaching the masses the importance of the 
wisdom of the elderly and the importance of the elderly in society. 616  Education 
                                                 
607 “生日久乎”. 高恒, 《秦汉简赎中法制文书辑考》, 北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 2 0 0 8 年. Gao H, 
Collected and Annotated Documents on the Legal System from Qin and Han Dynasty Bamboo Strips, (Beijing: 
Social Sciences Literature Press, 2008), at 174. 
608 The five extreme sentences including tattooing the face, ear, back of the neck or arm; cutting off the nose; 
breaking the foot; castration; and death. 《刑法志》, ‘Xing Fa Zhi’ in above note 338. 
609“凡有爵者与七十者与未齿者, 皆不为奴。”《刑法志》, ‘Xing Fa Zhi’ in above note 338. 
610 “八十九十曰耄, 七年曰悼。悼与耄, 虽有罪, 不加刑焉。”《曲礼》, ‘Qu Li’ in above note 337. 
611 “掌不孝不弟之刑”《地官·大司徒》, ‘Di Guan ·Da Si Tu’ in above note 400. 
612 “以肺石远（达）穷民, 凡远近恂独老幼之欲有复于上, 而其长弗达者, 立于肺石, 三日, 士听其辞, 以
告于上而罪其长”《秋官·大司寇》, ‘Qiu Guan · Da Si Kou’ in above note 400. 
613 学中养老礼; and “凡视学, 必遂养老”.《文王世子》, ‘Wen Wang Shi Zi’ in above note 337.  
614 “释奠于先老” in 杨天宇注: 《礼记译注·文王世子》, 上海: 上海古籍出版社, 2 0 0 4 年; Yang T, 
annotated, Translated and Annotated Wen Wang Shi Zi of Book of Rites, (Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Text 
Publisher, 2004), at 256. 
615 “设三老、五更、群老之席位” 《文王世子》, ‘Wen Wang Shi Zi’ in above note 337. 
616 乡饮酒礼.《祭义》, ‘Ji Yi’ in above note 337. 
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campaigns included behaviour etiquette education by village elders to the masses, of 
which filial piety was an important element.617 
4.5.2 Filial Piety in Confucian Works 
Filial piety has a pivotal role in Confucian thought. It is the theoretical underpinning to 
people’s livelihoods policies that aimed to look after the elderly. Filial piety is therefore 
an important part of ancient China’s rigid and orderly society.  
In Confucius’s own words, looking after the elderly includes both maintaining the 
elderly,618 that is, physically looking after them; and respecting the elderly,619 that is, 
spiritually and psychologically looking after the elderly of one’s realm or in one’s 
family.  
After the Spring and Autumn Period620, each dynasty and period had policies to look 
after the elderly that were informed by GUAN Zhong’s writings and practices. GUAN 
Zhong’s621 work is the most significant in regards to filial piety as a principle in the Li 
rules.  
In his seminal work Guanzi,622 GUAN Zhong added to Confucian thinking on the 
concept of filial piety. Confucius referred to three important relationships: the 
relationships between the sovereign and his people, between father and son, and 
between husband and wife.623 Filial piety is based on the relationship between father 
                                                 
617 “孝、友、睦、姻、任、恤”六行.《地官·大司徒》, ‘Di Guan ·Da Si Tu’ in above note 400. 
618 养老. 《辞海》, Ci Hai, Online <http://cihai.supfree.net/> (5 Nov. 2015). 
619 敬老. Above note 342. 
620 770-476 BC. 
621 管仲 735－645 BC. 
622 Above note 344. 
623 “三纲者, 何谓也？谓君臣、父子、夫妇也。”.《三纲六纪》, ‘Three Relationships and Six Behaviour 
Codes’ in above note 345. See also, 《颜渊》, ‘Yan Yuan’ in above note 342. 
111 
 
and son. GUAN Zhong was the first to formalise the importance of these three 
relationships as behavioural rules.  
The connotation of filial piety included loving one’s parents, providing them with 
material sustenance, being kind to them and respect, obedience and servitude, 
especially by the children and their spouses.624 As a patriarchal society, the role of the 
daughter-in-law in ancient China was regulated along with that of sons.625  
The son and the daughter-in-law had a duty to look after elderly parents, otherwise as 
punishment, they would lose their livelihoods. They were required to supply their 
elderly parents with material goods. To GUAN Zhong, no matter how important or busy 
the personwas, whether they were officials, craftsmen or farmers, it was a crime not to 
maintain the elderly. This crime was also unpardonable.626 
In Mumin,627 GUAN Zhong discussed the four facets of governing a country: rituals, 
morals and etiquette – Li,628 righteousness – Yi,629 free from corruption – Lian,630 and 
a sense of shame – Chi.631 Only Li and Yi are discussed here. Li in this context refers 
to seven behaviour types when dealing with different people and in different situations. 
Filial piety was the most important in these seven behaviour types.632 
When GUAN Zhong wrote on Li and Yi, there were clear statements about how to look 
after the elderly. These statements related to how the young were supposed to look after 
their older kin. These instructions included respect and obedience633 as discussed in 
                                                 
624 《形势解》, ‘Xing Shi Jie’ in above note 344. 
625 《形势解》, ‘Xing Shi Jie’ in above note 344. 
626 Above note 344. 
627 《牧民》, ‘Mu Min’ in above note 344. Here, GUAN Zhong talked about governance with reference to 
pastoral care. 
628 礼. Here it means etiquette, rituals and morals.  
629 义. 
630 廉. 
631 耻. 
632 《五辅》, ‘Wu Fu’ in above note 344. 
633 《五辅》, ‘Wu Fu’ in above note 344. 
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the eight methods GUAN Zhong used to teach the people to follow Li. GUAN Zhong 
placed much importance on the education of the people to follow Li, where the 
sovereign should lead by example634 as part of his policies to look after the elderly. 
These policies were essential to the benevolence policy framework.  
GUAN Zhong opined that if the sovereign did not lead by example to look after his 
parents, the people would not consider filial piety as so important, thereby the policies 
and laws would not be voluntarily complied with.635 Once the sovereign leads by 
example, he can then promote looking after the elderly through educating all levels and 
sectors in society by teaching the young to support the older generations; so farmers, 
craftsmen, as well as officials know how to respect and look after the elderly.636 
4.5.2.1 GUAN Zhong’s Policy Implementations 
As the prime minister of one of the largest kingdoms in the Spring and Autumn Period 
-- the Qi Kingdom, GUAN Zhong designed and implemented a welfare system that 
covered three key policy proposals.637 The first was the creation of a social welfare 
system that focused on the elderly. Guanzi suggested that638 if a family has an old 
person whose age was over 70, one of his sons would be exempt from conscription or 
forced labour; and meat should be supplied by the local government every three 
months.639 If a family has an old person whose age was over 80, two of his sons would 
be exempt from conscription or forced labour and the government should provide meat 
                                                 
634 Above note 344. 
635 《牧民》、《山权数》, ‘Mu Min’ & ‘Shan Quan Shu’ in above note 344. 
636 《大匡》, ‘Da Kuang’ in above note 344. 
637 These policy proposals were captured by the Confucian writings that were the compulsory part of the 
education received by the sovereign and officials. GUAN Zhong’s policy designs that were implemented became 
the Li rules in the dynasties. 
638 “年七十以上, 一子无征, 三月有馈肉；八十以上, 二子无征, 月有馈肉；九十以上, 尽家无征, 日有酒
肉。死,上供棺椁。” .《入国》, ‘Ru Guo’ in above note 344. 
639“年七十以上, 一子无征, 三月有馈肉”。《入国》, ‘Ru Guo’ in above note 344. 
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every month.640 If the old person in the family was over 90 years old, the whole family 
would be exempt from conscription or forced labour, the government should provide 
meat and wine to the elderly person every day.641  When the old person dies, the 
government should also supply funeral needs.642 
The second type of policy proposal was to create a social relief system that included 
the elderly. Guanzi suggested643 that society should support the elderly and orphans, 
and help both widows and widowers.644 Relief policies should also include enquiring 
after their health status (including medical services), and financial support when these 
weaker members of society die from accidents.645 To Guanzi646, implementation of all 
these policies contributed to the sovereign’s benevolence, where he cares in 
emergencies.647  
The third type of policy proposal was to create a health system for the elderly. To 
Guanzi,648 in relation to enquiring after health status, nations and major cities should 
have officers who were in charge of “asking about the health status” of the elderly. 
When citizens were sick, these officers should go and visit them. For old people whose 
age was over 90, officers should visit them every day; for those who were over 80, 
officers should visit every two days; those who ere over 70, the visit should be every 
three days.649  
                                                 
640“八十以上, 二子无征, 月有馈肉”. 《入国》, ‘Ru Guo’ in above note 344. 
641 “九十以上, 尽家无征, 日有酒肉”. 《入国》, ‘Ru Guo’ in above note 344. 
642 “死, 上供棺椁”. 《入国》, ‘Ru Guo’ in above note 344. 
643 “养长老, 慈幼孤, 恤鳏寡, 问疾病, 吊祸丧, 此为匡其急。”. 《入国》, ‘Ru Guo’ in above note 344. 
644 《入国》, ‘Ru Guo’ in above note 344. 
645 “问疾病, 吊祸丧”. 《入国》, ‘Ru Guo’ in above note 344. 
646 Another name for GUAN Zhong. Ancient Chinese literature refers to a wise man or a sage as “zi” – 子。 
647 “此为匡其急”. 《五辅》, ‘Wu Fu’ in above note 344. 
648 “所谓问病者, 凡国、都皆有掌病, 士民有病者, 掌病以上令问之, 九十以上, 日一问；八十以上, 两日
一问；七十以上, 三日一问。”. 《入国》, ‘Ru Guo’ in above note 344. 
649 “所谓问病者, 凡国、都皆有掌病”. 《入国》, ‘Ru Guo’ in above note 344. 
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Establishing one cohesive system in the country that combined the three types of policy 
proposals to look after the elderly was therefore very important for GUAN Zhong. His 
real policy proposals were in the following forms: 
1) Praise and material encouragements, such as praising the top ten percent of filial 
children, and reward them in monetary form;650 
2) Exemption from forced labour or conscription;651 
3) Reward with public service employment. GUAN Zhong considered filial piety 
as the most important virtue for an official, and listed it in his public service 
recruitment policy proposals.652 
4.5.3 Policies in Later Dynasties 
Each dynasty made taking care of its elderly population an important policy goal. The 
court histories included public expenditure detail on looking after the elderly. 653 
Governments654 took the view that looking after the elderly was a mechanism of social 
control. This part of people’s livelihoods has its practical purpose. In the traditional 
Chinese society, there was an obvious reason to emphasise looking after the elderly. 
The experiences the elderly could pass down in traditional societies that have slower 
scientific development were vital for production to continue, and for the accumulation 
of wealth. The wisdom of the elderly also provided the basis to educate the people, and 
pass down the appropriate moral standards.  
                                                 
650 《山权数》,‘Shan Quan Shu’ in above note 344. 
651 《山权数》,‘Shan Quan Shu’ in above note 344. 
652 Above note 344. 
653 For examples, see the Tables in above note 338. 
654 This research chooses to use the term “government”, because governments took many forms in ancient China 
and the emperor may not be the de facto sovereign in his court.  
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The policies often included: in-kind benefits such as food, clothing to materially 
provide for the elderly;655 tax benefits; preferential political treatment; special laws and 
punishments, and education to promote filial piety as a concept based on the writings 
of DONG Zhongshu.656  
Later dynasties continued to have policies to look after the elderly by the State. The 
types of policies were similar to those in the Qin and Han Dynasties discussed below. 
From the Tang Dynasty, females began to enjoy the same benefits as males.657  
4.5.4 The Qin (221 – 207 BC) and Han (202 BC – 220AD) Dynasties 
The reign of Qin Shihuang,658 the first emperor in China’s history ended the Waring 
States Period, and unified China as a nation. Qin Shihuang’s reign began the long 
tradition of centralised politics in China, where much precedents were made. However, 
the dynasty he started – the Qin Dynasty659 was short lived. The ruinous habits of his 
son, the second emperor and the strong influence of a few calculating ministers led to 
the demise of the dynasty and the beginning of the Han Dynasty660 – one that was 
lengthy and relatively stable. The prosperity and stability of the Han Dynasty allowed 
policies to develop from their Qin Dynasty precedents and be implemented. The system 
of welfare policies targeting the elderly in the Qin and Han Dynasties included five 
types of policies: welfare, support, compensation, law and education. This section 
briefly discusses each, as these policies carried on the tradition from the Western Zhou 
era, and laid the foundation for the other periods661 in China’s long ancient history. 
                                                 
655 These are part of the policies to maintain the elderly. 
656 董仲舒 Above note 346. 
657 李穆, 《从性别角度看唐代的养老政策》, Li M, ‘Welfare Policies Targeted at the Elderly in the Tang 
Dynasty – From a Gender Perspective’, (2007) Science & Technology Information 51. 
658 秦始皇 260–210 BC. 
659 221 – 207 BC. 
660 202 BC - 220 AD. 
661 Periods included dynasties and the relatively unstable periods between dynasties, where the geographic area of 
“China” was divided into multiple smaller States. 
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Welfare and support policies and laws are discussed separately, while compensation, 
and education are discussed as part of welfare and support policies.  
4.5.4.1 Welfare Policies to Look After the Elderly 
In the Qin and Han Dynasties, there were three major policy groups under the heading 
of welfare policies to look after the elderly. These were in-kind benefits, tax and forced 
labour policies, and policies to keep the counsel of the elderly.  
In-kind benefits were often one off non-monetary ex-gratia payments by the 
government to the elderly. Some of these in-kind benefits were continuous and regular 
in nature, others were truly one off awards. Examples from the court history records of 
the Han Dynasty 662  showed that things that were awarded are usually food and 
different types of fabric. These things were often awarded to the elderly and people who 
have been filial. 663  These awards often happened when there were special events 
relating to the emperor or special national events, such as naming the empress, the 
sovereign’s national tour to audit officials in his reign, a good harvest, naming the heir, 
general pardons, and coronations.664  
Tax and forced labour policies revolved around exemptions for the elderly and for those 
who had to look after the elderly. For example, in the Qin Dynasty, for people who 
were titled, forced labour was exempted when they turned fifty six; for those who were 
not titled, exemptions began when they turned sixty.665 In the Han Dynasty, people of 
different classes were exempt from forced labour from a different age, the higher their 
                                                 
662 Above notes 338 and 339. 
663 Table in 高宁, 《硕士学位论文：秦汉养老制度研究》, Gao N, Master’s Dissertation: The System of 
Welfare Targeted at the Elderly in the Qin and Han Dynasties, (Northwest University, 2012), at 17-20. 
664 Above notes 338 and 339. 
665 “秦制二十爵, 男子赐爵一级以上, 有罪以减, 年五十六免。无爵为士伍, 年六十乃免老” [汉] 卫宏《四
部备要· 汉旧仪》, 北京: 中华书局, 1 9 3 6 年, [Han Dynasty] Wei H, Collected Important Documents of Four 
Sectors · Han Dynasty Old Rituals, (Beijing: Zhonghua Press, 1936), at 3657. 
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class, the younger exemptions began. For an esteemed official, this began when they 
turned fifty-eight, a normal peasant has to turn sixty-six before exemptions began.666 
There were also policies to half forced labour in the Han Dynasty for people who almost 
meet the age for exemption.667 There were policies to exempt per capita taxes in both 
dynasties.668 
Policies to keep the counsel of the elderly were introduced to improve the status of the 
elderly in society. The emperor usually kept counsel of the elderly in three ways: asking 
for their health to improve the elderly person’s social status, in-kind benefits, and asking 
them to suggest the right person to be officials. 
4.5.4.2 Support Policies to Look After the Elderly 
Support policies to look after the elderly began in the Han669 Dynasty. They were a 
safety net mechanism to maintain the basic living standards of elderly people or for the 
elderly during times of natural disaster. Policies included food distribution, or 
government subsidised loans to the elderly. There were four main types of policies:  
1) Temporary aid policies, such as the distribution of rice, food, money and the 
services of people in the form of forced labour;670 
                                                 
666 “大夫以上年五十八, 不更六十二, 簪袭六十三, 上造六十四, 公士六十五, 公卒以下六十六, 皆为免老” 
《傅律》, ‘Fu Lv’ in 朱红林, 《张家山汉简〈二年律令〉集释》, 北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 2 0 0 5 年. 
Zhu H, Collected and Annotated Zhangjiashan Han Dynasty Bamboo Strips (Second Year Codes), (Beijing: Social 
Sciences Literature Press, 2005), at 221. 
667 “院老各半其爵徭, 入独给邑中事” 《徭律》, ‘Yao Lv’ in 朱红林, 《张家山汉简〈二年律令〉集释》, 
北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 2 0 0 5 年. Zhu H, Collected and Annotated Zhangjiashan Han Dynasty Bamboo 
Strips (Second Year Codes), (Beijing: Social Sciences Literature Press, 2005), at 243; and“年六十[ 以上] 与年十
六以至十四, 皆为半作”, 《银雀山田法》, ‘Yin Que Shan Tian Fa’ in 朱红林, 《张家山汉简〈二年律令〉集
释》, 北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 2 0 0 5 年. Zhu H, Collected and Annotated Zhangjiashan Han Dynasty 
Bamboo Strips (Second Year Codes), (Beijing: Social Sciences Literature Press, 2005), at 74. 
668 For example, 《高帝纪上》, ‘Emperor Gao Ji I’ in above note 338. 
669 202BC－220AD. 
670 《光武帝纪》, ‘Emperor Guang Wu Ji’, and《和帝纪》, ‘Emperor He Ji’ in above note 339. 
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2) Moving people to food or moving food to the people during times of famine or 
other natural disasters;671 
3) Exempting rent and taxes and opening up mountains and forests for the elderly 
or the widowed to gather food during times of disaster and famine;672 and 
4) Distributing public land and loaning seeds to people affected by famines and 
disasters, in order to encourage people to get back to food production and return 
to being self-sufficient. 673  The seeds were loaned because an equivalent 
amount was required to be returned to the government warehouses subsequent 
to harvest time. 
There were also long term continuous aid policies, usually focusing on exempting or 
discounting rent on land or places at markets. Those who benefited were the widowed 
or childless people who were over sixty; and other relatives who took on the burden to 
care and provide for childless people who were over sixty.674 
4.5.4.3 Policies to Look After the Elderly Who Had Made Special 
Contributions to the Country 
The people who made special contributions to the country often referred to officials, 
ex-officials or ex-soldiers. The policies to look after the elderly who had made special 
contributes to the country can be divided into three categories: 
1) Special retirement treatment675 for elderly officials; 
2) Special retirement treatment676 for elderly scholars (over 60); 
                                                 
671 《高帝纪》, ‘Emperor Gao Ji’ in above note 338; and《安帝纪》, ‘Emperor An Ji’ in above note 339. 
672 《和帝纪》, ‘Emperor He Ji’ in above note 339. 
673 《宣帝纪》, ‘Emperor Xuan Ji’, and《昭帝纪》, ‘Emperor Zhao Ji’ in above note 338. 
674 ‘Emperor Wen Ji’ in above note 338. 
675 优抚. 
676 耆儒. 
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3) Special retirement treatment for the elderly who received a “Sovereign’s 
Mace”.677 
4.5.4.3.1 Special Retirement Treatment for Elderly Officials 
The special retirement treatments for elderly officials were administered according to 
three conditions, and the official would either be old or sick before they could apply to 
retire. The first condition was the age of the official – ordinarily this meant a minimum 
of seventy years old in the Han Dynasty;678 where the person was considered to be 
infirm. The second condition was illness,679 where the official retires because they 
were gravely ill. The third condition was the official applies to retire,680 often this 
means the retirement was necessary as the forms of wording used in the application 
would indicate the official was “begging for their bones for burial”.681 
These stringent conditions meant those officials who did retire were treated very well 
by three types of policies: 
1) Financial special treatments that included large sums of money682 as a one off 
reward. The reward may also include food, wine and medicine; and a lifetime 
pensions683 that either equalled to or was a proportion of their working life 
salary.  
                                                 
677 王杖. A wooden mace commissioned by the sovereign to be made for the person. It can be used as a crutch.  
678 “七十阳道极, 耳目不聪明, 跤蹄之属, 是以退去避嫌者”.《致仕》, ‘Zhi Shi’ in above note 345. 
679 甘肃省文物考古研究所等, 《居延新简》, 北京: 文物出版社, 1 9 9 0 年. Gansu Archelogy Research 
Centre, Ju Yan Xin Jian, (Beijing: Antiques Press, 1990), at 199; and《杜延年传》‘Du Yan Nian Zhuan’ in above 
note 338. 
680 《匡张孔马传》, ‘Kuang Zhang Kong Ma Zhuan’, and《王莽传》, ‘Wang Mang Zhuan’ in above note 338. 
681 匡衡 “连乞骸骨” and 王邑上书 “愿乞骸骨” . 《匡张孔马传》, ‘Kuang Zhang Kong Ma Zhuan’, and《王
莽传》, ‘Wang Mang Zhuan’ in above note 338. 
682 《杜延年传》, ‘Du Yan Nian Zhuan’, and《史丹传》, ‘Shi Dan Zhuan’ in above note 338; and《郑钧传》, 
‘Zheng Jun Zhuan’ in above note 339. 
683 《石奋传》, ‘Shi Fen Zhuan’ in 《史记》Records of the Grand Scribe, 
<http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_5.aspx> (2 Nov. 2015). 
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2) Political special treatments that included gifting of the “Sovereign’s Mace” and 
horses and vehicles;684 visitation by the emperor or representatives from the 
emperor; 685  acting as a special counsel to the emperor in important state 
matters;686 and recommending direct descendants to the emperor.687  
3) Special treatments at death that included attendance at funerals by the emperor 
or his representatives,688 the emperor paying for burial and funeral costs,689 the 
emperor issuing decrees to praise the dead, 690  and commanding a family 
member to look after their grave – the implication of this command was that the 
family member’s job became looking after the grave, thereby taxes and forced 
labour were exempt for that family member. 
There were also policies to lighten the load 691  of elderly officials who were not 
permitted to retire; and providing conveniences such as crutches and seats to those 
elderly officials.692 
4.5.4.3.2 Special Retirement Treatment for Elderly Scholars (over 60)  
The reason scholars were important was that the scholars were the nation’s reserve of 
officials, as they have all passed the requisite exams. The major retirement policies for 
elderly scholars involved giving them employment as policy officials. Official posts 
allowed elderly scholars economic independence and political security. 
                                                 
684 《杜延年传》, ‘Du Yan Nian Zhuan’ in above note 338. 
685 《郑钧传》, ‘Zheng Jun Zhuan’ in above note 339. 
686 《李通传》, ‘Li Tong Zhuan’ in above note 339. 
687 《哀帝纪》, ‘Emperor Ai Ji’ in above note 338. 
688 《霍光传》, ‘Huo Guang Zhuan’ in above note 338; and《杨赐传》, ‘Yang Ci Zhuan’, 《祭遵传》, ‘Ji Zun 
Zhuan’, and 《班超传》 ‘Ban Chao Zhuan’ in above 339. 
689 《循吏传》, ‘Xun Li Zhuan’ in above note 338;《周荣传》, ‘Zhou Rong Zhuan’, and《胡广传》, ‘Hu 
Guang Zhuan’, in above note 339. 
690 《尹翁归传》, ‘Yin Weng Gui Zhuan’ in above note 338. 
691 《史律》, ‘Shi Lv’ in 朱红林, 《张家山汉简〈二年律令〉集释》, 北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 2005
年. Zhu H, Collected and Annotated Zhangjiashan Han Dynasty Bamboo Strips (Second Year Codes), (Beijing: 
Social Sciences Literature Press, 2005), at 285; and《顺帝纪》, ‘Emperor Shun Ji’ in above note 339. 
692 《致仕》, ‘Zhi Shi’ in above note 345. 
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4.5.4.3.3 Special Retirement Treatment for the Elderly who Received a 
“Sovereign’s Mace”  
The system of Li693 gave the elderly a special place in ancient Chinese societies. The 
“Sovereign’s Mace” was a sign that the elderly person had attained a status that the 
emperor considered important. The mace – a long wooden crutch, was a keepsake from 
the emperor, and the law and Li rules contained special treatment arising from having 
the mace. The person’s status equalled to a local official who was in charge of a 
county.694 It is interesting to note that the age and place for the elderly to use their mace 
were noted. The Book of Rites,695 which acted as part of the civil law in ancient China 
clearly specified rules of how people of different ages need to be treated by society and 
the emperor. Therefore carrying a mace or crutch became the distinction of the person’s 
status in their community. An interesting feature of the regime surrounding the mace 
was that when one becomes 90, if the emperor wants their counsel, the emperor had to 
pay the visit and bring gifts. 
Once the elderly person received the mace, they were allowed special political rights, 
such as not kneeling when they were in the presence of the emperor,696 and travelling 
on riding ways.697  These elderly people also received special legal treatment: the 
elderly were exempt from punishment for many lesser crimes, and when they were 
                                                 
693 Here it is interesting to note that the age and place for the elderly to use their staff/crutches were noted. Li Ji, 
which was part of the civil law in ancient China clearly specifies rules of how people of different ages need to be 
treated by society and the emperor. “五十杖于家, 六十杖于乡, 七十杖于国, 八十杖于朝。九十者,天子欲有
问焉,则就其室,以珍从。” 《工制》in above note 337. 
694《王杖诏书令》, A Collection of Bamboo Strips on the Orders of Emperor’s Mace, as noted in 魏燕利,《“王
杖”考辨》, Wei Y, ‘Analysis of the “Emperor’s Mace”, (2004) Bamboo Strip Analysis. 
695 “五十杖 于家, 六十杖于乡, 七十杖于国, 八十杖于朝。九十者,天子欲有问焉,则就其室,以珍从。” 
《工制》in above note 337. 
696 “入宫廷不趋”. 《武威王杖诏书令》, ‘King Wu Wei’s Order on the Mace’ in 高恒, 《秦汉简赎中法制文
书辑考》,北京:社会科学文献出版社, 2008 年. Gao H, Collected and Annotated Documents on the Legal System 
from Qin and Han Dynasty Bamboo Strips, (Beijing: Social Sciences Literature Press, 2008), at 174. 
697 Riding ways were only for the use of horse riders, carriages and pedestrians were not allowed to travel on 
riding ways. 《武威王杖诏书令》, ‘King Wu Wei’s Order on the Mace’ in 高恒, 《秦汉简赎中法制文书辑
考》,北京:社会科学文献出版社, 2008 年. Gao H, Collected and Annotated Documents on the Legal System from 
Qin and Han Dynasty Bamboo Strips, (Beijing: Social Sciences Literature Press, 2008), at 174; and《江充传》, 
‘Jiang Chong Zhuan’, and《成帝纪》, ‘Emperor Cheng Ji’in above note 338. 
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arrested, they were not bound. Those who offend against these elderly people were 
given harsher punishments that even included public executions.698  
4.5.4.4 Laws on the Punishments or Exemptions Related to Looking 
After the Elderly 
In the Qin and Han Dynasties, there were criminal codes specifically promulgated, 
directly or indirectly in relation to the criminal punishments of the elderly and their 
relatives. Direct rules included: 
 Laws that exempted the elderly from suit – both by official channels (akin to 
modern public prosecutions), and by the family – that is, the suit involved the 
elderly in a crime against a family member - children or servants;699 
 Laws that decreased the severity of penalties from physical punishment to 
monetary fines. Physical punishments included death or other penalties that 
harmed or injured the body;700 and 
 Procedural laws that prohibited harming the elderly during the arrest and court 
processes;701 and those that sped up the court process for the elderly702, such 
as questioning the accused elderly person immediately after arrest. 
                                                 
698 《武威王杖诏书令》, ‘King Wu Wei’s Order on the Mace’in 高恒,《秦汉简赎中法制文书辑考》,北京:社
会科学文献出版社, 2008 年. Gao H, Collected and Annotated Documents on the Legal System from Qin and Han 
Dynasty Bamboo Strips, (Beijing: Social Sciences Literature Press, 2008), at 174. 
699 《法律答问》, ‘Q & A on Laws’ in Qin Tomb Bamboo Strips Cleaning Team, Shuihudi Qin Tomb Bamboo 
Strips, (Beijing: Antiques Press, 1978), at 256; and 《告律》, ‘Gao Lv’ in 朱红林, 《张家山汉简〈二年律令〉
集释》, 北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 2005 年. Zhu H, Collected and Annotated Zhangjiashan Han Dynasty 
Bamboo Strips (Second Year Codes), (Beijing: Social Sciences Literature Press, 2005), at 100. 
700 《贼律》, ‘Zei Lv’ in 朱红林, 《张家山汉简〈二年律令〉集释》, 北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 2 0 0 5 
年. Zhu H, Collected and Annotated Zhangjiashan Han Dynasty Bamboo Strips (Second Year Codes), (Beijing: 
Social Sciences Literature Press, 2005), at 38-39; and《具律》, ‘Ju Lv’ in 朱红林, 《张家山汉简〈二年律令〉
集释》, 北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 2005 年. Zhu H, Collected and Annotated Zhangjiashan Han Dynasty 
Bamboo Strips (Second Year Codes), (Beijing: Social Sciences Literature Press, 2005), at 74. 
701 “男子八十以上, 十岁以下, 及妇人从坐者, 自非不道, 诏所名捕, 皆不得系。”《光武帝纪》, ‘Emperor 
Guang Wu Ji’ in above note 339. 
702 《平帝纪》, ‘Emperor Ping Ji’ in above note 338. 
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Indirect laws were issued to target the children of the elderly with an aim to promote 
filial piety in the society. These laws included: 
 Allowing children to receive the punishment on behalf of the parent,703 or 
allowing sons who had titles or military rewards to give up the title or reward to 
cancel the parent’s punishment;704 
 Allowing children to keep secret the criminal activities of their elderly parents, 
where the children were exempt from the crime of “cover up” that often 
attracted heavy punishment. 705  These laws had similar effects to legal 
privileges spouses enjoyed in common law systems; 
 Exempting or lowering punishment on crimes committed caused by the filial 
actions of children, including revenging the murder or harm of a parent.706 
There were also laws to specify rights for the elderly. Governments took children being 
non-filial as a grave crime707 with economic and criminal sanctions.708  
                                                 
703 《仓律》, ‘Cang Lv’ in 睡虎地秦墓竹简整理小组,《睡虎地秦墓竹简》, 北京: 文物出版社, 1978 年. 
Shuihudi Qin Tomb Bamboo Strips Cleaning Team, Shuihudi Qin Tomb Bamboo Strips, (Beijing: Antiques Press, 
1978), at 53-54. 
704 《军爵律》, ‘Jun Jue Lv’ in 睡虎地秦墓竹简整理小组,《睡虎地秦墓竹简》, 北京: 文物出版社, 1 9 7 8 
年. Shuihudi Qin Tomb Bamboo Strips Cleaning Team, Shuihudi Qin Tomb Bamboo Strips, (Beijing: Antiques 
Press, 1978), at 93. 
705 《宣帝纪》, ‘Emperor Xuan Ji’in above note 338. 
706 《周黄徐姜申屠列传》, ‘Zhou Huang Xu Jiang Shen Tu Lie Zhuan’, and《张敏传》 ‘Zhang Min Zhuan’ in 
above note 339.  
707 胡平生、陈美兰, 《孝经礼记·五刑章》, 北京: 中华书局, 2 0 1 0 年. Hu P & Chen M, ‘Five 
Punishments’in Book of Filial Piety and Book of Rites, (Beijing: Zhonghua Press, 2010), at 257. 
708 For example, the non-filial activities that attracted economic sanctions included breaking up the extended 
family when a parent was over seventy. The sanctions included allowing elderly parents and grandparents to 
possess land and servants that belonged to the non-filial offspring. Scolding one’s elderly parent attracted severe 
fines. The non-filial activities that attracted criminal sanctions included not giving the parent a proper burial or 
marrying during the time of mourning; falsely accusing parents of crimes; murdering or humiliating parents or 
receivers of the Sovereign’s Mace; not providing for elderly parents; abetting in non-filial activities; and not 
following the parents’ counsel. For most of these crimes, the punishment was death, therefore in order to allow for 
judicial fairness, a crime of non-filial activity was only heard in court after three complaints of the same crime has 
been filed in the court system. See 《户律》, ‘Hu Lv’ in 朱红林, 《张家山汉简〈二年律令〉集释》, 北京: 
社会科学文献出版社, 2 0 0 5 年. Zhu H, Collected and Annotated Zhangjiashan Han Dynasty Bamboo Strips 
(Second Year Codes), (Beijing: Social Sciences Literature Press, 2005), at 211; “奚诟詈之, 罚金一斤” 《敦煌悬
泉汉简贼律》, ‘Dun Huang Xuan Quan Han Bamboo Strip Zei Lv’ in 高恒, 《秦汉简赎中法制文书辑考》, 北
京: 社会科学文献出版社, 2 0 0 8 年. Gao H, Collected and Annotated Documents on the Legal System from Qin 
and Han Dynasty Bamboo Strips, (Beijing: Social Sciences Literature Press, 2008), at 45; 《李杜列传》, ‘Li Du 
Lie Zhuan’ in above note 339; 《告律》, ‘Gao Lv’, in 朱红林, 《张家山汉简〈二年律令〉集释》, 北京: 社
会科学文献出版社, 2 0 0 5 年. Zhu H, Collected and Annotated Zhangjiashan Han Dynasty Bamboo Strips 
(Second Year Codes), (Beijing: Social Sciences Literature Press, 2005), at 100; 《法律答问》, ‘Q & A on 
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4.6 Conclusion 
The existing academic analysis concerning sustainability of funding for Old-Age 
Pensions in the PRC argued that the funds in the Social Insurance Fund as a result of 
Old-Age Pensions insurance contributions are the only legitimate source of public 
revenue for the funding of Urban Old-Age Pensions. Scholars, as a consequence, built 
models to analyse funding sustainability based on hypotheses that took into 
consideration this assumption. The earlier academic analysis did not offer a reason for 
this assumption, or explain why other sources were not considered.  
Importantly, there does not appear to be contemporary research on the impact of 
China’s policy tradition that informed the PRC government in its making of Old-Age 
Pensions policies which carried with it the requirement for the government to supply 
full funding from general revenue.  
There is enough historical evidence to suggest that the argument regarding the 
contributions collected in the Social Insurance Fund being the only legitimate source of 
revenue is incorrect. The prevailing literature failed to recognise the Chinese policy 
tradition for the State to look after people’s livelihoods,709 including looking after the 
                                                 
Laws’in Qin Tomb Bamboo Strips Cleaning Team, Shuihudi Qin Tomb Bamboo Strips, (Beijing: Antiques Press, 
1978), at 111; and 《贼律》, ‘Zei Lv’ in 朱红林, 《张家山汉简〈二年律令〉集释》, 北京: 社会科学文献
出版社, 2 0 0 5 年. Zhu H, Collected and Annotated Zhangjiashan Han Dynasty Bamboo Strips (Second Year 
Codes), (Beijing: Social Sciences Literature Press, 2005), at 38-39 & 43; [唐] 杜佑撰, 王文锦校: 《通典》, 北
京: 中华书局, 1 9 8 8 年. [Tang Dynasty], Du Y, Tong Dian, Wang W, ed, (Beijing: Zhonghua Press, 1988), at 
4288;《奏谳书》, ‘Zou Zian Shu’ in 朱红林, 《张家山汉简〈二年律令〉集释》, 北京: 社会科学文献出版
社, 2 0 0 5 年. Zhu H, Collected and Annotated Zhangjiashan Han Dynasty Bamboo Strips (Second Year Codes), 
(Beijing: Social Sciences Literature Press, 2005), at 31; 《宗室四王三侯列传》, ‘The Four Kings and Three 
Dukes of the Royal Family Zhuan’ in above note 339; and 《奏淑书》, ‘Zou Shu Shu’ in 朱红林, 《张家山汉
简〈二年律令〉集释》, 北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 2 0 0 5 年. Zhu H, Collected and Annotated 
Zhangjiashan Han Dynasty Bamboo Strips (Second Year Codes), (Beijing: Social Sciences Literature Press, 2005), 
at 227;《奏淑书》, ‘Zou Shu Shu’ in 朱红林, 《张家山汉简〈二年律令〉集释》, 北京: 社会科学文献出版
社, 2 0 0 5 年. Zhu H, Collected and Annotated Zhangjiashan Han Dynasty Bamboo Strips (Second Year Codes), 
(Beijing: Social Sciences Literature Press, 2005), at 227;《秦始皇本纪》, ‘Records of Emperor Qin Shi Huang’s 
Reign’ in in 《史记》Records of the Grand Scribe, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_5.aspx> (2 Nov. 
2015)； “七十以上告子不孝, 必三环之。三环之各不同日而尚告, 乃听之”《贼律》, ‘Zei Lv’ in 朱红林, 
《张家山汉简〈二年律令〉集释》, 北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 2 0 0 5 年. Zhu H, Collected and Annotated 
Zhangjiashan Han Dynasty Bamboo Strips (Second Year Codes), (Beijing: Social Sciences Literature Press, 2005), 
at 38-39. 
709 For example, see《孟子》Mencius, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_11.aspx> (2.Nov 2015). 
125 
 
elderly, which allows drawing funds from general revenue. Historically, the sovereign, 
by complying with their sovereign obligations, has funded policies that looked after the 
elderly through general revenue.  
In the Chinese policy tradition, the governance philosophy was the Confucian method, 
whereas the principles were Confucian, the implementation methods were designed 
following the writings of the Legalist school of thought. This amounted to Confucian 
principles being implemented through strict adherence to a system of laws. Li rules that 
regulated people’s behaviour according to their station in life were complemented by 
Fa, Xing, and Zhi rules. Fa rules were the criminal codes that bore sanctions; Xing rules 
listed the sanctions themselves; and Zhi rules regulated the legal system. The four types 
of rules together performed the functions of “law” in the western sense, and they made 
up the ancient Chinese formal institutional framework. 
In this ancient Chinese formal institutional framework, the sovereign had to behave 
according to his station in life, with his standard of behaviour being “benevolence”. The 
Li rules were captured in the Confucian works that were the compulsory reading for 
officials and the sovereign, and “benevolence” featured prominently in the writings that 
were attributed to Confucius himself; to Mencius in his writings on the importance of 
looking after the people’s livelihoods for the sovereign; and to GUAN Zhong, whose 
major contribution was entrenching filial piety in the Li rules.  
Filial piety was the Confucian principle that informed the sovereigns of all dynasties to 
design Li in the form of behavioural rules and rituals that aimed at looking after the 
elderly. Following the writings and practices implemented by GUAN Zhong, these 
rules required the sovereigns themselves to set up concrete policies to look after the 
elderly, including welfare policies, social relief policies, support policies, tax and forced 
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labour policies, and special retirement treatment for elderly officials, scholars or people 
who received the “sovereign’s mace” because they have made significant contributions 
to society. In each dynasty, there were criminal sanctions for people who did not obey 
the Li behavioural rules and ritual according to their station in life. For the purposes of 
looking after the elderly, the maximum penalty for a non-filial child was death.  
The analysis in this chapter demonstrated that there is no evidence in the reviewed 
historical material that any forms of special levies were collected solely to look after 
the elderly. Since the sovereigns were making policies to look after the elderly to 
discharge their own duties as the sovereign, the Li rules implicitly required the 
sovereign to make good their promises by having adequate funding because looking 
after the elderly was a sovereign obligation. It can be stipulated that the traditional 
elderly care policies in China were funded by general government funds -- known in 
the west as consolidated revenue.  
The court histories of each period, such as the History of the Han Dynasty710 and 
History of the Later Han Dynasty711 recorded the times when the sovereign provided 
monetary or non-monetary awards to the elderly people of their reign. Some of these 
awards were periodic in nature, others were more one off. The court histories recorded 
the monetary value of the awards, evidencing that there were sufficient funds to make 
good the payments. The records did not specifically mention that extra levies were 
raised to pay for the policies. A conclusion can be made that the sovereigns in the 
ancient Chinese dynasties satisfied their Li obligations by fully funding policies that 
looked after the elderly through general fiscal revenue.  
                                                 
710 《汉书》History of the Han Dynasty, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_40.aspx> (2.Nov 2015). 
711 《后汉书》History of the Latter Han Dynasty, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_41.aspx> (2.Nov 2015). 
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When additional revenue was actually raised, the records pertained to raising revenue 
to guarantee the provision of welfare under special circumstances. As an example, from 
the Tang Dynasty (618-907 AD), governments collected a separate tea tax to purchase 
grain and seeds during normal harvests.712 This purchase was stored in government 
managed warehouses to be distributed ex-gratia or sold at below marketed prices at 
times of famine.713 
The lack of evidence on special levies aimed at funding care policies for the elderly is 
supportive to the PRC government’s aim to fully fund Urban Old-Age Pensions by 
allowing subsidies from consolidated revenue. The Social Insurance Law714 welfare 
framework is the PRC government’s promise to continue with tradition to look after 
the elderly. The returning to tradition by the PRC government legitimises sourcing 
subsidies from consolidated revenue as a source of funding for Urban Old-Age 
Pensions, and contributed Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurances in the Social 
Insurance Fund is no longer the only legitimate source of funding in the PRC’s Social 
Insurance Law715 welfare framework. 
Subsidies from consolidated revenue changes the assumptions in the exceeding models 
that analyse funding sustainability, therefore the results of the lack of sustainability in 
the prevailing literature will change. Amendments to the models that include subsidies 
allowed by the Social Insurance Law716 will change the sustainable funding research 
paradigm, and results from the amended models will better measure the PRC 
                                                 
712 翁礼华,《唐代茶税乃社保之税》, Weng L, ‘Tea Tax is in effect a Social Security Tax in the Tang Dynasty’, 
Qianjiang Evening News, 22 February 2010, <http://qjwb.zjol.com.cn/html/2010-02/22/content_270697.htm?div=-
1> (6 Nov. 2015). 
713 Ibid. 常平仓。 
714 Above note 177. 
715 Above note 177. 
716 Above note 177. 
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government’s ability to sustainably fully fund Urban Old-Age Pensions through its 
public revenues. 
The Social Insurance Law717 when considered in its full context of PRC obligations 
allows the government to make subsidies from consolidated revenue718 as additional 
funding for the payment of Urban Old-Age Pensions. The Chinese tradition of the 
government using public policy tools to look after the elderly provides justification for 
the PRC government’s policy choice that allows subsidies from consolidated revenue 
to fund Urban Old-Age Pensions in the Social Insurance Law719 welfare framework. 
The PRC government is simply returning to a policy tradition, and promising to look 
after its elderly by fully funding Old-Age Pensions. Subsidies from consolidated 
revenue adds a source of funding to the Urban Old-Age Pensions scheme.   
                                                 
717 Above note 177. 
718 Above note 177, Arts 65 & 71.  
719 Above note 177. 
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Chapter V Institutional Changes in the PRC and Associated 
Changes to Urban Old-Age Pensions Policies 
5.1 Introduction 
The prevailing literature on sustainably funding Urban Old-Age Pensions concluded 
that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) could not sustainably fund Urban Old-Age 
Pensions by presuming that the Social Insurance Fund is the only legitimate funding 
source for Urban Old-Age Pensions. The researchers did not provide reasons for the 
continuation of this presumption, leaving a gap in the literature. This chapter addresses 
the gap in the literature by analysing the institutional changes in the PRC and associated 
developments in Urban Old-Age Pensions Policies.  
As a result of a revolution, the governance and formal institutions720 of the PRC had 
to be rebuilt from 1949, when the PRC first became a State. The Communist ideology 
dictated the structure of its formal institutions in its formative years. Often, modern 
historians divide post 1949 China into several periods:721 the immediate years after the 
PRC was established, the great-leap-forward years,722 the Cultural Revolution years,723 
the early Open Door Policy Years (from 1978 to 1997), and the post Open Door Policy 
Years724 (from 1997). Economic historians725 often group these periods into two era – 
the planned economy days, and the market reform days. 1978,726 when the Open Door 
                                                 
720 Potter PB, ‘Review: Legal Reform in China: Institutions, Culture, and Selective Adaptation’, (2004) 29 Law & 
Social Inquiry (2) 465. 
721 Saich T, Governance and Politics of China, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 3rd ed, 2011). 
722 Lippit VD, ‘The Great Leap Forward Reconsidered’, (1975) 1 Modern China (1) 92. 
723项怀诚编,《中国财政通史·当代卷》, Xiang H ed, Public Finance History of China, Contemporary Volume 
(Beijing: China Public Finance and Economics Press, 2006), ch 3. 
724 Woo WT, ‘The Real Reasons for China’s Growth’, (1999) 41 The China Journal (January) 115, at 115. 
725 Above note 1462, ch 4. 
726 《中国共产党第十一届中央委员会第三次全体会议公报》Communiqué of The Third Plenum of the 
Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 1978 (The Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China); 人民网, 《中共党史上的 80 件大事（65）党的十一届三中全会》, People’s net, ‘80 
Important Events in the History of the Communist Party of China’, people.cn, 13 June 2001, 
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Policy727 was first identified as the development direction, was treated as the year that 
marked the turning point of policy development in the PRC. 
For the purposes of looking after the urban elderly, the PRC’s formal institutions have 
developed significantly since 1997. The Social Insurance Law728 welfare framework 
is part of a practicable formal institution framework.  
The significant elements of the formal institutional framework in the PRC include: its 
legal system, five-year plans as policy documents in the planning process, and the role 
played by the Communist Party in its policy making process.  
This chapter explains the PRC’s institutional developments in the years since its birth, 
in order to argue that unlike its earlier years, looking after its urban elderly according 
to the Social Insurance Law729 and associated law-documents is done in a developed 
formal institutional system that includes laws, a distinct government structure and a 
fiscal structure.  
5.2 Looking after the Elderly in the Pre Open Door Policy Era 
Tony Saich in the introductory chapter of his Governance and Politics of China730 
summed up the predominant perception of the early history of the PRC. He opined that  
“…Careful observers of the Olympic opening ceremony will have noticed that 
there was no history between 1949, the founding of the PRC, and when reforms 
                                                 
<http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5301/5302/20010613/488120.html> (21 Feb. 2016); and 新华网, 
《中共十一届三中全会（１９７８年）》, Xinhua Net, ‘The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of China (1978)’, Xinhua Net, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-
01/20/content_697755.htm> (21 Feb. 2016). 
727 《关于授权国务院在经济体制改革和对外开放方面制定暂行规定决定》Decision to Delegate to the State 
Council the Power to Make Provisional Regulation during the Systemic Reform to the Economy and about Issues 
Arising from the Implementation of the Open Door Policy 1985 (National People’s Congress). 
728 《中华人民共和国社会保险法》Social Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China 2010 (Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress). 
729 Ibid. 
730 Above note 721, at 1. 
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began in the late 1970s. China’s leader still do not know how to confront their own 
tumultuous past.”  
This is a period where institutions were built and broken, social or economic policies 
were made in a piecemeal fashion, and there was no apparent separation between the 
Chinese Communist Party and the government apparatus of the State. It was a time 
when ideology was driving changes in China. Party policies were implemented by the 
party, in form and in substance.731 State Owned Enterprises and Government entities 
were the sources of administration and economic activities. 732  The State Owned 
Enterprises represented the government as employer for the majority of the urban 
population. 
The PRC began to run its economy on two parallel planes – the urban economy that is 
characterised by industry, commerce and services; and the rural economy that is 
characterised by primary production. Although this urban/rural distinction existed in 
China before 1949,733 it was the passing of the Resident Registration Regulation of the 
People’s Republic of China 734  (the Hukou Regulation) by the National People’s 
Congress in 1958 that triggered the PRC to cement its dual urban-rural economies in 
their present form. This Regulation735 regulates residence registration (Hukou), thereby 
distinguishing residence rights for the rural and urban populations.736  When rural 
residents move to urban areas, they are required to follow a strenuous process to apply 
                                                 
731 Above note 721, at 21-24, & 41; and Saich T, ‘The Fourth Constitution of the People’s Republic of China’, 
(1983) 2 Review of Socialist Law 113, at 115. 
732 Above note 721, ch 1& 3. 
733 白永秀,《城乡二元结构的中国视角：形成、拓展、路径》, Bai Y, ‘Urban-Rural Dual Structure under the 
Chinese Perspective: Its Formation, Expansion and Path’, (2012) 44 Academic Monthly (May) 67, at 69.  
734 《中华人民共和国户口登记条例》Resident Registration Regulation of the People’s Republic of China 1958 
(National People’s Congress). 
735 Ibid. 
736 Ibid. 
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for urban Hukou, including the submission of either the acceptance letters of education 
institutions or employment offers.737  
The Hukou policy in post 1949 China738 stemmed from two reasons: the policy goal of 
prioritising heavy industry,739 and guaranteeing the levels of food production.740 The 
former contributed to the problem of the latter. At the beginning of the PRC’s formation, 
its cities were full of refugees from rural areas. Industrial production and other 
economic activities were at below pre-World War II levels, and there was a severe food 
shortage.741 The rural refugees in the urban areas were required to return to the rural 
areas for food production.  
In order to prioritise industrialisation (especially heavy industry), policies were 
implemented. These included unequal exchange between industrial and agricultural 
products; collectivisation of agricultural production;742 centralisation of purchasing, 
warehousing and sale of agricultural products; and the control of factors of production 
by the state.743 These policies controlled the price of grains and farming equipment 
through the central management of rural land and the rural population through 
collectives, which are the political and economic organs in a rural area.744  
The government bought grain from farmers at below market prices to be sold at market 
prices in urban areas; and sold farming equipment at above market prices to farmers.745 
                                                 
737 Ibid.  
738 Liu Z, ‘Institution and Inequality: the Hukou System in China’, (2005) 33 Journal of Comparative Economics 
133, at 135. 
739 许经勇《解析中国城乡二元结构体制的成因》, Xu J, ‘Explaining the Reason for the Urban-Rural Dual 
Structure in China’, (2009) 9 World of Research 3 – 6 & 32. 
740 李学,《城乡二元结构问题的制度分析与对策反思》, Li X, ‘The Institutional Analysis of Dualistic Urban-
rural Economy Structure Problem and Relevant Countermeasures’, (2006) 3 Public Management (No 4) 87. 
741 Selden M & You L, ‘The Reform of Social Welfare in China’, (1997) 25 World Development 1657, at 1658. 
742 Agricultural production was organised into rural collectives, which are the economic and political units in rural 
areas. 
743 See above note 733, at 69-70. 
744 See above note 739. 
745 See above note 739. 
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This price difference policy is referred to as the “scissors difference”,746 which is a 
form of hidden tax in the PRC. 747  This “scissors difference” meant the original 
accumulation of capital in the early days of the PRC came from the real surpluses of 
the agricultural sector. The government directed funding away from agriculture to 
promote industry, which means in effect it defocused on agriculture.748 Prioritising 
industrialisation created more job opportunities in urban areas, and fewer people 
remained in rural areas to produce food, thus leading to the need to control the 
movements of the population.  
The decision to have a planned economy in the PRC between 1949 and 1978 was the 
reason behind the developmental differences between the urban and rural economies. 
The major planning tool was the Five-year Plan. Five-year Plans were and still are 
essential to policy development in the PRC. Since 1953, the country planned for its 
economic and social developments through the use of Five-year Plans. Five-year Plans 
and their associated Recommendations by the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party are the most important policy documents in the PRC’s reform and 
economic agenda. Recommendations by the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party are important in the policy process because the preamble of the 
Constitution749 of the PRC prescribed the leadership role of the Chinese Communist 
Party in the governance of the PRC. The Central Committee is the leadership body of 
the Chinese Communist Party. Five-year Plans and their associated Central Committee 
of the Chinese Communist Party Recommendations illustrate the strategic aims of the 
government, in order to identify the focus of government policy to manipulate market 
                                                 
746 剪刀差 
747 Yang B and Huang E, ‘Characteristics of the Chinese tax system and its cultural Underpinnings: a comparison 
with the west’, (2011) 1 Journal of Chinese Tax and Policy 13. 
748 Above note 721, at 70-74.  
749 《中华人民共和国宪法》The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China 2004 (National People’s 
Congress). 
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activities.750 These documents form the basis for the government to perform their 
economic regulation, market supervision, social administration and public service 
functions.751 
Policies to look after the elderly in this pre reform era developed along with other 
economic and social policies. They reacted to the transition from the pragmatism of 
post-war continuation of pre-1949 policies,752 to the time of “rest” between 1949 and 
1955, when the country moved to a Soviet model of governance; and for production 
purposes, private businesses were organised into a State Owned Enterprises framework. 
They then survived the radical socialism of 1955 - 1962, where ideology overtook the 
importance of economy753 to give rise to policy initiatives such as the “great leap 
forward”,754 in the process, breaking the continuity in public finances to look after 
people’s livelihoods. Finally, like other policies, policies to look after the elderly 
suffered during the Cultural Revolution that began in the early 1960s755 that destroyed 
the continuity of a governance infrastructure, where arguably, there was no longer a 
practicable set of formal institutions. The following collates the piecemeal Old-Age 
Pensions policies during this pre Open Door Policy era.  
5.2.1 Piecemeal Policies to Look after the Elderly 
In the pre Open Door Policy era, Old-Age Pensions were part of the social security 
system. The PRC’s post 1949 social security system began at a time when the civil war 
had not completely ended, and the model of government was based on the military 
                                                 
750 The Government of the People’s Republic of China, Online 
<http://www.gov.cn/2011lh/content_1825838.htm> (09 Feb. 2012). 
751 Ibid.  
752 Above note 721, at 39. 
753 Above note 721, at 47-53,  
754 Lippit VD, ‘The Great Leap Forward Reconsidered’, (1975) 1 Modern China (1) 92. 
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structure applied in the base areas during the civil war.756 This military structure also 
bore civil responsibilities.757  
The long war severely damaged the economy, and urban unemployment during 1949-
1951 was as high as 20%.758 The welfare policies at the time were implemented in a 
rations system that was continued from the war era, established on a policy of 
government support for the families of soldiers and those who died in the war; and a 
policy of resettlement of ex-serviceman and soldiers that were disabled by the war.759  
The natural disasters of the early 1960s forced the rural population to escape the land; 
crime and disease became an issue in affected areas. 760  The continuous high 
unemployment meant a “national” social security system was necessary. 761  In the 
Common Creed of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference,762 which was the temporary Constitution at the time, the 
PRC government chose to have its “national” social security system based on that of 
Soviet Russia Policies.763  The system was a workforce insurance system.764  This 
workforce insurance system covered the urban workforce. The full employment 
policies765 of the pre Open Door Policy era meant nearly all of the non-public service 
employees of the urban population were employees of State Owned Enterprises, 
                                                 
756 Above note 721, at 39-40. 
757 刘翠霄,《社会保障法史》, Liu Cuixiao, History of Social Security Laws: 
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762 Above note 759. 
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764 Above note 758. 
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therefore the workforce insurance system covered the whole urban population. Old-
Age Pensions policies were part of this “national” social security system based funded 
by the workforce insurance. This pre Open Door Policy era was the age of the Iron-
rice-bowl.766  
Before the Open Door Policy reforms, the PRC’s social security system that covered 
Urban Old-Age Pensions had the following characteristics:767  
First, the national government used its policy tools to guide the development of the 
social security sector. Until the People’s Livelihoods Reform in the Twelfth Five-year 
Plan,768 there were no consolidated law-documents769 to regulate the social security 
sector, indicating that the leadership did not care whether there was a systemic set of 
institutions.770  
The social security system during planned economy times were based on policy 
documents issued by the State Council or other Ministries. These law-documents were 
regulatory in nature, but were often temporary.771 They were strong on policy but 
weaker on legal formalities. They were flexible but uncertain, which meant that 
although they covered every area of society, they did not solve the social issues a social 
security system ought to address in a practical sense. The instability and ad hoc nature 
of social policies also weakened the security function of the social security system. For 
example, the 1969 Systemic Reform Proposals for the Accounting of State Owned 
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767 Above note 757. 
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Enterprises772 issued by the Ministry of Finance easily shifted something that is the 
fiscal responsibility of the nation to enterprises – turning compulsory Social Insurance, 
albeit contributed by the State Owned Enterprises, into enterprise insurance that is 
funded, paid and administered by the enterprises. Urban Old-Age Pensions as one form 
of social security became essentially one form of remuneration paid by the State Owned 
Enterprise employer. 
Second, social security was the responsibility of the national government (1949-1969) 
or the employer (1970-1978). The individual had no responsibility.773 This meant the 
social welfare of planned economy days, in substance, was provided by the government, 
who was also the major employer. The government as employer was manifested in the 
public service, government agencies, State Owned Enterprises, rural collectives and the 
military. Taking into consideration the Systemic Reform Proposals for the Accounting 
of State Owned Enterprises,774 before 1969, this manifestation was in substance only. 
After 1967, it existed also in form.  
Third, the urban rural divide was another obstacle in the coordination of social security 
in the country. The Hukou Regulation775 separated the PRC’s population and economy 
into the rural and urban planes.776 The distinction of welfare regimes followed. From 
the planned economy days, there were separate welfare schemes for four distinct groups 
in the PRC’s demography: two schemes for the urban population - one for the public 
service and government agencies, and one for enterprises (which are businesses that 
produce goods and services); one for the rural population; and one for the Military 
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774 Above note 772. 
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(comprised of people from both the urban and rural populations, that is, their civilian 
Hukou could either be rural or urban).  
At the time, rural social security policies only existed on paper, so the social security 
system was biased towards the urban economy.777  This is very different from the 
ancient Chinese tradition of looking after the elderly. The traditional policies paid close 
attention778 to the mostly agricultural nature of the economy, and thereby the majority 
of the population is rural.  
For the privileged urban residents,779 there was a relatively complete set of welfare 
policies. The government and enterprises not only had to contribute to the Workforce 
Insurance Fund, 780  as employers, they also had the responsibility to administer 
different social security policies as they evolved through time. These social security 
policies included payments of employee Old-Age Pensions, reimbursement of 
employee medical expenses, even the provision of social security items such as housing, 
canteens, pricing subsidies, childcare, bathing, etc. The employer funded social security 
system also covered education, housing and unemployment through the national 
government’s annual budgets.781 
This meant the social security framework was employer focused. When the turnover of 
the enterprise could no-longer cover social security costs, the government provided 
subsidies.782 Again, this suggests that the social security system was a very good 
                                                 
777 Above note 721, at 309-316. 
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example that before the Open Door Policy, there was no distinct institutional 
framework783 in the PRC that separated government as employer, and government as 
the administrator of laws and policies.784  
The initial urban social security policies in the planned economy era was divided into 
three branches: civil benefits (overlaps with the social relief system), enterprise 
employee benefits, and benefits for public servants and employees of government 
agencies.  
Civil benefits were and are administered by the Ministry and Departments of Civil 
Affairs785 at different levels of government. These are the PRC’s safety net and the 
most basic form of social security. They continue to play the same role in the Social 
Insurance Law786 welfare framework. Civil benefits are funded through the national 
government’s annual budget. Although evidence showed that, when the policy was in 
its infancy, it covered less than 1% of the urban population in the PRC in 1961;787 and 
approximately 3% of the urban population in 2011;788 those who required its support 
were extreme cases; the level of these benefits affected the payment levels of Urban 
Old-Age Pensions throughout the PRC’s post 1949 history. In the Social Insurance 
Law789 welfare framework, they are the benchmarks for the level of basic Urban Old-
Age Pensions benefits. 
                                                 
783 Xu C ‘The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development’, (2011) 49 Journal of Economic 
Literature (4) 1076. 
784 Above note 721, ch 1.  
785 Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Online <www.mca.gov.cn> (2 Feb. 2012).  
786 《中华人民共和国社会保险法》Social Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China 2010 (Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress). 
787 郑功成等,《中国社会保障制度变迁与评估》, Zheng G & others, Changes and Evaluation of the Social 
Security System in China, (Beijing: Remin University Press 2002), at 331.  
788 Urban population that receive the safety net / urban population size = 22,749 / 690,790. Population in 
thousands. Data taken from Civil Affairs Statistics of November 2011, Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s 
Republic of China, Online <www.mca.gov.cn> (2 Feb. 2012); and 马建堂, 《2011 年国民经济继续保持平稳较
快发展》, Ma J, ‘GDP Growth in 2011 Remains Relatively Fast and Stable’, website of National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, January 2012, <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/jdfx/t20120117_402779443.htm> (4 Feb. 2012). 
789 Above note 729. 
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Benefits for enterprise employees were administered by the Ministry of Labor790 and 
its local level government departments, funded according to the different iterations of 
Social Insurance policies. Benefits for public servants and employees of government 
agencies were administered by internal government human resource departments, 
funded by the national government’s annual budget.791 
Urban Old-Age Pensions policies in the welfare framework under the Social Insurance 
Law 792  are based on policies for enterprise employees. 793  The Urban Enterprise 
Employees Social Security Scheme in planned economy days was covered by the 
Workforce Insurance Regulation.794 It covered the whole range of social security items, 
including what later was partially funded by the five Social Insurances: Old-Age 
Pensions, Healthcare, Workers Compensation, Parental and an unemployment safety 
net. In this era, these five social security items and their associated Social Insurances 
did not develop separately, because especially from 1969,795 the system was employer 
administered. 
The insignificant role played by laws in this era meant that the social security items 
were regulated by a regulation made by the then Ministry of Government (now State 
Council). On 26th February 1951, the first Workforce Insurance Regulation796 was 
promulgated. It came into effect on 1st March 1951. The scheme in the Workforce 
Insurance Regulation797 was an employer-centric scheme, where the government as 
                                                 
790 Now renamed as the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. 
791 Above note 757. 
792 Above note 729. 
793 《国务院关于机关事业单位工作人员养老保险制度改革的决定》Decision on Reforming the Old-Age 
Pensions Social Insurance System of Public Servants and Employees of Government Agencies 2015 (State 
Council). 
794 Above note 780.  
795 Above note 772. 
796 Above note 780. 
797 Above note 780. 
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employer provided welfare. The coverage of the Workforce Insurance Regulation798 
was strictly limited since the economy had not recovered.799  
The employer centric nature of the workforce insurance allowed coverage to change as 
production levels changed.800 With fixed and planned price levels, changed level of 
production was equivalent to changes in economic output, therefore equivalent to 
economic growth. The Workforce Insurance Regulation801 was amended on 2 January 
1953 to take into account the improved economic conditions.802  
The improved economic conditions meant that enterprise employees of “factories, 
mines and their affiliated organisations, and railway, shipping, postage enterprises and 
their affiliated organisations” with fewer than “100 employees” were also covered by 
the scheme.803 For enterprises that were temporarily not covered by the Workforce 
Insurance Regulation, 804  their Workforce Insurance was covered by Workforce 
Insurance Contracts according to the principles 805  of the Workforce Insurance 
Regulation.806  
By the end of 1956, the Workforce Insurance Regulation807 had expanded its scope to 
dependent parents, children and spouses of employees, where benefits included half-
fee medical services and support benefits after the death of the employee. During the 
                                                 
798 Above note 780. 
799 Above note 757. 
800 Svejnar J, ‘China in Light of the Performance of the Transition Economies’, in Brandt L & Rawski TG ed, 
China’s Great Economic Transformation, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), at 68 - 90. 
801 Above note 780. 
802The Ministry of Labor followed to issue the Workforce Insurance Regulation Detailed Implementation Rule to 
detail how the Regulation was to be implemented.《劳动保险条例实施细则》Workforce Insurance Regulation 
Detailed Implementation Rule of the People’s Republic of China 1953 (Previously Ministry of Labor, Now 
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security) 1953. 
803 Above note 780, Art 2.  
804 Above note 780. 
805 As the legal system was still at its infancy, “principles” allowed a lot of freedom for discretion. During the 
planned economy days, this discretion made decision making pragmatic. 
806 Above note 780. 
807 Above note 780. 
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time of the Workforce Insurance Regulation,808  those who benefited amounted to 
between one sixth and one fifth of the total population.809 The coverage of the scheme 
was relatively broad.  
The Workforce Insurance Regulation 810  was successfully implemented up till the 
Cultural Revolution. Its success was attributed to the strict formulation of the law and 
regulation, and a centralised contribution and public expenditure model that was 
implemented throughout the country. 811  Its implementation reflected economic 
efficiency and equality812 because the funds in the specialised Workforce Insurance 
Fund and their associated union accounts were relatively difficult to redirect to other 
purposes.813 Towards the end of 1957, the foundation of the Social Insurance system 
for post 1949 China was almost complete. The PRC had re-established a welfare 
state.814 
5.2.1.1 Coverage and Contributions under the Workforce Insurance 
Regulation815 
For enterprise employees, the coverage of the Workforce Insurance Regulation816 was 
very similar to the welfare policies under the contemporary Social Insurance Law817 
                                                 
808 Above note 780. 
809 高书生,《社会保障改革何去何从》, Gao S, Social Security Reform, Where to from Now, (Beijing: Renmin 
University Press, 2006), at 33. 
810 Above note 780.  
811 Yang B & Huang E, Taxation in China (Sydney: Thomeson Reuters, 2016 Forthcoming), at ch 2.  
812 Efficiency and equality are two of the four cannons of good tax system design argued for by Adam Smith in 
his Wealth of Nations. The other two cannons are simplicity and certainty. See Coleman C, & others, Australian 
Tax Analysis: Cases, Commentary, Commercial Applications and Questions, (Sydney: Lawbook Co., 2011), at 4-
5. 
813 Above note 757. 
814 王占臣等主编,《社会保障法全书》（上）, Wang Z, & others, eds, Encyclopaedia of Social Security I, 
(Beijing: Reform Press,1995), at 7. 
815 Above note 780. 
816 Above note 780. 
817 Above note 729. 
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welfare framework, because the Workforce Insurances were the original forms of the 
contemporary welfare policies.  
Events that triggered the payment of benefits covered by Workforce Insurance 
Regulation818 included retirement, sickness, disability, childrearing, death and support 
of dependent parents, children and spouses. There were three type of benefits based on 
the employment relationship between the employee and the government as employer: 
1) Short term Workforce Insurance benefits directly paid by the employer; 
2) Long term Workforce Insurance benefits paid by the Workforce Insurance Fund; 
and  
3) Workforce Insurance benefits paid to the dependent parents, children and 
spouses. 
The employer centric scheme paid benefits based on two conditions that were 
dependent on the employment relationship:  
1) Whether the employee was a union member. Non-union members received half 
of the benefits otherwise payable; 
2) Model employees and war heroes who returned to work for their original 
employer enjoyed further Workforce Insurance benefits.819 
The contributions mechanism for employers of Workforce Insurance under the 
Workforce Insurance Regulation 820  was similar to the contribution mechanism of 
                                                 
818 Above note 780. 
819 Above note 757. 
820 Above note 780.  
144 
 
Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions under the Social Insurance 
Law.821  
The Workforce Insurance was paid by employers, at a rate of 3% of total payroll of the 
enterprise. It prohibited deducting payments from the wages and salary of employees, 
and prohibited otherwise collecting an amount equivalent to an insurance contribution 
from employees. 
During the first two months of contributing to the Workforce Insurance for the benefit 
of any employee, the insurance paid by enterprises was collectively saved in an account 
kept by the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, as part of the sinking fund of the 
Workforce Insurance.822 From the third month, 70% of funds collected were saved in 
the accounts of the enterprise’s union branch823 accounting for Workforce Insurance 
funding; and 30% was collectively saved in the account of the All-China Federation of 
Trade Unions, as part of the sinking fund of the Workforce Insurance.824 This way, the 
policy was administered centrally by the national government, and the funding of 
benefits was from one pool. Those employers who did not pay or were late in paying 
workforce insurance were penalised by a fine, or the local bank branch was notified to 
deduct payment from the employer’s accounts.825 
The difference to the scheme under the Social Insurance Law826 was that the employer 
was responsible for administering the benefits, making it part of the urban employee’s 
employment benefits. Since the employer was the government, the collection of the 
                                                 
821 Above note 729.  
822 Above note 757. 
823 The All-China Federation of Trade Unions is the head body of trade unions in the PRC. It is a government 
agency. There was a branch in every government department, government agency and State Owned Enterprise. 
824 Above note 757. 
825 Above note 757. 
826 Above note 729.  
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Workforce Insurance also worked like the collections of an earmarked tax paid and 
born by employers. An earmarked tax is collected, and kept separate to general tax 
revenue, for a specific purpose.827 The penalties added to the compulsory nature of the 
Workforce Insurance contributions.  
The government here mixed its roles as the employer and asset owner, and that of 
government authority. Instead of providing welfare as a public good in legal form, it 
was providing benefits to employees as if they were private employment benefits. In 
substance, because the PRC had a planned economy where all enterprises were State 
Owned Enterprises and all members of the urban population were practically State 
employees, there was no difference between the State providing a private benefit as an 
employer, or it providing a social benefit as a government. Where the employer was 
not the government, Labor Departments at local government areas had the 
responsibility to administer payments to employees of privately owned enterprises.828 
5.2.1.2 Unfortunate Turn of Events 
One unfortunate turn of events in the post 1949 history of providing welfare for urban 
employees was the issuing of the Reform Proposal on the Accounting System of State 
Owned Enterprises 829  by the Ministry of Finance in February 1969. This law-
document shifted the formal responsibility of funding social welfare for urban 
enterprise employees to the employer. It completely abolished the distinction between 
the government as employee and asset owner, and the government as administrative 
authority.830  
                                                 
827 Carling R, ‘Tax Earmarking, is It Good Practice?’ in Perspectives on Tax Reform (12),CIS Policy Monograph 
75, (Sydney: The Centre for Independent Studies, 2007). 
828 Above note 757. 
829 Above note 772. 
830 Above note 811, at ch 2. 
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The Reform Proposal on the Accounting System of State Owned Enterprises831 stopped 
requiring State Owned Enterprises to pay Workforce Insurance as an earmarked tax 
into the separate Workforce Insurance Fund accounts held at enterprise level unions 
and the general Workforce Insurance Fund administered by the All-China Federation 
of Trade Unions. What this meant was instead of listing Workforce Insurance as a line 
item in the enterprise’s accounts; enterprises have to account for retirement wages,832 
long term sickness payments and other types of workforce security payments as 
separate expenses. In substance, the Reform Proposal on the Accounting System of State 
Owned Enterprises833 turned an at least formally, centrally administered earmarked tax 
type social welfare (including Old-Age Pensions) system that played a role of income 
redistribution, to an employer administered social security system where enterprises 
were fully responsible for funding it. It turned a Social Insurance system covered by 
public finances, to a semi-private welfare insurance system born by the employer, 
thereby completely reducing the provision of social welfare into internal affairs of an 
enterprise.834  
In regards to providing for Urban Old-Age Pensions as a welfare item, the government 
is no longer providing it as a public authority through its budget. Instead, it is providing 
it as part of the remuneration of the employee. To the government, when providing 
welfare items such as Urban Old-Age Pensions, the employees are no longer citizens 
of the State, but employees. At this point, the PRC government turned away from the 
tradition of looking after the elderly by the sovereign. Although the system still looks 
similar to a pay as you go Pensions funding model, 835  the government was not 
                                                 
831 Above note 772. 
832 The Chinese word “工资”, meaning wages was used in the Workforce Insurance Regulation. 
833 Above note 772. 
834 Above note 772. 
835 Feldstein M, ‘Social Security Pensions Reform in China”, (1999) 10 China Economic Review 99. 
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considering funding the Urban Old-Age Pensions as a public good. It is no longer 
making policies for social welfare. The 1969 Reform Proposal on the Accounting 
System of State Owned Enterprises836 signified that in the PRC government’s policy 
making process, social security items, such as the Urban Old-Age Pensions were 
considered as an expense item for State Owned Enterprises.  
This unfortunate turn of events meant enterprises of different sizes and nature bore 
different social security burdens, giving rise to inefficiency and unfairness in the social 
security system, and placing a long term obstacle in China’s post 1949 development of 
social welfare policies. It ended the opportunity to build a nationwide social security 
policy framework. This negative event also broke with the tradition of government 
provided welfare to look after the elderly in China’s history. 
Another turn of events was the Cultural Revolution.837 It was an unfortunate turn for 
the development of social welfare policies, as it was for other areas of policy in the 
PRC. The realities of the Cultural Revolution meant the implementation of the social 
security system was again almost non-existent. In June 1970, the Ministry of Labor was 
abolished and the union system was nearing collapse. What this meant was that many 
employees who met the requirements to retire had no place to register their retirement 
status.838 Only until the Temporary Implementation Rules on Caring for Old, Weak, Ill 
and Disabled Officials (the No. 104 Document)839 was issued, did the semblance of an 
Old-Age Pensions system begin to re-emerge. The No.104 Document840 listed detailed 
provisions of conditions for retirement and retirement benefits, especially the minimum 
                                                 
836 Above note 772. 
837 Above note 723. 
838 Above note 757. 
839 No 104 Document included two law-documents: 《关于安置老弱病残干部的暂行办法》Temporary 
Implementation Rules on Caring for Old, Weak, Ill and Disabled Officials 1978 (State Council); and《关于工人
退休、退职的暂行办法》Temporary Implementation Rules on Retirement and Resignation of Workers 1978 
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Old-Age Pensions standard and the policy of “child swap parent”.841 The “child swap 
parent” policy was that, when the parent retires, one of the children can work in a State 
Owned Enterprise, usually that of the parent’s previous employer. No.104 Document 
is still often used as a benchmark in the PRC when registering a person’s retirement 
and calculating Old-Age Pensions benefits.  
5.3 The Open Door Policy and Urban Old-Age Pensions 
The end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976842 signalled the beginning of a new era in 
the PRC. The Open Door Policy that began in 1978 started reform to gradually rebuild 
formal institutions in the PRC. This was an era where private activities in the market 
were again allowed and encouraged, giving rise to the necessity for formal institutions 
that enabled effective and efficient market activities.843 
The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China 844  (the third plenum) marked the beginning of economic, social and legal 
reforms in the PRC. Reforms began as decisions made by the Chinese Communist Party. 
Throughout the reform, the party did not lose its “paramount position” in the PRC’s 
institutional framework. Although the party continued to dictate policy directions, a 
functional institutional framework had been established.845 The PRC continued with a 
gradual approach to its reforms. 846  This gradual approach is highlighted by 
                                                 
841 顶岗。 
842 Above note 723. 
843 Clark D & Others, ‘The Role of Law in China’s Economic Development’, in Brandt L & Rawski TG ed, 
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721, ch 1. 
844 Above note 726. 
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experiments in the form of pilots847 regulated by lower level law-documents in local 
government areas, or particular industries.  
The reform to Urban Old-Age Pensions policies is not an exception.848 Specifically for 
Urban Old-Age Pensions policies. The Pilot Proposal on Improvements to the Urban 
Social Security System (Pilot 2000)849 issued by the State Council in 2000 was the 
experiment in preparation for the Decision of the State Council on Improving the System 
of Basic Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance for Enterprise Employees850 issued in 
2005. The experiment was performed in the Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang Provinces. 
Reforms important for the purposes of looking after the urban elderly included the 
marketisation of the economy, especially State Owned Enterprise reform, and allowing 
the growth of the private sector; the fiscal structure reform; and the rebuilding of State 
machinery.851 The rebuilding of State machinery was the process that developed a 
practicable legal system, where the Constitution852 clarified the roles and functions of 
different branches of government. 853  The increasing importance of law 854  in the 
reform process had made policy implementation more certain. In this era, the economy 
gradually opened to the global market, and industrialisation meant the population began 
to urbanise. 
                                                 
847 For example, during the recent real estate tax reform process, Shanghai was chosen as an experiment area, the 
pilot was regulated by《上海市开展对部分个人住房征收房产税试点的暂行办法》Temporary Implementation 
Rule for the Shanghai Pilot on the Levying of Real Estate Tax for Selected Individual Residential Real Estate 2011 
(Shanghai People’s Government).  
848 west L, ‘Pensions Reform in China: Preparing for the Future’, (1999) 35 The Journal of Development Studies 
(3) 153. 
849 《完善城镇社会保障体系试点方案》Pilot Proposal on Improvements to the Urban Social Security System 
2000 (State Council). 
850 《国务院关于完善企业职工基本养老保险制度的决定》Decision of the State Council on Improving the 
System of Basic Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance for Enterprise Employees 2005 (State Council). 
851 Above note 723, 115. 
852 Above note 749. 
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18 The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs (July) 15. 
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Chinese scholars often refer to four stages of post Open Door Policy reforms.855 The 
first stage was December 1978 to September 1984, where the capitalist mode of 
production and commerce was reintroduced into the planned economy in the PRC, with 
the market allowed to operate at minimal regulation.856 October 1984 to January 1992 
was the second stage, the era of the “planned market economy on the basis of public 
ownership”.857 The third stage covered February 1992 to September 2003, establishing 
the “socialist market economy”.858 October 2003 to the present continues economic 
development and develops policies for people’s livelihoods and income redistribution. 
The policy proposals in the People’s Livelihoods Reform stage aim for harmonisation 
between urban and rural areas in relation to economic and social policies. 859  The 
People’s Livelihoods Reform stage refers to the Twelfth Five-year Plan860 period, 
including the policy discussion and the associated recommendation by the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 
This research reconfigures the periods for the purposes of looking after the urban 
elderly. 1997 861  was chosen as the turning point, because it was when the PRC 
consolidated regulations to rebuild a welfare framework that is suitable for its 
increasingly market-based economy. It was the year the State Council Decision on 
                                                 
855 白永秀,《由“前改革时代”到“后改革时代》, Bai Y, ‘From the “Pre-reform” Era to the “Post-reform” Era’, 
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Renmin Press, 2003). 
859 Above note 855, at 7 - 8. 
860 Above note 768.  
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Unifying the Enterprise Employee Basic Old-Age Pensions Insurance Systems862 was 
issued. 
5.3.1 The Open Door Policy Era 1978 – 1997 
In this era, the first phase of the reform to government policies that looked after the 
urban elderly began to emerge as a reaction to the marketisation of the economy. State 
Owned Enterprises could no longer perform the role of welfare provider,863 because 
they needed the flexibility to react to market forces and newly established market based 
regulations.864 Employees of these State Owned Enterprises, however, still demanded 
welfare paid to them as employees, not as citizens. Increasingly, private enterprises 
began to enter the market, either as individuals or as companies.865 The government 
had to balance the pensions needs of its citizens, since it was no longer the major 
employer in the economy.  
Out of the two elements of marketisation – allowing private enterprises and the State 
Owned Enterprises reform, the former was the focus in this era.866 The Third Plenum 
allowed market forces to play an important role in the economy, and pragmatic policies 
were made as a result.867 This was type I reform as identified by Svejnar,868 where two 
important elements were government abandoning central planning and developing a 
safety net.  
                                                 
862 《国务院关于建设统一的企业职工基本养老保险制度的决定》State Council Decision on Unifying the 
Enterprise Employee Basic Old-Age Pensions Insurance Systems 1997 (State Council). 
863 Above note 721, at 297.  
864 Clark D & Others, ‘The Role of Law in China’s Economic Development’, in above note 846, at 391. 
865 Clark D & Others, ‘The Role of Law in China’s Economic Development’, in above note 846, at 391. 
866 Above note 721, at 68-69. 
867 Above note 721, at 68-69. 
868 Above note 800, at 70. 
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In this phase of reform, a social security system based on the five types of Social 
Insurances was established as a reaction to the economic reform in the form of the Open 
Door Policy.869 As employment was no longer guaranteed in the urban areas through 
State Owned Enterprises and the public sector, these policies based on Social 
Insurances began to bridge the policy gaps.870 Social welfare became necessary as 
additional policies to welfare items supplied as part of employment remuneration. In 
this era, the leadership focused more attention on economic growth, and trusting that 
growth will lead to funds to cover Urban Employee Old-Age Pensions.871  
With respect to providing social welfare, economic developments post Open Door 
Policy necessitated the gradual separation of the private and public functions of the 
government 872  in the PRC. This necessity was the trigger for re-establish social 
securities based on a welfare state model, returning to the tradition where the 
government looked after the elderly.  
In order to better identify citizens for benefits, from the late 1980s, administration of 
social security became beneficiary based. In this scheme, the unit of contribution for 
the five Social Insurances was the employee who is the individual participant in the 
scheme, not the employer. This participation model is still implemented within the 
Social Insurance Law873 welfare framework. The five Social Insurances are the Old-
Age Pensions Social Insurance, Health Social Insurance, Workers Compensation Social 
Insurance, Parental Leave Social Insurance, and Unemployment Social Insurance.  
                                                 
869 Above note 848. 
870 Above note 721, at 297. 
871 Above note 721, at 297 - 299. 
872 Above note 811, at ch 2. 
873 Above note 729. 
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There were significant policy developments in Urban Old-Age Pensions policies before 
the People’s Livelihoods Reform that resulted in the Social Insurance Law874 welfare 
framework. The contribution and payment mechanisms returned to that in the 
Workforce Insurance Regulation875 before the unfortunate turn of events in 1969.  
The difference to the Workforce Insurance Regulation876 era was the redevelopment of 
the private sector as part of market reforms meant State Owned Enterprises were no 
longer the only players in the PRC’s economy. As well as encouraging private 
enterprise, there were different policy phases to corporatise or privatise State Owned 
Enterprises.  
As more people began to work for the private sector, or became unemployed during 
State Owned Enterprise restructures, and more rural dwellers began to find employment 
in urban centres, social security based on welfare policies centred on the government 
as employer was no longer enough to cover the whole society. State Owned Enterprises 
became solidly private citizens when they acted as employers and owners of assets. The 
government separated itself from the market based activities of these State Owned 
Enterprises to play the role of the administrative authority by administering laws and 
regulations that affect enterprises, regardless whether they are state owned, or privately 
owned. While the government no longer mixed its two roles, it was necessary for the 
government to have separate fiscal policies and laws to regulate the welfare state. 
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875 Above note 780.  
876 Above note 780. 
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5.3.1.1 Urban Old-Age Pensions Policies that Reacted to Marketisation 
Through the operation of the Reform Proposal on the Accounting System of State 
Owned Enterprises,877 the Old-Age Pensions provisions in the Workforce Insurance 
Regulation 878  forced the burden of Old-Age Pensions provision onto employers; 
thereby tying employees to one employer because their retirement benefits were the 
responsibility of that employer. This inflexibility meant the labour force was not mobile. 
This disadvantage was heightened during the period of economic system reform as a 
result of the Open Door Policy. One important reform during this first period of the post 
Open Door Policy era was the reform of State Owned Enterprises to further differentiate 
the asset ownership function and public authority functions of the government.879 The 
establishment of the five Social Insurances (Old-Age Pensions, Health, Workers 
Compensation, Parental, and Unemployment) assisted in the process to reform State 
Owned Enterprises and the social security system to free up labour supply.  
In this era, the social security system that included Urban Old-Age Pensions moved 
organically from a system based in the State Owned Enterprise, or public sector 
employers, to that administered by the government, especially local governments.880 
The Temporary Rules on Labour Contracts of State Owned Enterprises881 issued by 
the State Council in 1986 established the Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance system 
where employers and employees share contributions. It prescribed social contribution 
to a Social Insurance Fund as the source of funding to provide for the retirement of 
                                                 
877 Above note 7721461. 
878 Above note 780.  
879 Above note 811. 
880 Above note 721, at 297-298. 
881《国营企业实行劳动合同制暂行规定》Temporary Ruling of Labour Contracts of State Owned Enterprises 
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employees who have employment contracts, where the enterprise and the employee 
make contributions according to a set ratio to an Old-Age Pensions fund. When the 
Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Fund does not have sufficient funds to meet 
retirement benefit needs, the government subsidises. This was the response to the 
failing employer administered remuneration like system that was the result of the 1969 
unfortunate turn of events. Those who work for the private sector began to have access 
to the five forms of social securities, including Urban Old-Age Pensions.  
Social Contribution882 of funds continues to be an essential feature of the contributions 
mechanism of Urban Old-Age Pensions, continuing in the welfare framework under the 
Social Insurance Law.883 What it amounts to is Social Insurance Contributions and 
associated benefit payments administered by government authorities, rather than 
administered by employers. The government no longer sees itself as the employer. 
In the Open Door Policy era, social contribution was administered by Labor 
Departments – both the contributions of Social Insurance, and the payment of benefits. 
Employers and employees contributed towards funds operated by third party financial 
institutions.884 When there was a shortfall of funds in the third party operated Old-Age 
Pensions Fund, adjustments in the form of government subsidies from consolidated 
revenue according to pensions payment needs were made.885 
The same mechanisms are still in place in the current Old-Age Pensions Social 
Insurance Contributions structure, except the Local Tax Bureaus of the State 
                                                 
882 劳动保障部,《什么是退休费用社会统筹?》, Ministry of Labor, What is Retirement Insurance Centralised 
Social Contribution? : <http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-06/14/content_6394.htm> (2 Feb. 2012). 
883 Above note 729. 
884 Above note 757. 
885 Above note 881. 
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Administrations of Taxation now have administrative responsibility for 
contributions.886   
Another essential element of Urban Old-Age Pensions under the Social Insurance 
Law 887  welfare framework is centralised administration of Social Insurance 
Contributions. Policies for centralised administration of Social Insurance Contributions 
were first developed in this era. In 1991, the State Council issued State Council 
Decision on the Reform of Urban Employee Social Insurance System (the 1991 
Decision)888, establishing the principle to increase administrative centralisation of Old-
Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions from the prefecture level, to the 
provincial level, then to the national level. By the end of 1992, 95% of prefectures in 
the PRC achieved social contribution of Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance by State 
Owned Enterprises at the prefecture level.889 
The 1991 Decision890 also made provisions about the multi-tier Old-Age Pensions 
structure in the PRC. It achieved this by making in principle provisions to allow the 
development of private pensions insurances.  
The structure of Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Accounts in the Social 
Insurance Funds Budget – a social pooling account and individual accounts for each 
participant, also began to be developed in this era. In 1995, the State Council issued 
                                                 
886 《社会保险费征缴暂行条例》Temporary Regulations on the Collection of Social Insurance Contributions 
1999 (State Council); and State Administration of Taxation, Online: 《全国税务机关社会保险费征管工作会议
日前召开  税务机关 4 年征收百姓“养命钱”1.8 万亿元》, ‘the Social Insurance Contributions Administration 
Conference was Convened a Few Days Ago  Tax Bureaus Collected RMB1.8 Trillion of “Survival Money” from 
the People’<http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810219/n810724/c1108439/content.html> (13 Feb. 2011). 
887 Above note 729. 
888 《国务院关于城镇企业职工养老保险制度改革的决定》State Council Decision on the Reform of Urban 
Employee Social Insurance System 1991 (State Council). 
889 中国社会科学院、德国阿登纳基金会,《中国城市社会保障的改革》, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
& Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Current Social Security Reform in Urban China, KAS-Schriftenreihe China Nr. 11, 
(Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung), at 107. 
890 Above note 888. 
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Circular on Increasing the Efforts to Reform Employee Old-Age Pensions Insurance891 
to establish such an Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance model based on social 
contribution and individual accounts.892 In this model, the Old-Age Pensions Social 
Insurance contributed by the employer is collected into social insurance pooling 
accounts in the Social Insurance Fund. Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance contributed 
on behalf of the employee is collected in the individual accounts in the Social Insurance 
Fund.893 In this era, the two accounts began to be administered by social security 
authorities. Currently, this authority is the Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security and its lower level government departments. Old-Age Pensions for employees, 
therefore, consist of benefits funded by both the social contribution pooing fund and 
individual accounts.  
Fiscal reform in the PRC that reacts to the increased volume of market based activities 
also began in this era.894 It was marked by the 1993/1994 tax sharing895 reform. This 
reform introduced the Value Added Tax and Business Tax into the revenue mix, 
capturing the majority of market based enterprise activities. Up to the end of 2013, 
revenue from these two taxes contributed a dominant portion of the PRC’s fiscal 
revenue.896  
                                                 
891 《关于深化企业职工养老保险制度改革的通知》Circular on Increasing the Efforts to Reform Employee 
Old-Age Pensions Insurance 1995 (State Council). 
892 The government took into consideration the benchmark practice in Germany. See 刘翠霄,《主题研讨 :德国
法巡礼-德国社会保障制度》, Liu C, ‘Keynote Address: Travel through German Law - The German Social 
Security System’, (2001) Global Legal Comments 423. 
893 Above note 757, at ch10.  
894 Wong CPW, ‘China’s Fiscal System: A Work in Progress’, in Brandt L & Rawski TG ed, China’s Great 
Economic Transformation, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), at 429-466. 
895 《国务院关于实行分税制财政管理体制的决定》The Decision of the State Council on Implementing a Tax 
Split Public Finance Management System 1993 (State Council).  
896 See statistical analysis in Appendix F. 
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5.3.2 The Post Open Door Policy Era – After 1997  
During the Open Door Policy economic reforms from a planned economy to a market 
economy, structural issues became apparent in the PRC. 1997 was the year when 
sustainable economic development became important in the PRC.897 This is the stage 
of type II reforms identified by Svejnar, 898  where privatisation of State Owned 
Enterprises and “enforcement of a market-oriented legal system and accompanying 
institutions” are important elements in the reform. Around this time, urban poverty 
became apparent in different forms, such as unemployment, inflation induced low Old-
Age Pensions benefit levels and high medical costs, and poverty from the resulting 
economic life cycle events of the Open Door Policy, especially the newly unemployed 
from the State Owned Enterprise reform.899 This poverty arose because there were 
initially no policies and laws to cover the urban population who were not public 
servants, government agency employees or employees of State Owned Enterprises.  
Policy developments took into consideration a broader policy perspective, where the 
government no-longer aims for the same types of pensions replacement rates as the 
employer funded era. Pensions replacement rates refer to the ratio between Pensions 
benefit payments and average wage and salary levels.   
In this era, policy direction gradually moved towards looking after those who have not 
yet benefited from the reform.900 The government also moved to tighten its Social 
Insurance framework to capture the urban population that is no longer employed by 
State Owned Enterprises or the government. This tightening of the framework means 
                                                 
897 Above note 721, at ch 10; and Clark D & Others, ‘The Role of Law in China’s Economic Development’, in 
note 846, at 391. 
898 Above note 868, at 70, 
899 Above note 721, at  
900 Above note 721, at 298. 
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that the PRC is finally considering Old-Age Pensions as part of the State’s liability, and 
therefore providing for it as a public good in its laws. Tong901 identified this era as a 
time when citizens could no longer hide under the protective umbrella provided by their 
government organisations. Urban Old-Age Pensions are no longer employment 
remuneration. This policy shift is returning to the Chinese policy tradition of looking 
after the elderly by the government as discussed in detail in Chapter IV. 
Three policy initiatives were important in this era: 
The first, was allowing profit seeking private players to enter the market to supply 
private insurance programmes parallel to the five types of social insurances,902  to 
participants who were not previously covered by the government as employer.903  
A second initiative, was to establish a social relief system.904 This system covered three 
types of beneficiaries: the “three withouts” 905  – without legal guardians or legal 
providers, without ability to work, without stable income source; that is, orphans, the 
elderly, the disabled and the widowed; victims of natural disasters; and people living in 
distress.906  
The State Council issued the Announcement on Establishing Systems of Urban Resident 
Low Income Safety Net by Local Government Authorities907 in 1997, requiring all 
urban governments to establish a system of minimum living standards (the safety net) 
                                                 
901 佟新,《我国的老龄化、性别和养老政策》Tong X, ‘The Ageing Population, Gender and Old-Age Welfare 
Policies in China’ (2008) 22 Central China Science and Technology University Journal Social Sciences Edition (2) 
82, at 86. 
902 Allowed by the State Council Decision on the Reform of Urban Employee Social Insurance System. Above 
note 888. 
903 Above note 721, at 298. 
904 Above note 757. 
905 “三无” 
906 Department of Civil Affairs of Guangdong Province, Online <http://www.gdmz.gov.cn/ywgl/shjj/> (8 Feb. 
2012).  
907《国务院关于在各地建立城市居民最低生活保障制度的通知》Announcement on Establishing Systems of 
Urban Resident Low Income Safety Net by Local Government Authorities 1997 (State Council). 
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by the end of 1999. The Regulation of Urban Resident Low Income Safety Net908 issued 
by the State Council that came into effect on the 1st of October 1999 included the 
following:909 
1) Coverage, where urban residents with urban Hukou, whose average per-capita 
household income910 is below the safety net of the local area are entitled to 
monetary and non-monetary support from the local government.911 
2) Relief standards, where the minimum urban living standard was set according 
to the cost of food, clothing and housing in the local area, also taking into 
consideration the cost of water, energy and public education for minors.912  
3) Source of funding for social relief, where the source of funding is accounted for 
in the local government’s budget (as opposed to the national government’s 
budget) as a separate line item – Social Relief Special Fund, it is independently 
administered.913  
These provisions of the social relief system performed the role of the safety net914 in 
the PRC’s welfare policy framework. 
                                                 
908 《城市居民最低生活保障条例》Regulation of Urban Resident Low Income Safety Net 1999 (State Council). 
909 Above note 757. 
910 Per-capita household income refers to total income in the household divided by number of persons in the 
household.  
911 After one year of implementation of the Regulation of Urban Resident Low Income Safety Net, nationally, up 
to 3.82 million people were enjoying the Civil Benefit, traditional civil affairs targets accounted for 15% of the 
people or households that received the Civil Benefit, 85% were made up of families experiencing difficulties who 
are employed, made redundant (下岗), unemployed, and retired, etc. See 时正新主编,《中国社会福利与社会进
步报告》, Shi Z, ed, Report on the Social Security and Social Development in China, (Beijing: Social Sciences 
Literature Press, 2001), at 77. 
912 In 2000, the highest level of the safety net in an administrative district was RMB 319 per month, the lowest 
was RMB 78 per month. See 时正新主编,《中国社会福利与社会进步报告》, Shi Z, ed, Report on the Social 
Security and Social Development in China, (Beijing: Social Sciences Literature Press, 2001). Data showed, in July 
2012, the average Civil Benefits standard in the PRC was RMB 236.01, the highest level of the Civil Benefits in an 
administrative district occured in the Zhejiang Province, the standard was RMB 652.66 per month; the lowest 
occured in the Yunnan Province, the standard was RMB24.08 per month.《2012 年 7 月份全国县以上城市低保
数据》, ‘Urban Safety Net Data of Chinese Administrative Areas above County Level 2012’in Ministry of Civil 
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Online 
<http://files2.mca.gov.cn/cws/201208/20120821161457813.htm> (21 Sep. 2012). 
913 In 2000, each level of government spent more than RMB 2, 960 Billion on the safety net (Approximately AUD 
892 Billion). See 多吉才让, 《中国最低生活保障制度研究与实践》, Duo Ji Cai Rang, Research and 
Application of the Safety Net in China, (Beijing: Renmin Press, 2001), at 154. 
914 Above note 811, at ch 10. 
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The third policy initiative relates specifically to Urban Old-Age Pensions policies. 
Many policies in the Social Insurance Law915 welfare framework and its associated 
law-documents were made in this era. Amendments continued to improve the Old-Age 
Pensions Social Insurance scheme, where the employer and employee share 
contribution responsibilities.  
In 1997, the turning point in the PRC’s welfare policy reform, the State Council issued 
the State Council Decision on Unifying the Enterprise Employee Basic Old-Age 
Pensions Insurance Systems (the State Council Decision 1997).916 The State Council 
Decision 1997917 entrenched the requirement for the government to provide for social 
security, including the Urban Old-Age Pensions, as a public authority. The issuing of 
the Decision918 in effect returned Urban Old-Age Pensions to a government provided 
public good, rather than a form of employment remuneration. The government’s role 
as employer is no longer included within the terms of reference in the PRC’s welfare 
policy making process. The Decision919 enabled the expansion of the coverage of Old-
Age Pensions Social Insurance to employees of all urban enterprises, and to gradually 
extend to covering urban sole-traders.  
The State Council Decision 1997920 decided to standardise three core issues:  
1) the ratio between employer and employee contribution; 
2) the size of individual accounts; and 
3) payment methods of Old-Age Pensions benefits. 
                                                 
915 Above note 729. 
916 Above note 862.  
917 Above note 862. 
918 Above note 862. 
919 Above note 862. 
920 Above note 862. 
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Feldstein921 suggested that at this point, the PRC has a conditional defined benefits 
system, where “individuals have defined contribution accounts but are also guaranteed 
a minimum amount (a defined benefit). Any shortfall between the annuity provided by 
the defined contribution account and the guaranteed defined benefit amount is made up 
by the government.” The defined benefit portion of the Urban Old-Age Pensions 
scheme in the PRC refers to the Basic Urban Old-Age Pensions that is now guaranteed 
by the Social Insurance Law.922 
2000 was the next important year in the institutional development of looking after the 
urban elderly in the PRC. The State Council issued the Pilot Proposal on Improvements 
to the Urban Social Security System.923 The Pilot 2000924 was an experiment in the 
Liaoning, Shenyang and Heilongjiang Provinces in preparation for the issue of the 
Decision of the State Council on Improving the System of Basic Old-Age Pensions 
Social Insurance for Enterprise Employees (the State Council Decision 2005)925 in 
2005. The Pilot 2000926 stipulated that enterprises are liable to contribute an amount 
of Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance equivalent to 20% of their total payroll927 
to the social pooling account, income redistribution in the form of centralised 
administration of Social Insurance Contributions and final payment of benefits would 
occur at the provincial level; and the employer is liable to contribute on behalf of the 
employee an amount of Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance equivalent to 8% of the 
individual’s wage income to the individual’s Individual Urban Old-Age Pensions 
Account. The employee portion was reduced from 11% in earlier policy in the State 
                                                 
921 Above note 835, at 99-107. 
922 Above note 729, Art 15. 
923 Above note 849.  
924 Above note 849. 
925 Above note 850.  
926 Above note 850. 
927 Total payroll = total cost of the wages and salaries of employees. 
163 
 
Council Decision 1997.928 Individuals who had not yet contributed for 15 years could 
not enjoy Basic Urban Old-Age Pensions. Instead, savings in individual accounts would 
be paid out as a one off lump sum.929  
In the same year, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security issued the 
Announcement on Speeding up the Implementation of Social Distribution of Old-Age 
Pensions Benefits930 and the Announcement on Standardising the Procedure of Social 
Distribution of Old-Age Pensions Benefits 931  to standardise payment of Old-Age 
Pensions through social means932 rather than by the retiree’s enterprise employer, 
finalising the move of responsibility for administering Urban Old-Age Pensions from 
the government as employer to the formal institutional framework captured by laws and 
the fiscal structure. These two Ministerial Rules cemented the social security nature of 
Urban Old-Age Pensions payment in the PRC. By this stage, welfare items in the PRC 
were certainly no-longer the liability of enterprises. By the end of 2001, the financial 
services and postage systems 933  were responsible for administering 98% of the 
payment of Old-Age Pensions to urban enterprise retirees. 934  This standardisation 
increased the coverage of the scheme.  
In 2005, the State Council Decision 2005935 was issued by the State Council, to replace 
the Pilot 2000.936 It generalised the requirements in the Pilot 2000937 to the whole 
nation, and included a few extra provisions to ascertain that the Administrative 
                                                 
928 Above note 850, Art 4. 
929 Above note 757. 
930 《关于加快实行养老保险金社会化发放的通知》Announcement on Speeding up the Implementation of 
Social Distribution of Old-Age Pensions Benefits 2000 (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security). 
931 《关于进一步规范基本养老金社会化发放工作的通知》Announcement on Standardising the Procedure of 
Social Distribution of Old-Age Pensions Benefits 2000 (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security). 
932 Government administration. 
933 China Post also performs a funds transfer function. It has its own savings bank. 
934 国务院新闻办公室,《中国劳动和社会保障状况白皮书》, State Council Media Office, ‘White Paper on 
Current Labour and Social Security in China, People’s Daily, 28 April 2002.  
935 Above note 850.  
936 Above note 850. 
937 Above note 850. 
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Regulation could be implemented throughout the country. One notable new provision 
is to ascertain the funds in the individual accounts, to make sure they are not empty.938 
This is a direct response to the literature on the “historical Old-Age Pensions insurance 
debt” problem. There is not much further analysis on whether this policy goal has been 
accomplished, but researchers from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences have 
identified the failure of these individual accounts as a tool to ascertain funding for 
Urban Old-Age Pensions, they also argued that there is enough funds for social security 
in the PRC’s fiscal structure.939  
The State Council Decision 2005940 added to the Pilot 2000941 by stipulating concrete 
requirements for the payment of benefits. The recipients of Basic Urban Old-Age 
Pensions are defined as people who began contributions after the issue of the State 
Council Decision 1997,942 who have contributed (including equivalent contributions, 
such as private Old-Age Pensions insurance, or people who were previously entitled to 
the employer administered Old-Age Pensions) for at least 15 years. These recipients are 
entitled to monthly Basic Urban Old-Age Pensions upon retirement.  
The State Council Decision 2005943 also provided for the retirement of other urban 
workers. It stipulated that urban sole traders and freelance workers are required to 
contribute to retirement insurance at a rate of 20% of the local average wage rate: 12% 
goes to the social contribution fund, 8% to the individual fund. This Decision 944 
                                                 
938 Above note 925, Art 4. 
939王钰磊, 引郑秉文, ‘中国与拉美及加勒比社保体系国际研讨会’, Wang Y, quoting Zheng B, ‘Comment in 
the International Conference on the Comparison between the Social Security Systems of China and South 
American and Caribbean Nations’, in《社科院专家：中国社保不差钱,政府补空帐是傻瓜做法》, ‘Expert from 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences: There is No Lack of Funding for Social Security in China, Government 
Subsidies for the Deficit in the Social Security Account is a Fool’s Way’, ifeng, 22 July 2010, 
<http://finance.ifeng.com/news/special/laolinghua/20100722/2433092.shtml> (24 Feb.2012). 
940 Above note 850.  
941 Above note 850. 
942 Above note 862.  
943 Above note 850.  
944 Above note 850. 
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brought urban sole traders and freelance workers into the Urban Old-Age Pensions 
Social Insurance net.  
The policy reforms from the State Council Decision 1997 to the State Council Decision 
2005945 happened in an organic process. This process was the beginning of the People’s 
Livelihoods Reform in the Twelfth Five-year Plan946 planning phase in the PRC. 
5.3.2.1 Urban Old-Age Pensions Planning in this Era 
Planning is still important for the PRC government. Five-year Plans regained their 
importance as policy making tools at the end of the Culture Revolution. In the post 
Open Door Policy era, its role as a planning tool changed. In 2006947, there was a name 
change in Chinese from Five-year Plans948 to Five-year Blue-prints,949 so instead of 
the Eleventh Five-year Plan, the document was named the Eleventh Five-year Blue-
print in Chinese. Since the phrase “Five-year Blue-print” was not used in the English 
language literature, this research continues to refer to the current policy document as 
the Twelfth Five-year Plan.950  
It is essential to understand the role of Five-year Plans in the PRC. The name change 
emphasise that currently, the policy importance of these Five-year Plans are as policy 
guides, rather than more strict policy goals as they were before 2006. 
According to the National Development and Reform Commission,951 the change of 
terminology is to take into account a change in the function of the Five-year Plans. 
                                                 
945 Above note 850. 
946 Above note 768.  
947 中新网,《中国政府将首次把“五年计划”变为“五年规划”》, Chinanews, ‘The First Time the PRC 
Government Changes “Five-year Plan” to “Five-year Blue-print”’,Chinanews, 26 March 2004, 
<http://www.chinanews.com/n/2004-03-26/26/418226.html> (28 Jun. 2014). 
948 Above note 947.  
949 Above note 947. 
950 Above note 947. 
951 Above note 947. 
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Previously the Plans used to focus on economic development and they had to be strictly 
adhered to. The Blue-prints focus on the government’s role to balance economic and 
social developments, and strict adherence is no-longer required.952 The name change 
also reflects amendments made in the 2004 redrafting of the Constitution 953  to 
emphasise that the PRC now has a socialist market economy.954 
This change in terminology in Chinese did not restart the numbering of the Plans/Blue-
prints because the functions of these documents did not change. They form the basis of 
economic and social policies in the PRC. The most material change is that the 
government perception of its role changed in relation to economic and social 
management.  
In the “plan” days, the plans acted as microeconomic management tools, where the 
government played a major role in the economy through State Owned Enterprises, as 
well as took charge of all social policy developments.955  
In the “blue-print” days, the government has shifted towards emphasising its 
macroeconomic management role. Since the marketisation of the economy started by 
the Open Door Policy is a “de-planning”956 process, the economy was allowed to break 
from the boundaries of the plans.957 The “Blue-prints” in the market economy plays a 
similar role to the explanatory material that accompanies annual budgets in western 
developed economies. The de-planning began from deregulation of prices and 
                                                 
952 于建荣, 《从五年计划走向五年规划》, Yu J, ‘The Journey from Five-year Plan to Five-year Blue-print’, 
(2005) Ascent (6) 23-25. 
953 Above note 749. 
954 Above note 749, Arts 14 & 15. 
955 胡鞍钢、 鄢一龙、吕捷, 《中国发展奇迹的重要手段--以五年计划转型为例( 从“六五”到“十一
五”)》,Hu A, Yan Y & Lv J, ‘The Important Mechanisms of the Chinese Development Miracle --the 
Transformation of Five-year Plans as an Example (the Sixth Five-year Plan to the Eleventh Five-year Plan’, (2011) 
26 Tsinghua University Academic Journal 43. 
956 Above note 952.   
957 Above note 952.   
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corporatisation of State Owned Enterprises.958 The result is that the “Blue-prints” can 
no-longer be strictly adhered to as the market is allowed to do its job.959  
The Five-year Plans include all important policy goals as thematic policy goals for the 
five year planning period. The Twelfth Five-year Plan960 was the planning document 
associated with the Social Insurance Law961 welfare framework. The relevant thematic 
policy goal in the Twelfth Five-year Plan962 was “People’s Livelihoods”.  
The current people’s livelihoods wave of reform to Old-Age Pensions began from the 
discussions to draft the Twelfth Five-year Plan.963 The Recommendation by the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Forming the Twelfth Five-year Plan for 
National Economic and Social Development (Recommendation on the Twelfth Five-
year Plan)964 passed by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on 18 
October 2010 was the result of these discussions. The Twelfth Five-year Plan965 was 
tabled at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party at the 
same time.  
5.3.2.2 Before the Recommendation on the Twelfth Five-year Plan966 
By 2008, the PRC’s social security system had experienced 30 years of continuous 
reform. The PRC’s welfare policy reform evolved from a subordinate reform in the 
process of the State Owned Enterprises reform, to an independent functional set of laws 
                                                 
958 Above note 952.   
959 Above note 952.   
960 Above note 952.   
961 Above note 729. 
962 Above note 768. 
963 Above note 768. 
964 新华社,《授权发布：中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划的建议》, Xinhua Press, 
‘Authorised Publication: Recommendation by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Forming 
the Twelfth Five-year Plan for National Economic and Social Development’, Xinhua Net, 27 October 2011, 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-10/27/c_12708501.htm> (2 Oct. 2012). 
965 Above note 964.  
966 Above note 964. 
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necessary for the PRC’s market economy. However, new issues continue to arise from 
this post Open Door Policy social and economic transformation period, where reform 
continues to be affected by the PRC’s historical dual urban-rural economic systems, 
where economic development differs due to geographic and demographic 
differences.967 In order to solve these issues, the People’s Livelihoods reform began 
during the drafting process of the Central Committee of the Twelfth Five-year Plan.968 
One important episode in this planning process is that the second draft of the Draft 
Social Insurance Law969 was sent for comments to the people on 28 December 2008. 
It aimed to improve the social security system based on consolidating changes to the 
existing system. 
The Draft Social Insurance Law970 included provisions for enabling a participant of the 
Urban Old-Age Pensions schemes to have a continuous Old-Age Pensions Social 
Insurance relationship 971  during their lifetime 972  when they move between local 
government areas to earn income. It also stipulated for provincial level administration 
of Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions, and then gradually move towards 
national level administration of Social Insurance Contributions.973 Article 56 of the 
Draft Social Insurance Law974 stipulated for the establishment of a national system of 
social security numbers. The social security number would be the individual’s resident 
identification number.975 Article 56 was not written into the Social Insurance Law.976 
                                                 
967 Above note 964. 
968 Above note 964. 
969 《社会保险法(草案)》Draft Social Insurance Law 2008 (National People’s Congress). 
970 Above note 969.  
971 Above note 969. 
972 The “lifetime” refers to the fifteen years of continuous contribution into the schemes. 
973 Above note 969.  
974 Above note 969. 
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Accompanying the development of the Draft Social Insurance Law977, and in order to 
accomplish its aims to fully fund Urban Old-Age Pensions by the government, the 
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security issued two lower level ministerial 
rules – Mechanism to Participate in Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance by Rural 
Residents who Work in Urban Areas978 and the Temporary Implementation Rule on the 
Transfer of Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Relationships by Urban Employees of 
Enterprises. 979 These two documents facilitated the inclusion of rural Hukou holders 
who are working in urban areas for Old-Age Pensions purposes.  
5.3.2.3 Provisions in the Recommendation on the Twelfth Five-year 
Plan980 
The Recommendation on the Twelfth Five-year Plan981 identified that the five years 
between 2011 and 2015 were crucial to continue economic and social reform and to 
change the direction of economic development. This five-year period was seen as a 
strategic opportunity to promote relative high speed economic growth that is 
sustainable in the long term.982  
Unlike the previous Five-year Plans, the Twelfth Five-year Plan983 emphasised the 
importance of people’s livelihoods instead of GDP growth.984 This Five-year Plan aims 
to balance the provision of social services, that is, social security policies, to different 
                                                 
977 Above note 969.  
978 《农民工参加基本养老保险办法》Mechanism to Participate in Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance by Rural 
Residents who Work in Urban Areas 2009 (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security). 
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Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Relationships by Urban Employees of Enterprises 2009 (Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security). 
980 Above note 979.  
981 Above note 979 
982 Above note 964.  
983 Above note 964. 
984 《聚焦十二五：２０１１－２０１５年国民经济和社会发展若干重大问题深度解析》, Focusing on the 
Twelfth Five-year: an In-depth Analysis of A Number of Important Issues of National Economic and Social 
Development in 2011-2015, (Beijing: China Youth Press, 2010), at 223-224. 
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sectors of the society – rural and urban residents, income groups, ethnic groups and 
gender.985 In order to achieve this balance and continue the reform to the welfare 
state,986 the Plan required the PRC to have transparent public finances, and that the 
fiscal revenue of the PRC is adequate to fund the five social security items and other 
social relief policies. 
Recommendation Eight of the Recommendation on the Twelfth Five-year Plan 987 
targets social development improvements and the establishment of a system to provide 
for basic public services. 988  This Recommendation identified the importance of 
“security” and the improvement of people’s livelihoods.989  
This planning process considered building a public service provision system that adapts 
to the PRC’s national circumstances, where the economy still exhibits the dual 
urban/rural parallel planes.990 This public service provision system should cover both 
the urban and rural sectors sustainably, thereby increasing the government’s ability to 
fund social security programmes to ensure income equality.991  
Recommendation Eight992 included three policy directives:  
1) Encourage employment and balance the relationship between employee and 
employer.993 
2) Evaluate the income redistribution relationship.994  
                                                 
985 Above note 984, at 224-227. 
986 Above note 984, at 228-238. 
987 Above note 964.  
988 Above note 964. 
989 Above note 964. 
990 Above note 964. 
991 Above note 964. 
992 Above note 964. 
993 Above note 964. 
994 Above note 964. 
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3) Establish a social security system that covers both urban and rural residents.995 
The third policy directive covers the policy group that guide the reform of the different 
Old-Age Pensions schemes, including Urban Old-Age Pensions. It refers broadly to 
social security, not just Social Insurance, because the policy goal was to have fully 
funded Urban Old-Age Pensions – therefore policies are required for sources of funds 
and payment of benefits. The aim was to maintain broad coverage and sustainability, 
secure basic provisions, and to establish a multi-tier structure. 996  The policy 
requirement viewed the Urban Old-Age Pensions scheme in the generational contract 
model, where current generation of workers contribute to fund the Pensions of current 
generation retirees, and the government makes subsidies from consolidated revenue. 
The PRC government aimed to fully fund social security, and Social Insurance 
Contributions into the Social Insurance Fund997 was considered as only one component 
of that funding. The language in the policy directive is very clear, that the source of 
funding is “Social Insurance” that are compulsory contributions. This policy group 
illustrated that the PRC has finally returned to its policy tradition, where the 
government looks after its elderly population.  
                                                 
995 Above note 964. 
996 Above note 964. 
997 The fiscal relationship between Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance, the Social Insurance Fund and the 
consolidated revenue in the PRC is explained in detail in Chapter VI. 
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This research focuses on policy aims two, three and six 998  of Recommendation 
Eight.999 Policy aim two proposes to improve implementation of the urban enterprise 
employee and other residents’ Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance systems. There are 
two components to this policy, one focuses on urban enterprise employees, the other 
focuses on other residents.1000 The other-residents component falls into the private 
insurance tier of Old-Age Pensions policy in the PRC.  
Policy aim three suggests implementing basic Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance 
social contributions at the national level, which is centralised contribution 
administration at the highest level of government. As at October 2015,1001 this policy 
aim is not yet achieved. Urban Old-Age Pensions are still administered at the provincial 
level.1002 However, the information flow within the tax administration system means 
there is no administrative hindrance to centrally administer Old-Age Pensions Social 
Insurance Contributions. The provincial Local Tax Bureaus report directly and 
independently to the State Administration of Taxation. The aim to centrally administer 
                                                 
998 Above note 964. Implement a broad coverage new style rural socially contributed998 Old-Age Pensions 
system. This system includes social accounts.998 The other policy aims are: 
1. Implement a broad coverage new style rural socially contributed Old-Age Pensions System. This system 
includes social pooling accounts. 
4. Promote reform of the Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance scheme for public servants and employees of 
government agencies. This policy aim is almost achieved. 
5. Increase regulation of individual Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance accounts to allow for continuation when 
employees move provinces. This is an administrative issue relating to implementing the Social Insurance Law. It 
reflects the first goal of the second draft of the Draft Social Insurance Law. 
7. Promote the establishment of enterprise Old-Age Pensions funds and industry Old-Age Pensions funds in the 
private sector to attract voluntary contributions to act as commercial supplements to the public Old-Age Pensions 
Social Insurance structure. This policy aim considers the private savings tier of the Old-Age Pensions structure.  
8. Implement full coverage of social relief in both urban and rural areas. The relevance of this policy aim to this 
research is in relation to civil benefits standards that are chosen to compare with actual per capita Urban Old-
Age Pensions expenditure. 
9. Promote management and investment of Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Funds. 
Emphasise on developing a charities sector. This is social relief policy. 
10. Improve the development of social security information networks, and implement the social security card 
system, in order to improve the administration of social security.  
999 Above note 964.  
1000 Note that the Old-Age Pensions policies for urban employees, government employees and other urban 
residents are being merged as at March 2015. 
1001 人民网-财经频道, 《人社部：目前全国 31 个省区市已出台养老保险省级统筹办法》, People’s Net 
Finance and Economics Channel, ‘Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security: 31 Provincial Level 
Governments Now Have Provincial Level Centralisation Rules for the Administration of Contributions of Old-Age 
Pensions Social Insurance’, people.cn, 27 October 2015, <http://finance.people.com.cn/n/2015/1027/c1004-
27745507.html> (4 Nov. 2015). 
1002 Ibid.  
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“Social Insurance Contributions” as part of the funding of Urban Old-Age Pensions by 
the government is now fulfilled.  
Policy aim six suggests increasing social security coverage and gradually raise benefits 
levels, this issue relates to the expenditure side of social security policies. This policy 
aim means that the government wants to increase the Old-Age Pensions replacement 
rate in relation to national average wage and salary income.  
5.3.2.4 Twelfth Five-year Plan1003 Policy Guidance  
For the five years between 2011 and 2015, the Twelfth Five-year Plan1004 itself is the 
thematic national level policy document. It operates as a blue-print for the social and 
economic developments of the PRC in those five years. For actual policies in relation 
to Urban Old-Age Pensions to be implemented, or to be drafted into and promulgated 
as relevant laws, the policy aims have to be formally included in the Twelfth Five-year 
Plan1005 itself. The provisions relevant for this research are in Chapter XXXIII1006 of 
Part Eight of the Twelfth Five-year Plan,1007 where it stipulates specifically for a social 
security system that covers all residents, that is, both urban and rural residents.  
The relevant thematic aim1008 of the Twelfth Five-year Plan1009 is to improve the living 
standards of the people in a way that is sustainable. The Twelfth Five-year Plan1010 
aims to significantly lower the number of people living below the poverty line. The 
                                                 
1003 Ibid. 
1004 Ibid. 
1005 Ibid. 
1006 Above note 768.  
1007 Above note 768. 
1008 Above note 768. 
1009 Above note 768. 
1010 Above note 768. 
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specific policy aim1011 within the thematic aim is to promote equal provision of basic 
public services.  
Policies proposed following the promulgation of the Twelfth Five-year Plan1012 include: 
treating the public services system as a system that provides public goods to the people; 
improving the public finance system; and increasing the government’s ability to 
provide social security. 1013  These policies together will establish a relatively 
sustainable system of basic public services that suits the PRC’s dual urban-rural 
economy; thereby gradually closing the gap in living standards and public services 
provision between the urban and rural economies.1014  
Part Eight of the Twelfth Five-year Plan1015 directly responded to Recommendation 
Eight.1016 It considers improving people’s livelihoods and establishing a functioning 
basic public services system.1017 The policy focuses were: systematic measures to 
improve living standards and quality of life through policies to improve employment, 
income distribution, social security, healthcare and housing; and promote fair provision 
of public services, in order to bring the fruits of economic development to the whole 
population.1018  
The Twelfth Five-year Plan1019 is a blue print of the social security system in the PRC, 
it includes requirements that are now drafted into the Social Insurance Law.1020 It is 
                                                 
1011 Above note 768. 
1012 Above note 768. 
1013 Above note 984.  
1014 Above note 984. 
1015 Above note 768.  
1016 Above note 964.  
1017 Above note 768, at Part Eight.  
1018 For the sake of completeness, very briefly, Chapter XXX of the Twelfth Five-year Plan deals with improving 
the standards of public services. Chapter XXXI considers policy aim one of Recommendation Eight, that is, to 
encourage employment and balance the relationship between employee and employer. Chapter XXXII considers 
policy directive two of Recommendation Eight, that is, to evaluate the income redistribution relationship. See 
Chapters XXX, XXXI and XXXII, above note 768, and Recommendation Eight, above note 964.  
1019 Above note 768.  
1020 Above note 729. 
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worth emphasising that the Twelfth Five-year Plan1021 specifically stipulates for the 
government to continue subsidising the administratively centralising socially 
contributed Old-Age Pensions fund in the Social Insurance Fund. This is to be done 
through redirecting revenue from State owned assets and expanding the issuing of 
welfare lottery tickets,1022 while encouraging investment in Old-Age Pensions funds to 
grow the pool of funds.1023 This stipulation ascertains that the government aims to fully 
fund Urban Old-Age Pensions through its fiscal policies. 
5.4 Formal Institutions in the PRC to Implement the Social 
Insurance Law1024 Welfare Policy Framework 
After the years of gradual reform from the beginning of the Open Door Policy, the PRC 
now has a practicable system of institutions.1025 The PRC’s government structure and 
law making powers are the current formal institutions that enables it to look after its 
urban elderly under the Social Insurance Law1026 welfare framework.  
Economists have performed empirical research on the effectiveness of policy 
implementation in the PRC in the post Open Door Policy era. 1027  The research 
evidences the increasing effectiveness of the PRC’s formal institutions in implementing 
economic policies. Specifically, utilisation of digital government services platforms 
such as the Golden Tax Project that assists tax administration by Local and National 
                                                 
1021 Above note 768.  
1022 福利彩票. These are lottery tickets issued by the Welfare Lottery Issuing Bureau, where a certain percentage 
of sales revenue goes towards funding the Civil Benefit, refuges, orphanages, nursing homes and other social relief 
programmes. 
1023 Above note 768.  
1024 Above note 729. 
1025 Naughton B, The Chinese Economy Transitions and Growth, (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2007). 
1026 Above note 729. 
1027 See 陈太明,《中国改革开放政策有效性的定量研究》, Chen T, ‘An Empirical Study on China’s Reform 
and Opening-up Policy Effectiveness’, (2011) 28 Statistical Research (10) 54; and 陈杰、王立勇, 《改革开放以
来我国宏观调控的有效性研究》, Chen J & Wang L, ‘Macroeconomic Control Policy Effectiveness in the Post 
Open Door Policy Era in China’, (2015) Macroeconomic Research (3) 50. 
176 
 
Tax Bureaus have proven to be effective.1028 The implementation of the Golden Tax 
Project has led to effective collection of tax revenue according to the law, rather than 
relying on revenue collection quotas as part of the tax bureau’s work plan.1029  
Clarke and others introduced their paper on The Role of Law in China’s Economic 
Development by pointing out that1030  
“Economic growth requires economic agents to believe that political, social, and 
economic conditions are such that they can expect a reasonable return from their 
investments in property and from the agreements they make with others.” 
The PRC’s formal institutions are complex as a result of the gradual developments in 
its distinct historical periods. The Social Insurance Law 1031  and its related law 
documents are implemented into this complex institutional framework. 
The current formal institution for the purposes of looking after the urban elderly 
includes the laws that regulate the welfare policy framework, the government structure 
that implements the laws, and the fiscal structure and laws that enable the funding of 
Urban Old-Age Pensions. The Constitution1032 and the new Legislation Law1033 play 
a vital role to regulate the PRC’s institutions by ascertaining the law making powers, 
and the hierarchy of law-documents.  
This section first explains the PRC’s sources of laws and hierarchy of laws, then the 
complicated government structure that implements the Urban Old-Age Pensions 
policies, then explain the laws of the fiscal revenue structure of the PRC. 
                                                 
1028 靳万军, 《政府绩效管理与金税工程绩效》, Jin W, ‘Government Performance Management and the 
Effectiveness of the Golden Tax Project’, (2005) 242 Taxation Research (7) 24 – 32. 
1029 Ibid; and Brys B & Others, “Tax Policy and Tax Reform in the People's Republic of China”, (2013) OECD 
Taxation Working Papers, No. 18, OECD Publishing: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k40l4dlmnzw-en> (4 May 
2016). 
1030 Clark D & Others, ‘The Role of Law in China’s Economic Development’, in above note 846, at 375.  
1031 Above note 729. 
1032 Above note 749. 
1033 《中华人民共和国立法法》Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China 2015 (National People’s 
Congress). 
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5.4.1 The Formal Sources of Law and the Hierarchy of Law-documents 
in the PRC 
The PRC’s Constitution 1034  through the Legislation Law of the PRC (Legislation 
Law)1035 allows lower level governments some law making powers in relation to the 
implementation of national laws. Saich1036 opined that 
“The new Constitution reflects the leadership’s concern to create a more 
predictable system based on a clearer separation of roles and functions and a 
system of clearly defined rules and regulations applicable to everyone. It is 
hoped that such a system will be better equipped to implement the plans for 
economic modernization. Indeed the process of drafting the Constitution is 
heralded by the Chinese as a triumph for the new emphasis on socialist legality 
and democracy.”  
Two important peculiarities in the regulation of law-making in the PRC are that: it is 
done by the Constitution1037 and the Legislation Law,1038 which is a Legislation made 
by the National People’s Congress according to the Constitution;1039  and that the 
Chinese Communist Party’s power is entrenched by the Constitution1040 because the 
leadership role of the party is specified in the Preamble of the Constitution. 1041 The 
Preamble of the in Constitution of the PRC1042 is part of the actual content of the 
Constitution. 1043  This means that the Chinese Communist Party leadership as 
embodied by the Politburo is allowed to make policy decisions and issue policy 
comments. The Recommendation on the Twelfth Five-year Plan1044 is an example of 
this. These policy decisions and comments have significant impact on how policies 
                                                 
1034 Above note 749. 
1035 Above note 1033. 
1036 Saich T, ‘The Fourth Constitution of the People’s Republic of China’, (1983) 2 Review of Socialist Law 113, 
at 113.  
1037 Above note 749. 
1038 Above note 1033. 
1039 Above note 749. 
1040 Above note 749. 
1041 Above note 749. 
1042 Above note 749. 
1043 Above note 749. 
1044 Above note 749. 
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were actually formulated, and how laws are drafted, yet, they are not a part of the PRC’s 
source of law. 
Frazier1045 analysed the sources of laws for Old-Age Pensions purposes in 2004. His 
analysis does not change, but the new Legislation Law1046 gives more certainty to the 
priority and conflicts between the different law-documents. The current Legislation 
Law1047 is very different from the previous iteration. It clearly stipulates the different 
types of law-documents and their hierarchy. The Legislation Law1048 embodies specific 
provisions on enacting, revising and nullification of law-documents in the PRC.1049 
Chapter II details requirements on making legislations by the National People’s 
Congress and its Standing Committee. Section 1, Article 8 lists eleven “Limits of 
Legislative Power”, 1050  which means in order to regulate these eleven matters, 
legislation must be promulgated, and they cannot be regulated by lower level law-
documents.  
The formal sources of law in the PRC are the law-documents that are made according 
to the Constitution.1051 These law-documents are of different levels of importance in 
the legislative hierarchy in the PRC: 1052  the Constitution is the most important; 
followed by Legislation;1053 then Administrative Regulations,1054 Local Regulations, 
                                                 
1045 Above note 771, at 103-106.  
1046 Above note 749. 
1047 Above note 1033.  
1048 Above note 749. 
1049 Above note 1033, Art 2. 
1050 Above note 1033.  
1051 Above note 954.  
1052 舒国滢主编, 《法理学导论》, Shu G, ed, Introduction to Jurisprudence, (Beijing: Peking University Press, 
2006), at 71. 
1053 法律. See above note 1033, ch II.  
1054 行政法规. See above note 1033, ch III. 
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Autonomous Regulations, Separate Regulations and Rules;1055 then Rules.1056 The 
whole hierarchy of law-documents can be litigated in the PRC’s court system. 
The Constitution1057  of the PRC does not list the law-making powers. Instead, it 
prescribes that the National People’s Congress1058 and its Standing Committee1059 are 
allowed to make Legislation. Specifically, Constitutional amendment is the job of the 
full National People’s Congress,1060 the Standing Committee is only allowed to explain 
the Constitution and supervise its implementation.1061 In terms of making Legislation, 
the full National People’s Congress enacts and amends “basic laws governing criminal 
offences, civil affairs, the State organs and other matters”, 1062  but the Standing 
Committee is only allowed to enact other laws1063 and to interpret laws.1064 Basic laws 
refer to laws that have nation-wide importance. Other laws are more specific. The 
Social Insurance Law is treated as a specific law because the Standing Committee was 
the enactment body.  
Legislation as a term with its western connotation (meaning statues made by the 
legislature)1065 does not cover all the documents that have the force of law in the PRC. 
The National People’s Congress and local government level People’s Congresses are 
not the only bodies that could issue legally enforceable documents. This research 
hereafter refers to these legally enforceable documents collectively as law-documents. 
                                                 
1055 地方性法规、自治条例和单行条例. See above note 1033, ch IV. 
1056 规章. See above note 1033, ch IV, s 2. 
1057 Above note 954.  
1058 Above note 1033, Art 62. 
1059 Above note 1033, Art 67. 
1060 Above note 1033, Art 62, para (1). Above note 954. A 2/3 majority of the full National People’s Congress is 
required to amend the Constitution.  
1061 Above note 1033, Art 67, para (1). Above note 954.  
1062 Above note 1033, Art 61, para (3). Above note 954.  
1063 Above note 1033, Art 67, para (2). Above note 954.  
1064 Above note 1033, Art 67, para (4). 
1065 Nygh PE, & Butt P, eds, Butterworths Australian Legal Dictionary, (Sydney: Butterworths, 1997), at 682. 
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Legislations1066 in the PRC refer specifically to the laws made by the National People’s 
Congress or its Standing Committee.1067  
The role of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress is to perform 
the functions of the National People’s Congress when it is not in session, but laws or 
amendments to existing laws cannot be made against the principles of how the National 
People’s Congress would have made or amended the law. Examples of Standing 
Committee made law include the Trade Mark Law, 1068  and the Administrative 
Procedure Law of the PRC.1069 Decisions made by the National People’s Congress and 
its Standing Committee that are of a regulatory nature are also Legislations.1070  
Article 61 of the Legislation Law1071 defines how to order the content within a piece 
of legislation, where “According to the need of the contents, a law may consists of parts, 
chapters, sections, articles, paragraphs, subparagraphs and items”. Usually articles are 
numbered continuously from the beginning of the legislation, that is, when there is a 
new section, the articles do not restart at 1.  
The State Council and its Ministries, lower level governments and functional 
administrative departments could all issue law-documents. All these law-documents 
together form the laws of the PRC. As such, although the PRC claims to have a 
                                                 
1066 Above note 1033, Art 58. 
1067 The roles and how laws can be made by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress are 
regulated by the Constitution in ch III, s 1. The procedural rules of law making by the National People’s Congress 
and its Standing Committee are regulated by the Legislation Law of the PRC in ch II, ss 2 & 3 respectively. See 
above notes 1033.  
1068 《中华人民共和国商标法》Trade Mark Law of the People’s Republic of China 2013 (Standing Committee 
of the National People’s Congress). 
1069 《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》Administrative Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China 2014 
(Standing Committee of the National People's Congress). 
1070 Above note 749, Art 58.  
1071 Above note 1033. 
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“unitary”1072 system, it in fact has a “multi-level” and “multi-dimensional” system of 
authorities that are able to make laws.1073  
Administrative Regulations1074 are regulatory documents made by the State Council 
according to the Constitution1075 and the Legislation Law.1076 Orders issued by the 
State Council are Administrative Regulations. 1077  Article 9 1078  of the Legislation 
Law1079 explains that the National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee can 
authorise the State Council to formulate Administrative Regulations based on need. 
These provisions allow the State Council to make Temporary Regulations. The 
authorisations need to be specific, clear, no longer than five years, and for the State 
Council to report on the success of the administrative regulation in regulating the matter 
and whether continued authorisation is required.1080  When permanent Legislations 
should be made based on the content of the Administrative Regulation need also be 
specified, and those Legislations could only be made by the National People’s Congress 
or its Standing Committee.1081 
Rules are made by the functional ministries in relation to their administrative function. 
Functional Ministries and Commissions are able to “issue orders, directives and 
regulations within the jurisdiction of their respective departments and in accordance 
                                                 
1072 Above note 749, Preamble. 
1073 Chen J, Chinese Law: Context and Transformation, (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), at 173.  
1074 Above note 1033. Arts 66 to 71 are procedural requirements for making Administrative Regulations by the 
State Council. 
1075 Above note 749. 
1076 Above note 1033. 
1077 Above note 749, Chapter III, Section 3. Art 89 allows the State Council to “enact administrative regulations 
and issue decision and orders in accordance with the Constitution and other laws”. 
1078 Above note 1033.  
1079 Above note 1033. Except for “criminal offences and their punishment, mandatory measures and penalties 
involving deprivation of citizens of their political rights or restriction of the freedom of their person, and the 
judicial system”. 
1080 Above note 1033, Art 10. 
1081 Above note 1033, Art 11. Articles 9, 10, 11 together provide for the gradual nature of law and economic 
reform in the PRC. There will be efficient and functional responses to regulate new issues when they arise, so 
when permanent Legislation are made, they would require less frequent revisions.  
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with law and the administrative regulations, decisions and orders issued by the State 
Council”.1082 These are called Ministerial Rules.1083  
Local Regulations, Autonomous Regulations, Separate Regulations and Rules are made 
by local area People’s Congresses and their Standing Committees,1084 these documents 
regulate the implementation of the national level law-documents at the local 
government areas.  
International Treaties that the PRC has ratified, except Articles that it specifically made 
reservations, form one source of law in the PRC.1085 Ratification1086 by the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress is required for treaties and important 
agreements.  
Conflict settlement between law-documents that regulate the same matter are regulated 
by Chapter V of the Legislation Law.1087 Article 87 specifies that the “legal effect of 
the Constitution is the highest”. This is important in the context of the PRC’s current 
law reforms, it clarifies that the current government has the will to govern according to 
the “rule of law”1088 and the Constitution.1089 Below notes the conflict settlement rules: 
                                                 
1082 Above note 749, Art 90. 
1083 Article 2 of Chapter 1 of the Administrative Procedure Law of the PRC1083 specifically includes these Rules 
in relation to administrative procedures, that is, citizens and legal persons in the PRC could sue a government 
organisation when they have not performed their functions according to the Rules made by themselves. 
1084 Above note 1032, s 5, especially Art 100 allows the Local People’s Congresses and their Standing 
Committees at provincial levels to “adopt local regulations, which must not contravene the Constitution and other 
laws and administrative regulations (made by the State Council)”, and they need to report these local regulations to 
the National People’s Congress’s Standing Committee for record; s 6 lists the roles of the organs of self-
government of National Autonomous Areas, where Article 116 allows People’s Congresses of the National 
Autonomous Areas to “enact regulations on the exercise of autonomy and other separate regulations in the light of 
the political, economic and cultural characteristics of the nationality or nationalities in the areas concerned” and 
report them to the National People’s Congress’s Standing Committee for approval. Those of lower level 
autonomous governments would report the law-documents to the provincial level People’s Congress for approval. 
Procedural rules are in above note 1033, ss 1 & 2. 
1085 《中华人民共和国缔结条约程序法》Law of the People's Republic of China on the Procedure of the 
Conclusion of Treaties 1999 (Standing Committee of the National People's Congress). 
1086 Id, Art 7. 
1087 Above note 1033.  
1088 Peerenboom R, China’s Long March toward Rule of Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
1089 Above note 749.  
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 when there is conflict between Rules of different functional ministries/ 
departments, or between the Rules of function ministries/ departments and 
Local People’s Congresses, the Rules only operate within the functional 
boundaries of the ministry/department or local government area;1090  
 Specific provisions in law-documents take priority over general provisions and 
new provisions take priority over old (but still valid) provisions;1091 
 There is no retroactive application of law-documents except for those law-
documents that are formulated to protect rights and interests;1092 
 When there is conflict and uncertainty, the maker of the law-document needs 
to make a decision.1093 
5.4.2 The PRC’s Government Structure 
The PRC government has two distinct functions: as asset owner and employer through 
State Owned Enterprises, and as the public authority. The government is an asset owner 
and employer, because the PRC’s planned economy policies between 1949 and 1978 
means it still controls a significant amount of capital assets and business activities 
through State Owned Enterprises.1094  
The PRC’s government structure is complicated and confusing. The following first 
explains the reasons that makes the PRC’s government structure confusing, then briefly 
                                                 
1090 Above note 1033, Art 91. 
1091 Above note 1033, Art 92. 
1092 Above note 1033, Art 93. 
1093 Above note 1033, Arts 94 & 95. These requirements may allow the law-document maker too much discretion 
when there is conflict over priority. 
1094 State Owned Enterprises in the PRC has a very narrow definition – they have to be 100% owned by the State. 
Otherwise the laws in the PRC such as the Company Law treat them as normal private enterprises. 《中华人民共
和国公司法》Company Law of the People’s Republic of China 2005 (Standing Committee of the National 
People's Congress), s1 of ch1. 
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explains the extra complication that relates to tax administration because Social 
Insurance Contribution is administered and collected by Local Tax Bureaus. 
The PRC’s government structure is confusing in three aspects: 
1) The PRC has five levels of “People’s Governments”;1095 
2) The legal “separation of powers” functions in a government is divided 
differently, and the executive function is further complicated by the role of the 
State Council1096 and its administrative functions ministries and departments; 
3) The reference to the levels of governments, and administrative functions 
departments at these levels are different when considering the relationship 
between the governments themselves, and the relationship between the 
administrative functions departments at these levels and the level above.  
The five levels of “People’s Governments”1097 in the PRC’s government structure 
refers to the national central government, and the provincial, prefecture, county, and 
township level governments.  
Provincial governments include Provinces, 1098  Municipalities Directly under the 
Central Government1099 and Autonomous Regions.1100 The PRC has thirty-one1101 
provincial level governments, including twenty-three Provinces, four Municipalities 
Directly under the Central Government, and five Autonomous Regions. This research 
collectively refers to them as provinces. Prefecture level governments include Cities 
                                                 
1095 人民政府 Above note 749, ch III, ss 5 & 6.  
1096 Above note 749, ch III, s3. 
1097 人民政府 
1098 省 See above note 749, Arts 95 & 97. 
1099 直辖市 See above note 749, Arts 95 & 97. 
1100 自治区 See above note 749, Arts 112, 113, & 114. Autonomous refers to the autonomy of the minority ethnic 
group that form the majority of the population in the region. 
1101 Not including Taiwan. 
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Divided into Districts1102 and Autonomous Prefectures.1103 This research collectively 
refers to them as prefectures. County level governments include Counties,1104 Cities 
not Divided into Districts,1105 Municipal Districts,1106 and Autonomous Counties.1107 
This research collectively refers to them as counties. Township level governments 
include Townships, 1108  Nationality Townships, 1109  and Towns. 1110  This research 
collectively refers to them as towns. 
Table 5-1 Government Levels and Responsibility Lines in the PRC 
Urban 
Area 
Rural Areas 
People’s 
Congresses 
Court Procuratorate 
Communist 
Authorities 
State Council 
National People’s 
Congress 
Supreme Court 
Supreme People's 
Procuratorate 
Central 
Committee 
Provinces, municipalities, 
autonomous regions 
Provincial 
People’s 
Congress 
Provincial 
People's Court 
Provincial 
Procuratorate 
Provincial 
Party 
Committee 
Prefecture-
level cities 
Autonomous 
prefectures 
Prefecture 
People’s 
Congress 
Prefecture 
People's Court 
Prefecture- Cities 
People's 
Procuratorate 
Municipal 
party 
committee 
Municipal 
Districts1111 
County 
District or 
County People’s 
Congress 
District 
People's Court 
District People's 
Procuratorate 
District 
Committee 
 Town    …1112 
Table 5-1 illustrated the government levels and different functional lines in the PRC. 
The functional lines loosely reflect the western concept of “separation of powers”. 
There is a very limited application of the doctrine of separation of powers (as 
                                                 
1102 设区的市, See above note 749, Arts 95 & 97. 
1103 自治州, See above note 749, Arts 112, 113, & 114. Autonomous refers to the autonomy of the minority ethnic 
group that form the majority of the population in the prefecture.  
1104 县, See above note 749, Arts 95 & 97. 
1105 不设区的市, See above note 749, Arts 95 & 97. 
1106 市辖区, See above note 749, Arts 95 & 97. 
1107 自治县, See above note 749, Arts 112, 113, &114. Autonomous refers to the autonomy of the minority ethnic 
group that form the majority of the population in the county.  
1108 乡, See above note 749, Arts 95 & 97. 
1109 民族乡, See above note 749, Articles 95& 97. These are to a limited extent autonomous, where the minority 
ethnic group that form the majority of the population in the township has some autonomy, such as the freedom to 
practice particular religions or other special cultural rites. 
1110 镇, See above note 749, Articles 95 & 97. 
1111 Municipal district is used as an example of a county level urban government. 
1112 Communist Authorities are included in this table because of the leadership role afforded to them by the 
Constitution in its preamble. See above note 749, Preamble. They exist at each level, including grassroots 
committees at villages and enterprises. 
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traditionally understood in the west) in the PRC’s legal structure. “Legal structure” is a 
deliberate choice of phrase. In this research, it is broader than the meaning of “legal 
system” because of the PRC’s complicated governance structure.  
In the PRC’s governance structure, the concept of “separation of powers”: the three 
arms of government – the legislature, judiciary and executive function 
independently 1113  has never been the norm in China’s long history. The Chinese 
version of the term itself is a classic case of “meanings lost in translation”.  
There were two phases in the history of introducing “separation of powers” into China 
that gave rise to meanings lost in translation. The first phase happened when the word 
was first translated into Chinese. The second phase was a longer process during the 
usage of the translated term. What this means is that when translated back into English, 
the current Chinese term means “three independent powers”,1114 which gives the term 
a political, rather than legal connotation. The lack of a clear understanding of the 
western separation of powers meant the PRC’s legal structure is not based strictly on a 
western rule of law.  
One early iteration of the western conception of the rule of law is by Dicey, showing a 
clear legal framework. 
“No man can be made to suffer punishment or to pay damages for any conduct 
not definitely forbidden by law; every man's legal rights or liabilities are almost 
invariably determined by the ordinary Courts of the realm, and each man's 
individual rights are far less the result of our constitution than the basis on which 
that constitution is founded”.1115 
                                                 
1113 Dicey AV, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1889), 
<http://www.constitution.org/cmt/avd/law_con.htm> (19 Oct. 2012).  
1114 三权分立. 
1115 Above note 1113. 
187 
 
The political connotation of the term in the PRC means different branches of 
government are divided in the PRC not with reference to what legal purposes they serve, 
but according to administrative functions. This means, unlike western countries, there 
are more kinds of documents in the PRC that serve the purposes of laws, and the 
Constitution1116 and the Legislation Law of the PRC1117 have special provisions to give 
force of law to these documents.  
Western separation of powers is fundamentally rooted in the idea of a system of checks 
and balances.1118 It is argued that separating the three branches of government means 
the government is less likely to be embroiled in corruption or dictatorial rule, as all 
three have distinct roles but are still interdependent.1119  
Throughout ancient China, however, the emperor was the head of each branch of 
government, including the military. This resulted in the never ending debate between 
different schools of thinkers on whether to rule by law and punishment, or to rule by 
the benevolence of the sovereign. The former is from the writings of the legalists such 
as Han Feizi,1120 the latter from the writings of the students of Confucius.1121 Emperors 
governed their reign according to concepts of these two schools of thought. This 
tradition continued, and law reform in the PRC now is turning back to this tradition for 
guidance. This tradition also means, politically, the executive branch of government is 
more dominant in the policy making process.  
                                                 
1116 See above note 749. 
1117 See above note 1033. 
1118 Welch S & others, Understanding American Government. (Boston: Cengage, 2010), at 32 - 33. 
1119 Ibid. 
1120 See《物权》, About Power, 《问田》, About Agriculture,·The Five Pests, 《有度》About Proportion, in 
《韩非子》, Han Feizi <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_31.aspx> (2 Nov. 2015) 
1121 《论语》Confucius, Analects, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_2.aspx> (2 Nov.2015). 
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This dominance of the executive is apparent in the structure of the PRC’s Constitution. 
Unlike western developed countries such as Australia, the Preamble of the PRC’s 
Constitution is included in the contents of the Constitution.1122 In this Constitution, the 
leadership role played by the Chinese Communist Party is described clearly.  
The following section discusses the functional lines of the PRC’s government structure, 
with reference to how the three legal powers of the government in the western concept 
of “separation of powers” – the legislative, judicial and executive powers are exercised 
in the PRC. 
Since 1949, the PRC has four lines of government responsibilities. Firstly, the National 
People’s Congress1123 and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference1124 
can be identified as the legislature. Secondly, the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China 1125  and the State Council 1126  (with its administrative functions 
ministries) can be identified as the executive. The third line is the military. Finally, the 
Courts and the Procuratorates (a system of prosecutors and prosecutor courts) act as the 
judiciary. It is worth noting here that one of the thematic policy aims of the Thirteenth 
Five-year Plan1127 announced in October 2015 is judicial independence. This thematic 
policy aim is leading the PRC into a direction where a western form of “separation of 
powers” may be possible, at least from the judicial perspective.  
                                                 
1122 黄惟勤, 《论我国宪法序言的法律效力》, Huang W, ‘On Its Preface’s Legal Effectiveness of China’s 
Constitution’, (2010) Law Magazine 104.  
1123 Set up by above note 749.  
1124 Not a Constitutional Organ. 
1125 The Preamble of the PRC’s Constitution makes it a constitutional organ. See above note 749. 
1126 Set up by Chapter III of the Constitution. See above note 749. 
1127 网易财经,《十三五”规划最全梳理》, 163 Money, ‘The Most Comprehensive Summary of the Thirteenth 
Five-year Plan’, 163 Money, <http://money.163.com/15/1015/13/B5VK7HFR00253B0H.html> (2 Nov. 2015). 
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The National People’s Congress has powers to legislate1128, and the Constitution1129 
identifies it as the top power organ of the country. Its Standing Committee at times can 
exercise this power for efficiency purposes.1130 This legislative power includes the 
function of Constitutional amendments, supervision of the implementation of the 
Constitution, amendments of legislations, voting for all leadership positions in the lines 
of government, establishing new provincial level governments and making decisions 
on war.1131 The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference is somewhat like 
a consulting body consisting of a variety of people from the private sector and retirees 
from the government who revise and debate policy.1132  
The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress supervises the Courts.1133 
The Supreme Court President must report back to the National People’s Congress.1134 
This suggests that in practice, the Supreme Court of the PRC draws its judicial power 
from the National People’s Congress, which is one step removed from directly deriving 
its powers from the Constitution.1135 This practice differs from that of many western 
countries, where the highest level court directly receives its powers from the 
Constitution. For example, Chapter III of Australia’s Constitution1136 provides for the 
Judicature in Australia. In a way, there is only functional separation of powers between 
the legislature and the judiciary in the PRC. 
                                                 
1128 See above note 749, Art 58.  
1129 Above note 749, at cha III, s 1.  
1130 See above note 749, Art 67. 
1131 See above note 749, Art 62. 
1132《中国人民政治协商会议章程》The Constitution of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
1982(The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference), 
<http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/2011/09/14/ARTI1315980170869872.shtml> (23 Oct. 2012). 
1133 See above note 749, Art 67. 
1134 Jayasuriya K, Law, Capitalism and Power in Asia: The Rule of Law and Legal Institutions, (New York: 
Routledge, 1999), at 244. 
1135 See above note 749, ch 1, s 7. 
1136 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act. 
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The State Council is the main administrative state organ, its top officials are elected 
democratically by the National People’s Congress.1137 The State Council is responsible 
for national development in a variety of portfolios such as public security, education, 
defence and security, health, economic management and issuing regulations according 
to the law and the Constitution.1138 The different administrative functions ministries 
report directly to the State Council, and the Ministers report to the Premier, who is the 
head of the State Council. 
It is clear there is little separation of power between the legislature and executive in the 
PRC, considering how the Executive is chosen from the National People’s Congress.1139 
Although there are differences between the roles of President and Premier to that of the 
more legislative National People’s Congress, it is clear that much like the judiciary, 
they draw their authority from the National People’s Congress and the Politburo of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.  
There has been debate as to whether the Communist Party or the National People’s 
Congress actually controls the military. It is worth noting that the PRC’s 
Consititution1140 now provides that the Central Military Committee that controls the 
military belongs to the People’s Republic of China,1141 making the military a State 
organ and a part of the government. It is not the property of the Communist Party of 
China. As an arm of the government, social security for the military has always been 
separate policies in the PRC. 
                                                 
1137 See above note 749, ch 1, s 1. 
1138 See above note 749, ch 3, s 3. 
1139 See above note 749, ch 3, s 3. 
1140 Above note 749. 
1141 See above note 749, ch 3, s 4. 
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Figure 5-1 Possible Law-document Making Bodies in the PRC 
 
Figure 5-1 identified all the organs that can issue law-documents that have the force of 
law. Considering the different levels of governments illustrated in Table 5-2, the organs 
in the lower levels of governments can also issue interpretation and implementation 
documents that also have the force of law.  
There are reporting relationships between four parties: the State Council, administrative 
functions Ministries, the Premier and the Ministers. Section 3 of chapter 3 of the 
Constitution stipulates in that the Premier is responsible for the works of the State 
Council, the Ministers are responsible for the works of their Ministries.1142 This means 
                                                 
1142 See above note 749, Art 86. 
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that the Ministries are part of the State Council, and the Ministers report to the Premier. 
However, the Ministries do not report directly to the Premier.  
There are two reporting relationships between these four parties, where the Ministries 
report to their Minister and to the State Council, but not to the Premier; and the 
Ministers report to the Premier. Flowing from these two relationships are relationships 
between the lower level governments, the functional ministries and the local functional 
departments. The local functional departments report to the local governments and to 
the associated administrative functions ministries at central level. For example, the 
Department of Finance of the Guangdong Province reports to the Guangdong 
Provincial Government and the Ministry of Finance. These functional departments do 
not report directly to the head of the provincial government (the Governor of the 
province), but to the Provincial Department Head; that Provincial Department Head in 
turn reports to the Governor and the Minister of the functional ministry; and the 
Governor reports to the Premier.  
Since Urban Old-Age Pensions Contributions are collected and administered by Local 
Tax Bureaus, tax administration adds to the complexity in the administrative and 
funding structure of the PRC for Urban Old-Age Pensions purposes. The central agency 
for tax administration is the State Administration of Taxation of the PRC. The 1994 tax 
reform1143 divided tax collection duties between the Local Tax Bureaus and National 
Tax Bureaus, both part of the State Administration of Taxation. The reason for this 
divide arose out of the revenue sharing agreement between the provinces and the central 
                                                 
1143 Blazey P & Chan K, eds, Commercial Law of the People’s Republic of China, (Sydney: Lawbook Co., 2012); 
above note 747; and《国务院关于实行分税制财政管理体制的决定》The Decision of the State Council on 
Implementing a Tax Split Public Finance Management System 1993 (State Council). 
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government,1144 especially in relation to the Value Added Tax1145 (VAT) (25% for 
local expenditure, 75% for central expenditure). The National Tax Bureaus collect tax 
types that would be used for central government expenditure, Local Tax Bureaus collect 
tax types that would be used for local government expenditure. Colloquially, people 
call the taxes collected by the National Tax Bureaus national taxes, and those collected 
by Local Tax Bureaus local taxes. It is worth noting that revenues collected by both 
national and local tax bureaus are held in consolidated revenue in the national accounts. 
Expenditures are administered by the Ministry of Finance and the Departments of 
Finance at each levels of government. There is a complicated intergovernmental 
transfers process.1146  
The extra layer of confusion in relation to the government structure appears in the 
reporting relationship between the tax bureaus and local governments. The usual 
practice is that the functional departments at different levels of government would have 
an indirect reporting relationship to the local government, as explained above. The local 
and national bureaus of taxation, however, only has one reporting relationship, they 
ultimately report directly to the State Administration of Taxation; and they do not report 
at all to the local governments. Tax administration is an independent process, and the 
function of both tax bureaus is the collection of revenue. The local and national bureaus 
are also independent from each other, that is, the Local Tax Bureaus at each level of 
government would report to the Local Tax Bureau at the upper level government; and 
the National Tax Bureaus would report to the National Tax Bureaus. The local and 
national tax bureaus at the provincial level report directly to the State Administration 
                                                 
1144 《国务院关于实行分税制财政管理体制的决定》The Decision of the State Council on Implementing a Tax 
Split Public Finance Management System 1993 (State Council). 
1145 Yang B & Huang E, in Taxation in China (Sydney: Thomeson Reuters, 2015 Forthcoming), ch 13. 
1146 Wong C, ‘Reforming China’s Public Finances for Long-term Growth’, in Garnaut, R & Song, L eds, China 
Update 2013 (Canberra: Australian National University, 2013), at 199-219.  
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of Taxation. At the moment, Old-Age Pensions “Social Insurance Contributions” are 
collected by Local Tax Bureaus at each levels of government. The administration of the 
payments of Old-Age Pensions are administered by the Ministry of Human Resources 
and Social Security and the Departments of Human Resources and Social Security at 
local government areas, where funding is appropriated by the Ministry of Finance and 
the Departments of Finance at local areas through the budgeting process. 
The peculiar reporting relationships in the PRC’s government structure, and the lack of 
consideration to the western connotation of “separation of powers”, resulted in law 
documents appearing in many forms. The executive branch of the government headed 
by the State Council is allowed to make documents that have the force of law, thereby 
making administrative and funding transparency difficult to achieve. The continuing 
fiscal centralisation reforms are not only necessary for funding purposes, it is also 
necessary to clarify regulatory relationships with regard to the sources of laws. 
In summary, the complex government structure and the mistranslation of “separation 
of powers” into Chinese meant that the three legal functions: judicial, legislative and 
executive are not independently performed by three distinct bodies in the PRC. Instead, 
the leadership of the Communist Party embodied in its Politburo of its Central 
Committee, the State Council and its Ministries, the National People’s Congress, the 
People’s Courts and the People’s Procuratorates are intricately linked in their functions 
and administrative relationships by Constitutional provisions. Also, the ancient 
tradition of benevolent governance by the sovereign means that the role of the executive 
is more important in the governance of the PRC.  
Although the PRC is now in the post Open Door Policy era, where the market is 
significantly deregulated from the planned economy days, government functions are 
195 
 
still being reorganised to be more transparent.1147 This reorganisation contributes to 
the argued in the literature about centralisation of Social Insurance Contributions to 
ascertain the funds that are accounted in the Social Insurance Funds for the purposes of 
fully funding Urban Old-Age Pensions, because geographical developmental 
differences at the different provinces means Urban Old-Age Pensions administration is 
not uniform throughout the country. 
The argument for further centralisation of Social Insurance Contributions is part of the 
continuous government transfers reform1148 (also called fiscal centralisation, here after, 
these two terms are used interchangeably) in the PRC. Increased fiscal centralisation 
improves transparency because it allows for easier access to information on the PRC’s 
fiscal policies.  
Briefly, the government transfers reform in the PRC is a continuous process beginning 
from the structural economic reforms arising out of the Open Door Policy. 1149 
Professor Christine Wong’s research on reforming China’s public finances 1150  is 
representative in the English language literature on this issue. The major components 
of this reform include the consolidation of the budgeting process, clarifying the 
responsibilities of lower level governments in the budgeting and public goods funding 
process and reforming the tax system structure. Centralisation allows the national 
government more fiscal control.  
                                                 
1147 白永秀,《由“前改革时代”到“后改革时代》, Bai Y, ‘From the “Pre-reform” Era to the “Post-reform” Era’, 
(2010) 40 Journal of Northwest University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition) (No.2) 5, at 6. 
1148 Wong, C ‘Reforming China’s Public Finances for Long-term Growth’, in Garnaut, R & Song, L eds, China 
Update 2013 (Canberra: Australian National University, 2013), at 199; and Wong, C ‘Fiscal Reform: Paying for 
the Harmonious Society’, (2010) 14 China Economic Quarterly (June 2010) 20. 
1149 Ibid. 
1150 For example, see above note 1148. 
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For the purposes of funding Urban Old-Age Pensions, fiscal centralisation itself does 
not contribute directly to the sustainability of fully funding Old-Aged Pensions by the 
government. It allows for simpler administration of Social Insurance Contributions and 
payment of Pensions. By decreasing the government’s administrative costs of providing 
Old-Aged Pensions, it contributes positively to sustainability. 
The laws that relate to the fiscal structure in the PRC are its revenue laws. The PRC has 
formal taxes, sundry levies and hidden taxes in its fiscal revenue structure. Below 
classifies the revenue types according to the law-documents that regulate their 
collection. 
5.4.3 Legal Classification of Revenue Types in the PRC  
There are multiple revenue types in the PRC depending on the law-document that 
regulates and the authorities that administers their collection. Inductive reasoning 
processes where general theory was utilised to examine a concept1151 could be applied 
to study revenue types in the PRC. 
The inductive reasoning “duck test” goes something like this: “If it looks like a duck, 
swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck”. This test can be 
used to classify the fiscal revenue types in the PRC. The sources of revenue are 
collected according to different types of law-documents, but in substance, they can 
essentially be characterised as taxes.  
The PRC’s tax laws are drafted according to the nation’s Constitution and other 
legislative instruments, but the legal sources of its taxes are peculiar from a western 
                                                 
1151 Creswell JW, Research Design Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches, 4nd ed, (US: Sage 
Publications International Student Edition, 2014), at 65-66. 
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angle. Legally taxes in the PRC can be classified according to two special typologies: 
by distinguishing formal taxes, Sundry Levies and hidden taxes 1152 ; and by 
distinguishing central and local taxes. 1153  
5.4.3.1 Fiscal Revenue Types in the PRC According to Sources of Law 
According to the sources of law, there are three types of fiscal revenue in the PRC: 
formal taxes, Sundry Levies and hidden taxes.  
“Formal taxes” is a term specific to the PRC due to its complicated sources of law. They 
are levied according to legislations made by the National People’s Congress or its 
Standing Committee; or according to Administrative Regulations made by the State 
Council that are called Temporary Regulations, or other delegated law-documents such 
as Regulations, Detailed Rules, Implementation Rules, and Ministerial Policy 
Interpretations (also called red letterhead documents)1154 by the Ministry of Finance 
and the State Administration of Taxation. The administration of formal taxes are by the 
State Administration of Taxation and its national and local tax bureaus.  
From March 2015, the Legislation Law 1155  requires taxation to be regulated by 
legislations.1156 As explained in the above sources of law discussion, delegation needs 
to be reviewed, and successful pilots1157 or Temporary Regulations need to be passed 
as legislation. Table C-1 in Appendix C lists the formal taxes and the type of law-
                                                 
1152 Yang B & Huang E, ‘China’s major tax system: Characteristics and Development Directions’, in Other 
Governance: Business Regulation in China, 2010 (Sydney, 2010). 
1153 Ibid.  
1154 红头文件. These are high level government documents specific to the PRC. The letterhead has the name of 
the issuing Ministry in red ink. These documents has legal effect and often deal with the interpretations of the law. 
Red letter documents are law-documents as explained in the sources of law discussions in Section 5.4.1.. 
1155 Above note 1033.  
1156 Above note 1033, Art 8. 
1157 The PRC’s policy making and legislative processes are very pragmatic. Pilots are often administered as 
experiments to test the merits of policies. The pilot law-document themselves give these experiments legal 
backing. 
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document that regulates them. The Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance 
Contribution is a formal tax. Although it is not called a tax, it is regulated by the Social 
Insurance Law1158 and its associated lower level law-documents, and it is administered 
by the Local Tax Bureaus of the State Administration of Taxation. 
As an illustration of the disperse nature of tax laws, in 2009, there were 21 types of 
formal taxes in the PRC,1159 including the Value Added Tax, Individual Income Tax, 
Enterprise Income Tax, Consumption Tax, the five Social Insurance Contributions and 
the Pollution Discharge Fee.1160 Up to September 2015, these 21 formal taxes are still 
in place.  
Formal taxes usually experience a longer legislative process, where the tax is first 
regulated by temporary regulations made by the State Council. After the pilot period 
according to the Legislation Law1161 has passed, the tax may continue to be levied by 
a new Temporary Regulation or by Legislation made by the National People’s Congress 
or its Standing Committee, or cease to exist. This longer legislative process means the 
shell-life for formal taxes is longer, and there is a smaller chance of changes to legal 
requirements, implementation policies and tax rates.  
If any lower level government purports to levy an additional amount on top of that 
permitted by the formal taxes legislation or Temporary Regulation, the levy is illegal 
because those lower level law-documents will be in conflict with the legislation. If the 
amounts are not specifically regulated by the formal taxes legislation or Temporary 
                                                 
1158 Above note 729. 
1159 Above note 747, at15. 
1160 Above note 811.  
1161 Above note 1033.  
199 
 
Regulation, additional levies may be collected if they are supported by lower level law-
documents.  
The constitutional structure of the PRC means it is a centralised State, not a federal one. 
Currently in the PRC, formal taxes are regulated centrally. Different levels of local 
governments do not have rights to make legislation, they can only undertake minor 
adjustments to the tax rates of taxes such as the Individual Income Tax, Enterprise 
Income Tax and the VAT; or minor adjustments to policies of some small tax types 
(such as Urban Land Usage Tax, Real Estate Tax, etc.).1162 The adjustments to tax rates 
are made within the rate scale that is nominated in the national level law-documents. 
Sundry Levies are levies collected by non-tax law-documents, that is, the regulatory 
law-document does not have the word “tax” in it and the State Administration of 
Taxation is not the levy administrator. They are compulsory in nature. Therefore they 
behave like taxes. Often they are collected by Ministerial Rules. The Ministry of 
Finance sometimes participates in the levying process by being a signatory on the law-
document, sometimes it does not.  
Most often, central government committees (as part of the State Council) make 
decisions about whether Sundry Levies should be levied. They appear as government 
funds, fees and levies in the budget. Sundry Levies are earmarked for a particular type 
of expenditure. One major problem with having Sundry Levies in the PRC is that the 
administration of the collection of the levy, and the administration of the expenditure 
                                                 
1162 For example, the Pilot Real Estate Tax Implementation Rule in Shanghai and Chongqing have different 
provisions in relation to when the tax applies, and the rates to be applied on the non-primary residence residential 
real estate. See《上海市开展对部分个人住房征收房产税试点的暂行办法》Temporary Implementation Rule 
for the Shanghai Pilot on the Levying of Real Estate Tax for Selected Individual Residential Real Estate 2011 
(Shanghai People’s Government); and 《重庆市人民政府关于进行对部分个人住房征收房产税改革试点的暂
行办法》 Temporary Implementation Rule for the Chongqing Pilot on the Levying of Real Estate Tax for Selected 
Individual Residential Real Estate 2011 (Chongqing People’s Government). 
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from those funds are done by the same functional ministry, or its lower level 
government departments. This means, there is a lack of independence and transparency 
in the administration of the earmarked funds. As illustration, Table C-3 in Appendix C 
is a list of Sundry Levies effective at the end of 2012. 
For a long time in the PRC, central government and local governments at each level 
levied a large amount of revenue by charging funds, fees and levies. The revenue from 
these items were not listed in the budget for planning and transparency purposes, 
therefore, they were treated as extra-budgetary funding. Some administrative fees are 
not collected with an aim to provide government services; or although they aimed to 
provide government services, the amounts collected exceeded the costs to provide the 
service; these two types of levies are also Sundry Levies. Some organisations and 
agencies in their organisational accounts even list the Sundry Levies they administer as 
part of organisational petty cash.1163  
The lack of regulation attached to these fees, funds and levies meant that there was a 
lack of fiscal supervision by the People’s Congresses of each level of government, 
leading to serious arbitrary levying and careless spending. It does not just create 
disorder in the transfer payment between levels of governments and income 
redistribution, it also increases the possibility of corruption.1164 For this reason, from 
1993, the State Council and the Ministry of Finance began to manage arbitrary levies, 
repealing a large amount of funds that were not strictly levied by law-documents made 
according to the Legislation Law.1165 This process gradually brought government funds 
and administrative fees into the budgetary management process.  
                                                 
1163 Above note 747. 
1164 《国务院关于加强预算外资金管理的决定》Decision on Improving Management of Extra-budgetary 
Funds 1996 (State Council). 
1165 Above note 1033.  
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Sundry Levies now mainly consist of the so called government funds and administrative 
fees that are levied by the State Council and other authorities by delegated law-
documents. In official documents such as the budget, these revenue items are treated as 
non-tax revenue. From an administrative point of view, this is not inappropriate; but 
economically, if these levies are in substance taxes, they should be treated as taxes.1166 
Economically, most government funds and administrative fees have characteristics of 
taxes, because they are not “fees”, nor returns on capital, nor purchases of goods and 
services. People who pay the Sundry Levy (fee-payers) cannot directly use facilities 
that are funded by the funds or fees, therefore the payments by fee-payers are non-
compensating. Fee-payers cannot choose how much to pay or when to pay, because the 
payment is regulated by levying law-documents. 1167  The Sundry Levies are 
compulsory, because whenever the levying instance occurs the fee payer has to pay, 
otherwise they face penalties. The amount or rate of payment is determined by the law-
document. As long as the fee-payers have the same circumstances, the levy types and 
amounts are the same.  
The Sundry Levies that appear in the budget are money that government departments 
or agencies collect from residents in three situations. Firstly, fees levied to provide 
specific services to residents, or fees collected for the use of specific national resources. 
Although compulsory, these levies take on user- pays characteristics, they are the price 
of a service.1168 However when some levying agencies levy further administrative fees 
                                                 
1166 Huang E and Yang B, ‘Substance over Form? Principle based vs. Rules based drafting? Why doesn't this good 
theory work in reality in drafting income tax laws? -the difficulties from two different words’, in Other 
Governance: Business Regulation in China, 2010 (Sydney, 2010). 
1167 A type of red letterhead document. 
1168 Including passport fees, notary fees, visa fees, normal high school fees, higher education fees, higher 
education accommodation fees, various examination fees, certificate making fees, property ownership registration 
fees, waste water testing fees, maritime mediation fees, satellite transformer channel fees, radio channel occupancy 
fees, telecom numbering resource occupancy fees, farming irrigation water source and equipment occupancy 
compensation fees, the Yangtze river sand and gravel resources fee, measuring instruments usage fees, patent fees, 
etc. 
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above the funding they receive from consolidated revenue, the levies become extra 
Sundry Levy burdens on residents.  
Secondly, compulsory contributions collected by public institutions authorised by 
governments or their departments to issue licences, registrations, tests and 
assessments.1169 In substance, these compulsory contributions are taxes, because on the 
one hand, the funding for the operation of these institutions are already sourced from 
consolidated revenue; on the other hand, the fees calculated for these activities are not 
based on services, but collected for government regulative and administrative purposes. 
Hidden taxes are other economic mechanisms that in effect give rise to government 
revenue that exhibit characteristics of taxation. 1170  An example is the agriculture 
“scissors difference”, where the government buys agricultural goods collectively at 
prices lower than the market price, but sells farming equipment to farmers at higher 
than market prices.1171  
5.4.3.2 Fiscal Revenue Types in the PRC According to Administrative 
Jurisdiction 
Administrative jurisdiction here refers to whether the tax is collected by Local Tax 
Bureaus, or National Tax Bureaus. The literature talks about taxes in the PRC as central 
and local taxes.1172 The central and local distinction does not always mean the same 
thing. Taxes can be categorised into national taxes and local taxes according to the level 
of the tax administrative jurisdiction, or according to the destination of revenue. The 
                                                 
1169 These compulsory contributions include: automobile safety test fees, foreign law firm annual review fees, ship 
and shipping equipment testing fees. 
1170 Above note 747.  
1171 Above note 747. 
1172 In Chinese, 中央税 and 地方税. 
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former looks at the revenue side of the budget, and the latter looks at the expenditure 
side.  
The taxes collected and administered by national legislation made by the National 
People’s Congress or its Standing Committee, or Temporary Regulations by the State 
Council, where the central government controls spending, are national taxes. They are 
administered by National Tax Bureaus of the State Administration of Taxation. In the 
budgeting process, national taxes work in the same way as federal taxes in a federal 
country, such as those listed in the Australian Commonwealth Budget.  
Local taxes are taxes levied by national law-documents but administered by the Local 
Tax Bureaus at each level of government, or Sundry Levies that have tax characteristics 
that were collected by local government law-documents. Some of these local taxes are 
exclusively levied to fund local government expenditure needs.  
Revenue collected from national taxes has to be remitted to central consolidated 
revenue, and the central budgeting process appropriates the funds. Local taxes often 
gets returned directly to the local government area once they entered consolidated 
revenue. Local governments may appropriate funds in their own budgets.1173  
There are also shared taxes, where the National Tax Bureaus and Local Tax Bureaus 
collect their relevant share of tax revenue. An example is the Value Added Tax 
(VAT),1174 the 75% central share works like national taxes in the budgetary process, 
the 25% local share works like local taxes.  
                                                 
1173 《中华人民共和国预算法》Budget Law of the People’s Republic of China 2014 (Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress). 
1174 新华网,《楼继伟：分税制遗留营业税“尾巴” “营改增”倒逼财税改革》, Xinhua Net, ‘Lou Jiwei: The Tax 
Sharing System Left a Business Tax “Tail” “The Business Tax to VAT Reform” Pushes for Fiscal Policy Reform’, 
Ministry of Finance, 17 April 2013, 
<http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhuantihuigu/ygz2013/mtbdygz/201304/t20130417_828738.html> (30 May 2013). 
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5.4.3.3 The Sources of Tax Laws in the PRC1175 
From March 2015, Article 8 of the Legislation Law 1176  requires tax laws to be 
promulgated by the National People’s Congress or its Standing Committee.1177 Article 
9 of the Legislation Law 1178  allows delegation to the State Council to make 
Administrative Regulations in the form of Temporary Regulations. In addition, an 
earlier Decision made by the National People’s Congress, the Decision to Delegate to 
the State Council the Power to Make Provisional Regulation during the Systemic 
Reform to the Economy and about Issues Arising from the Implementation of the Open 
Door Policy1179 gives a blanket delegation to the State Council to make law-documents 
in relation to particular issues is still in place. One of the issues in this blanket delegation 
is taxation in the period after the implementation of the Open Door Policy.  
5.6 Conclusion 
Researchers who contributed to the prevailing literature on sustainably funding Urban 
Old-Age Pensions in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) made the presumption that 
Old-Age Pensions insurance contributions in the Social Insurance Fund formed the only 
legitimate funding source for Urban Old-Age Pensions. This presumption resulted in 
the argument that the PRC has a “historical Old-Age Pensions insurance debt”1180 
problem. 
                                                 
1175 Section C.3 in Appendix C lists the important law-documents and their sections in relation to the law making 
powers in the PRC, including those specific on tax law making powers. 
1176 Above note 1033. 
1177 Above note 1033, Art 8, para (6). 
1178 Above note 1033, Art 8, para (6).  
1179 《关于授权国务院在经济体制改革和对外开放方面制定暂行规定决定》Decision to Delegate to the State 
Council the Power to Make Provisional Regulation during the Systemic Reform to the Economy and about Issues 
Arising from the Implementation of the Open Door Policy 1985 (National People’s Congress). This decision is 
legislation according to the Constitution. 
1180 谭喜祥,《中国养老保险历史债务偿还的法律思考》Tan X, ‘Legal Considerations of the Repayment of the 
Historical Social Insurance Debt in China’ (2005) 146 Lanzhou Academic Journal (5) 213. 
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The presumption did not change from 1997, when research on Urban Old-Age Pensions 
reform as a result of the issuing of the State Council Decision on Unifying the 
Enterprise Employee Basic Old-Age Pensions Insurance Systems 1181  was first 
performed. Around 1997, scholars were researching to prepare for reform, and they 
assumed that the PRC did not have a practicable set of institutions and fiscal revenue 
structure, thereby the contributed funds are the only assured source of funding for Old-
Age Pensions. The presumption was correct at the time.  
The existing academic analysis did not provide reasons for why further reform 
considerations and sustainable funding analyses persisted with the presumption. 
Researchers neglected formal institutional developments when presuming that Urban 
Old-Age Pensions insurance contributions in the Social Insurance Fund was the only 
legitimate source of funding. The analysis in chapter addresses this gap in the literature 
by documenting the significant events in formal institutional developments in the PRC, 
with specific references to Urban Old-Age Pensions.  
The post 1949 institutional developments are examined according to time periods 
marked by events that are significant for Urban Old-Age Pensions reform. This chapter 
divides the PRC’s post 1949 history into three time periods. The first period is the pre 
Open Door Policy era, that is, 1949 – 1978.1182 The second period is the Open Door 
Policy era, that is, 1978 – 1997.1183 The third period is the Post Open Door Policy era, 
                                                 
1181《国务院关于建设统一的企业职工基本养老保险制度的决定》State Council Decision on Unifying the 
Enterprise Employee Basic Old-Age Pensions Insurance Systems 1997 (State Council). 
1182 《中国共产党第十一届中央委员会第三次全体会议公报》Communiqué of The Third Plenum of the 
Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 1978 (The Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China); 人民网, 《中共党史上的 80 件大事（65）党的十一届三中全会》, People’s net, ‘80 
Important Events in the History of the Communist Party of China’, people.cn, 13 June 2001, 
<http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5301/5302/20010613/488120.html> (21 Feb. 2016); and 新华网, 
《中共十一届三中全会（１９７８年）》, Xinhua Net, ‘The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of China (1978)’, Xinhua Net, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-
01/20/content_697755.htm> (21 Feb. 2016). 
1183 Woo WT, ‘The Real Reasons for China’s Growth’, (1999) 41 The China Journal (January) 115, at 115. 
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that is, 1997 – present.1184 1997 is significant because it marked the beginning of the 
reforms that ultimately resulted in the Social Insurance Law1185 welfare framework in 
the PRC. 
The formal institutions in the PRC evolved along with its country’s economic 
development. Albeit confusing and complicated, the PRC now has a government 
structure and laws that enable it to look after its peoples’ livelihoods. One of the groups 
that it looks after is the urban elderly.  
The building of the legal structure and government structure happened as a reaction to 
significant events in the PRC’s history, where the more material developments occurred 
as a reaction of marketisation. After nearly 40 years of post-Open Door Policy reforms, 
formal institutions have developed in the PRC to give it a legal framework that is 
practicable. Although this framework is still not in essence or in substance 1186 
comparable to those of western developed countries, the framework is allowing 
effective and efficient implementation of policies,1187 execution and administration of 
laws and compliance of laws.1188  
During the post Open Door Policy economic and institutional developments, the 
demography of the PRC has experienced increasing urbanisation. This increase in 
urbanisation requires the PRC’s government to focus policy attention on the finessing 
of the Urban Old-Age Pensions scheme, with full consideration of its fiscal revenue 
structure within the formal institution to source funding for the scheme.  
                                                 
1184 Ibid. 
1185 Above note 728. 
1186 See above notes 845 & 1088. 
1187 Above note 1027. 
1188 Above note 1028. 
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The institutional, legal 1189  and demographic developments 1190  in the PRC have 
facilitated the development of its fiscal policies, and the mechanisms for 
intergovernmental transfers in the budgeting process.1191 The next chapter is a fiscal 
analysis to analyse the possible sources of funds in the PRC’s fiscal structure that could 
contribute to funding Urban Old-Age Pensions.   
                                                 
1189 Saich T, ‘The Fourth Constitution of the People’s Republic of China’, (1983) 2 Review of Socialist Law 113. 
1190 See the demographic analysis in Chapter I. 
1191 Wong C, ‘Fiscal Reform: Paying for the Harmonious Society’, (2010) 14 China Economic Quarterly (June 
2010) 20; and Wong C, ‘Reforming China’s Public Finances for Long-term Growth’, in Garnaut, R & Song, L eds, 
China Update 2013 (Canberra: Australian National University, 2013), 199-219.  
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Chapter VI Fiscal Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
The “empty individual accounts problem” and its solutions was an important 
component of the prevailing literature. Two gaps in the literature arose in relation to 
this problem and its suggested solutions, namely, the lack of reasons to explain why 
individual accounts have to be accounted for separately; and identifying other sources 
of revenue in the PRC’s fiscal revenue structure to subsidise Urban Old-Age Pensions 
funding as allowed by the Social Insurance Law.1192  This chapter utilises a fiscal 
analysis to address these two gaps.  
The institutional analysis in Chapter V showed that legally, the PRC has three types of 
fiscal revenue. The first type is formal tax revenue regulated by laws made by the 
National People’s Congress or its Standing Committee, or by Administrative 
Regulations made by the State Council. These formal taxes are collected by the 
National or Local Tax Bureaus of the State Administration of Taxation. The second 
type is Sundry Levy revenue regulated by regulations or rules made by administrative 
functional ministries, and collected by the regulating ministry or its local government 
level departments. The third type is hidden taxes. As hidden taxes have mostly 
disappeared and are difficult to account for,1193 this analysis is only concerned with 
formal tax revenue and Sundry Levies.  
The fiscal analysis reported in this chapter has three steps. Step one identifies Old-Age 
Pensions as a public good to be funded through the budgetary process in the PRC. It 
                                                 
1192 《中华人民共和国社会保险法》Social Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China 2010 (Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress). 
1193 Yang B and Huang E, ‘Characteristics of the Chinese tax system and its cultural Underpinnings: a comparison 
with the west’, (2011) 1 Journal of Chinese Tax and Policy 13. 
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emphasises that the legal provisions to make budgets for the payment of Urban Old-
Age Pensions in the Budget Law of the People's Republic of China1194 (Budget Law) 
and the Social Insurance Law1195 did not specify that Old-Age Pensions are required to 
be funded by an earmarked revenue source. Earmarking means the matching of the 
revenue source to the expenditure item. 1196  The generational contract model in 
Germany’s Old-Age Pension scheme is taken to be the policy benchmark in this 
analysis.  
Step two collates the types of formal tax revenue and Sundry Levies in the PRC and 
identifies that the PRC could source additional funds from formal taxes, but not from 
Sundry Levies. This step analyses the ten year fiscal revenue trend in the PRC from 
2005 and 2014, that although total revenue and total formal tax revenue are growing, 
the proportion of total revenue taken by formal tax revenue is decreasing. This trend is 
significant for the purposes of adequately funding Urban Old-Age Pensions, because 
Sundry Levies are collected for specific purposes, and could not be otherwise 
appropriated in the budget.  
Step three identifies that the contributions base of Urban Old-Age Pensions Social 
Insurance Contributions is the same as the Individual Income Tax tax-base for the 
participants of the Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance scheme. The Individual 
Income Tax tax-base thereby captures Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance 
Contributions, and economically, they fall within the same head of revenue. This allows 
for an argument to be made that if the PRC government wishes to source additional 
funds from consolidated revenue, Individual Income Tax revenue would be the priority.  
                                                 
1194 《中华人民共和国预算法》Budget Law of the People’s Republic of China 2014 (Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress). 
1195 Above note 1192. 
1196 Yang B & Huang E, Taxation in China (Sydney: Thomeson Reuters, 2016 Forthcoming), ch 1. 
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6.2 Funding for Urban Old-Age Pensions as a Public Good in 
the PRC’s Budget 
6.2.1 Old-Age Pension as a Public Good 
The PRC government promised to fully fund Old-Age Pensions as part of the people’s 
livelihoods policy aim in the Twelfth Five-year Plan.1197 This promise entrenched in 
the Social Insurance Law1198 suggests that Old-Age Pensions are selected as public 
goods by the PRC government to be provided for from its public revenue. 
General definitions of public goods usually distinguish between pure public goods and 
publically provided private goods. Pure public goods are perfectly non-rival and non-
excludable.1199 What this means is that everyone can enjoy the goods freely and each 
person’s enjoyment of the goods does not impact on the enjoyment of another. No one 
could be excluded from enjoying it without incurring significant costs. For example, 
air, water and the defence of a State.  
Those goods that are not pure public goods, but can only be provided efficiently by 
governments are usually called publically provided private goods.1200 They are treated 
as public goods by economists. This research refers to publically provided private goods 
as normal public goods, and makes the distinction between pure and normal public 
goods. The government has to make provisions for the normal public goods because of 
market failures1201 and the free rider problem. Under-consumption and undersupply are 
                                                 
1197 新华社,《授权发布：中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要》, Xinhua Press, 
‘Authorised Publication: A Compendium to the Twelfth Five-year Plan of Economic and Social Development of 
the People’s Republic of China’, Xinhua Net, 16 March 2011, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2011-
03/16/c_121193916.htm> (19 Sep. 2012). 
1198 Above note 1192. 
1199 Stiglitz JE, Economics of the Public Sector, (New York: W.W.Norton & Company, 3rd ed, 2000), at 132 - 
133. 
1200 Id, at 127 - 155. 
1201 Id, at 6-8. 
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the two basic forms of market failure associated with public goods.1202 If the normal 
public goods are provided privately, there will be under-consumption and/or 
undersupply. Governments often place user fees on public goods or goods that resemble 
public goods to mitigate the free-rider problem, and it is viewed as an equitable means 
to raise revenue. Free-riders are people who enjoy the goods without having to pay for 
them. Unlike pure public goods, countries choose the types of normal public goods to 
be supplied by the government.  
Collectively,1203 Old-Age Pensions in the PRC exhibit qualities of a normal public 
good. There is a high marginal cost associated with providing an additional unit, and 
the government has a natural monopoly because it is the only party that could provide 
the desirable supply to the economy. The Social Insurance Contributions in the 
generational contracts model are similar to raising taxes, similar graphs to Figure 6.3 in 
Stiglitz’s Economics of the Public Sector could also be drawn for the provision of Old-
Age Pensions.1204 For illustrative purposes, Figure 6-1 reproduces Stiglitz’s diagram. 
Figure 6-1 Government Natural Monopoly to Provide Old-Age 
Pension 
   
                                                 
1202 Id, at 129. 
1203 Above note 1197. 
1204 Above note 1199, at 137. 
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In a welfare economics model1205, the analysis of Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance 
as a funding source for Old-Age Pension is similar to the analysis of the funding of 
other social welfare policies by earmarked taxes that are compulsory Social Insurances. 
The policy maker identifies the market failure, information asymmetry and the 
mechanism for income redistribution, and then provide the particular item of the normal 
public good.  
In the PRC, policy makers identified Old-Age Pensions as a normal public good to be 
provided. It is different from private insurance that pays benefits as a lifetime annuity, 
because the private insurance market has a transaction based profit motive, where the 
contract has to specify clearly the insured object, scope, time period and responsibility 
of parties. In the language of the insurance paradigm, the risk event is “retirement”. 
This similarity in the language means that the confusion between insurance and Social 
Insurance apparent in the prevailing literature, and the subsequent choice of the 
insurance analytical paradigm is understandable.  
In private insurance, there is generally a principle of equal exchange for the payment 
of final benefits when the risk event occurs. As soon as the contract between the insurer 
and the beneficiary lapses, the insurer’s insurance responsibility ceases to exist.  
The PRC has also developed a private tier of pension provision where insurance 
companies offer lifetime annuity products that are based on current income. These 
products are similar to Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance schemes up to a certain point 
– the products are designed around the provision of a pension in retirement and the 
premiums are designed around working life income. However, the insurance company 
                                                 
1205 Above note 1199.  
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has to approximate different risk factors for different levels of payment, then demand 
different premiums.  
If a government’s social Old-Age Pension system relies on a private insurance scheme, 
there will be few policyholders. The market then contracts in size and becomes less 
able to provide insurance effectively. Since there is information asymmetry, when the 
insurance company is unable to acquire information based on the probability of 
different risk factors for different persons, the only possibility is to provide the same 
policy to each person. However, those policy holders with higher risk factors will be 
more likely to demand insurance benefits, and these are also the less desirable 
customers for insurance companies. In order to maximise benefit levels and minimise 
risk, the insurance company would be more willing to choose customers with opposite 
characteristics, leading to adverse selection. The existence of this phenomenon means 
that the private insurance market is unable to solve the conflict between risk uncertainty, 
profitability and contract stability, because it could not make a profit and provide equal 
benefits to all retirees. It is also not able to solve the conflict between the long term 
nature of the insured activity and the short term nature of efficient capital returns sought 
by the insurance industry. Therefore it is not possible for an effective and efficient 
private insurance market to provide Old-Age Pensions, as well as health care, 
unemployment benefits, and work injury compensation. 1206  The market failure is 
obvious. The government, therefore, has to step in to provide for Old-Age Pension as a 
normal public good in its policy choice.1207  
The PRC government’s policy choice is to have an Urban Old-Age Pensions scheme 
that covers urban enterprise employees and government employees. This scheme is to 
                                                 
1206 Above note 1199, at 127 – 155, and 76-90. 
1207 Above note 1199, at 76 - 90. 
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be partially funded by Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions. Through 
compulsory Social Insurance, it is not necessary to consider insurance premium 
discrepancies between members of the society that have different retirement needs. In 
the relative long term, it is even possible to achieve a balance between risk and benefit 
through cross generational capital balance – that is, the generational contracts model. 
1208 In times of inflation, the society can provide insurance indexing, which cannot be 
provided by private insurance companies, in order to inflation proof benefits.  
6.2.2 The Generational Contract Pension Funding Model  
The requirements in the Social Insurance Law1209 for the PRC government to fully 
fund Urban Old-Age Pensions, by allowing subsidies from consolidated revenue means 
that the PRC has chosen to fund Urban Old-Age Pensions through a generational 
contracts model. 1210  The generational contract pension funding model means the 
current working age population bears the burden of funding Urban Old-Age Pensions 
for current retirees. 1211  A brief discussion of Germany’s pension funding model 
illustrates the elements of a generational contracts model. 
Germany has the oldest social security system, with pension social insurance laws first 
issued in 1889.1212  It went through several reforms, and the latest reform was in 
1997.1213 Most countries that have a social insurance as part of their social security 
                                                 
1208 Verbon HAA, ‘Explaining Pay-as-you-go Financed Public Pension Systems’ (1988) 28 Economics Letters 
181; and Veall MR, ‘Public Pensiosn as Optimal Social Contracts’, (1986) 31 Journal of Public Economics 237. 
1209 Above note 1192. 
1210 Above note 1208. 
1211 Above note 1208. 
1212 Deutsche Socialversicherung (German Social Insurance), Online <http://www.deutsche-
sozialversicherung.de/en/Old-age Pension/history.html> (21 Feb. 2012).  
1213 刘翠霄,《主题研讨 :德国法巡礼-德国社会保障制度》, Liu C, ‘Keynote Address: Travel through German 
Law - The German Social Security System’, (2001) Global Legal Comments 423, at 424.  
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system (that included Old-Age Pensions) took the German system as their policy design 
benchmark.  
Germany’s pensions are funded through a generational contracts model, also known as 
the two-overlapping-generations model. 1214  What this means is that the current 
working age population is contributing to fund the Old-Age Pension needs of the 
currently retired population. This funding model works in a similar way as paying 
earmarked taxes to fund other public goods supplied by the government. The 
generational contract Social Insurance model is distinctly different to how normal 
private insurances are funded: usually participants of private insurance pay premiums 
to insure against a “risk” event in the future, and the premiums correspond with 
expected payment levels. Social Insurances are compulsory payments required by laws, 
they are like taxes.  
Liu analysed Germany’s social security system.1215 Below is a brief discussion of the 
German system to give context for the fiscal analysis to collate sources of possible 
funding for Urban Old-Age Pensions in the PRC.  
The German social security system consists of four types of policies: Social Insurance, 
social compensation, social welfare promotion and social relief, where the Social 
Insurance is the core.1216 Both social compensation and social relief are social policies 
that provide a safety net for citizens. Social welfare promotion policies are policies to 
promote awareness.1217 Social Insurance policies are codified in the Sozialgesetzbuch, 
which is the German Social Code. There are five types of Social Insurances in Germany 
–occupation accident (which is workers compensation insurance), health, long-term 
                                                 
1214 Above note 1208.   
1215 Above note 1213, at 424.  
1216 Above note 1213, at 424. 
1217 Above note 1213, at 424.. 
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care, Old-Age Pensions and unemployment. 1218  This means a compulsory Social 
Insurance system is an important component of Germany’s social security system.  
The policy aim of the Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance in Germany, akin to other 
Social Insurance systems, is based on three principles: the contribution principle, the 
subsidies principle and the relief principle.1219 
Benefits are paid according to the contribution principle, which means if the participant 
of Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance contributed towards the Social Insurance fund 
during their working life, they then receive Old-Age Pension benefits calculated based 
on the amounts contributed. The government provides subsidies1220 when the amounts 
in the Social Insurance fund could not meet pension payment needs.  
Benefits are also paid according to the subsistence principle, where the government 
provides benefits to those who have contributed to society in a special way, such as 
public servants, victims of wars and soldiers; and compensation for victims of crime 
and the failure of vaccination. The funding for those benefits is from tax revenue.1221  
Benefits paid according to the relief principle is where an individual is not entitled to 
receive benefits from Social Insurance, they could receive residual benefits from the 
safety net, which is also funded by tax revenue. 1222  Old-Age Pensions “Social 
Insurance Contributions” in Germany for employees are paid by both the employer and 
the employee; an employee can participate in voluntary insurance supplied by the 
                                                 
1218 Above note 1213, at 424; and Deutsche Socialversicherung (German Social Insurance), Online 
<http://www.deutsche-sozialversicherung.de/en/old-age pension/history.html> (21 Feb. 2012). 
1219 刘翠霄译, 霍尔斯特·杰格尔著,《社会保险入门:论及社会保障法的其他领域》, Jäger H, Einführung in 
die Sozialversicherung und in die sonstigen Bereiche des Sozialrechts mit Schaubildern und Beispielen (An 
Introduction to Social Insurance and Other Issues Relating to Social Security Law), Liu C, trans, (Beijing: China 
Legal System Press, 2000), at 5. 
1220 Ibid.  
1221 Ibid.  
1222 Ibid.  
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private sector – if their income exceeds the benchmark level. The cost of the voluntary 
insurance is born by the individual.1223 
In Germany, approximately 80% of Old-Age Pension benefits are sourced from the 
insurance contributions by beneficiaries during their working life.1224 The rest is made 
good by subsidies by the government from consolidated revenue.  
There are three types of Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance in Germany: employee, 
public servants and miners.1225 The standard of Old-Age Pension benefits correlate to 
the income level of the contributor, as the level of contribution is calculated based on 
the level of income.1226  
From 1957, Germany’s Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance has been funded through a 
generational contract model, where Old-Age Pensions benefits of the current period are 
funded by Social Insurance Contributions of the working age population in the current 
period. The first month’s Social Insurance Contributions by any contribution unit1227 is 
saved as a reserve, the rest of the Social Insurance Contributions are invested in short 
term instruments according to actuarial calculations of the requirements for Old-Age 
Pensions of the current period.1228  
                                                 
1223 Above note 1213, at 424.  
1224 Above note 1213, at 424. 
1225 Above note 1219, at 5. 
1226 Above note 1213, at 424.  
1227 Here contribution unit refers to the person who Old-age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions are made on 
their behalf. 
1228 Above note 1213, at 424.  
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6.2.3 Old-Age Pensions in the PRC’s Budget 
The PRC has a “multiple budgets” fiscal structure regulated by the Budget Law of the 
People's Republic of China1229 (Budget Law). This legislation is made by the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress.  
The PRC’s national budget consists of four separate budgets: the general public 
budget,1230 the budget for government-managed funds,1231 the budget for State capital 
operations, 1232  and the budget for Social Insurance Funds. 1233  Each level of 
government in the PRC prepares its own budgets.1234  
For the national budget, the general public budget also includes intergovernmental 
transfers.1235 The funds in the general public budget for the PRC is what is known more 
commonly as government consolidated revenue.  
The government-managed funds 1236  are earmarked in nature, where the revenue 
collected are for a specific purpose, these are known as Sundry Levies revenue in the 
PRC.  
The Social Insurance Fund Budget is also regulated by the Social Insurance Law.1237 
Chapter VIII of the Social Insurance Law1238 requires centralised administration of 
Social Insurance Contributions, where Article 651239 sets out that the balancing of 
                                                 
1229 Above note 1194. 
1230 Above note 1194, Art 5, and more specifically, Art 6. 
1231 Above note 1194, Art 5, specifically Art 9. 
1232 Above note 1194, Art 5. More specifically, Art10. State capital operations relate to the government’s function 
as an asset owner. It deals mainly with State Owned Enterprises and sovereign investments. Art 10 made 
provisions for funds to be transferred from this budget to the general public budget. 
1233 Above note 1194, Art 5, and more specifically Article 11. For detailed provisions on the line items of the 
Social Insurance Funds Budget, see 《国务院关于实行社会保险基金预算的意见》Guiding Opinion of the 
State Council on Implementing a Social Insurance Funds Budget 2010 (State Council). 
1234 Above note 1194, Art 3. 
1235 Above note 1194, Art 6. 
1236 Above note 1194, Art 9 
1237 Above note 1192. 
1238 Above note 1192. 
1239 Above note 1192. 
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revenue and payments in the Social Insurance Fund is through the budgets of 
governments above county level. Governments will subsidise when payment levels 
exceed funds contributed. This shows that payments of social security, including Old-
Age Pension are funded by consolidated revenue, or fiscal revenue of each local 
government areas. Article 711240 sets out that the national government establishes a 
national social security fund that is funded by the national budget. The funding acts as 
supplement and adjustment funding for the Social Insurance Fund.  
The Budget Law1241 mentions the different methods the PRC could source funding for 
social insurance purposes. These funding sources include arrangements made via the 
general public budget, that is, subsidies made from consolidated revenue. As required 
by the Social Insurance Law,1242 a line item called “government subsidies” already 
exists – listing the separate Social Insurance types in the Social Insurance Funds 
Budget,1243 where an amount is directed to the fund through the general budgeting 
process. These subsidies are part of the public expenditure that funds Old-Age Pensions. 
It illustrates that the PRC government, by taking the responsibility to fully fund Urban 
Old-Aged Pensions, an important component of its policies to look after the elderly, is 
following tradition where the sovereign is obligated to look after the elderly from 
general revenue.  
Article 64 of Chapter VIII of the Social Insurance Law1244 is the requirement, which 
specifies that the Social Insurance Fund consists of the separate funds of the five types 
of Social Insurances – basic Old-Age Pensions, basic health, workers compensation, 
                                                 
1240 Above note 1192. 
1241 Above note 1194, Art 11 
1242 Above note 1192. 
1243 《国务院关于试行社会保险基金预算的意见》The Decision of the State Council on Piloting a Social 
Insurance Funds Budget 2010 (State Council), and above note 1192, Art 65, 66 and 68.  
1244 Above note 1192. 
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parental and unemployment. The five Social Insurance funds are to be accounted for 
separately according to national public accounting standards.1245 The Social Insurance 
Fund therefore is earmarked. Earmarking means funds collected should not be spent for 
other purposes. The Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance is one of the line items 
in the Social Insurance Funds budget as it is a separate Social Insurance type.1246  
6.3 The PRC’s Fiscal Revenue Structure 
The contributions of Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance is a line item in the 
PRC’s Social Insurance Funds Budget.1247 These contributions are an integral part of 
the PRC’s fiscal revenue structure. Formal tax revenue and Sundry Levies are analysed 
in the PRC’s fiscal revenue structure to collate the possible sources of funding that 
could add to the Social Insurance Funds Budget to fund Urban Old-Age Pensions. 
Formal tax revenue is first analysed through an analysis of the PRC’s tax system 
structure, then it is analysed together with Sundry Levies with reference to a ten year 
(2005-2014) fiscal revenue trend. 
6.3.1 The Tax System Structure of the PRC 
6.3.1.1 Terminology: the Components of Taxes 
Before analysing the tax system structure in the PRC, it is important to note the 
component of taxes for definitional purposes. Modern taxes have a few elements, 
namely jurisdiction, tax base, tax incidence and tax rates.  
                                                 
1245 Above note 1192. 
1246 Above note 1192. 
1247 Above notes 1194 and 1192. 
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The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s working 
definition of taxes1248 reflects today’s views on what a tax is: “a tax is a compulsory 
unrequited payment to the government”.1249 This definition illustrates that modern 
taxes are monetised levies by modern governments to satisfy their expenditure needs, 
which includes the provision of public goods such as the Old-Age Pension that is the 
focus of this research. 
Each country’s taxes have to be levied by its government through tax laws made 
according to the country’s constitution.1250 This tax law making process gives the 
country the jurisdiction to tax. A country’s jurisdiction 1251  to tax is based on the 
sufficient connection1252 a taxpayer has to that jurisdiction. Sufficient connection can 
be manifested in the following ways:1253 
1) Based on the citizenship of the taxpayer, that is whether the taxpayer has 
political allegiance to the jurisdiction; and based on the residency or domicile 
of the taxpayer, giving the country jurisdiction over the world wide income of 
the taxpayer. This is to say, people who choose to reside in the country as 
residents or are born as citizens who reside in the country have tax liabilities to 
the country, no matter whether their income or property is derived from the 
country.1254  
2) Based on temporary residence of the taxpayer;  
                                                 
1248 Above note 1199, at 452-453. 
1249 OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, ‘Glossary of Tax Terms’, OECD, Online 
<http://www.oecd.org/ctp/glossaryoftaxterms.htm> (10 Jul. 2013). 
1250 See Woellner RH, & others, Australian Taxation Law (Sydney: CCH, 23rd ed, 2013), at 40-52, for an 
example on Australia’s tax law making. 
1251 Above note 1196; and Dirkis M, Is it Australia’s?: Residency and Source Analysed, (Sydney: Australian Tax 
Research Foundation, 2005). 
1252 Dirkis M, Is it Australia’s?: Residency and Source Analysed, (Sydney: Australian Tax Research Foundation, 
2005), at 22-24. 
1253 Ibid. 
1254 See an example in s 6 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, for a definition of “resident” in Australia. 
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3) Based on the location of the property or where the income is sourced, this is 
also called the territorial principle of taxation;1255 and 
4) Based on the economic interest or economic allegiance of the taxpayer.1256 
Each tax has a tax base1257 – directly on income, or indirectly on consumption or wealth 
that are the results of receiving income.1258 For example, the Individual Income Tax 
and Enterprise Income Tax in the PRC are direct taxes; the Value Added Tax (VAT) is 
an indirect tax. Tax laws legitimise and systematise the compulsory levying of a sum 
by the government from different tax bases as a response to economic need.  
An important tax economic concept is taxable items,1259 these items specify the scope 
of the tax base. Tax item as a concept is more important when analysing taxes of the 
PRC, because the tax scope of different tax types are constantly changing as the 
economy develops. A good example is the different types of income taxes. Countries 
such as Australia have a broad income tax tax-base – where the tax laws are global in 
nature, that is, including all types of income.1260 Countries such as the PRC employ a 
more scheduler approach,1261  evidenced by two income tax laws – the Individual 
Income Tax Law1262 and the Enterprise Income Tax Law,1263 where the different types 
of income are listed and taxed differently. Regardless of the type of income tax a 
country chooses to levy, the tax is levied on net income; that is, the tax base is the same, 
                                                 
1255 Coleman C, Hart G, Bondfield, B, McKerchar M, McLaren J, Sadiq K & Ting A, Australian Tax Analysis: 
Cases, Commentary, Commercial Applications and Questions, (Sydney: Thomson Reuters, 8th ed, 2011), at 11-47. 
1256 Above note 1252, at 22-24. 
1257 Above note 1196. 
1258 Burgess P, Cooper GS, Stewart M and Vann RJ, Cooper, Krever & Vann’s Income Taxation Commentary and 
Materials, (Sydney: Thomson Reuters, 7th ed, 2012), at 6-7. 
1259 Above note 1196. 
1260 Auldt HJ & Arnald BJ, Comparative Income Taxation A Structural Analysis, (Chicago: Aspen Publishers, 3rd 
ed, 2010), at 197-198. 
1261 Ibid. 1260 
1262 《中华人民共和国个人所得税法》Individual Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China 2011 
(Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress), Art 1, para(1). 
1263 《中华人民共和国企业所得税法》Law of the People's Republic of China on Enterprise Income Tax 2007 
(National People's Congress), Art 1.  
223 
 
but the tax scope is different. Tax scope refers to how broad the reach of the tax is. For 
example, Australia’s Goods and Services Tax is a broad base consumption type VAT. 
The next concept is tax incidence. Each tax has a legal and an economic incidence, and 
they often differ. The legal incidence is what the law states as the object of taxation, 
and the economic incidence is the tax burden.1264 Tax incidence is the final resulting 
tax burden or the ultimate destination of the tax burden. The tax burden can be shifted, 
but tax burden shifting does have a limit. There is always an economic entity who is 
unable to shift the tax, therefore making it the incidence of the tax burden. 
There are two concepts that are related to the concept of tax incidence: the taxpayer1265 
and tax bearer. The taxpayer is the person1266 who pays the taxes, that is, the person 
who is the legal incidence. The tax bearer is the person who bears the tax burden, 
therefore he or she is where the economic incidence falls. What this means is, when 
there is tax burden shifting, the taxpayer is not the same as the tax bearer, and the legal 
incidence differs from the economic incidence. When there isn’t tax burden shifting, 
the taxpayer and tax bearer are the same person, and the legal incidence and economic 
incidence of taxation are the same.  
Each tax has rates.1267 Depending on the structure of tax rates, a tax can be considered 
as progressive, proportional or regressive.1268 A progressive tax takes an increasing 
proportion of income as taxes when income rises, so that higher income earners pay 
                                                 
1264 For a full treatment of the incidence of taxation, see Rosen & others, Public Finance, (Beijing: McGraw-Hill 
Companies, Inc. & Tsinghua University Press, 8th ed, 2008), at 305-328; and above note 1199, at 482-517. 
1265 Above note 1196. 
1266 Person refers to both natural and legal persons. 
1267 Above note 1196. 
1268 Woellner RH, & others, Australian Taxation Law (Sydney: CCH, 23rd ed, 2013), at 11-12; and Rosen & 
others, Public Finance, (Beijing: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. & Tsinghua University Press, 8th ed, 2008), at 
307. 
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more of their income in taxes.1269 The progressive tax rate can be further classified into 
full-value progressive rate and marginal value progressive rate.  
Full-value progressive rates treat the whole tax base as the basis for progressivity. When 
the tax base exceeds a certain bracket, the tax rate appropriate for that bracket is applied. 
Marginal progressive rate treats the amount above the bracket as the basis for 
progressivity, it applies the tax rate appropriate for the next bracket on the amount 
exceeding the lower bracket. The tax rate appears to be the same, but the after tax result 
is different.  
A proportional tax takes the same proportion of income at all levels, a tax that is 
designed to be proportional is also called a flat tax.1270  
A regressive tax is one where a decreasing proportion of income is paid as taxes when 
the income level increases. Consumption or turnover taxes are usually regressive as the 
tax base is the amount that is consumed or spent on goods and services.1271  
The Individual Income Tax tax-rate scale in the PRC is progressive, and the Old-Age 
Pensions Social Insurance Contribution acts as a flat tax with a rate of 28% in addition 
to each bracket of that progressive rate scale.  
6.3.1.2 Tax Typologies – Comparing Old-Age Pensions Social 
Insurance Contributions to Individual Income Tax 
There are several ways to classify a tax, these are according to tax base, whether the tax 
is a specific or ad valorum tax, whether the tax is a direct or indirect tax, whether the 
tax is an earmarked or non-earmarked tax, and whether the tax is events based or 
                                                 
1269 Ibid. 1268 
1270 Woellner RH, & others, Australian Taxation Law (Sydney: CCH, 23rd ed, 2013), at11. 
1271 Ibid. 1270 
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activity based. Prima facie, the Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contribution can be 
classified according to these categories. These characteristics add to the methodological 
framework to analyse Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions as part 
of the Individual Income Tax tax-base of the urban population in the PRC. 
Tax Base Types 
There are three main types of tax bases – on consumption, on income and on wealth. 
Taxes may be broad or narrow based depending on their reach to the taxpayer or the 
tax incidence,1272 that is, the specific tax items of the tax type influences the scope of 
the tax.  
Turnover taxes are levied based on the turnover amount (gross sales revenue or the 
value add, sales volume, acquisition value) of goods and services. The tax burden is 
borne by the final consumer of the turnover, that is, the tax is levied indirectly on 
businesses, but passed on to consumers. Therefore the real tax base is consumption.1273 
Some turnover taxes are: Sales Tax, full value turnover taxes, VAT (often broad based, 
such as the Goods and Services Tax in Australia and New Zealand),1274 consumption 
taxes, the Business Tax in the PRC etc.  
Some taxes have different tax bases compared to their nominal tax base (that is, the tax 
base suggested by its name). For example, the current tax base for the Resource Tax in 
the PRC is the sales volume of the taxable resource product, although it is an ad valorem 
(taxed calculated on price), its tax base is still a measure of turnover. 
                                                 
1272 Above note 1258, at 6. 
1273 Above note 1258, at 12. 
1274 Above note 1258, at 6. 
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Income taxes are levied based on the gross income derived by resident or non-resident 
taxpayers less deductible expenses; in other words, the income for a person which is 
above the tax free threshold. The income tax therefore is levied based on net income. 
For example, the Individual Income Tax and Enterprise Income Tax in the PRC. Wealth 
taxes1275 (property taxes) are levied based on the stock value (price or quantity) of real 
or personal property. For example, the Real Estate Tax that is currently being debated 
in the PRC,1276 and inheritance taxes.  
For tax practitioners, taxes that are levied by the government on income and the stock 
value of property for specific purposes, or on specific behaviour are called behaviour 
taxes. Strictly speaking behaviour taxes will fall under one of the above three categories 
depending on their tax base. For example, the narrowly based Land Tax, or broad based 
on total wealth.1277  
For urban employees, Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions in the 
PRC has the same tax base as the Individual Income Tax.  
Specific Taxes and ad valorem Taxes1278 
According to whether the tax base is calculated based on price or quantity, taxes can be 
classified as specific taxes (on volume) or ad valorem taxes (on price). This tax 
typology focuses on turnover taxes. It is usually not applied to analyse income taxes.1279  
                                                 
1275 Above note 1258, at 6. 
1276 See for example, Long Z & Bao N, ‘The Impact of Tax and Non-Tax Policies on Adjusting Housing Prices in 
China’, (2014) 4 Journal of Chinese Tax and Policy 73; and Zhu Y, ‘The Practical Choice for Real Property Tax 
Reform’, (2014) 4 Journal of Chinese Tax and Policy 114. 
1277 Above note 1258, at 6. 
1278 Above note 1196. 
1279 For a discussion of the distinction between specific and ad valorm taxes, please see above note 1199, at 488-
490; above note 1258, at 6; and Rosen & others, Public Finance, (Beijing: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. & 
Tsinghua University Press, 8th ed, 2008), at 313-314. 
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Direct Taxes and Indirect Taxes1280 
A tax can be classified as direct taxes or indirect taxes depending on whether the 
taxpayer and the tax-bearer are the same person, that is, whether the tax burden shifts 
to another person. Tax burden shifting1281 is the process where the taxpayer is able to, 
through different means, shift his or her economic tax incidence to another party.  
Direct taxes are taxes on individual income, enterprise wealth or individual wealth, 
where the tax burden cannot be shifted onto another party. Indirect taxes are taxes with 
the turnover of goods and services as their tax bases, thereby requiring the tax burden 
to be shifted to a person’s income away from the tax base. The Urban Old-Age Pensions 
Social Insurance Contribution is a direct tax that has some indirect characteristics.  
Earmarked Taxes and Non-earmarked Taxes1282 
Taxes can be classified according to whether they are earmarked or non-earmarked 
taxes, depending on whether the revenue is used for a specific purpose. The majority 
of taxes itemised in the general budget1283 without a matched expenditure item are non-
earmarked taxes. Most non-earmarked taxes are formal taxes.  
Earmarked taxes have specialised purposes. For example, in the PRC, after collecting 
the ship tonnage tax, the revenue is allocated to the Ministry of Transport to be used for 
specific purposes, such as the construction and maintenance of ports and public signals 
on sea routes.  
                                                 
1280 Above note 1196. 
1281 Above note 1199, at 482-484. 
1282 Above note 1196. 
1283 Above note 1194. 
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In the PRC, there are many fiscal revenue types levied in the names of funds or fees, 
they are usually Sundry Levies that are in substance earmarked taxes. For example, the 
Rural Electricity Re-networking Fee is an earmarked tax levied on provincial level 
Rural Electricity Re-networking Loans;1284 and the Civil Airport Management and 
Construction Fee is an earmarked tax levied by the government for airport construction 
purposes.  
In terms of sourcing subsidies, the government cannot source subsidies from earmarked 
taxes. As the Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contribution is contributed towards 
the Social Insurance Fund to fund Old-Age Pensions, in effect, it is an earmarked formal 
tax. 
Events Based Taxes and Activity Based Taxes1285 
Taxes can be classified as events based taxes or activity based taxes depending on the 
tax incidence. Events based taxes are taxes that are levied when a taxable activity or 
transaction occurs. For example, the different types of turnover taxes where tax is levied 
whenever the taxable transaction occurs; and inheritance taxes and gift taxes, where tax 
obligation occurs when the property owner dies or gifts the property before death.  
Activity based taxes are taxes which are levied on the cumulated outcomes of an 
activity within a period (the tax period), such as income taxes, where the tax base is the 
net income, that is, receipts less expenses in the tax period.  
                                                 
1284 This is the so called “one province, multiple loans” policy (referring to the loans offered by multiple 
electricity providers for provincial level rural electricity re-networking projects) for electricity users, it is 
specifically used to repay the principal and interest on rural electricity re-networking loans. 
1285 Above note 1196. 
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Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions is levied as an activity based 
tax – the activity is income earned by urban employees as defined by the Individual 
Income Tax Law.1286 
Summary 
For urban employees, it is possible to account for Urban Old-Age Pensions Social 
Insurance Contributions in their Individual Income Tax tax-base. It has a flat rate and 
it is an earmarked direct activity based tax that has some indirect characteristics.  
They have indirect characteristics because if the elasticity of demand of a certain type 
of employee is high, it is possible to shift the burden of the contribution of Urban Old-
Age Pensions Social Insurance to the employee by lowering their nominal wage levels, 
thereby lowering their real wages.  
6.3.1.3 The Nature of the PRC’s Composite Tax System Structure 
The PRC has a composite tax system structure dominated by turnover taxes and income 
taxes. Figure 6-2 below is reproduced from Figure D-1 in Appendix D. It illustrates the 
percentage proportion of each tax type in the PRC’s fiscal revenue structure for 2013. 
Other taxes represent revenue from Sundry Levies (not including Urban Old-Age 
Pensions Social Insurance Contributions). 
  
                                                 
1286 Above note 1262. 
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Figure 6-2 2013 Fiscal Revenue Proportions of the PRC (RMB Billion)1287 
 
Figure 6-2 shows that total turnover taxes make up 34% of total fiscal revenue; and 
income taxes including Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions make 
up 30% of total fiscal revenue in the PRC. These two major forms of taxes make up 64% 
of total fiscal revenue in the PRC in 2013. In other words, turnover taxes make up 49% 
of formal tax revenue, and income taxes including Urban Old-Age Pensions Social 
Insurance Contributions make up 43% of formal tax revenue. Therefore, the PRC has a 
composite tax system structure with two dominant tax groups – turnover taxes and 
income taxes. Together, these two tax types accounted for 92% of formal tax revenue 
in 2013. 
The two major types of turnover taxes in terms of revenue collection are the VAT and 
the Business Tax. The PRC is currently undergoing a reform of its turnover taxes, and 
                                                 
1287 Pension Contributions is short for Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions. Other revenue 
refers to Sundry Levies. 
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the VAT and the business tax will gradually merge into a single tax, where the VAT 
captures the tax base of the Business Tax.1288  
In this fiscal analysis, the tax system structure of the PRC is analysed to determine the 
major revenue types that additional funding can be sourced to fund Urban Old-Age 
Pensions in the PRC’s budgeting process. Formal taxes are the focus because they are 
non-earmarked, and are able to be appropriated at the discretion of the government in 
the budgeting process. 
The tax system structure of the PRC demonstrates characteristics of tax system 
structures dominated by turnover taxes, and tax system structures dominated by income 
taxes. Appendix G is a detailed analysis of the PRC’s tax system structure for the 
purposes of this fiscal study. It is performed based on the roles different formal taxes 
play in their contribution to fiscal revenue, and assessments are made according to 
efficiency, equity, simplicity of collection 1289  and appropriateness. 1290 
Appropriateness is a traditional Chinese measure to analyse tax systems. The emperor-
centric society allowed by a social contract1291 drawn based on the body of Li rules 
meant taxation was a “way to gather wealth” 1292 by the emperor. One of the most 
common proposals by ancient Chinese thinkers is for the emperor to “Gather with limit”, 
where the thinkers oppose extorting excessive taxes and levies, and likens policies that 
do so to drying the pond to gather fish.1293 “Light taxes” is an important element of 
                                                 
1288 新华网,《楼继伟：分税制遗留营业税“尾巴” “营改增”倒逼财税改革》, Xinhua Net, ‘Lou Jiwei: The Tax 
Sharing System Left a Business Tax “Tail” “The Business Tax to VAT Reform” Pushes for Fiscal Policy Reform’, 
Ministry of Finance, 17 April 2013, 
<http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhuantihuigu/ygz2013/mtbdygz/201304/t20130417_828738.html> (30 May 2013); and 
《中华人民共和国增值税暂行条例》Temporary Regulation of the People's Republic of China on Value Added 
Tax 2008 (State Council). 
1289 Smith A, The Wealth of Nations, Skinner AS, ed, (London: Penguin Books, 1999), at Book V; and above note 
1255, at 6-7. 
1290 Above note 1196. 
1291 Roussau JJ, ‘The Social Contract That We Must Always GO Back to an Original Compact’, excerpt in 
Freeman MDA, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 8th ed, 2008), at 147-150. 
1292 《管子》Guanzi, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_34.aspx> (2 Nov. 2015). 
1293 Ibid.  
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limit,1294 and the idea of limit includes a much earlier iteration of the Laffer Curve,1295 
where LI Ao1296 in the Tang dynasty argued that lighter taxes are better at growing 
fiscal revenue than heavier taxes.  
In summary, the PRC’s tax system structure is dominated by the two turnover taxes – 
business tax and the VAT, and income taxes. The benefits of the business tax, which is 
a full value turnover tax contributes to the tax system structure is that it is effective in 
achieving fiscal revenue goals. This was important for the PRC before the current 
merger between the business tax and the VAT1297 because the PRC required a pro-
revenue tax design model. The current reform to merge Business Tax with the VAT 
signals that the PRC government now has other policy goals than simply collecting 
revenue efficiently. As the VAT becomes the only major type of turnover tax, it is 
relatively simple to collect and administer, the tax system structure of the PRC would 
be fairer. The income tax1298 contributes to fairness and efficiency. The VAT and 
income tax together achieves the tax system design goals of fairness, efficiency, 
simplicity and appropriateness. 
The PRC’s tax system structure is currently balancing between ease of revenue 
collection and equity. The phasing out of the Business Tax means the revenue policy 
goal is moving away from collecting as much as the government can. The institutional 
developments achieved in the PRC allows income taxes to play a more dominant role 
                                                 
1294 《尧曰》, ‘Rao Yue’, in 《论语》Confucius, Analects, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_2.aspx> (2 
Nov.2015); and “百姓足,君孰与不足；百姓不足,君孰与足”《颜渊》, ‘Yan Yuan’ in 《论语》Confucius, 
Analects, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_2.aspx> (2 Nov.2015). 
1295 Laffer AB, ‘The Laffer Curve: Past, Present, and Future’ (2004) Backgrounder #1765 on Taxes, 
<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/06/the-laffer-curve-past-present-and-future> (9 Feb. 2016). 
1296 Above note 1196, ch 4. 
1297 See above note 1288. 
1298 See Wan Y, ‘An Empirical Study of Income Distribution by the Individual Income Tax in the PRC’, 
International Conference of Chinese Tax and Policy, 2015 (Xiamen, 2015); Du L, ‘Measuring the Redistributive 
Effect of Personal Income Tax Using Generalized Entropy Indexes with an Application to China’, International 
Conference of Chinese Tax and Policy, 2015 (Xiamen, 2015); and Sawyer A, ‘Individual Income Tax Reform in 
China, New Zealand Experience’, International Conference of Chinese Tax and Policy, 2015 (Xiamen, 2015).  
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in the fiscal revenue structure of the PRC because revenue collection mechanisms are 
stronger than when the VAT and Business Tax were first recognised as major tax types 
in the 1994 tax system reform.1299  This changing nature in the PRC’s tax system 
structure simplifies the process when the government budgets for discretionary 
spending, which includes budgeting for Urban Old-Age Pensions. This simplification 
allows the PRC government to budget for Urban Old-Age Pensions transparently from 
consolidated revenue, giving it access to a larger pool of funds for the funding of Urban 
Old-Age Pensions. Sustainability assessments of the PRC’s Urban Old-Age Pensions 
scheme could be made with reference or the PRC’s whole fiscal revenue that is not 
earmarked. 
Below is a holistic analysis of the PRC’s fiscal revenue with the aid of statistics. The 
analysis include formal taxes and Sundry Levies, that is, including non-earmarked and 
earmarked revenue sources. The analysis shows that Sundry Levies still accounts for a 
large proportion of total fiscal revenue in the PRC. This revenue proportion could not 
be budgeted for Urban Old-Age Pensions purposes because of their earmarked nature. 
6.3.2 Fiscal Revenue Statistics   
The fiscal revenue statistics account for total fiscal revenue in the PRC, including 
Sundry Levies. Sundry Levies in the PRC are made up of fiscal revenue collected by 
functional ministries and their lower level government departments for specific 
purposes. They are usually called government funds or administrative fees. 
Government funds are accounted for in the PRC’s budget.  
                                                 
1299 《国务院关于实行分税制财政管理体制的决定》The Decision of the State Council on Implementing a Tax 
Split Public Finance Management System 1993 (State Council). 
234 
 
Although the number of funds and fees are dramatically decreasing, when this research 
began in 2009, there were still thirty-four types1300 of government funds, accounting 
for RMB 422.8 Billion1301 in the budget. When Sundry Levies were re-examined in 
2012,1302 there were still thirty types of government funds, accounting for RMB 3.75 
Trillion1303 in the budget.  
Sundry Levies in the PRC are summarised in Appendix C. Table C-2 lists 2009 Sundry 
Levies accompanied by their regulating law-document, and levels of fund management; 
and Table C-3 lists 2012 Sundry Levies.  
The statistics collected here relate to the most recent decade – 2005 to 2014. Analysis 
on 2014 could not be performed because the full set of data is not available as at October 
2015.1304 Appendix D reports in detail the analysis on fiscal revenue statistics of the 
PRC between 2005 and 2013. This section briefly reports on the fiscal revenue statistics 
to illustrate the PRC’s current fiscal system structure. The change of terminology from 
tax system structure to fiscal revenue structure takes into account the contribution to 
revenue by Sundry Levies.  
Table D-1 in Appendix D collates statistics on all revenue types in the PRC for 2005 to 
2014. Data for 2014 is incomplete as at October 2015. Table 6-1 is an excerpt from 
                                                 
1300 《财政部关于公布 2008 年全国政府性基金项目目录的通知》Circular on Publishing the List of National 
Government Funds 2008 (Ministry of Finance). 
1301 RMB 422.802 Billion This is approximately AUD 84.56 Billion. Calculated according to the data provided by 
财政部, 《关于 2008 年中央和地方预算执行情况与 2009 年中央和地方预算草案的报告——2009 年３月５
日在第十一届全国人民代表大会第二次会议上》, Ministry of Finance, ‘Report on the Administering of Central 
and Local Government Budgets of 2008 and the Central and Local Government Budget Drafts of 2009, to the 
National People’s Congress’, Xinhua Net, 15 March 2009, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2009-
03/15/content_11014326_1.htm> (11 Nov. 2015).  
1302 Above note 1196. 
1303 RMB 3,753.49 Billion. This is approximately AUD 750.7 Billion.《关于公布 2012 年全国政府性基金项目
目录的通知》Circular on Publishing the List of National Government Funds 2012 (Ministry of Finance).  
1304 Database of the National Bureau of Statistics of China (Chinese Version), Online <http://data.stats.gov.cn/> 
(25 Aug. 2015). A limited English version of the data are available at: <http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/>. Data 
assessed for this research came from the Chinese version. 
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Table D-1. It includes the statistics for 2012 and 2013 to illustrate the complex nature 
of the composition of fiscal revenue in the PRC.  
Table 6-1 Fiscal Income of the PRC 2012 and 20131305  
Unit: RMB Billion 
   
   
    2012 (RMB Billion) 2013 (RMB Billion) 
Total National Income 
National Fiscal 
Income 
11,725.35  12,920.96  
National Tax 
Income 
10,061.43  11,053.07  
Indirect 
Taxes 
Turnover 
Taxes 
Domestic VAT 2,641.55  2,881.01  
Consumption Tax 787.56  823.13  
Customs Duty 278.39  263.06  
Business Tax 1,574.76  1,723.30  
Sum of VAT and 
Business Tax 
4,216.32  4,604.32  
VAT and Business 
Tax as percentage 
of Total Revenue 
28.14% 27.48% 
Sum of Turnover 
Tax 
5,282.27  5,690.51  
Turnover Tax as 
percentage of Total 
Revenue 
35.26% 33.96% 
Other Indirect 
Taxes 
City and rural area 
maintenance 
development tax 
312.56  341.99  
Tobacco Leaf Tax  13.18   15.03  
Vehicle Purchase Tax  39.30   47.40  
Sum of 
Indirect 
Taxes 
Total Indirect Tax 5,647.31  6,094.92  
Imports 
and 
Exports 
Consumption 
taxes on 
Imports and 
Exports  
VAT, Consumption 
tax on Imported 
Goods 
1,480.22  1,400.46  
VAT, Consumption 
tax on Exported 
Goods 
(1,042.89) (1,051.89) 
Net VAT, 
Consumption tax on 
Import and Export 
437.33  348.57  
                                                 
1305 Ibid. Data for 2014 is incomplete as at October 2015. 
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Income 
Tax 
Types of 
Income Taxes 
Enterprise Income 
Tax 
1,965.45  2,242.72  
Individual Income 
Tax 
582.03  653.15  
Pension Insurance 
Contribution 
(Revenue Collected) 
2,000.10  2,268.04  
Sum of 
Income 
Taxes 
Sum of Individual 
Income Tax and 
Pension Insurance 
Contribution 
2582.128 2921.193 
Individual Income 
Tax and Pension 
contribution as a 
Percentage of Total 
Revenue 
17.23% 17.43% 
Total Income Taxes 4,547.58  5,163.91  
Total Income Tax 
as Percentage of 
Total Revenue 
30.35% 30.82% 
Individual and 
Enterprise Income 
Taxes as a 
Percentage of 
Formal Taxes 
25.32% 26.20% 
Wealth and Activity 
Taxes 
Real Estate Tax 137.25  158.15  
Deed Tax 287.40  384.40  
Arable Land 
Occupancy Tax 
162.07  180.82  
Urban Area Land 
Usage Tax 
154.17  171.88  
Land Capital Gains 
Tax 
271.91  329.39  
Ship Tonnage Tax 4.10  4.36  
Vehicle and Shipping 
Tax 
222.89  259.63  
Stamp Duty  98.56  124.44  
Other tax type 0.52  0.07  
Total Wealth and 
Activity Taxes 
1,338.87  1,613.14  
Formal Taxes 
Total Formal Taxes 9,533.66  10,603.93  
Total Formal Taxes 
Plus Pension 
Insurance 
Contribution 
11,533.76  12,871.97  
Other Fiscal Revenue1306 Resources Tax  90.44  100.57  
                                                 
1306 Other Fiscal Revenue refers to Sundry Levies. 
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Deed Tax from 
Securities 
Transactions 
 30.35   46.97  
Non-tax revenue 1,663.92  1,867.89  
National Dedicated 
Revenue (Earmarked) 
323.26  352.86  
National 
Administrations Fees 
457.95  477.58  
Penalty Revenue 155.98  165.88  
Other revenue 726.73  871.57  
Total 
Total 14,982.40  16,755.29  
Proportion of 
Formal Tax 
76.98% 76.82% 
Note: National Fiscal Income does not Include Domestic and Foreign Debt Incomes 
Total government 
expenditure    12,595.30 14,021.21 
Figures 6-3 and 6-4 are reproduced from Figure D-2 in Appendix D. They are pie charts 
that illustrate the composition of fiscal revenue in 2012 and 2013 to present an image 
of the fiscal revenue structure of the PRC in recent years. 
Figure 6-3 Fiscal Revenue Structure of 2012 (RMB Billion)1307 
 
                                                 
1307 Pension Contributions is short for Urban Old-Age Pensions Insurance Contributions. Other revenue refers to 
Sundry Levies. 
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Figure 6-4 Fiscal Revenue Structure of 2013 (RMB Billion)1308 
 
Total revenue in the PRC significantly increased every year from 2005 to 2013. Figure 
6-5 below is reproduced from Figure D-1 of Appendix D. It illustrates this increasing 
trend. The composition of revenue, however, changes each year, and the proportion of 
fiscal revenue that is sourced from formal taxes has decreased in the decade. This 
decrease is significant as it represents a decrease in the proportion of revenue for 
discretionary expenditure, as well as the increase in revenue that is not administered 
independently by the tax authority in the PRC’s institutional structure. It also means 
that the statistics on Sundry Levies, that is the revenue not administered by the tax 
authorities are harder to varify, further signaling the importance of focusing on formal 
taxes in the budgeting process. 
                                                 
1308 Ibid. Data for 2014 is incomplete as at October 2015. 
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Figure 6-5 Total Fiscal Revenue (RMB Billion) 
 
Figure 6-6 and 6-7 are reproduced from Figure D-2 and Figure D-4 in Appendix D. 
They illustrate the trends of income sourced from the two dominant tax types in the 
PRC.  
Figure 6-6 Trend in VAT and Business Tax Revenue (RMB Billion) 
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Figure 6-6 illustrates that total revenue from the VAT and Business tax is increasing, 
but its contribution to total fiscal revenue is decreasing. This means the PRC is relying 
less on these two major types of turnover taxes for its fiscal revenue needs. 
Figure 6-7 Trend in Income Tax Revenue – including Urban Old-Age Pensions 
Social Insurance Contributions (RMB Billion)  
 
 
Figure 6-7 illustrates that total revenue from income taxes (including Old-Age Pensions 
Social Insurance Contributions) is increasing significantly during the data period, but 
its contribution to total fiscal revenue is decreasing. This means the PRC is also relying 
less on income taxes for its total fiscal revenue needs. 
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Figure 6-8 Trend of Formal Taxes Revenue (RMB Billion) 
Figure 6-8 illustrates the decreasing trend in the proportion formal taxes are 
contributing to total fiscal revenue in the PRC. This means Sundry Levies are 
contributing more to fiscal revenue. As explained above, Sundry Levies are not 
administered independently by the State Administration of Taxation. This trend in the 
PRC’s fiscal revenue structure means the PRC is sourcing more fiscal revenue from 
earmarked Sundry Levies. The government cannot source subsidies from these 
earmarked Sundry Levies to fund Urban Old-Age Pensions. 
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3,266.33,964.45,267.66,213.76,943.18,304.910,168.11,533.12,871.
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6.4 Capturing Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance into 
the Tax Base of Individual Income Tax for Urban Employees 
6.4.1 The PRC’s Individual Income Tax Tax-base in its Tax System 
Structure 
The Individual Income Tax is a tax on income, its legal and economic incidences are 
the same – the individual’s annual income, therefore the tax bearer and the taxpayer are 
the same. This section identifies the nature, jurisdiction, taxpayer and tax rates of the 
Individual Income Tax in the PRC, in order to provide context for capturing the Urban 
Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contribution into the tax base of Individual Income 
Tax. 
6.4.1.1 The Scheduler Nature of the Individual Income Tax in the PRC 
The PRC has a scheduler income tax structure with two income taxes, namely the 
Individual Income Tax and the Enterprise Income Tax. The Individual Income Tax is 
itself a scheduler income tax,1309 where different types of individual incomes are taxed 
in a different manner. Article 2 of the Individual Income Tax Law of the People’s 
Republic of China1310 stipulates 11 types of taxable income for an individual.  
Income computation is regulated by Article 6. 1311  How Individual Income Tax is 
computed is prescriptive in the PRC’ laws. Paragraph (1) of Article 6 deals with the 
income of wages and salary earners, which corresponds to paragraph (1) of Article 2.1312 
                                                 
1309 马海涛主编, 《中国税制》, Ma H, ed, China’s Tax System, (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 3rd 
ed, 2007), at 171; and 钱淑萍主编, 《税收学》, Qian S, ed, Taxation Studies, (Shanghai: Shanghai University of 
Finance and Economics Press, 2005), at 307-309. 
1310 Above note 1262. 
1311 Above note 1262. 
1312 These two articles are reproduced in Appendix E. Above note 1262.  
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The paragraph prescribes a statutory deduction of RMB 3,500 per month, this is 
equivalent to an annual tax free threshold of RMB 42,0001313 for resident wages and 
salary earners. Taxpayers whose annual income do not exceed this level do not have to 
pay Individual Income Taxes, but the Social Insurance Law1314 requires Urban Old-
Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions to be paid on behalf of them as soon as 
they start earning income. 
6.4.1.2 The Jurisdiction and Taxpayer of the Individual Income Tax in 
the PRC 
The PRC chooses to use residence and source as the basis for determining sufficient 
connection 1315  for its tax jurisdiction. Therefore there are two types of taxpayers 
according to jurisdiction – the resident and non-resident taxpayers.1316 For the purposes 
of this study, jurisdictional issues for Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance 
Contributions are taken to be the same as the Individual Income jurisdiction for wage 
and salary earners. Table 6-2 illustrates how income is taxed for residents and non-
residents of the PRC for income tax purposes. 
  
                                                 
1313 This is approximately AUD 8,400 per annum. 
1314 Above note 1192. 
1315 Above note 1252, at 22-24. 
1316 Above note 1196, ch 19.  
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Table 6-2 Tax Responsibility of Individual Income Tax on Wages and Salaries of 
Residents and Non-residents 
 Income derived onshore 
(Onshore working periods) 
Income derived offshore 
(Offshore working periods) 
Payment 
Onshore 
Payment 
Offshore 
Payment 
Onshore 
Payment 
Offshore 
Below 90 (183) days Taxable Exemption Exemption Exemption 
90 (183) Days - 1 year 
(275 days)1317 
Taxable Taxable Exemption Exemption 
1 - 5 years Taxable Taxable Taxable Exemption 
Over 5 years – PRC 
tax residents 
Taxable Taxable Taxable Exemption 
Jurisdictional issues are regulated by Article 1 of the Individual Income Tax Law of the 
People’s Republic of China.1318 The practical issues of tax residence means that the 
provisions in Article 1 are not enough. Domicile in Paragraph 1 of Article 1 is further 
defined to mean individuals who habitually reside in the PRC in relation to their 
residence registration (Hukou), family ties or economic interests.1319  
“Habitual place of residence” is an important concept to distinguish whether an 
individual is a tax resident of the PRC. The State Administration of Taxation of the 
PRC in a Circular1320  defines “habitual place of residence” to mean the place an 
individual returns to when the purpose to reside elsewhere ends. These purposes include 
study, employment or visiting family. It doesn’t mean the actual place of residence, or 
the place of residence of a particular time. What this means is, if a Chinese individual 
has to return to the PRC after the study, employment or the visit to family finishes, the 
PRC is the person’s “habitual place of residence”.1321 
                                                 
1317 The 275 days take into account the time the non-Chinese resident spends outside of the PRC.  
1318 Above note 1262. 
1319 《中华人民共和国个人所得税法实施条例》Regulation for the Implementation of the Individual Income 
Tax Law 2015 (State Council), Art 2. 
1320 《关于印发〈征收个人所得税若干问题的规定〉的通知》Announcement to Circulate the ‘Decision on A 
Few Issues Relating to the Collection of Individual Income Tax’ 1994 (State Administration of Taxation).  
1321 Ibid.  
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The Regulation for the Implementation of the Individual Income Tax Law1322 clarified 
“residing for one year” in more detail. The “year” refers to a calendar year, and the 
calendar year is deemed to have 365 days. Temporarily leaving the PRC is considered 
as residing in the PRC, those days outside of the PRC are not subtracted from the 365 
day calendar year. The Regulation 1323  defined “temporarily leaving the PRC” as 
leaving for no more than 30 days in one trip, or no more than 90 days in total, within 
the calendar year. Once the individual has resided in the PRC for more than five years, 
income from all sources are taxable from the sixth year of residence.1324 
The Implementation Regulation1325 also regulates Individual Income Tax for taxpayers 
who are non-PRC residents, but have resided in the PRC for more than one year, their 
taxable income includes worldwide income. Non-PRC residents who have resided in 
the PRC for more than one year, but less than five years are liable for Individual Income 
Tax arising from wages and salaries that have world-wide source, but only during the 
time they are in the PRC. During the time they temporarily leave the PRC, only wages 
and salaries sourced from the PRC are taxable.  
The Ministry of Finance in a Circular clarified that residing in the PRC for more than 
five years means an individual resided in the PRC continuously for five years, and for 
the full year of every year.1326 For a non-resident,1327 the PRC’s Individual Income 
Tax Law1328 prescribes that income with a PRC source are taxed. Different provisions 
                                                 
1322 Above note 1319, Art 3.  
1323 Above note 1319, Art 3.  
1324 Above note 1319, Art 6.  
1325 Above note 1319, Art 3. 
1326 《关于在华无住所的个人如何计算在华居住满五年问题的通知》Circular on How to Calculate the Five 
Years of Residence in the People’s Republic of China by Non-residents 1995 (Ministry of Finance and the State 
Administration of Taxation). 
1327 Defined by above note 1262, Art 1, para 2. It is the opposite of resident. 
1328 Above note 1262.  
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for the types of income in the schedule in Article 2 are prescribed in the Circular1329 
and Article 5 of the Implementation Regulation.1330 
Special rules and double tax agreements with different countries vary the residence and 
source rules in the PRC,1331 giving rise to the 90 days and 183 days rules for temporary 
residents.1332 
Urban Old-Age Pensions policies are developed to look after the urban elderly who are 
residents for income tax purposes. This analysis focuses on Individual Income Tax 
provisions for residents. 
6.4.2 The Income Tax Model to Capture Urban Old-Age Pensions Social 
Insurance Contributions into the Individual Income Tax Tax-base 
This research focuses on the Urban Old-Age Pensions scheme because the PRC 
continues to urbanise at an increasing rate. The number of participants in the Urban 
Old-Age Pensions scheme will grow as a consequence. The generational contract 
pension funding model means the current working age population bears the burden of 
funding Urban Old-Age Pensions for current retirees. The Urban Old-Age Pensions 
Social Insurance Contributions is ultimately calculated based on the individual income 
of the employee. Therefore Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions add onto 
their Individual Income Tax tax-burden. This section performs an income tax analysis 
                                                 
1329 Above note 1320. 
1330 See above note 1319, Art 5.  
1331 Above note 1319; and 《关于对临时来华人员按实际居住日期计算征免个人所得税若干问题的通知》
Circular on Issues Relating to Calculating Actual Days of Residence for the Purposes of Individual Income Tax for 
Temporary Residents in the People’s Republic of China 1988 (Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of 
Taxation). 
1332 See above note 1319; and 《关于对临时来华人员按实际居住日期计算征免个人所得税若干问题的通
知》Circular on Issues Relating to Calculating Actual Days of Residence for the Purposes of Individual Income 
Tax for Temporary Residents in the People’s Republic of China 1988 (Ministry of Finance and the State 
Administration of Taxation). 
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to capture Urban Old-Age Pensions into the Individual Income Tax tax-base for urban 
employees.  
The model is based on a tax incidence analysis and an effective marginal income tax 
rate analysis. Section 6.4.2.1 explains the income tax model as the methodology used 
in this analysis. Section 6.4.2.2 identifies that the Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance 
Contribution’s contributions base is the same as the Individual Income Tax tax-base for 
urban employees. Section 6.4.2.3 then performs an Average Income Tax Rate and an 
Effective Marginal Income Tax Rate analysis to illustrate how the Individual Income 
Tax captures Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions into its tax base; 
and effectively, the magnitude of the increase in tax burdens for urban employees.  
6.4.2.1 Income Tax Analysis Methodology 
The methodology of this analysis is adapted from the income tax theories proposed by 
Edgeworth 1333  and Stern 1334  and the optimal income tax model proposed by 
Mirrlees.1335 These theories are the basis for performing income tax analyses on public 
policies. They are integral parts of the public economics and tax economics 
literature.1336 A brief summary of the three theories is included in Appendix E. 
                                                 
1333 Edgeworth FY, ‘The Pure Theory of Taxation’, (1897) 7 The Economic Journal (25) 46. 
1334 Stern NH, ‘On The Specification of Models of Optimum Income Taxation’, (1976) 6 Journal of Public 
Economics 123. 
1335 Mirrlees JA, ‘An exploration in the theory of optimal income taxation’, (1971) 38 Review of Economic 
Studies 175; and Mirrlees JA, ‘Optimal tax theory: A synthesis’, (1976) 6 Journal of Public Economics 327. 
1336 See for example, the following well known texts: Kaplow L, The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics, 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008); Rosen, HS & Gayer T, Public Finance, (Beijing: 
McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. & Tsinghua University Press, 8th ed, 2008); Stiglitz JE, Economics of the Public 
Sector, (New York: W.W.Norton & Company, 3rd ed, 2000); and 萨拉尼、伯纳德著,陈新平、王瑞泽、陈宝
明、周宗华译,《税收经济学》, Salanié B, The Economics of Taxation, Chen X & others, trans, (Beijing: China 
Renmin Press, 2009). 
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6.4.2.2 Tax Incidence of Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance 
Contributions and its Effective Tax base 
Each tax has a legal tax incidence and an economic tax incidence. The following 
analysis is interested in the economic incidence of Urban Old-Age Pensions Social 
Insurance Contributions. The Social Insurance Contributions are treated as prima facie 
formal taxes in the PRC, because the contributions are requirements of the Social 
Insurance Law,1337 which is legislation promulgated by the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress; and the levy of the contributions are administered by the 
Local Tax Bureaus of the State Administration of Taxation. This analysis aim to 
illustrate how the effective tax base of the Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance 
Contributions is the same as the Individual Income Tax tax-base for the urban 
population. 
Methodologically, the analysis is performed according to the partial equilibrium model 
of tax burden analysis. Tax burden and how it shifts within an income tax framework 
is a good indicator of where the economic incidence of the tax actually lies. 
6.4.2.2.1 Brief Explanation of the Partial Equilibrium Analysis 
Partial equilibrium1338 analysis is a method of analysis focusing on a single market 
with a single consumer and a single supplier, assuming that market participants have 
no impact on each other. In recent decades, this method of analysis has received much 
criticism because it could not reflect and illustrate the complex relationships between 
                                                 
1337 Above note 1192. 
1338 Above note 1199, at 505-510; and Rosen, HS & Gayer T, Public Finance, (Beijing: McGraw-Hill Companies, 
Inc. & Tsinghua University Press, 8th ed, 2008), at 309-321. 
249 
 
market participants in real life. It is, however, an effective model in illustrating 
economic tax incidence and tax burden shifting.  
Price elasticity of demand and supply in the market is the key to evaluate tax burden 
shifting in a partial equilibrium model. For the purpose of Urban Old-Age Pensions 
Social Insurance Contributions, that is, to understand its tax incidence, the market is the 
labour market. In the labour market for Urban Old-Age Pensions purposes, the demand 
of labour is from urban employers, the supply from the urban working age population, 
and the price is wages. If the elasticity of demand of a certain type of employee is high, 
the burden of the contribution of Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance can be shifted to 
the employee by lowering their nominal wage, thereby lowering their real wage.  
6.4.2.2.2 Incidence of Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions  
The following brief partial equilibrium analysis1339 is an illustration of how burden 
shifting with regard to price (income) elasticity happens in relation to Urban Old-Age 
Pensions Social Insurance Contributions.  
Demand elasticity is the elasticity of demand relative to price, which is the degree of 
responsiveness of the quantity demanded according to price change.1340 The specific 
form of price elasticity here is the taxable income elasticity. Analysis is the same as a 
normal elasticity function. 1341  The elasticity of demand is measured by the Price 
Elasticity Quotient of Demand Edp： 
dp
Q P Q P
E
Q P P Q
  
   
  
                                                 
1339 Above note 1196, ch 6.  
1340 Above note 1196, ch 6.  
1341 For further discussion about taxable income elasticity, please see Kaplow L, The Theory of Taxation and 
Public Economics, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), at 82-90. 
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Edp= price elasticity of demand 
Q = Quantity Demanded, 
Q  = Changes in Quantity Demanded, 
P = Price, 
P  = Changes in Price, 
Q Q  = Quantity Demanded Change Index. 
P P  = Price change quotient. 
When dpE 1 , the elasticity of demand is high, reflecting that the changes in quantity 
demanded is greater than changes in price, or that the consumer (here the employer) is 
sensitive to changes in price (here wage levels). The lowering of the price will lead to 
a larger increase in consumption quantity (number of employee hours). Also, price 
increases will lead to a larger decrease in consumption quantity.  
When dpE 1 , the elasticity of demand is low, reflecting that the consumer is not 
sensitive to price changes.  
When dpE 1 , demand is unit elastic where price changes leads to the same changes in 
quantity.  
When dpE   , demand is perfectly elastic, reflecting a theoretical extreme, where the 
smallest change in price will lead to extreme changes in consumption quantity – a tiny 
decrease in price will lead to unlimited demand, and a tiny increase in price will lead to 
no demand.  
When dpE 0 , demand is not elastic, which means no matter how prices change, 
quantity demanded does not change.  
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Assume that the price elasticity of supply and other conditions do not change, then the 
more sensitive quantity demanded is relative to price changes (that is, a higher Edp) , 
the more difficult for the taxpayer to forward shift the tax burden to the purchaser or 
consumer through raising the price. To the contrary, the less sensitive quantity 
demanded is relative to price changes, (that is, a smaller Edp), the easier it is to forward 
shift the tax burden. Within the employment relationship, what this means is that the 
burden of Urban Old-Age Pensions Insurance Contributions can be forward shifted to 
the employee, when the price elasticity of demand for that type of employee is high. 
For the majority of employment relationships, a high price elasticity of demand can be 
assumed, this research assumes this high Edp. 
As the urban economy continues to grow, it is likely that the price elasticity of supply 
of labour from the majority of urban employees will be lower than the price elasticity 
of demand. The burden of the Social Insurance Contributions actually fall on the 
employee when the employer designs their remunerations options. This research 
therefore assumes demand elasticity is higher than supply elasticity for the urban 
population, and tax burden shifting of Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Contributions 
occurs. The employee bears the burden of the contributions, therefore the economic tax 
incidence of Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions for urban 
employees is on the employee. This makes the tax incidence equal to that of Individual 
Income Tax for those urban employees, which means the Individual Income Tax tax-
base captures Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions. 
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6.4.3 Impact of Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions 
on the Individual Income Tax Burden of Urban Employees 
The following analysis calculates the actual changes in the Individual Income Tax tax-
burden of urban employees, after including Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance 
Contributions into the Individual Income Tax tax-base. The analysis is performed by 
ascertaining the effective marginal tax rate after the changes to the tax base, according 
to the theories proposed by Edgeworth, Stern and Mirrlees.1342 
6.4.3.1 Assumptions and Data Selection 
Urban Old-Age Pensions benefits are for domestic retirees. For the purposes of 
calculating Effective Marginal Tax Rate and Average Tax Rate as a result of Urban 
Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions by urban employees, this research 
assumes a closed economy. Resident Individual Income Tax tax-rates are used. 
Calculations are performed using both the before and after Individual Income Tax 
reform income brackets and tax rates. Analysis is only performed on wage and salary 
income because contributors are employers on behalf of employees, and not on other 
individual income types, such as business income and income of sole traders. The same 
inference can be drawn when analysis are performed with regards to the international 
sector, by using non-resident Individual Income Tax tax-rates; 1343  and the same 
inferences can be drawn when analysis is performed on tax rates of other types of 
individual income. It is assumed that the Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance 
                                                 
1342 See Appendix E for theoretical discussion. 
1343 The Social Insurance Law does provide for contributions and Old-age Pension of foreign employees, or 
retirees who have participated in basic Old-age Pension insurance who have migrated overseas. Above note 1192. 
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Contribution’s contribution burden can be forward shifted to employees due to high 
elasticity of labour demand. 
Calculations are performed by incorporating the rates from Tables 6-1 or 6-2 and the 
contribution rates stipulated by the Proposal to Pilot Improvements to the Urban Social 
Security System1344 issued by the State Council in 2000. The reason to use both the 
before and after reform rates is because the Social Insurance Law1345 took effect in 
2010, which was during the Individual Income Tax tax-rates reform process.  
The Proposal1346 stipulated that enterprises contribute an amount of Urban Old-Age 
Pensions Social Insurance equivalent to 20% of the employee’s total wage income to 
the Social Contributions Account, and income redistribution occurs at the provincial 
level. The employee contributes an amount of Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance 
equivalent to 8% of the individual’s wage income to the individual’s Individual 
Contributions Account. Since the Social Insurance Contributions burden can be 
forward shifted to the employee, this analysis combines the employer and employee 
contribution rates, the total rate is 28%. 
Table 6-3 is adapted from the pre-reform Resident Marginal Individual Income Tax 
Rate Table.1347 Table 6-4 is adapted from the post-reform Resident Marginal Individual 
Income Tax Rate Table.1348 
                                                 
1344 《完善城镇社会保障体系试点方案》Pilot Proposal on Improvements to the Urban Social Security System 
2000 (State Council). 
1345 Above note 1192. 
1346 Above note 1344. 
1347 《中华人民共和国个人所得税法》Individual Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China 1993 
(Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress). 
1348 《关于修改<中华人民共和国个人所得税法>的决定 》Decision to Amend the Individual Income Tax Law 
of the People’s Republic of China 2011 (National People’s Congress). 
254 
 
6.4.3.2 Adapting the Rate Tables from the Individual Income Tax Law 
The Individual Income Tax Law 1349  regulates tax rates by referring to a general 
deductions amount. This format is difficult to apply in an income tax model. Before 
applying the income tax model to test tax incidence that identifies the tax bearer, for 
the purposes of arguing that Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions 
forms part of the Individual Income Tax tax-base, it is necessary to adapt the Individual 
Income Tax rate tables from the Individual Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic 
of China1350 into a more workable form.  
Firstly, it is necessary to incorporate the rate table into marginal tax rate table format. 
The following formula is applied: 
Tn = TmaxYn-1 + MTR (Y – maxY n-1) 
T = Tax payable  
n = current tax bracket 
n-1 = previous tax bracket 
maxY n-1 = maximum income from the previous tax bracket. 
Table 6-3 1351  Pre-reform Resident Monthly Marginal Individual Income Tax 
Rate (effective before 1 September 2011)1352 
Taxable Income (RMB) Tax Rate Tax Payable (RMB) 
0-500 5% nil 
501-2,000 10% nil 
2,001-5,000 15% 175+ 15% of excess over 2,000  
5,001-20,000 20% 625 + 20% of excess over 5,000 
20,001-40,000 25% 3,625+ 25% of excess over 20,000 
40,001-60,000 30% 8,625 +30% of excess over 40,000 
60,001-80,000 35% 14,625 + 35% of excess over 60,000 
80,001-100,000 40% 21,625 + 40% of excess over 80,000 
Over 100,000 45% 25,625 + 45% of excess over 100,000 
                                                 
1349 Above notes 1262 & 1263. 
1350 Above notes 1347 and 1348.  
1351 Adapted from above note 1347. 
1352 Above note 1347. 
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Table 6-3 presents the results from turning the pre-reform rate table into marginal tax 
rate format. 
Table 6-41353 Post-reform Resident Monthly Marginal Income Tax Rate (effective 
from 1 September 2011)1354 
Taxable Income (RMB) Tax Rate Tax Payable (RMB) 
0-1,500 3% nil 
1,501-4500 10% 45 + 10% of excess over 1,500 
4,501-9,000 20% 345 + 20% of excess over 4,500 
9,001-35,000 25% 1,245 + 20% of excess over 9,000 
35,001-55,000 30% 7,995 + 30% of excess over 35,000 
55,001-80,000 35% 13,995 + 35% of excess over 55,000 
Over 80,000 45% 22,745 + 45% of excess over 80,000 
Table 6-4 presents the results of turning the post-reform rates into marginal tax rate 
format. 
Take the average national annual wage income of 2013 as an example. The wage 
amount is RMB 51,483,1355 equivalent to monthly wages of RMB 4,290.25. It falls into 
the second bracket in Table 6-4. The monthly taxable amount is:  
RMB 45 + (RMB 4,290.25 – 1,500) x 10% = RMB 324.03 per month. 
This is equivalent to RMB 3,888 per year.  
6.4.3.3 Combining the Individual Income Tax Tax-base and Old-Age 
Pensions Social Insurance Contributions 
Table 6-5 combines the rates from Table 6-3 and the Proposal to Pilot Improvements 
to the Urban Social Security System1356 issued by the State Council in 2000.  
                                                 
1353 Adapted from above note 1262, sch 1. 
1354 Above note 1262. 
1355 See Table F-6. This is approximately AUD 10,297. 
1356 Above note 1344.  
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Table 6-5 Pre-reform Individual Monthly Marginal Income Tax Rate + Old-Age 
Pension Social Contributions 
Taxable Income 
(RMB) 
Tax Rate Tax Payable (RMB) + Old-Age Pensions 
Social Insurance Contributions 
0-500 5% nil + 28% 
501-2,000 10% nil + 28% 
2,001-5,000 15% 175+ 15% of excess over 2,000 + 28% 
5,001-20,000 20% 625 + 20% of excess over 5,000 + 28% 
20,001-40,000 25% 3,625+ 25% of excess over 20,000 + 28% 
40,001-60,000 30% 8,625 +30% of excess over 40,000 + 28% 
60,001-80,000 35% 14,625 + 35% of excess over 60,000 + 28% 
80,001-100,000 40% 21,625 + 40% of excess over 80,000 + 28% 
Over 100,000 45% 25,625 + 45% of excess over 100,000 + 28% 
Table 6-6 combines the rates from Table 6-4 and the Proposal to Pilot Improvements 
to the Urban Social Security System1357 issued by the State Council in 2000. 
Table 6-6 Post-reform Individual Monthly Marginal Income Tax Rate + Old-Age 
Pension Social Contributions 
Taxable income 
(RMB) 
Tax Rate Tax Payable (RMB) + Old-Age Pensions 
Social Insurance Contributions 
0-1,500 3% nil + 28% 
1,500-45001358 10% 45 + 10% of excess over 1,500 + 28% 
4,500-9,000 20% 345 + 20% of excess over 4,500 + 28% 
9,000-35,000 25% 1,245 + 20% of excess over 9,000 + 28% 
35,000-55,000 30% 7,995 + 30% of excess over 35,000 + 28% 
55,000-80,000 35% 13,995 + 35% of excess over 55,000 + 28% 
Over 80,000 45% 22,745 + 45% of excess over 80,000 + 28% 
 
Continuing the illustration from the Marginal Tax Rate calculations, by using the 
average national annual wage income of 2013 as an example. The wage amount is RMB 
51,483,1359 equivalent to monthly wages of RMB 4,290.25. For Individual Monthly 
Marginal Income Tax Rate + Old-Age Pension Social Contributions purposes, it falls 
into the second bracket in Table 6-6. The new monthly taxable amount is:  
                                                 
1357 Above note 1344. 
1358 Monthly income below RMB 3,500 is exempt, this is approximately AUD 700 per month. Above note 1348. 
1359 See Table F-6 in Appendix F. 
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RMB 45 + (RMB 4,290.25 – 1,500) x 10% + 28% x RMB 4,290.25  
= RMB 1525.30 per month. 
This is equivalent to RMB 18,303.60 per year, which is a significantly higher burden 
than when calculations are made for the marginal income tax rates alone. It increased 
the Individual Income Tax burden or a participant in the Urban Old-Age Pensions 
scheme by RMB 14,415.61360 per year. 
6.4.3.4 Average Tax Rate and Effective Marginal Tax Rate 
Calculations 
Calculation of the Average Tax Rate (ATR) assuming that the measure of income is 
sufficiently well correlated with the pre-tax living standards of individuals gives an 
indication of the distributional or equity merits of a tax system. A system is said to be 
progressive, proportional or regressive as the ATR rises, remains constant or falls with 
income.1361  
Calculation of Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR)1362  is an efficiency measure. 
Along with equity, progressivity or regressivity, efficiency is another important factor 
when analysing taxes and benefits. Taxes can give rise to efficiency costs if there are 
behavioural responses to changes in relative prices and wage rates induced by the 
system.  
In the case of contributions to Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance in the PRC, 
the contribution is an additional levy, changing the measures of both ATR and EMTR 
                                                 
1360 This is approximately AUD 2,883. 
1361 Apps P, LAWS 6257, Public Policy Course Readings, (Sydney: The University of Sydney, 2009), at 147. 
1362 Ibid.  
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in the fiscal system, thereby affecting economic decisions made by employees and other 
participants of the Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance scheme. 
In the following calculations:  
T = tax payments,  
Y = Income,  
C = Consumption,  
RIC = Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions, and 
MTR = marginal tax rate.  
Average Tax Rate from 2009-10 Nominal Marginal Tax Rates1363 
ATR = (T-C)/Y 
Since marginal tax rates are listed for an income range, and Average Tax Rate 
calculations could only be performed at an income level, for the purposes of illustrating 
the distributional effects of the PRC’s Individual Income Tax system, Average Tax 
Rate calculations are made for the higher number of each nominal marginal tax rate 
bracket. Further for illustrative purposes, RMB 150,0001364 is assumed to be the highest 
monthly individual wage income level.  
Table 6-7 Pre-reform ATR 
Y T  Nominal MTR ATR ATR as a Percentage 
500 0 5% 0.00 0% 
2,000 0 5% 0.00 0% 
5,000 625 15% 0.13 13% 
20,000 3,625 20% 0.18 18% 
40,000 8,625 25% 0.22 22% 
60,000 14,625 30% 0.24 24% 
80,000 21,625 35% 0.27 27% 
100,000 29,625 40% 0.30 30% 
150,000 48,125 45% 0.32 32% 
                                                 
1363 Note: ATR is calculated based on the linear income tax model proposed by Stern in above note 1334. See 
Appendix E for a summary of Stern’s model. 
1364 This is approximately AUD 30,000. 
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Table 6-8 Post-reform ATR 
Y T  Nominal MTR ATR ATR as a Percentage 
1,500 0 3% 0.00 0% 
4,500 345 10% 0.08 8% 
9,000 1,245 20% 0.14 14% 
35,000 7,745 25% 0.22 22% 
55,000 13,995 30% 0.25 25% 
80,000 22,745 35% 0.28 28% 
150,000 54,245 45% 0.36 36% 
These tables show that based on nominal marginal tax rates, before the Old-Age 
Pensions Social Insurance Contributions is added onto the Individual Income Tax tax-
base for the urban population, the PRC tax system is progressive. Higher income 
earners are actually paying more in income tax. Also, after the reform, the Individual 
Income Tax for wage and salary earners has a flatter structure because there are fewer 
brackets. 
6.4.3.5 Effective Marginal Tax Rate and Average Tax Rate after Old-
Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions 
When the Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions is added onto the 
Individual Income Tax tax-base for Urban Old-Age Pensions participants, it is 
necessary to also perform the EMTR calculation to measure whether contributions of 
Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance alters the tax burden for urban employees, 
and if it does, by how much. 
Similar to the ATR calculations based on nominal Marginal Tax Rates, for the purposes 
of demonstrating the impact on equity and efficiency of the PRC’s Individual Income 
Tax system by capturing Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions into 
the Individual Income Tax Tax-base, EMTR and ATR calculations are performed for 
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the higher number of each tax rate bracket in Table 6-6. Further, for illustrative 
purposes, assume RMB 200,0001365 is the highest individual income level. 
EMTR = Δ(T+RIC-C)/ ΔY 
ATR= (T+RIC-C)/Y 
Table 6-9 Pre-reform Average Tax Rate and Effective Marginal Tax Rate with 
Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions 
Y Nominal 
MTR 
T + 
RIC 
ATR ATR as a 
Percentage 
EMTR EMTR as a 
percentage 
500 5% 140 0.28 28% 0.28 28% 
2,000 5% 560 0.28 28% 0.28 28% 
5,000 15% 2025 0.41 41% 0.49 49% 
20,000 20% 9225 0.46 46% 0.48 48% 
40,000 25% 19825 0.50 50% 0.53 53% 
60,000 30% 31425 0.52 52% 0.58 58% 
80,000 35% 44025 0.55 55% 0.63 63% 
100,000 40% 57625 0.58 58% 0.68 68% 
150,000 45% 90125 0.60 60% 0.65 65% 
 
Table 6-10 Post-reform Average Tax Rate and Effective Marginal Tax Rate with 
Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions 
Y Nominal 
MTR 
T + 
RIC 
ATR ATR as a 
Percentage 
EMTR EMTR as a 
percentage 
1,500 3% 420 0.28 28% 0.28 28% 
4,500 10% 1605 0.36 36% 0.40 40% 
9,000 20% 3765 0.42 42% 0.48 48% 
35,000 25% 17545 0.50 50% 0.53 53% 
55,000 30% 29395 0.53 53% 0.59 59% 
80,000 35% 45145 0.56 56% 0.63 63% 
150,000 45% 96245 0.64 64% 0.73 73% 
Tables 6-9 and 6-10 showed that Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance 
Contributions adds to the EMTR for those who are participating in Urban Old-Age 
                                                 
1365 This is approximately AUD 40,000. 
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Pensions Social Insurance. The Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance 
Contributions adds a significant tax burden to urban employees. 
The ATR still shows progressivity, but EMTR fluctuates slightly before the Individual 
Income Tax sets in at the tax-free threshold of RMB 1,500 per month. The reason for 
this fluctuation is that employer contributions for Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance 
begin as soon as the Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance participant begins to 
earn income, this is much earlier than the onset of Individual Income Tax.  
6.4.3.6 Results 
This analysis showed that Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions can 
be seamlessly added onto the Individual Income Tax tax-base for urban employees. It 
does not affect the progressive nature of the Individual Income Tax, but the earlier onset 
of the Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions means tax liability 
begins as soon as an urban employee begins to earn income. The impact of the Urban 
Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions before and after the Individual 
Income Tax reform are the same. The Effective Marginal Tax Rate calculation showed 
that the 20% of income contributed by employer contributions is seamlessly forward 
shifted to the employee, as part of their Individual Income Tax tax-burden; and Urban 
Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions adds a significant tax burden for 
urban employees.  
6.5 Conclusion 
In the existing academic analysis, solutions to the “empty individual accounts” problem 
were treated as a major solution to sustainably fund Urban Old-Age Pensions. By 
presuming that Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions in the Social 
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Insurance Fund was the only legitimate source of funding, researchers suggested that 
one of the solutions to this problem was to increase centralisation of the administration 
of Urban Old-Age Pensions insurance contributions. 
There were two issues with the “empty individual accounts problem” and its solutions, 
leaving a large gap in the literature. Firstly, the significant portion of the existing 
academic analysis that was published in Chinese referred to the contributions as “Old-
Age Pensions insurance”.1366 As the reform proceeds, the terminology of “insurance” 
rather than “Social Insurance” confused the analysis. The insurance paradigm was 
applied in the analysis, instead of purely researching in a Social Insurance paradigm 
that is a public economics paradigm. The insurance paradigm was a major reason why 
researchers argued that the funds in the individual accounts in the Social insurance Fund 
need to be accounted for separately. Secondly, increase centralisation of the 
administration of Urban Old-Age Pensions insurance contributions is an administrative 
solution, but sustainable funding of Urban Old-Age Pensions is a substantive fiscal 
problem.  
The gap left by the two issues is that, in order to analyse the funding sustainability of 
Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions, an analysis of all sources of 
public funds in the PRC’s fiscal revenue structure is required.  
This chapter is an analysis of the fiscal revenue of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
for the purposes of funding Urban Old-Age Pensions. The fiscal analysis collates the 
fiscal revenue types and identifies all possible sources of public funds that the PRC 
government could appropriate towards the payment of Urban Old-Age Pensions. It adds 
                                                 
1366 养老保险.  
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a necessary analysis of the PRC’s fiscal revenue structure, for the purposes of sourcing 
subsidies that are allowed by the Social Insurance Law.1367 
This fiscal analysis was performed in three steps. Step one is an illustration of Urban 
Old-Age Pensions as a public good in the PRC that requires appropriation of public 
funds in the budgetary process. This illustration places analysing Urban Old-Age 
Pensions in the public economics paradigm, more specifically, to a Social Insurance 
paradigm that analyses funding Urban Old-Age Pensions in a generational contracts 
model.  
Step two is an analysis of the PRC’s total fiscal revenue structure to distinguish formal 
taxes revenue that are non-earmarked, from sundry levies that are earmarked. This 
analysis determines the possible other sources of revenue in the PRC’s fiscal revenue 
structure, that the PRC government could utilise to subsidise the payment of Urban Old-
Age Pensions.   
Step three is an income tax analysis to identify the Contributions or tax base of Urban 
Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions. This analysis places Urban Old-Age 
Pensions Social Insurance Contributions for urban employees into the Individual 
Income Tax tax-base in the PRC’s fiscal revenue structure. This analysis also illustrates 
that the Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions significantly increases 
the participant’s Individual Income Tax tax-burden, but does not alter the progressive 
nature of the Individual Income Tax in the PRC. The illustration contributes to 
clarifying that Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions is a source of 
                                                 
1367 Above note 1192. 
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public revenue, and that the new Individual Income Tax tax-base could be treated as a 
priority source of funds as subsidies as allowed by the Social Insurance Law.1368 
Analysing the funding capabilities in a Social Insurance paradigm means that Urban 
Old-Age Pensions are treated as a public good to be supplied by the government, and 
funded through consolidated revenue. The difference to the insurance paradigm is that 
Urban Old-Age Pensions individual accounts are treated as a component of the total 
funding structure, not as insurance accounts that the individual has proprietary rights. 
The funds in the individual accounts are not required to be accounted for separately in 
the Social Insurance paradigm, therefore the “empty individual accounts” is only an 
administrative issue, and it does not contribute as a substantive solution to the issue of 
funding sustainability in relation to Urban Old-Age Pensions in the PRC. 
The analysis in this chapter ascertained that the PRC government can source subsidies 
from non-earmarked formal tax revenue, but not earmarked Sundry Levies. The 
analysis however also shows that although total formal tax revenue grew in the decade 
of 2005-2014, total Sundry Levies is growing in importance as a source of funding. 
This is alarming for the PRC in its fiscal revenue structure, because Sundry Levies are 
not independently administered by a tax authority, making verification of statistics 
more difficult. The result is that sources of verified fiscal revenue for the PRC to make 
discretionary public spending decisions is decreasing as a proportion of total revenue. 
This leads to a smaller funding pool to source subsidies as supplementary funding for 
Urban Old-Age Pensions payments.  
                                                 
1368 Above note 1192. 
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Chapter VII Feasibility Study 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter VI analysed the fiscal structure of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for 
the purposes of collating the types of fiscal revenue in the PRC’s consolidated revenue. 
It identified formal taxes as the revenue category for the PRC’s government to source 
subsidies for Urban Old-Age Pensions payment purposes. It illustrated that the 
contributions to the Urban Old-Age Pensions scheme, according to the requirements of 
the Social Insurance Law,1369 are in effect a component of the Individual Income Tax 
tax-base of urban employees. As such, the Individual Income Tax revenue would be 
the priority as the source of subsidies. 
This chapter is a feasibility study that tests the funding ability of the current Urban Old-
Age Pensions scheme in the PRC against three funding pools. It is a static study1370 
performed with respect to the generational contracts model of funding Old-Age 
Pensions. That is, the current generation of working age people contribute to fund the 
retirements of current retirees.  
In this static feasibility study, Urban Old-Age Pensions funding requirements are tested 
against three pools of funds, to measure the PRC government’s public funding 
capability as a preliminary study for future sustainability analyses. This study aims to 
demonstrate the shift in research paradigm for the sustainability models in the literature, 
                                                 
1369 《中华人民共和国社会保险法》Social Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China 2010 (Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress). 
1370 For a full static analysis, see for example, Verbon HAA, ‘Explaining Pay-as-you-go Financed Public Pensions 
Systems’, (1988) 28 Economics Letters 181, at 184-185. 
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as a result of the fiscal analysis. The three pools of funds are chosen according to the 
revenue structure of the PRC.  
This static feasibility study makes three assumptions.  
Assumption 1: The current Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance 
Contributions made according to the Social Insurance Law1371 are adequate to 
fund Urban Old-Age Pensions in the PRC. 
Assumption 2: Revenue from the Individual Income Tax tax-base is adequate to 
fund Urban Old-Age Pensions in the PRC. 
Assumption 3: The formal tax revenue in the PRC’s fiscal transfer system can 
adequately fund Urban Old-Age Pensions.  
Assumption 3 is tested to ascertain the level of non-earmarked revenue available for 
other expenditure needs if the PRC government does not wish to go into debt. If the 
Urban Old-Age Pensions payments require too much subsidies from consolidated 
revenue, without going into debt, the PRC government could not afford to pay Urban 
Old-Age Pensions at the level being tested in the study.  
Three measures are taken to test these assumptions: 
1) The level of Civil Benefits; 
2) Actual Urban Old-Age Pensions expenditure; 
3) The Old-Age Pensions Replacement rate. 
                                                 
1371 Above note 1369. 
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The chapter progresses as follows. Section 7.2 explains the choice of measures. Section 
7.3 explains the methodology and notations of the study. Section 7.4 presents the results 
of the study. Section 7.5 concludes the chapter. 
7.2 Explanation of Measures 
Like the rest of this research, data sources of the feasibility study come from official 
data on the website of the National Bureau of Statistics of China.1372  
Measure 1 is the Civil Benefits1373 standards. Civil Benefits are the safety net as part 
of the PRC’s welfare policies. As only Civil Benefits standards of the most recent 
months are publically assessable on the Ministry of Civil Affair’s website,1374 it is not 
possible to make meaningful calculations at this stage. For illustrative purposes, the 
standards are presented to compare with current level per capita Urban Old-Age 
Pensions expenditure. The most recent data period is July 2015.  
Measures 2 and 3 have more explanatory power for the purposes of this study. The 
measures are taken for the ten years between 2005 and 2014 to test the assumptions. 
Since 2014 data are not completely available, in order to illustrate that when the PRC 
attains urbanisation levels of developed countries, that statically, it is still able to fund 
Urban Old-Age Pensions in its fiscal revenue structure; this study also tests the 
assumptions on 2013 data by assuming the PRC has attained the urbanisation rate of 
developed countries, that is, a hypothetical urbanisation rate of 80%.1375  
                                                 
1372 Database of the National Bureau of Statistics of China (Chinese Version), Online <http://data.stats.gov.cn/> 
(25 Aug. 2015). 
1373《国务院关于在各地建立城市居民最低生活保障制度的通知》Announcement on Establishing Systems of 
Urban Resident Low Income Safety Net by Local Government Authorities 1997 (State Council). 
1374 Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Online <www.mca.gov.cn> (2 Feb. 2012).  
1375 World Bank Database, Online <http://data.worldbank.org/topic/urban-development> (18 Apr. 2016). 
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7.2.1 Measure 1 
Civil Benefits1376 in the social security system of the PRC acts as the safety net, and 
covers widowed elderly people without children, orphans or abandoned infants, and the 
disabled, etc. Calculations are not performed for this measure because of the 
incompleteness of publically available data.  
Civil Benefits payment standards are different for each local government area because 
each local level government sets their own standards. The payment standards are 
comparable to actual payments of Urban Old-Age Pensions. Actual per capita Urban 
Old-Age Pensions expenditure for 2013 was RMB 5,732.87 1377  per year. For 
illustrative purposes, Table 7-11378 presents the Civil Benefits standards issued by the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs1379 for July 2015. In July 2015, the province that paid the 
highest Civil Benefits was Beijing at RMB 702.37 per month, which is RMB 
8,428.441380 per year. The national average was RMB 291.43 per month, which is RMB 
3,497.16 1381  per annum. This means, the actual Urban Old-Age Pensions are 
comparable to the minimum living standards in the PRC set at the Civil Benefits level. 
The measures taken at actual Urban Old-Age Pensions expenditure levels are thereby 
indicative of whether the PRC could look after its urban elderly at minimum living 
standards levels through public expenditure on Urban Old-Age Pensions. 
                                                 
1376 Above note 1374.  
1377 This is approximately $AU 1,147. 
1378 《2015 年 7 月份全国县以上城市低保情况》‘Civil Benefits Standards Of Government Levels Above The 
County Level, July 2015’, Ministry of Civil Affairs, Online 
<http://files2.mca.gov.cn/www/201508/20150827132448567.htm> (6 Sep. 2015). 
1379 Above note 1374.  
1380 This is approximately $AU 1,686. 
1381 This is approximately $AU 693. 
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The comparison between Civil Benefits and the actual per capita Urban Old-Age 
Pensions expenditure is important because OECD countries design their Old-Age 
Pensions with regard to the safety net in their respective countries.1382 
Table 7-1 National and Provincial Civil Benefits Levels of the PRC for July 
20151383 
 
Number of 
Urban Persons 
receiving Civil 
Benefits 
Number of 
Urban Families 
Receiving Civil 
Benefits 
Cumulative 
Urban Civil 
Benefits 
Expenditure 
(RMB '000) 
Urban Civil 
Benefits 
Standard 
(RMB) 
National 17,830,142 9,903,126 39,121,935 291.43 
Beijing 85,590 50,482 436,478 702.37 
Shanghai 180,352 124,188 911,780 638.21 
Tianjin 134,754 78,859 581,628 560.53 
Tibet Autonomous 
Region 
46,643 27,450 159,458 419.81 
Zhejiang Province 62,647 41,582 229,037 410.83 
Guangdong Province 302,516 153,390 891,673 398.18 
Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region 
660,356 393,501 1,840,797 385.68 
Jiangsu Province 293,061 160,308 827,390 344.79 
Anhui Province 679,309 413,466 1,647,337 327.21 
Liaoning Province 749,794 423,508 1,937,420 325.16 
Heilongjiang 
Province 
1,275,812 725,432 3,193,322 310.83 
Jilin Province 732,119 475,013 1,727,283 307.96 
Shandong Province 412,018 215,912 941,465 301.14 
Jiangxi Province 981,018 457,334 2,068,455 297.27 
                                                 
1382 OECD, ‘Pensions at a Glance 2013 OECD and G20 Indicators’, OECD, Online 
<http://www.oecd.org/pensions/public-pensions/OECDPensionsAtAGlance2013.pdf> (2 Feb. 2016). 
1383 Above note 1378. 
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Chongqing 376,484 225,545 859,150 295.32 
Yunnan Province 989,525 614,946 2,066,049 293.55 
Gansu Province 785,219 328,774 1,627,551 292.35 
Fujian Province 134,850 77,925 310,412 288.48 
Shanxi Province 620,198 320,654 1,331,842 286.33 
Guizhou Province 425,542 235,599 948,156 279.07 
Shannxi Province 547,335 270,466 1,169,303 276.00 
Xinjiang 
Autonomous Region 
838,368 399,717 1,697,084 268.19 
Qinghai Province 182,480 88,388 408,847 266.91 
Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region 
427,656 219,436 817,461 266.53 
Ningxia Hui 
Autonomous Region 
157,343 81,570 312,579 260.79 
Hubei Province 996,324 565,909 2,060,407 258.94 
Hunan Province 1,309,551 752,703 2,415,893 257.07 
Hebei Province 574,584 322,139 1,067,187 253.39 
Hainan Province 98,796 44,402 193,585 249.98 
Sichuan Province 1,633,421 956,964 2,682,011 227.15 
Henan Province 1,136,477 657,564 1,760,895 213.36 
Another data set collected for an earlier version of this study was collected at the end 
of 2010. The Civil Benefits standards collected was for December 2010.1384 This data 
set is presented in more detail in Table F-2 in Appendix F. The national average 
standard was RMB179 per month, which is RMB 2,1481385 annually. The highest 
standard at the time was set by Tianjin, it was RMB 428 per month, which was RMB 
                                                 
1384 Adapted from《2010 年 12 月份全国县以上低保情况 (城市)》‘2010 December Safety Net of Urban 
Government Areas Above County Level’, Ministry of Civil Affairs, Online 
<http://cws.mca.gov.cn/article/tjsj/dbsj/index1.shtml?3> (21 Feb. 2012). 
1385 This is approximately $AU 430. 
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5,1361386 annually. In 2010, the actual per capita Urban Old-Age Pensions Expenditure 
was RMB 4,105.801387 per annum. Similar to 2015, the measures taken for actual 
Urban Old-Age Pensions Expenditure is indicative of whether the PRC could look after 
its urban elderly at minimum living standards levels through public expenditure on 
Urban Old-Age Pensions.  
7.2.3 Measure 2 Actual Urban Old-Age Pensions Expenditure 
Data on actual Urban Old-Age Pensions expenditure for the ten years between 2005 
and 2014 are available from the National Bureau of Statistics of China.1388 Up to 
October 2015, the complete data for Urban Old-Age Pensions expenditure is not 
available for 2014. Calculations for this measure are made for the nine years of 2005 to 
2013. It is worth noting that the average per capita actual Urban Old-Age Pensions 
expenditure is comparable to Civil Benefits standards. Table F-2 in Appendix F 
illustrates Old-Age Pensions expenditure for the years of 2005 to 2013. 
7.2.4 Measure 3 The Old-Age Pensions Replacement Rate 
The OECD defines the net pensions replacement rate as  
“the individual net pensions entitlement divided by net pre-retirement earnings, 
taking into account personal income taxes and social security contributions 
paid by workers and pensionsers. It measures how effectively a pensions 
system provides a retirement income to replace earnings, the main source of 
income before retirement. This indicator is measured in percentage of pre-
retirement earnings by gender.”1389 
This research simplifies this definition and takes the Old-Age Pensions replacement 
rate in the PRC as the annual per capita Urban Old-Age Pensions benefit level as a 
                                                 
1386 This is approximately $AU 1,093. 
1387 This is approximately $AU 821. 
1388 Above note 1372.  
1389 OECD (2015), Net pensions replacement rates (indicator) doi: 10.1787/4b03f028-en, 
<https://data.oecd.org/pensions/net-pensions-replacement-rates.htm> (9 Sep. 2015) 
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percentage of annual national average urban wage level calculated by the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China.1390 Depends on whether the replacement level is given, 
or the Old-Age Pensions amount is given, this study performs calculations.  
Several replacement rates are considered for this study, and calculations made to make 
the results more convincing. When calculating the replacement rate in the PRC, the 
literature usually uses four methods of calculation:1391 
1) The target replacement rate in the policy design. This is the replacement rate of 
a representative participant upon retirement. That is, the Old-Age Pensions 
benefit of the representative retiree as a percentage of the National Average 
Urban Wage Level of the previous year. Currently the target rate in the PRC is 
59.2%.1392 
The National Average Urban Wage Level in the PRC is an average of the annual 
income of employed people from the urban population.1393 Employed people 
are those who are above 16 and in the workforce, including employees, re-
employed retirees, sole-traders, private enterprises employees, town enterprises 
employees,1394  rural employed people, and people otherwise employed1395 . 
Table F-6 in Appendix F captures this data as part of the calculations made for 
Assumption 1.  
                                                 
1390《城镇单位就业人员平均工资 2005-2014》‘Urban average wages 2005-2014’, in above note 1372. 
1391 白天亮, 《养老金替代率衡量劳动者退休前后生活水平的差异,也反映整个养老保险制度安排是否合理
-- 养老金替代率有多高（民生视线）》, Bai T, ‘The Old-Age Pensions Replacement Rate Reflects the Living 
Standard Difference of a Person Before and After Retirement, it Also Reflects Whether the Old-Age Pensions 
Social Insurance System is Appropriate – How High is the Old-Age Pensions Replacement Rate (People’s 
Livelihoods Perspective)’, people.cn, 12 December 2014, <http://society.people.com.cn/n/2014/1212/c1008-
26193112.html> (9 Sep. 2015). 
1392 Ibid.  
1393 Above note 1390.  
1394 乡镇企业. These are enterprises located in rural areas, but are usually not primary producers. 
1395 Defined by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, above note 1372. See also《中华人民共和国劳动
法》Labor Law of the People’s Republic of China 1994 (National People’s Congress), Art 10. 
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The representative participant is an employee who is employed during his or 
her whole working age life, has continuously contributed to the Old-Age 
Pensions Social Insurance according to regulatory requirements, and their wage 
level is consistent with the National Average Urban Wage Level.  
2) As a measure of the difference of income of a specific retiree before and after 
retirement, that is, the actual Old-Age Pensions Replacement Rate for the new 
retiree. This is the rate of the pensions received by the retiree as a percentage of 
his or her pre-retirement income.  
3) The average Old-Age Pensions replacement rate of all new urban retirees. This 
is a measure of income differences between current period retirees and current 
period employees, thereby it acts as a test of how well the Old-Age Pensions 
policy supports the living standard of urban retirees.  
4) Actual Old-Age Pensions replacement rate of the whole urban retiree population. 
Payments at this level equals actual Urban Old-Age Pensions expenditure. The 
unknown here is the replacement rate itself. Calculation is performed for the 
purposes of ascertaining current period funding adequacy.  
Internationally, the target replacement rates are usually set at between 40% and 
70%.1396 The Convention Concerning Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors’ Benefits of 
the International Labour Organisation 1397  sets the payment standard for Old-Age 
Pensions at a 45% replacement rate for participants who have made contributions for 
more than 30 years. The replacement rate in France1398 is 50% for participants who 
have made contributions for more than 40.5 years. In Germany and Sweden,1399 the 
                                                 
1396 Above note 1391. 
1397 Convention Concerning Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors' Benefits 1967(International Labour Organization) 
<http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C128> (9 Sep. 
2015), Art 29. 
1398 Above note 1391. 
1399 Above note 1391. 
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rate is approximately 40% for participants who have made contributions for more than 
40 years.  
For Australia, the actual replacement rate for the government Old-Age Pensions funded 
by consolidated revenue1400 can be calculated. The maximum a single person could 
receive as an Old-Age Pensions is $860.00 per fortnight,1401 that is, $430 per week. 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics calculates the trend of All Employees Average 
Weekly Total Earnings for May 2015 to be $1,136.60. This means the Old-Age 
Pensions replacement rate is approximately 38%.  
The Old-Age Pensions replacement rates for the purposes of Measure 3 are adapted 
from the rate in the PRC’s policy design,1402 the actual replacement rate of the year,1403 
the standard set by the Convention Concerning Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors’ 
Benefits of the International Labor Organization, 1404  and the standards France, 
Germany and Sweden, and Australia. These replacement rates are: 
Measure 3A – 59.2%, which is the target replacement rate in the PRC’s policy 
design.1405 
Measure 3B is the actual replacement rate of the year as calculated from Urban Old-
Age Pensions expenditure and average urban income data.1406 Calculations are made 
but not reported, because the results are the same as that for Measure 2. 
                                                 
1400 Australia’s Future Tax System, Retirement Income Strategic Issues Paper: 
<http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/StrategicPaper.aspx?doc=html/Publications/Papers/Retirement_Income_
Strategic_Issues_Paper/index.htm> (24 Feb. 2012). 
1401 Department of Human Services, Age Pensions: 
<http://www.humanservices.gov.au/customer/services/centrelink/old-age pensions> (1 Nov. 2015). 
1402 Above note 1391. 
1403 Above note 1372. 
1404 Above note 1397, Art 29.  
1405 Above note 1391. 
1406 Above note 1372. 
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Measure 3C – 45%, which is the standard set by the Convention Concerning Invalidity, 
Old-Age and Survivors’ Benefits of the International Labor Organization.1407 
Measure 3D – international standards for illustrative purposes: 4Da - France1408 at 50%; 
4Db - Germany and Sweden at 40%; and 4Dc - Australia (more accurately) at 37.86%.  
7.3 Study Methodology and Explanation of Notations 
This study is a case study1409 of the PRC’s public funding capabilities with regard to 
Urban Old-Age Pensions. The study is performed with regard to the generational 
contract model of funding Old-Age Pensions. It is a static, point in time, simple multi-
variable, multi-assumptions case study. The static nature of the study allows snap shots 
to be taken of the PRC’s public finances when considering the availability of revenue 
sources with regard to different pools of funding from fiscal revenue, for the purposes 
of funding Urban Old-Age Pensions. The static study is a good way to measure funding 
ability, as preliminary studies for sustainability models. If the study result is positive 
for a pool of funds with regard to funding Urban Old-Age Pensions, further 
sustainability studies could be performed that takes into consideration time 
variables.1410  
In this case study, three assumptions are tested to answer three questions: 
1) Does the Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions alone cater 
for the funding of Old-Age Pensions for urban employees in the PRC?  
                                                 
1407 Above note 1397, Art 29.  
1408 Above note 1391. 
1409 Yin R, Case Study Research Design and Methods, (Thousand Oaks CA: Sage, 4th ed, 2009), at 14. 
1410 Such as the variables chosen in Yang’s paper. See 杨斌, 《城镇企业养老保险个人账户给付期测算研
究》, Yang, B, ‘Approximating the Payment Period for Urban Old-age Pension Insurance Individual Accounts’, 
(2012) 5 Social Security Studies 3. 
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2) Does the Individual Income Tax tax-base that captures Urban Old-Age Pensions 
Social Insurance Contributions cater for the funding of Old-Age Pensions for 
urban employees?  
3) If subsidies are required from consolidated revenue, how much would the 
central government need to subsidise? 
Note that Question one is the question asked in the existing academic analysis, where 
researchers presumed Urban Old-Age Pensions insurance contributions was the only 
legitimate source of funds. 
Formulating the questions into assumptions, the assumptions are: 
Assumption 1: The current Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance 
Contributions made according to the Social Insurance Law1411 are adequate to 
fund Urban Old-Age Pensions in the PRC. 
Assumption 2: Revenue from the Individual Income Tax tax-base is adequate to 
fund Urban Old-Age Pensions in the PRC. 
Assumption 3: The formal tax revenue in the PRC’s fiscal transfer system can 
adequately fund Urban Old-Age Pensions.  
There are three components to testing each assumption. These components are the size 
of the urban retired population for the year, the pool of funds, and the measure. For 
Assumption 1, the pool of funds is the total contributions of Urban Old-Age Pensions 
Social Insurance in the year. For Assumption 2, the pool of funds is the new Individual 
Income Tax tax-base of the year that captures Urban Old-Age Pensions Social 
                                                 
1411 Above note 1369. 
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Insurance Contributions. For Assumption 3, the pool of funds is total non-earmarked 
fiscal revenue of the PRC for the year.  
7.3.1 Explanation of Notations 
The following are the notations used in this study. 
R = Pool of Funds  
E = Total government expenditure in the year; 
𝑃𝑢𝑟 = Size of the Urban Retired Population for the year; 
𝑅𝑢= Urbanisation Rate; 
𝑒𝑢𝑝 = Urban Old-Age Pensions expenditure for the year; 
C = Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions for the year; 
𝑇y = Individual Income Tax revenue for the year; 
F = Total formal tax revenue for the year; 
M = Measure; 
CB = Monthly Civil Benefits; 
W = National Average Urban Wage Level; 
𝑃𝑟𝑟 = Old-Age Pensions replacement rate. 
S = Subsidies necessary from the government if the pool of funds cannot cover Urban 
Old-Age Pensions calculated according to the measure.  
The tradition of looking after the elderly and current people’s livelihoods policies as 
specified by the Twelfth Five-year Plan1412 require the PRC government to fully fund 
Urban Old-Age Pensions. It promised to fully fund Urban Old-Age Pensions through 
the Social Insurance Law.1413  
                                                 
1412 新华社,《授权发布：中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要》, Xinhua Press, 
‘Authorised Publication: A Compendium to the Twelfth Five-year Plan of Economic and Social Development of 
the People’s Republic of China’, Xinhua Net, 16 March 2011, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2011-
03/16/c_121193916.htm> (19 Sep. 2012). 
1413 Above note 1369. 
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If S is a positive number, the assumption is correct, and the pool of funds covers Urban 
Old-Age Pensions funding requirements. If S is a negative number, the absolute value 
of the number is the subsidies required from consolidated revenue. 
7.3.2 Equations for Testing Assumptions 
The following equations are applied to test each assumption. 
𝑆 = 𝑅 − 𝑀        (1) 
This equation measures funding ability, or requirements for subsidies form 
consolidated revenue. First, substitute R with the following equations for the three 
assumptions. 
For Assumption 1: 
𝑅 = 𝐶 
The pool of funds tested is the total Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance 
Contributions in the Social Insurance Fund.  
For Assumption 2: 
𝑅 = 𝐶 + 𝑇𝑦 
The pool of funds tested is the new Individual Income Tax tax-base as identified in the 
fiscal analysis. That is, the Individual Income Tax tax-base that captures Urban Old-
Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions. 
For Assumption 3: 
𝑅 = 𝐹 
The pool of funds tested is total formal tax revenue in consolidated revenue, that is, 
total non-earmarked sources of revenue. 
Next, substitute M in Equation (1) with the following definition: 
For Measure 2: 
𝑀 = 𝑒𝑢𝑝 
That is, the measure is Urban Old-Age Pensions expenditure for the chosen year. 
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For Measure 3: 
𝑀 = 𝑊𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑟 
That is, the measure is a function of the chosen Urban Old-Age Pensions replacement 
rate. 
Table 7-2 summarises the equations. 
Table 7-2 Summary of Equations 
S = Assumption 1 Assumption 2 Assumption 3 
Measure 2 C − 𝑒𝑢𝑝 (𝐶 + 𝑇𝑦) − 𝑒𝑢𝑝 𝐹 − 𝑒𝑢𝑝 
Measure 3 C − 𝑊𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑟 (𝐶 + 𝑇𝑦) − 𝑊𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑟 𝐹 − 𝑊𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑟 
In order to finally conclude whether the PRC could adequately fund its Urban Old-Age 
Pensions in the present period according to the Social Insurance Law,1414 calculations 
of Urban Old-Age Pensions expenditure as a percentage of total government 
expenditure is necessary. It is difficult to find a theoretical best practice for pensions 
expenditure as a percentage of total government expenditure because the underlying 
policy goals of countries are different. This study uses the publically available data on 
OECD countries as benchmarks.1415  
For the data period of 2005-2014, OECD data are only available for 2007, 2010, and 
2011. Comparisons between the PRC and the OECD are made for these three years. 
The comparatives to be used are the OECD total, France, Germany, Sweden, and 
Australia. The countries are chosen to continue the illustration from Measure 3D.  
                                                 
1414 Above note 1369. 
1415 OECD social expenditure – aggregated data, Online 
<https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SOCX_AGG> (10 Sep. 2015). 
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For the PRC:  
𝑒𝑢𝑝 as a percentage of EXP = 𝑒𝑢𝑝  ÷ EXP × 100%  
The OECD benchmarks and the calculated percentage expenditure for the PRC are 
presented in Table 7-3. For 2007, 2010 and 2011, the results for the OECD total, France, 
Germany, Sweden, Australia, and the PRC are highlighted in yellow. 
Table 7-3 Old-Age Pensions Cash Benefits as a Percentage of Total General 
Government Expenditure1416 
OECD - Total 2007 2010 2011 
Australia  9.40 9.00 9.23 
Austria  21.07 21.85 22.36 
Belgium  14.38 15.06 15.23 
Canada  9.62 9.34 9.71 
Chile  .. .. .. 
Czech Republic  15.68 17.69 18.85 
Denmark 10.18 10.26 10.76 
Estonia  14.87 18.94 18.11 
Finland  15.68 16.71 17.08 
France 20.24 21.05 21.55 
Germany  19.61 18.53 18.92 
Greece 21.16 22.25 23.60 
Hungary  15.60 17.07 17.37 
Iceland  4.44 3.20 4.47 
Ireland  7.54 6.24 8.88 
Israel 9.32 9.61 9.87 
Italy  24.58 26.12 26.65 
Japan  20.63 21.07 20.96 
Korea  5.02 6.41 6.52 
Luxembourg  13.37 13.39 13.93 
Mexico  5.24 6.53 6.74 
Netherlands  10.09 10.06 10.57 
New Zealand  10.67 9.54 10.83 
Norway  10.87 11.03 11.71 
Poland  20.77 20.46 20.57 
Portugal  20.59 20.69 22.74 
Slovak Republic  14.72 15.21 15.60 
Slovenia  19.22 19.25 19.47 
Spain  16.18 17.03 17.93 
Sweden 13.03 13.80 13.47 
Switzerland  18.30 18.12 18.54 
Turkey 15.47 16.06 16.35 
United Kingdom  11.51 11.12 11.51 
United States  13.84 13.82 14.40 
OECD - Total  14.33 14.74 15.29 
PRC1417 11.98 11.74 11.68 
                                                 
1416 Excerpt from above note 1415. 
1417 Extracted from Table F-10 in Appendix F. 
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As the PRC’s economy continues to grow, in anticipation that the PRC may attain 
urbanisation rates of those of developed countries, hypothetical calculations are also 
performed for 2013 to test the assumptions as if the PRC has reached urbanisation rates 
of developed countries. The Urban Old-Age Pensions shceme is covered by well 
documented law-docoments, and its administration is more transparent. The 
hypothetical calculation provides a rough prediction of static funding ability when the 
PRC reaches developed countries’ urbanisation levels, where the Urban Old-Age 
Pensions scheme could realistically cover the whole population.  
The World Bank’s data shows that, in 2014, the urbanisation rate of OECD countries 
is 80%.1418 The hypothetical urbanisation rate of the PRC for 2013 is set at 80%.  
On 2013 data, assume urbanisation rate is 80%, 
80%𝑃𝑢𝑟2013  = 𝑃𝑢𝑟2013 ÷ 80%𝑅𝑢2013 
80%𝑃𝑢𝑟2013   =  322,184,0001419 ÷ 53.73%1420 × 80% 
Therefore, the number of participants in the Urban Old-Age Pensions scheme is 
479,708,171 persons. Based on the per capita actual annual Urban Old-Age Pensions 
expenditure level in 2013, that is, RMB 5,732.87, the expected Urban Old-Age 
Pensions expenditure is RMB 2.75 Trillion. 
For the hypothetical calculations based on 2013 data and the urbanisation rate set at 
80%, the PRC would have increased Urban Old-Age Pensions expenditure, and thereby 
total government expenditure by approximately RMB 0.9 Trillion. The PRC’s total 
                                                 
1418 Above note 1428. 
1419 2005-2014 Urban Old-Age Pensions expenditure data, in above note 1372. See Appendix F.  
1420 Urbanisation data, in above note 1372. See Appendix A. 
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Urban Old-Age Pensions expenditure as a percentage of total government expenditure 
is approximately 18.4%. This rough prediction demonstrates that the PRC is able to 
fund Urban Old-Age Pensions at 2013 average per capita expenditure levels, even at 
developed country urbanisation rates.  
7.4 Results for the Study 
7.4.1 Summary of Feasibility Study Results  
Table 7-3 is a summary of results of the feasibility study. Appendix F collates the 
detailed results for this study. The results are summarised in Table F-1 in Appendix F. 
Table 7-3 is reproduced from Table F-1 in Appendix F.  
Table 7-4 Summary of Results 
Measure Assumption 1 Assumption 2 Assumption 3 
M2 = Actual Urban Old-Age Pensions Expenditure Yes Yes Yes 
M3A: pensions replacement rate @ 59.2%  No No Yes 
M3B: pensions replacement rate @ actual levels  
=M2 Yes Yes Yes 
M3C: pensions replacement rate @ 45%  No No Yes 
M3Da: pensions replacement rate @ 50%  No No Yes 
M3Db: pensions replacement rate @ 40% No No Yes 
M3Dc: pensions replacement rate @37.86% No No Yes 
“Yes” means the pool of funds covers Urban Old-Age Pensions expenditure when 
pensions are paid at the level of the measure.  
“No” means the pool of funds does not cover Urban Old-Age Pensions expenditure 
when pensions are paid at the level of the measure. 
Note that results for the hypothetical data when the urbanisation rate is 80% for 2013 
is reported separately in Table F-11 in Appendix F. 
For the years of 2005 to 2013, Assumptions 1 and 2 are correct for measures 2 and 3. 
That is, for Assumption 1, the pool of funds collected as Urban Old-Age Pensions 
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Social Insurance Contributions is able to cover Urban Old-Age Pensions paid at current 
per capita expenditure levels.  
For Assumption 2, revenue from the Individual Income Tax tax-base, including Urban 
Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions is able to cover Urban Old-Age 
Pensions paid at current per capita expenditure levels.  
For Assumptions 1 and 2, since the PRC government could sufficiently pay for Urban 
Old-Age Pensions in this static analysis, sustainability studies could be performed. 
Sustainability studies have already been performed for Assumption 1 in the existing 
academic analysis. 
Assumptions 1 and 2 are incorrect for Measures M3A, M3C, M3Da, M3Db and M3Dc. 
That is, for Assumption 1, the pool of funds collected as Urban Old-Age Pensions 
Social Insurance Contributions is not able to cover Urban Old-Age Pensions paid when 
the Urban Old-Age Pensions replacement rate is at the target replacement rate in the 
PRC’s policy design; 1421  nor at the standard set by the Convention Concerning 
Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors’ Benefits of the International Labour 
Organisation; 1422  nor at the replacement levels of France, Germany, Sweden and 
Australia. Similarly, for Assumption 2, revenue from the Individual Income Tax tax-
base, including Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions is not able to 
cover Urban Old-Age Pensions paid at the same replacement rates noted for 
Assumption 1.  
The incorrectness of the assumptions at these measures means that the PRC government 
has to make transfer payments from consolidated revenue to fund Urban Old-Age 
                                                 
1421 Above note 1391. 
1422 Above note 1397, Art 29.  
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Pensions. The incorrectness also means that sustainability studies could not be 
performed for Urban Old-Pensions paid at higher pension replacement rates, since the 
payments could not be covered by the pools of funds selected for the static study. 
Figures 7-1 and 7-2 are excerpts from Figures F-1 and F-2 in Appendix F. These figures 
demonstrated that the Urban Old-Age Pensions expenditure is growing at a faster rate 
than annual Social Insurance Contributions.1423  
Figure 7-1 illustrates the amount of subsidies required from consolidated revenue if 
Urban Old-Age Pensions is funded from current year contributions, or the current year’s 
Individual Income Tax tax-base, including Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance 
Contributions. Higher pension replacement rates lead to steeper changes in the 
requirements for subsidies. 
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Figure 7-2 illustrates a comparison between the subsidies growth trends when urban 
Old-Age Pensions is funded from current year contributions, or the current year’s 
                                                 
1423 Please see the illustration in Figure F-3 in Appendix F. 
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income tax tax-base, including Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance 
Contributions.  
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Figure 7-2 shows much more clearly, that changes are steeper when a higher 
replacement rate is chosen. The subsidies amount grows faster when the pool of funds 
is smaller  
Assumption 3 takes into account the whole fiscal revenue of the PRC that are available 
for discretionary public finance expenditure, that is, non-earmarked formal taxes 
revenue. Therefore for the years of 2005 to 2013, it more than covers the funding of 
Urban Old-Age Pensions. The PRC could fund Urban Old-Age Pensions from its total 
formal tax revenue at all of the replacements rates chosen for this static study. This 
means sustainability studies can be performed. Care is required when designing 
sustainability models because the government has responsibility to fund other 
expenditure items.  
Figure 7-3 is reproduced from Figure F-2 in Appendix F. It captures the amount of 
funds left for other government discretionary expenditure without going into debt. 
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Figure 7-3 Surplus after Measure 3 
 
In future sustainability studies, Urban Old-Age Pensions expenditure as a percentage 
of total government expenditure is the most important consideration. There is no 
research on what is the optimal level of expenditure on Urban Old-Age Pensions, the 
OECD data1424 are only available for 2007, 2010 and 2011 in the ten years data period 
chosen for this research, that is, 2005 to 2014.1425  
As a prima facie measurement of sustainability, at Measure 2, when Urban Old-Age 
Pensions are paid at actual levels, Urban Old-Age Pensions as a percentage of total 
government expenditure for 2005 to 2013 in the PRC are set out in Table 7-4. 
Table 7-5 Urban Old-Age Pensions Expenditure as a Percentage of Total 
Government Expenditure 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Replacement 
Rate 
(actual %) 11.91 12.11 11.98 11.81 11.66 11.74 11.68 12.36 13.17 
Table 7-5 is extracted from Table F-11 in Appendix F. The results for 2007, 2010 and 
2011 are highlighted, they are 11.98%, 11.74% and 11.68%. The OECD total Old-Age 
                                                 
1424 Excerpt from above note 1415. 
1425 Excerpt from above note 1415. 
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Pensions expenditure as a percentage of total government expenditure rates these three 
years were 14.33%, 14.74% and 15.29% respectively.  
At current Urban Old-Age Pensions replacement rates, the PRC’s expenditure on Urban 
Old-Age Pensions is comparable to OECD levels. At this payment levels, the PRC pays 
pensions at a comparable level to the Civil Benefits,1426 therefore is deem to meet 
minimum living standards, since the Civil Benefits is the PRC’s official measure of 
minimum living standards.  
The PRC has a much lower old age dependency ratio than OECD countries, for example, 
in 2014, the PRC’s old age dependency ratio was 13.7,1427 which was much lower than 
Germany at 32, Australia at 22, the USA at 22, and the UK at 28.1428 Therefore, 
although there is research on improving pensions funding sustainability for OECD 
countries, the PRC is fairing better with the much lower old age dependency ratio, and 
a growing economy, albeit at a slower pace than the previous decade.1429  
If the PRC chooses to have policies that pay Urban Old-Age Pensions at the other 
replacement rates from Measure 3, funding is not sustainable, because Urban Old-Age 
Pensions will consume too high a proportion of the available formal tax revenue. For 
example, at the target replacement rate of 59.2%,1430 payments of Urban Old-Age 
Pensions would account for 64.31% of total expenditure in 2011.1431 The Old-Age 
Pensions as a proportion of total expenditure in Italy in 2011 was only 26.65%, and 
Italy had the highest proportion out of OECD countries. Table F-10 in Appendix F 
                                                 
1426 Above note 1373. 
1427 Above note 1372. Please also see Appendices A and B. With more robust data, Hu and Yang calculated the 
PRC’s old-age dependency ratio at 11% in 2009. Hu N & Yang Y, ‘The Real Old-Age Dependency Ratio and the 
Inadequacy of Public Pensions Finance in China’, (2012) 5 Journal of Population Ageing 193. 
1428 World Bank Database, Online <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.DPND> (6 Sep. 2015). 
1429 凤凰网, 《经济增长放缓 中国准备好了吗》, ifeng, ‘Economic Growth is Slowing Down, is China 
Ready’, ifeng, <http://finance.ifeng.com/news/special/jjzzfh/> (11 Feb. 2016).  
1430 Above note 1391. 
1431 See Table F-10 in Appendix F. 
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illustrates the Urban Old-Age Pensions expenditure proportion (out of total government 
expenditure). 
When the urbanisation rate is at 80%, Table F-9 in Appendix F reports on results from 
hypothetical 2013 data. Assumption 1 takes into consideration the smallest pool of 
funds. 
For Assumption 1, there is already a surplus of RMB 626.84 Trillion1432 at current 
replacement rates. At this hypothetical level, although sustainability studies can be 
performed with reference only to amounts in the Social Insurance Fund, the studies will 
be more robust when considering the whole formal tax revenue pool, in consideration 
of the generational contracts funding model, and the discretionary nature of public 
expenditure. For the purposes of Urban Old-Age Pensions in the PRC, the government 
has chosen to fund Old-Age Pensions as a normal public good, therefore full 
consideration of the whole revenue is necessary in future sustainability studies.  
7.5 Conclusion 
The results in this study takes consideration of funding Urban Old-Age Pensions with 
regard to the generational contracts model, that is, the current working age population 
contribute to fund the retirement of current retirees. Three pools of funds were 
identified from total consolidated revenue to measure the PRC government’s ability to 
fund Urban Old-Age Pensions. Three assumptions were made in relation to these three 
pools of funds, to test the PRC government’s ability to fund Urban Old-Age Pensions 
paid at different levels.  
                                                 
1432 This is approximately AUD 125 Trillion. 
289 
 
The three pools of funds from consolidated revenue varied in size. The smallest pool of 
funds is the Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions line item in the 
Social Insurance Funds Budget. The existing academic analysis’s conclusions on the 
lack of sustainability of funding Urban Old-Age Pensions in the PRC were performed 
based on the lack of funding in the Social Insurance Fund itself. The feasibility study 
illustrates that, even statically, the amount recorded in the Urban Old-Age Pensions 
Social Contributions line item on the Social Insurance Funds budget could not 
adequately fund Urban Old-Age Pensions. Authors in the existing academic analysis 
already performed sustainability analysis based on this pool of funds. Their conclusion 
was that the PRC government could not sustainably fund Urban Old-Age Pensions. The 
authors however wrongfully chose to analyse in an insurance paradigm.  
The other two funding pools for this study are the new Income Tax tax-base that 
accounts for Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions, and total formal 
taxes revenue. These two funding pools account for the available funding sources for 
Urban Old-Age Pensions.   
This static feasibility study concludes that at present Urban Old-Age Pensions 
payments levels, that is, at the average replacement rate of 11.63% between 2005 and 
20131433, the PRC is able to adequately fund Urban Old-Age Pensions to meet minimum 
safety net living standards. It does this by firstly making subsidies from the Individual 
Income Tax tax-base, then the whole formal tax tax-base. This result contributes to 
future sustainability studies by broadening the sources of funding that the PRC 
government could source subsidies as additional funding.  
                                                 
1433 See Table 7-5. 
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The present policy choices would not allow the PRC to fund Urban Old-Age Pensions 
at higher replacement rates, such as the target replacement rate in the PRC’s policy 
design1434 - 59.2%; the standard set by the Convention Concerning Invalidity, Old-Age 
and Survivors’ Benefits of the International Labor Organization 1435  - 45%; and 
international standards such as that for France1436 at 50%, Germany and Sweden at 
40%; and Australia at 37.86%. Benefits at these higher replacement rates cannot be 
adequately met even by broadening the funding pool to include the whole formal tax 
tax-base because Urban Old-Age Pensions will consume a material proportion of the 
fiscal revenue sources available for discretionary expenditure, that is, available non-
earmarked formal taxes fiscal revenue.  
Future sustainability studies could be performed based on the results of this static case 
study. Since the research in the existing academic analysis in relation to the Urban Old-
Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions pool of funds were performed according 
to the insurance paradigm, in light of the results of this study, a paradigm shift is 
necessary. Lack of adequate funds is concluded from the static feasibility study, 
sustainability studies are not necessary at face value. If researchers chose to include the 
results of the studies in the literature performed on the investment of funds in a 
sustainability study, conclusions would add to the literature. 
In relation to the new Individual Income Tax tax-base as sources of funding Urban Old-
Age Pensions, the static feasibility study demonstrated that there are adequate funds if 
Urban Old-Age Pensions are paid at current payment rates. Future sustainability studies 
could be performed by taking into consideration variables such as the impact of the 
                                                 
1434 Above note 1391. 
1435 Above note 1397, Art 29. 
1436 Above note 1391. 
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changing demographics in the PRC, that is, the ageing and urbanising population has 
on the sources of funds. The static feasibility study also demonstrated that if Urban Old-
Age Pensions are paid at higher levels, there is no adequate funding. If sustainability 
studies are performed, including the results of the studies in the literature performed on 
the investment of funds would lead to meaningful conclusions that adds to the literature. 
In relation to total formal taxes revenue as sources of funding Urban Old-Age Pensions, 
conclusions from the static feasibility study was that, at current levels of payment, there 
is adequate funding. Payments at higher replacement rates, however, would not be 
feasible, when Urban Old-Age Pensions payments were compared to total fiscal 
expenditure. If the PRC government wishes to raise the level of payments, many more 
considerations are needed before a sustainability study could be performed.   
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Chapter VIII Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
The promulgation of the Social Insurance Law 1437  began a new era for welfare 
provision in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In this era, the PRC government 
moves to the Social Insurance Law1438 welfare framework, and provides welfare to its 
citizens including Urban Old-Age Pensions to its urban retirees. The Urban Old-Age 
Pensions are partially funded by Social Insurance Contributions made by employers on 
behalf of employees, and partially funded by subsidies from consolidated revenue to 
the Social Insurance Fund. Unlike the years before the Open Door Policy in 1978,1439 
the PRC government treats social security items, including Urban Old-Age Pensions as 
a public good. Urban Old-Age Pensions are no longer considered as employment 
remuneration for employees of the State. 
Urban Old-Age Pensions policies in the Social Insurance Law1440 welfare framework 
were developed through many years of reform. The most recent reform was during the 
policy formulation process for the Twelfth Five-year Plan.1441 The Twelfth Five-year 
Plan1442  aims for the country to have a set of social welfare policies to improve 
                                                 
1437 《中华人民共和国社会保险法》Social Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China 2010 (Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress). 
1438 Ibid. 
1439 《中国共产党第十一届中央委员会第三次全体会议公报》Communiqué of The Third Plenum of the 
Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 1978 (The Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China); 人民网, 《中共党史上的 80 件大事（65）党的十一届三中全会》, People’s net, ‘80 
Important Events in the History of the Communist Party of China’, people.cn, 13 June 2001, 
<http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5301/5302/20010613/488120.html> (21 Feb. 2016); and 新华网, 
《中共十一届三中全会（１９７８年）》, Xinhua Net, ‘The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of China (1978)’, Xinhua Net, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-
01/20/content_697755.htm> (21 Feb. 2016). 
1440 Above note 1437. 
1441 新华社,《授权发布：中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要》, Xinhua Press, 
‘Authorised Publication: A Compendium to the Twelfth Five-year Plan of Economic and Social Development of 
the People’s Republic of China’, Xinhua Net, 16 March 2011, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2011-
03/16/c_121193916.htm> (19 Sep. 2012). 
1442 Ibid. 
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people’s livelihoods, in order to achieve a Xiaokang society by 2020.1443 The Xiaokang 
society is the achievable ideal suggested by Confucius. The people’s livelihoods policy 
theme in the Twelfth Five-year Plan1444 directed policies to be made for Urban Old-
Age Pension Social Contribution to be more centrally administered. 
The common theme in the prevailing literature was that the PRC government could not 
sustainably fund Urban Old-Age Pensions. The literature discussed the need for the 
PRC to have a welfare state with a fully funded Urban Old-Age Pensions system.1445 
It identified the role played by Old-Age Pensions insurance.1446 It also considered 
proposals for the PRC to develop its Old-Age Pensions system, focusing separately on 
Urban Old-Age Pensions insurance contributions and Urban Old-Age Pensions 
benefits.1447 It discussed increased levels of centralisation for the administration of 
contributions.1448 It also discussed the issues arising from Urban Old-Age Pensions 
insurance contributions in the PRC’s fiscal transfer system, where the rural and urban 
divide1449 gave rise to imbalance in provisions for the two sectors.1450  
                                                 
1443 《人民日报评论员：深刻把握全面建成小康社会宏伟目标——六论学习贯彻党的十八大精神, 四个全
面》, People’s Daily editorial, ‘Grasp the Grand Goal of Developing Fully a Xiaokang Society – Sixth Essay on 
Adopting the Sprits of the 18th Meeting of the Chinese Communist Party, Four Completes’, people.cn, 2 March, 
2015, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/pinglun/n/2015/0302/c78779-26620196.html> (16. Oct 2015). 
1444 Above note 1441. 
1445 庞凤喜, 《论社会保险税的征收与社会保险制度深化改革的关系》, ‘The Relationship between Levying a 
Social Insurance Tax and the Deepening Reform of the Social Insurance System’ (2007) Comments on Public 
Economics (7&8) 1. 
1446 宋晓梧, 《中国社会保障制度改革》Song X, Reform of the Social Insurance System in China (Beijing: 
Tsinghua University Press, 2001). 
1447 Ibid.  
1448 郑秉文,《关于加快推进省级社保统筹的建议》, Zheng B, ‘Suggestions on Speeding up Provincial Level 
Economical Centralised Contribution of Social Insurance’, (2007) A Guide to China’s Economics and Trade (18) 
9. 
1449 孔光、邢振航,《城乡二元体制下农村社会养老保险的重构》, Kong G & Xing Z, ‘Restructuring of 
Rural Social Retirement Income Insurance within a Urban Rural Dualistic System’, (2011) China Collective 
Economy (9) 11. 
1450 潘楠、 钱国荣, 《我国建立城乡养老保险统筹机制问题探讨》, Pan, N & Qian, G, ‘Contribution to the 
Discussion on Establishing a Rural and Urban Retirement Income Mechanism in China’, (2008) Legal System and 
Society (32) 274; and 桂世勋, 《未来中国养老保险面临的两大压力与对策》, Gui, X ‘The Two Pressures of 
Social Insurance in China in the Future and Proposed Solutions’ (1998) Journal of the Eastern China Normal 
University Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition (4) 56. 
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There are several gaps in the prevailing literature. First, there was a lack of analysis for 
the reasons behind the PRC’s policy decision to allow subsidies from consolidated 
revenue to supplement the funding of Urban Old-Age Pensions. Second, the researchers 
have not provided reasons for persisting with the presumption that the funds in the 
Social Insurance Fund pertaining to Urban Old-Age Pensions was the only legitimate 
source of revenue. Third, there is no study on possible sources of revenue as subsidies, 
as allowed by the Social Insurance Law.1451 
This research took the debates before the promulgation of Social Insurance Law1452 as 
a good opportunity to re-evaluate the common argument in the prevailing literature, 
that the PRC government is not capable of sustainably funding Urban Old-Age 
Pensions. This thesis addresses the gaps in the prevailing literature by answering the 
question: 
In order to meet the requirements of the Social Insurance Law of the People’s 
Republic of China 1453  to fully fund Urban Old-Age Pensions, does the 
government of the People’s Republic of China need to make further 
considerations about the funding sustainability of its Urban Old-Age Pension 
policies?  
This thesis approaches this question from three perspectives to respectively address the 
three gaps in the literature. First, the reason that the PRC government made the policy 
decision to allow subsidies from consolidated revenue to supplement the payment of 
Urban Old-Age Pensions was that, in its Social Insurance Law1454 welfare framework, 
it was returning to the Chinese tradition of the State looking after its elderly. This 
tradition developed according to Confucian principles that were embedded into the 
governance of ancient Dynastic governments by methods advocated by the Legalist 
                                                 
1451 Ibid. 
1452 Above note 1437. 
1453 Above note 1437. 
1454 Above note 1437. 
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school of thought, that is, strict adherence to a set of laws. In this tradition, each dynasty 
had concrete policies and laws to look after the elderly. The Sovereigns in order to 
satisfy their Li behaviour standards are required to look after people’s livelihoods, 
including those of the elderly. The Sovereigns funded their elderly care policies by 
general revenue. 
Second, there is no reason why there couldn’t be other sources of revenue for the 
purposes of funding Urban Old-Age Pensions, since the PRC has a practicable set of 
formal institutions to allow it to legitimately source revenue from consolidated revenue 
to fund its welfare programmes. The post 1978 Urban Old-Age Pensions reform in the 
PRC was implemented at the same time as formal institutional reforms in the country. 
The economic and legal institutions in the PRC evolved organically to react to the 
changing economic and social environment. 1997 was a significant year for Urban Old-
Age Pensions policies, because the PRC government recognised the importance of 
sustainable economic development,1455 and that it had to look after the urban elderly 
not as its employees, but its citizens. This change of perspective occurred because the 
role of State Owned Enterprises as the major urban employer gradually reduces in 
importance. The issue of the State Council Decision on Unifying the Enterprise 
Employee Basic Old-Age Pension Insurance Systems (the State Council Decision 
1997)1456 was the turning point in Urban Old-Age Pensions policy design, where the 
government began to develop welfare policies that are partially funded by Social 
Insurance Contributions.  
                                                 
1455 Saich T, Governance and Politics of China, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 3rd ed, 2011), at ch 10; and 
Clark D & Others, ‘The Role of Law in China’s Economic Development’, in Brandt L & Rawski TG ed, China’s 
Great Economic Transformation, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), at 391. 
1456 《国务院关于建设统一的企业职工基本养老保险制度的决定》State Council Decision on Unifying the 
Enterprise Employee Basic Old-age Pension Insurance Systems 1997 (State Council). 
296 
 
Third, the PRC government’s promise in the Social Insurance Law1457 to fully fund 
Urban Old-Age Pensions included enabling the government to source subsidies from 
consolidated revenue to the Social Insurance Fund to fund Urban Old-Age Pensions. 
The law signalled that the PRC government is treating Urban Old-Age Pensions as a 
public good to be funded by consolidated revenue. A fiscal study is performed in this 
research to analyse the PRC’s fiscal revenue structure for the purposes of sourcing 
funds for the payment of Urban Old-Age Pensions. The study concludes that the sum 
of non-earmarked fiscal revenue could be the source of subsidies for the purposes of 
funding Urban Old-Age Pensions according to the Social Insurance Law.1458 A static 
feasibility study of the PRC’s ability to fund Urban Old-Age Pensions is performed 
based on the findings of the fiscal analysis to illustrate the changes in the sources of 
funding as a result of the fiscal study.  
The thesis concludes that in order to meet the requirements of the Social Insurance 
Law1459 to fully fund Urban Old-Age Pensions, the government of the PRC is returning 
to tradition by allowing subsidies from consolidated revenue as supplement funding. If 
the PRC is aiming for a higher Urban Old-Age Pensions replacement rate, that is, 
paying a higher level of pensions, the argument in the prevailing literature on the lack 
of sustainable funding remains true, even when subsidies are sourced from formal taxes 
revenue. Further considerations need to be made in relation to the sustainability of 
Urban Old-Age Pensions policies, accounting for the Social Insurance research 
paradigm that addresses Urban Old-Age Pensions funding needs as the funding of a 
                                                 
1457 Above note 1437. 
1458 Above note 1437. 
1459 Above note 1437. 
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public good, demographic changes, and sources of funding in the PRC’s consolidated 
revenue. 
This chapter summarises the results of the research from these three perspectives, 
makes discussions of the flaws in the prevailing literature, and identifies future research 
opportunities and challenges.  
8.2 Summary of Results 
Chapter II is an analysis of the current laws regulating Urban Old-Age Pensions in the 
Social Insurance Law 1460  welfare framework. Urban Old-Age Pensions Social 
Insurance Contributions are administered by Local Tax Bureaus of the State 
Administration of Taxation. The Payment of Urban Old-Age Pensions benefits are 
administered by Departments of Human Resources and Social Security at local 
government areas. The minimum contribution years before a retiree could receive 
government administered Urban Old-Age Pensions benefits is 15 years. The welfare 
framework enables extra contributions to make up the 15 years. The welfare framework 
also enables a retiree to benefit from Urban Old-Age Pensions when the retirement 
location differs from the employment location. The laws in the welfare framework 
entrenches the PRC government’s promise to look after its urban elderly – returning to 
tradition. 
This section focuses on summarising the results from the historical analysis in Chapter 
IV, the institutional analysis of the reform Urban Old-Age Pensions in the PRC in 
Chapter V, the fiscal analysis in Chapter VI, and the feasibility study in Chapter VII. 
                                                 
1460 Above note 1437. 
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8.2.1 Results from the Historical Analysis 
The historical analysis of the Chinese tradition where the State looks after the elderly 
were performed by treating the policies as having the force of law. A comparison 
between the functions of Li rules in ancient China that capture the policies to look after 
the elderly and the functions of modern western laws showed that the functions are 
comparable.  
The historical analysis concluded that the ancient Chinese dynasties had continuous and 
one-off policies that supplied material goods to the elderly. These policies were funded 
by general revenue. The continuous policies focused on the status of the elderly in 
society, giving them travel conveniences; and tax and force labour exemptions. The tax 
and force labour exemptions applied to the elderly and their sons who have to look after 
them. The one-off policies were often implemented at specific events, such as the 
Emperor’s coronation and other special celebrations initiated by the Emperor. Often the 
elderly were given gifts in the form of food and fabric. 
The historical analysis illustrated that China has a long tradition of having government 
policies that looked after the elderly.  
8.2.2 Results from the Institutional Analysis of the Reform of Urban Old-
Age Pensions  
The institutional analysis showed that the PRC’s formal institutions for the purposes of 
Urban Old-Age Pensions experienced an organic development process. In China’s post 
1949 history, there are distinct eras, but formal institutional developments did not 
progress with the same clear distinction. Between 1949 and 1978, the institutional 
developments emphasised the role of the Communist Party in the governance of the 
299 
 
country, and the party’s policies were in form and substance intertwined with 
government policy.  
In relation to Urban Old-Age Pensions, the 1969 Systemic Reform Proposals for the 
Accounting of State Owned Enterprises1461 issued by the Ministry of Finance shifted 
funding responsibility from the State in its budgets, to State Owned Enterprises in their 
budgets. State Owned Enterprises budgeted for welfare for its employees and recorded 
expenditure in their enterprise accounts. Amongst other things, this law-document 
turned Urban Old-Age Pensions from a public welfare policy into an employment 
remuneration policy.  
The Open Door Policy began soon after the end of the Cultural Revolution,1462 and 
formal institutions in the PRC reacted to the marketisation of the economy. Laws and 
infrastructure began to be put in place, and Five-year Plans returned to play an 
important role in the policy development process. There is enough evidence to show 
that the PRC’s formal institutions are strengthened to allow for effective 
implementation of policies,1463 so the policy aim to fully fund Urban Old-Age Pensions 
could be achieved by sourcing subsidies from general public revenue.  
For the purposes of the Urban Old-Age Pensions policies, in the Social Insurance 
Law 1464  welfare framework, the relevant Five-year Plan is the Twelfth Five-year 
Plan.1465 The relevant policy group was covered by the People’s Livelihoods Reform 
                                                 
1461 《关于国营企业财务工作中几项制度的改革意见》Systemic Reform Proposals for the Accounting of State 
Owned Enterprises 1969 (Ministry of Finance). 
1462 项怀诚编,《中国财政通史·当代卷》, Xiang H ed, Public Finance History of China, Contemporary Volume 
(Beijing: China Public Finance and Economics Press, 2006), ch 3. 
1463 See 陈太明,《中国改革开放政策有效性的定量研究》, Chen T, ‘An Empirical Study on China’s Reform and 
Opening-up Policy Effectiveness’, (2011) 28 Statistical Research (10) 54;陈杰、王立勇, 《改革开放以来我国宏
观调控的有效性研究》, Chen J & Wang L, ‘Macroeconomic Control Policy Effectiveness in the Post Open Door 
Policy Era in China’, (2015) Macroeconomic Research (3) 50; and 靳万军, 《政府绩效管理与金税工程绩效》, 
Jin W, ‘Government Performance Management and the Effectiveness of the Golden Tax Project’, (2005) 242 Taxation 
Research (7) 24 – 32. 
1464 Above note 1437. 
1465 Above note 1441. 
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thematic policy goal. Law-documents developed according to this policy goal to 
regulate the Contributions, payments and administration of Urban Old-Age Pensions. 
Existing law-documents that regulated different types of fiscal revenue allow the 
government to source funds to subsidise the payments of Urban Old-Age Pensions 
benefits. 
These law-documents that regulated fiscal revenue in the PRC include law-documents 
on formal taxes and sundry levies. Formal taxes are non-earmarked, raised either by 
Legislation made by the legislature (the National People’s Congress, or its Standing 
Committee), or by Administrative Regulations made by the State Council, and 
administered by tax authorities. Tax authorities refer to the Local Tax Bureaus or 
National Tax Bureaus of the State Administration of Taxation. Sundry levies are raised 
by Ministerial Rules made by the relevant functional Ministry that is administering the 
policy. This revenue is earmarked, and the expenditure is made by the functional 
Ministry. Sundry levies are earmarked and less transparent.  
Local Tax Bureaus collect formal tax revenue that could be redistributed to local 
governments in the budgeting process, these are funds local governments are entitled 
to in the intergovernmental-transfers process. The funds collected by National Tax 
Bureaus are for the national government to appropriate. Centralisation of administration 
of Urban Old-Age Pensions to the provincial level have been achieved, and the 
collection of Urban Old-Age Pensions by Local Tax Bureaus are appropriate as the 
funds could be transferred from consolidated revenue to pay for Urban Old-Age 
Pension benefits.  
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8.2.3 Results from the Fiscal Analysis 
This fiscal analysis was performed to analyse how the PRC’s fiscal structure could fund 
Urban Old-Age Pensions. Urban Old-Age Pensions is a separate line item in the PRC’s 
Social Insurance Funds Budget. The fiscal study distinguished the different forms of 
fiscal revenue, and analysed their contribution to total fiscal revenue.  
The collection of Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions by Local 
Tax Bureaus illustrates that administratively, it is similar to a formal tax. The Social 
Insurance Law,1466  which is Legislation made by the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress, requires Social Insurance Contributions to be collected 
into the Social Insurance Fund, therefore, the Social Insurance Contributions are 
earmarked. The Social Insurance Contributions can be treated as an earmarked formal 
tax.  
The fiscal study also concluded that the Contributions base for Urban Old-Age Pensions 
Social Insurance Contributions are the same as the Individual Income Tax tax-base of 
urban employees. This suggests that if the government plans to identify a particular 
type of formal tax to source subsidies to fund Urban Old-Age Pensions benefits, the 
Individual Income Tax tax-base would be the obvious priority. 
8.2.4 Results from the Feasibility Study 
The feasibility study was performed based on 2005 to 2013 data. It is a static study that 
aims to illustrate the difference made by broadening the funding sources for Urban Old-
Age Pensions payments.1467 The generational contracts model is applied for this study, 
                                                 
1466 Above note 1437. 
1467 For a full static analysis, see for example, Verbon HAA, ‘Explaining Pay-as-you-go Financed Public Pension 
Systems’, (1988) 28 Economics Letters 181, at 184-185. 
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that is, the model assumes that the present generation of workers are contributing to 
fund the retirement of the present generation of retirees.  
The study took into consideration three funding pools of differing sizes, and tested 
whether these funding pools could adequately fund Urban Old-Age Pensions in the 
PRC. The smallest pool of funds was the Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance 
Contributions line item in the Social Insurance Funds Budget. The medium pool of 
funds is the Individual Income Tax tax-base, including Urban Old-Age Pensions Social 
Insurance Contributions. This new Individual Income Tax tax-base resulted from the 
fiscal study. The largest pool of funds is the whole formal tax revenue in the PRC’s 
consolidated revenue. 
The result of the feasibility study was that at present Urban Old-Age Pensions payments 
levels, that is, at the average replacement rate of 11.63% between 2005 and 2013,1468 
the PRC is able to adequately fund Urban Old-Age Pensions to meet minimum safety 
net living standards, by firstly making subsidies from the Individual Income Tax tax-
base, then the whole formal tax tax-base. 
The study also considered payment of benefits at higher pension replacement rates, that 
is, the rate between the level of the pension and average wage and salary levels in the 
PRC. It concluded that present policy choices would not allow the PRC to fund Urban 
Old-Age Pensions at higher replacement rates, such as the target replacement rate in 
the PRC’s policy design1469 (59.2%); the standard set by the Convention Concerning 
                                                 
1468 See Table 7-2. 
1469 白天亮, 《养老金替代率衡量劳动者退休前后生活水平的差异,也反映整个养老保险制度安排是否合理
--养老金替代率有多高（民生视线）》, Bai T, ‘The Old-age Pension Replacement Rate Reflects the Living 
Standard Difference of a Person Before and After Retirement, it Also Reflects Whether the Old-age Pensions 
Social Insurance System is Appropriate – How High is the Old-age Pensions Replacement Rate (People’s 
Livelihoods Perspective)’, people.cn, 12 December 2014, <http://society.people.com.cn/n/2014/1212/c1008-
26193112.html> (9 Sep. 2015). 
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Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors’ Benefits of the International Labor Organization1470 
- 45%; and international standards such as that for France1471 at 50%, Germany and 
Sweden at 40%; and Australia at 37.86%. Assuming that the government does not wish 
to go into debt, benefits at these higher replacement rates cannot be adequately met 
even by broadening the funding pool to include the whole formal tax tax-base because 
Urban Old-Age Pensions will consume a material proportion of the fiscal revenue 
sources available for discretionary expenditure, that is, available non-earmarked formal 
taxes fiscal revenue. 
8.3 Flaws in the Prevailing Literature 
The prevailing literature argued that the PRC’s Urban Old-Age Pension is underfunded 
for the country’s ageing population, and the scheme is not sustainable. The argument is 
made from different perspectives. Scholars began to write about the reform to Urban 
Old-Age Pensions around the time of the issuing of the State Council Decision 1997.1472 
This was the time that the PRC government began to rebuild a welfare state that 
includes the five types of social security benefits that are partially funded by Social 
Insurances1473– Old-Age Pensions, Health, Workers Compensation, Parental Care and 
Unemployment. 
The earlier literature around the time of the issuing of the State Council Decision 
19971474 identified areas that the reform needed to focus on. These issues included: a 
                                                 
1470 Convention Concerning Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors' Benefits 1967(International Labour Organization) 
<http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C128> (9 Sep. 
2015), Art 29. 
1471 Above note 1469. 
1472 Above note 1456. 
1473 The five types of Social Insurances are the Old-age Pensions Social Insurance, the Health Social Insurance, 
the Workers Compensation Social Insurance, the Parental Social Insurance and the Unemployment Social 
Insurance. 
1474 Above note 1456. 
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declining old age dependency ratio,1475 reduction in the level of coverage of the Urban 
Old-Age Pensions, 1476  “rising enterprise burden”, 1477  and “erosion of pension 
benefits”.1478 The authors argued that the administration of the enterprise contributed 
Social Insurance Contributions needs to be pooled at a higher level of government for 
administrative purposes.1479 Later authors continued to see these issues as requiring 
further reform, and suggested that in the reform process, the empty individual accounts 
in the Social Insurance Fund is the major contributor to the lack of funding 
sustainability. The authors argued that the empty individual accounts problem is caused 
by a “historical Old-Age Pension insurance debt”1480 problem; and administration of 
the Urban Old-Age Pensions scheme by lower level governments. In terms of the 
“historical Old-Age Pension insurance debt”, 1481  the literature critiqued the 
governments’ practice of making transfer payments from consolidated revenue to fund 
Urban Old-Age Pensions. Models were built to analyse sustainability based on these 
arguments, and solutions to the lack of sustainability were proposed.  
There are several significant flaws in this literature. Firstly, the literature spanned 
almost twenty years, yet the presumptions did not change. The arguments in the older 
literature around the issuing of the State Council Decision 19971482  was made to 
prepare for reform. The authors were analysing an economy that is experiencing 
significant transition, including high unemployment rates from the State Owned 
Enterprises reform, reemployment in the private sector and increased population 
                                                 
1475 West L, ‘Pension Reform in China: Preparing for the Future’, (1999) 35 The Journal of Development Studies 
(3) 153. 
1476 Id, at 156.  
1477 Id, at 156-158. 
1478 Id, at 158-161. 
1479 Id, at 173-177. 
1480 谭喜祥,《中国养老保险历史债务偿还的法律思考》Tan X, ‘Legal Considerations of the Repayment of the 
Historical Social Insurance Debt in China’ (2005) 146 Lanzhou Academic Journal (5) 213. 
1481 Ibid. 
1482 Above note 1456. 
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mobility in the form of the migrant workers. The authors were contributing to initial 
policy reform. The Urban Old-Age Pensions policy at the time was administered and 
paid by employers. These employers were either the public service or government 
agencies, or State Owned Enterprises. The government was the employer in that Urban 
Old-Age Pensions Scheme. 
The issue of the State Council Decision 19971483 was the break from the previous 
employer administered scheme, where Urban Old-Age Pensions became social security 
provided by the government to its citizens, rather than employment remuneration that 
looked after the employee’s retirement. 
Later authors continued their research from the arguments made by earlier researchers, 
and continued to view the accumulated funds from contributions in the Social Insurance 
Fund as the only source of legitimate revenue. They did not reconsider that the PRC’s 
Urban Old-Age Pensions has become a public good within the budgeting process. The 
“historical Old-Age Pension insurance debt” 1484  in the Social Insurance Law 1485 
welfare framework is not a real problem, because Urban Old-Age Pensions funding is 
part of general expenditure considerations for the PRC government. 
The second significant flaw is that the centralisation of the administration of Social 
Insurance Contributions is an administrative issue, it is not a substantive solution that 
will contribute to the funding of Urban Old-Age Pensions. Administrative solutions 
could clarify the responsibility of different levels of government, as well as make the 
                                                 
1483 Above note 1456. 
1484 Above note 1480. 
1485 Above note 1437. 
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policy more transparent. The administrative reforms are also within the continuous 
government transfers reform in the PRC.1486 
The third significant flaw is that the later authors did not take into consideration the 
changes in formal institutions in the PRC. It is possible to argue that before the Open 
Door Policy reforms, the PRC did not have a formal set of practicable institutional 
structures, because the early leaders governed according to Communist Ideology. The 
changes to formal institutions as a result of marketisation meant the legal system in the 
PRC is more developed, and therefore it is possible for the PRC to fund Urban Old-Age 
pensions as a public good, through its fiscal revenue structure.   
The most significant flaw in the literature is that many papers published in Chinese 
referred to Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions as Old-Age Pensions 
Insurance Contributions. The use of the terminology meant many authors 
fundamentally misunderstood the scheme as a private insurance scheme, and the 
contributions are made as a premium to insure for the risk of future loss.1487 
This misconception meant the authors perceived that each participant’s Urban Old-Age 
Pensions benefit requires independent verification that funds are required to be set aside 
for the particular individual. Individual accounts in the Social Insurance Fund was 
perceived as accounting provisions by the government to fund the Urban Old-Age 
Pensions need of the individual.  
In private insurance, there is generally a principle of equal exchange for the payment 
of final benefits when the risk event occurs. As soon as the contract between the insurer 
                                                 
1486 Wong C, ‘Reforming China’s Public Finances for Long-term Growth’, in Garnaut, R & Song, L eds, China 
Update 2013 (Canberra: Australian National University, 2013), at 199-219.  
1487 ‘Insurance’ in Delbridge & others, eds, The Macquarie Encyclopedic Dictionary, (Sydney: Macquarie Library 
Pty Ltd, 1995), at 482. 
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and the beneficiary lapses, the insurance responsibility of the insurer stops. In the 
private tier of pension provision, insurance companies offer lifetime annuity products 
that are based on current income. These products are similar to Old-Age Pensions 
Social Insurance schemes up to a certain point, and are designed around the provision 
of a pension in retirement and the premiums are designed around working life income. 
The insurance company, however, has to approximate different risk factors for different 
levels of payment and demand different premiums.  
If a government’s public Old-Age Pensions system relies on a private insurance scheme, 
there will be few policyholders. The market then contracts in size and becomes less 
able to provide benefits effectively. Since there is information asymmetry, when the 
insurance company is unable to acquire information based on the probability of 
different risk factors for different persons, the only possibility is to provide the same 
policy to each person. Those policy holders with higher risk factors, however, will be 
more likely to demand insurance benefits, and these are also the less desirable 
customers for insurance companies. In order to maximise benefit levels and minimise 
risk, the insurance company would be more willing to choose customers with opposite 
characteristics, leading to adverse selection.  
The existence of this phenomenon means that the private insurance market is unable to 
solve the conflict between risk uncertainty, profitability and contract stability. It is also 
not able to solve the conflict between the long term nature of the insured activity and 
the short term nature of efficient capital returns sought by the insurance industry. 
Therefore it is not possible for an effective and efficient private insurance market to 
provide Old-Age Pension, as well as health care, unemployment benefits, and work 
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injury compensation. The market failure is obvious. As such, the government has to 
step in to provide for Old-Age Pension as a normal public good in its policy choice.  
This funding model works in the same way as paying earmarked taxes to fund other 
public goods supplied by the government. The generational contracts Social Insurance 
model is distinctly different to how normal private insurances are funded: usually 
participants of private insurance pay premiums to insure against a “risk” event in the 
future, and the premiums correspond with expected payment levels. Social Insurances 
are compulsory payments required by laws, and behave similarly as taxes. 
8.4 Future Research Opportunities and Challenges  
The results presented in this thesis add to the literature on funding Urban Old-Age 
Pensions in the PRC. This research found that the reason behind the policy design of 
Urban Old-Age Pensions in the PRC, that is, the requirement by the Social Insurance 
Law1488 to fully fund Urban Old-Age Pensions, could be found in the Chinese tradition 
of the State having policies to look after the elderly.  
The formal institutions for implementing the Social Insurance Law1489 is different from 
when authors began to publish the prevailing literature around 1997, and the regulations 
for government revenue could be practicably administered to adequately fund public 
goods. This research analysed the PRC’s fiscal revenue structure to broaden the pool 
of funds that could be accessed to fund Urban Old-Age Pensions as a public good. The 
accumulated contributions in the Social Insurance Fund is not the only legitimate source 
of funding for Urban Old-Age Pensions.  
                                                 
1488 Above note 1437. 
1489 Above note 1437. 
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This thesis contributes to change the perspective on analysing the sustainability of 
funding Urban Old-Age Pensions in the PRC. If the PRC was to increase the Urban 
Old-Age Pensions replacement rate, results from the feasibility study shows that 
sustainability would still be an issue that needs to be addressed. 
Models to address sustainability must include considerations of a broader funding pool. 
Additional variables need to be considered because the legal requirements in the Social 
Insurance Law 1490  welfare framework allows the government to subsidise. This 
research illustrates that, assuming the government does not go into debt in its public 
finances, the total formal tax revenue in the PRC could be treated as a funding source 
for Urban Old-Age Pension purposes. If the government wants to place a limit on 
subsidies, since for urban employees, the tax base for Urban Old-Age Pensions Social 
Insurance Contributions and Individual Income Tax are the same, the Individual 
Income Tax tax-base that include Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance 
Contributions could be treated as the source of funding. Models could be built by adding 
these two larger pools of funds as variables. The challenges in rebuilding these 
sustainability models is in relation to forecasting the changes in the funding pools. The 
PRC is experiencing economic transition, and income tax revenue is growing in 
importance as a contributor to total fiscal revenue. The continuing legal and public 
finances reforms will lead to changes in the role sundry levies play in the fiscal revenue 
structure. It is difficult to predict the size of formal tax revenue, because there are many 
independent variables as components of formal tax revenue.  
The changes in the demographic nature of the PRC’s economy, that is, the growth of 
urbanisation and the growing ageing population will effect on the funding of Urban 
                                                 
1490 Above note 1437. 
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Old-Age Pensions. These changes lead to an increase in the number of urban retirees 
for the Urban Old-Age Pensions scheme. As at 2014 the PRC has a much lower old age 
dependency ratio than the OECD1491 at 13.7 retirees per 100 employed persons, but it 
was predicted to increase.1492 For OECD countries, Germany’s old age dependency 
ratio was 32, Australia and the USA were both at 22, and the UK at 28.1493  
The PRC does face an ageing population problem. Solutions for this problem are 
needed, but modelling should carefully consider Apps and Rees’s argument,1494 that 
any solution needs to consider the family structures in the country, where policies to 
stimulate the birth rate should be treated with caution.1495 Apps and Rees argued that 
although an increased birth rate adds to the potential pool of the working age population, 
the social welfare cost of the ageing population needs to be balanced with that of 
children.1496 The PRC has recently relaxed its one child policy1497 to combat the ageing 
population problem. Modelling should take this into account, but heed Apps and Rees’s 
caution. 
Further study could also be performed to contribute to the debate in the PRC on 
urbanisation, specifically the dismantling of the Hukou1498 system, and the merging of 
the dual urban-rural economies. The increasingly urbanised nature of the population is 
                                                 
1491 Database of the National Bureau of Statistics of China (Chinese Version) Online <http://data.stats.gov.cn/> 
(25 Aug. 2015), please also see Appendix A and B 
1492 For example, see Hu N & Yang Y, ‘The Real Old-Age Dependency Ratio and the Inadequacy of Public 
Pension Finance in China’, (2012) 5 Journal of Population Ageing 193; and the critique of the literature in Apps P, 
Rees R, & Wood M, ‘Population Ageing, Taxation, Pensions and Health Costs’, (2007) 10 Australian Journal of 
Labour Economics 79. 
1493 World Bank Database, Online <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.DPND> (6 Sep. 2015).  
1494 For example, Apps P & Rees R, ‘Australian Family Tax Reform and the Targeting Fallacy’, (2010) 43 
Australian Economic Review 153; Apps P, ‘The High Taxation of Working Families’, (2004) 5 Australian Review 
of Public Affairs (December) 1; and Apps P, Rees R, & Wood M, ‘Population Ageing, Taxation, Pensions and 
Health Costs’, (2007) 10 Australian Journal of Labour Economics 79. 
1495 Apps P & Rees R, Public Economics and the Household, (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
1496 Ibid. 
1497新华社,《授权发布:中国共产党第十八届中央委员会第五次全体会议公报》,Xinhua Press, ‘Authorised 
Publication: Public Announcement of The Fifth Plenum of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China’, Xinhua Net, 29 October 2015, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-
10/29/c_1116983078.htm> (14 Mar. 2016)   
1498 《中华人民共和国户口登记条例》Resident Registration Regulation of the People’s Republic of China 1958 
(National People’s Congress). 
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a signal to change the focus of the research on the demographic element in the 
sustainability models. The focus should change from targeting the rural economy 
because there is a large rural population, to looking at policies that will balance rural 
and urban development for social equality purposes.  
The challenge in predicting demographic changes for Urban Old-Age Pensions funding 
purposes is whether there is a correlation between the changes in the age structure in 
the population and the change in urbanisation. The Hukou system distinguishes rural 
and urban employees differently to the Urban Old-Age Pensions policies. The former 
is a registration system, whereas the latter depends on the location of employment. Data 
collected on potential retirees based on their residence registration are different from 
data collected based on employment location. The former would be more accurate for 
retirement destination purposes, therefore more useful for the administration of pension 
payments. The latter is more accurate for the collection of Social Insurance 
Contributions purposes, therefore more useful for the identification of retirees who will 
retire from the urban population. Potential reforms in residence registration may change 
the models that predict numbers of urban retirees for the purposes of funding Urban 
Old-Age Pensions.  
If the PRC government chooses to increase the replacement rate, further research can 
be performed to improve the funding ability. There is already literature1499 on investing 
the funds in the Social Insurance Fund. This literature was an alternative that looks at 
how to grow the funding pool. The misconception of Urban Old-Age Pensions Social 
Insurance as a private insurance is a major challenge in this area of research. Since 
                                                 
1499 For example, see 郑秉文, 《建立社保基金投资管理体系的战略思考》, Zheng, B, ‘Strategies for 
Establishing an Investment Management System for Social Insurance Funds’, (2004) 4 Public Administration 
Journal 4; and 张志超、但芳芳, 《社保基金投资组合选择和风险防范》, Zhang Z & Dan F, ‘Social 
Insurance Fund Investment Portfolio Choice and Risk Mitigation’, (2004) 4 Openness Digest 99. 
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Urban Old-Age Pensions is a social welfare policy issue, research should revaluate risk 
as a variable in the models.  
The prevailing literature argued for increasing the level of centralisation in the 
administration of Social Insurance Contributions. This thesis argued that it is an 
administrative issue and requires further research on how to administer the Old-Age 
Pensions Social Insurance Funds themselves to increase transparency thereby 
preventing the loss of funds. It is part of the administrative centralisation reform. There 
is currently research1500 analysing the administrative centralisation reform as part of 
the PRC’s government transfers reform. Further contribution to this literature should 
incorporate careful consideration of the PRC’s fiscal revenue structure. 
Taking into account all available funding sources, the PRC is able to fully fund Urban 
Old-Age Pensions. The historical analysis carried out combined with the current 
complete formal institutional framework showed increased sources of funding were 
available that had not been taken into account by previous scholars. The thesis therefore 
enhances current knowledge which will allow subsequent researchers to better model 
and propose reform for pensions funding in the PRC. 
                                                 
1500 For example, see Wong C ‘Fiscal Reform: Paying for the Harmonious Society’, (2010) 14 China Economic 
Quarterly (June 2010) 20; and Wong C ‘Reforming China’s Public Finances for Long-term Growth’, in Garnaut, 
R & Song, L eds, China Update 2013 (Canberra: Australian National University, 2013), at 199-219. 
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Appendix A Annual Urbanisation Growth of the PRC and 
its Provinces 
Note: Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing are provincial level Municipalities 
Directly under the Central Government. 
A.1 Methodological Note 
1. Collect population data of the most recent decade (2005 to 2014) from the website 
of the National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
2. Collate data into Tables A-1 to A-31. 
3. Run Least Squares analysis from EViews to calculate average annual urbanisation 
growth rate for each province: 
a) Independent variable = year 
b) Dependent Variable = Annual urbanisation rate.  
c) The year co-efficient taken in percentage points is the average urbanisation 
growth rate in percentage points.  
4. Collate National data and Provincial data into Table A-32. 
5. Repeat Least Squares analysis for the national data. 
6. Use EViews to draw scatter graph (shown in Figure A-1) to present urbanisation 
growth trend of the PRC and selected provinces. 
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A.2 Results on Provincial Urbanisation Trends 
Table A-1 Annual Urbanisation Rate of the Guangdong Province 2005 - 2014  
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
107240 106440 105940 105050 104410 101300 98930 96600 94420 91940 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
72920 72120 71400 69860 69100 64230 62690 60990 59490 55790 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
34320 34320 34540 35190 35310 37080 36240 35600 34940 36150 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
68.00% 67.76% 67.40% 66.50% 66.18% 63.41% 63.37% 63.14% 63.01% 60.68% 
 
 
 Guangdong  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151501  
2014 68.00%  Dependent Variable: GUANGDONG   
2013 67.76%  Method: Least Squares    
2012 67.40%  Date: 07/06/15Time: 12:52   
2011 66.50%  
Sample: 2005 2014 
  
2010 66.18%  Included observations: 10    
2009 63.41%         
2008 63.37%  Variable Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 63.14%         
2006 63.01%  C -15.4984 1.561223 -9.92709 0 
2005 60.68%  YEAR 0.008036 0.000777 10.34309 0 
          
   R-squared 0.930422  Mean dependent var 0.64945 
   
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.921725  S.D. dependent var 0.025223 
   
S.E. of 
regression 
0.007057  Akaike info criterion -6.89281 
   
Sum squared 
resid 
0.000398  Schwarz criterion -6.8323 
   Log likelihood 36.46407  Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.9592 
   F-statistic 106.9795  Durbin-Watson stat 2.088475 
   
Prob(F-
statistic) 
0.000007       
        
Therefore Guangdong’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 0.8036 percentage points. 
                                                 
1501 Statistical Analysis from EViews. 
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Table A-2 Annual Urbanisation Rate of the Jiangsu Province 2005 - 2014  
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
79600 79390 79200 78990 78690 78100 77620 77230 76560 75880 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
51910 50900 49900 48890 47670 43430 42150 41090 39730 38320 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
27690 28490 29300 30090 31020 34680 35470 36140 36820 37560 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
65.21
% 
64.11
% 
63.01
% 
61.89
% 
60.58
% 
55.61
% 
54.30
% 
53.20
% 
51.89
% 
50.50
% 
 
 
  Jiangsu  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151502   
2014 65.21%  Dependent Variable: JIANGSU       
2013 64.11%  
Method: Least 
Squares 
     
2012 63.01%  Date: 07/07/15Time: 11:10     
2011 61.89%  Sample: 2005 2014      
2010 60.58%  Included observations: 10     
2009 55.61%         
2008 54.30%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 53.20%         
2006 51.89%  C -35.31302 2.347668 
-
15.04175 
0 
2005 50.50%  YEAR 0.017862 0.001168 15.28894 0 
          
   R-squared 0.966908  Mean dependent var  0.5803 
   
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.962772  S.D. dependent var  0.054997 
   
S.E. of 
regression 
0.010611  Akaike info criterion  -6.07691 
   
Sum squared 
resid 
0.000901  Schwarz criterion  -6.01639 
   
Log 
likelihood 
32.38454  Hannan-Quinn criter.  -6.1433 
   F-statistic 233.7518  Durbin-Watson stat  1.424277 
   
Prob(F-
statistic) 
0       
 
Therefore Jiangsu’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 1.7862 percentage points. 
 
                                                 
1502 Statistical Analysis from EViews 
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Table A-3 Annual Urbanisation Rate of the Shandong Province 2005 - 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
97890 97330 96850 96370 95880 94700 94170 93670 93090 92480 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
53850 52320 50780 49100 47650 45760 44830 43790 42910 41620 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
44040 45020 46070 47270 48230 48940 49350 49880 50170 50860 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
55.01
% 
53.76
% 
52.43
% 
50.95
% 
49.70
% 
48.32
% 
47.61
% 
46.75
% 
46.10
% 
45.00
% 
 
 
  Shandong  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151503   
2014 55.01%  Dependent Variable: SHANDONG   
2013 53.76%  Method: Least Squares    
2012 52.43%  Date: 07/07/15Time: 11:19   
2011 50.95%  Sample: 2005 2014     
2010 49.70%  Included observations: 10    
2009 48.32%         
2008 47.61%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 46.75%        
2006 46.10%  C -21.8537 0.952923 -22.9333 1.39E-08 
2005 45.00%  YEAR 0.011122 0.000474 23.45343 1.16E-08 
         
   R-squared 0.985665 Mean dependent var 0.49563 
   
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.983873 S.D. dependent var 0.033917 
   
S.E. of 
regression 
0.004307 Akaike info criterion -7.88019 
   
Sum squared 
resid 
0.000148 Schwarz criterion -7.81968 
   
Log 
likelihood 
41.40097 Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.94658 
   F-statistic 550.0633  Durbin-Watson stat 0.492906 
   
Prob(F-
statistic) 
1.16E-08    
 
Therefore Shandong’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 1.1122 percentage points. 
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Table A-4 Annual Urbanisation Rate of the Zhejiang Province 2005 - 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
55080 54980 54770 54630 54470 52760 52120 51550 50720 49910 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
35730 35190 34610 34030 33560 30550 30020 29490 28660 27960 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
19350 19790 20160 20600 20900 22210 22100 22060 22060 21950 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
64.87
% 
64.01
% 
63.19
% 
62.29
% 
61.61
% 
57.90
% 
57.60
% 
57.21
% 
56.51
% 
56.02
% 
 
 
  Zhejiang   Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151504     
2014 64.87%  Dependent Variable: ZHEJIANG   
2013 64.01%  Method: Least Squares    
2012 63.19%  Date: 07/07/15Time: 11:09   
2011 62.29%  Sample: 2005 2014     
2010 61.61%  Included observations: 10    
2009 57.90%         
2008 57.60%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 57.21%         
2006 56.51%  C -21.2999 1.857787 -11.4652 0 
2005 56.02%  YEAR 0.010899 0.000925 11.78883 0 
          
   R-squared 0.94557 Mean dependent var 0.60121 
   
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.938766 S.D. dependent var 0.033934 
   
S.E. of 
regression 
0.008397 Akaike info criterion -6.54498 
   
Sum 
squared 
resid 
0.000564 Schwarz criterion -6.48446 
   
Log 
likelihood 
34.7249 Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.61137 
   F-statistic 138.9765 Durbin-Watson stat 1.563607 
   
Prob(F-
statistic) 
0.000002       
 
Therefore Zhejiang’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 1.0899 percentage points. 
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Table A-5 Annual Urbanisation Rate of the Henan Province 2005 - 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
94360 94130 94060 93880 94050 94870 94290 93600 93920 93800 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
42650 41230 39910 38090 36210 35770 33970 32140 30500 28750 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
51710 52900 54150 55790 57840 59100 60320 61460 63420 65050 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
45.20
% 
43.80
% 
42.43
% 
40.57
% 
38.50
% 
37.70
% 
36.03
% 
34.34
% 
32.47
% 
30.65
% 
 
 
  Henan  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151505   
2014 45.20%  Dependent Variable: HENAN       
2013 43.80%  Method: Least Squares     
2012 42.43%  Date: 07/06/15   Time: 12:56     
2011 40.57%  Sample: 2005 2014      
2010 38.50%  Included observations: 10     
2009 37.70%         
2008 36.03%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
2007 34.34%         
2006 32.47%  C -31.9079 0.621943 -51.3036 0 
2005 30.65%  YEAR 0.016068 0.00031 51.91736 0 
          
   R-squared 0.997041 Mean dependent var 0.38169 
   Adjusted R-squared 0.996671 S.D. dependent var 0.048722 
   S.E. of regression 0.002811 Akaike info criterion -8.73357 
   Sum squared resid 6.32E-05 Schwarz criterion -8.67305 
   Log likelihood 45.66783 Hannan-Quinn criter. -8.79995 
   F-statistic 2695.412 Durbin-Watson stat 1.825419 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0       
 
Therefore Henan’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 1.6068 percentage points. 
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Table A-6 Annual Urbanisation Rate of the Hebei Province 2005 – 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
73840 73330 72880 72410 71940 70340 69890 69430 68980 68510 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
36420 35280 34110 33020 32010 30770 29280 27950 26740 25820 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
37410 38040 38770 39390 39930 39570 40600 41480 42240 42690 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
49.32
% 
48.11
% 
46.80
% 
45.60
% 
44.50
% 
43.74
% 
41.89
% 
40.26
% 
38.76
% 
37.69
% 
 
 
  Hebei  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151506   
2014 49.32%  Dependent Variable: HEBEI     
2013 48.11%  Method: Least Squares    
2012 46.80%  Date: 07/07/15Time: 10:33   
2011 45.60%  Sample: 2005 2014     
2010 44.50%  Included observations: 10    
2009 43.74%         
2008 41.89%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 40.26%         
2006 38.76%  C -25.7124 0.707652 -36.3348 0 
2005 37.69%  YEAR 0.013013 0.000352 36.95194 0 
          
   R-squared 0.994175 Mean dependent var 0.43667 
   Adjusted R-squared 0.993447 S.D. dependent var 0.039513 
   S.E. of regression 0.003199 Akaike info criterion -8.47536 
   Sum squared resid 8.18E-05 Schwarz criterion -8.41484 
   Log likelihood 44.3768 Hannan-Quinn criter. -8.54175 
   F-statistic 1365.446 Durbin-Watson stat 1.04376 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0       
 
Therefore Hebei’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 1.3013 percentage points. 
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Table A-7 Annual Urbanisation Rate of the Liaoning Province 2005 – 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
43910 43900 43890 43830 43750 43410 43150 42980 42710 42210 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
29440 29170 28810 28070 27170 26200 25910 25440 25190 24780 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
14470 14730 15080 15760 16580 17210 17240 17540 17520 17430 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
67.05
% 
66.45
% 
65.64
% 
64.04
% 
62.10
% 
60.35
% 
60.05
% 
59.19
% 
58.98
% 
58.71
% 
 
 
  Liaoning  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151507  
2014 67.05%  Dependent Variable: LIAONING   
2013 66.45%  Method: Least Squares      
2012 65.64%  Date: 07/07/15Time: 11:17     
2011 64.04%  Sample: 2005 2014      
2010 62.10%  Included observations: 10     
2009 60.35%         
2008 60.05%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 59.19%         
2006 58.98%  C -20.4857 1.818786 -11.2634 0 
2005 58.71%  YEAR 0.010504 0.000905 11.60571 0 
          
   R-squared 0.943935 
Mean dependent 
var 
0.62256  
   
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.936927 S.D. dependent var 0.032734 
   S.E. of regression 0.008221 Akaike info criterion -6.58741 
   Sum squared resid 0.000541 Schwarz criterion -6.5269 
   Log likelihood 34.93707 Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.6538 
   F-statistic 134.6924 Durbin-Watson stat 0.695112 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0.000003       
        
 
Therefore Liaoning’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 1.0504 percentage points. 
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Table A-8 Annual Urbanisation Rate of the Sichuan Province 2005 - 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
81400 81070 80760 80500 80450 81850 81380 81270 81690 82120 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
37690 36400 35160 33670 32320 31680 30440 28930 28020 27100 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
43710 44670 45610 46830 48120 50170 50940 52340 53670 55020 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
46.30
% 
44.90
% 
43.54
% 
41.83
% 
40.17
% 
38.70
% 
37.40
% 
35.60
% 
34.30
% 
33.00
% 
 
 
  Sichuan  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151508   
2014 46.30%  Dependent Variable: SICHUAN   
2013 44.90%  Method: Least Squares      
2012 43.54%  Date: 07/07/15Time: 11:19     
2011 41.83%  Sample: 2005 2014      
2010 40.17%  Included observations: 10     
2009 38.70%         
2008 37.40%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 35.60%         
2006 34.30%  C -29.8515 0.329452 -90.6096 0 
2005 33.00%  YEAR 0.015052 0.000164 91.81092 0 
          
   R-squared 0.999052 Mean dependent var 0.39574 
   Adjusted R-squared 0.998933 S.D. dependent var 0.045594 
   S.E. of regression 0.001489 Akaike info criterion -10.0044 
   Sum squared resid 1.77E-05 Schwarz criterion -9.94389 
   Log likelihood 52.02202 Hannan-Quinn criter. -10.0708 
   F-statistic 8429.245 Durbin-Watson stat 1.761733 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0       
 
Therefore Sichuan’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 1.5052 percentage points. 
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Table A-9 Annual Urbanisation Rate of Shanghai 2005 – 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
24260 24150 23800 23470 23030 22100 21410 20640 19640 18900 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
21730 21640 21260 20960 20560 19580 18970 18300 17420 16840 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
2520 2510 2550 2510 2460 2520 2440 2330 2220 2060 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
89.57
% 
89.61
% 
89.33
% 
89.31
% 
89.27
% 
88.60
% 
88.60
% 
88.66
% 
88.70
% 
89.10
% 
 
 
  Shanghai  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151509   
2014 89.57%  Dependent Variable: SHANGHAI   
2013 89.61%  Method: Least Squares      
2012 89.33%  Date: 07/06/15Time: 12:54     
2011 89.31%  Sample: 2005 2014      
2010 89.27%  Included observations: 10     
2009 88.60%         
2008 88.60%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 88.66%         
2006 88.70%  C -1.1492 0.607934 -1.89033 0.0954 
2005 89.10%  YEAR 0.001015 0.000303 3.355541 0.01 
          
   R-squared 0.584624 Mean dependent var 0.89075 
   Adjusted R-squared 0.532702 S.D. dependent var 0.00402 
   S.E. of regression 0.002748 Akaike info criterion -8.77913 
   Sum squared resid 6.04E-05 Schwarz criterion -8.71861 
   Log likelihood 45.89565 Hannan-Quinn criter. -8.84552 
   F-statistic 11.25966 Durbin-Watson stat 1.147937 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0.009998       
 
Therefore Shanghai’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 0.01015 percentage points. 
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Table A-10 Annual Urbanisation Rate of the Hunan Province 2005 – 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
67370 66910 66390 65960 65700 64060 63800 63550 63420 63260 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
33200 32090 30970 29750 28450 27670 26890 25710 24550 23410 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
34170 34820 35420 36210 37250 36390 36910 37840 38870 39850 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
49.28
% 
47.96
% 
46.65
% 
45.10
% 
43.30
% 
43.19
% 
42.15
% 
40.46
% 
38.71
% 
37.01
% 
 
 
  Hunan  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151510   
2014 49.28%  Dependent Variable: HUNAN     
2013 47.96%  Method: Least Squares    
2012 46.65%  Date: 07/07/15Time: 10:35   
2011 45.10%  Sample: 2005 2014     
2010 43.30%  Included observations: 10    
2009 43.19%         
2008 42.15%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 40.46%         
2006 38.71%  C -25.7615 1.023524 -25.1695 0 
2005 37.01%  YEAR 0.013036 0.000509 25.59331 0 
          
   R-squared 0.987934 Mean dependent var 0.43381 
   
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.986426 S.D. dependent var 0.039708 
   S.E. of regression 0.004626 Akaike info criterion -7.73725 
   Sum squared resid 0.000171 Schwarz criterion -7.67673 
   Log likelihood 40.68624 Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.80364 
   F-statistic 655.0178 Durbin-Watson stat 1.347559 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0       
 
Therefore Hunan’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 1.3036 percentage points. 
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Table A-11 Annual Urbanisation Rate of the Hubei Province 2005 - 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
200
5 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
58160 57990 57790 57580 57280 57200 57110 56990 56930 
571
00 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
32380 31610 30920 29840 28470 26310 25810 25250 24940 
246
70 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
25780 26380 26870 27740 28810 30890 31300 31740 31990 
324
30 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
55.67
% 
54.51
% 
53.50
% 
51.82
% 
49.70
% 
46.00
% 
45.19
% 
44.31
% 
43.81
% 
43.2
0% 
 
 
  Hubei  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151511   
2014 55.67%  Dependent Variable: HUBEI     
2013 54.51%  Method: Least Squares     
2012 53.50%  Date: 07/07/15Time: 10:34     
2011 51.82%  Sample: 2005 2014      
2010 49.70%  Included observations: 10     
2009 46.00%         
2008 45.19%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 44.31%         
2006 43.81%  C -30.7716 2.407146 -12.7834 0 
2005 43.20%  YEAR 0.015556 0.001198 12.98606 0 
          
   R-squared 0.95471 Mean dependent var 0.48771 
   Adjusted R-squared 0.949048 S.D. dependent var 
0.04820
2 
   S.E. of regression 0.01088 Akaike info criterion -6.02687 
   Sum squared resid 0.000947 Schwarz criterion -5.96635 
   Log likelihood 32.13435 Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.09326 
   F-statistic 168.6376 Durbin-Watson stat 
0.88774
7 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001       
 
Therefore Hubei’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 1.5556 percentage points. 
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Table A-12 Annual Urbanisation Rate of the Fujian Province 2005 - 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
38060 37740 37480 37200 36930 36660 36390 36120 35850 35570 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
23520 22930 22340 21610 21090 20200 19290 18570 18070 17570 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
14540 14810 15140 15590 15840 16460 17100 17550 17780 18000 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
61.80
% 
60.76
% 
59.61
% 
58.09
% 
57.11
% 
55.10
% 
53.01
% 
51.41
% 
50.40
% 
49.40
% 
 
 
  Fujian  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151512  
2014 61.80%  Dependent Variable: FUJIAN     
2013 60.76%  Method: Least Squares     
2012 59.61%  Date: 07/07/15Time: 10:30    
2011 58.09%  Sample: 2005 2014      
2010 57.11%  Included observations: 10     
2009 55.10%         
2008 53.01%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 51.41%         
2006 50.40%  C -28.961 0.977823 -29.6179 0 
2005 49.40%  YEAR 0.014689 0.000487 30.18723 0 
          
   R-squared 0.991297 Mean dependent var 0.55669 
   Adjusted R-squared 0.99021 S.D. dependent var 0.044668 
   S.E. of regression 0.00442 Akaike info criterion -7.82861 
   Sum squared resid 0.000156 Schwarz criterion -7.76809 
   Log likelihood 41.14303 Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.89499 
   F-statistic 911.2689 Durbin-Watson stat 1.058076 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0       
 
Therefore Fujian’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 1.4689 percentage points. 
                                                 
1512 Statistical Analysis from EViews 
326 
 
Table A-13 Annual Urbanisation Rate of Beijing 2005 - 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
21520 21150 20690 20190 19620 18600 17710 16760 16010 15380 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
18580 18250 17840 17400 16860 15810 15040 14160 13500 12860 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
2940 2900 2860 2790 2750 2790 2670 2600 2510 2520 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
86.34
% 
86.29
% 
86.23
% 
86.18
% 
85.93
% 
85.00
% 
84.92
% 
84.49
% 
84.32
% 
83.62
% 
 
 
  Beijing  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151513   
2014 86.34%  Dependent Variable: BEIJING       
2013 86.29%  Method: Least Squares     
2012 86.23%  Date: 07/07/15Time: 09:14     
2011 86.18%  Sample: 2005 2014      
2010 85.93%  Included observations: 10     
2009 85.00%         
2008 84.92%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 84.49%         
2006 84.32%  C -5.440678 0.639089 -8.513179 0 
2005 83.62%  YEAR 0.003132 0.000318 9.848402 0 
          
   R-squared 0.923803 Mean dependent var 0.85332 
   Adjusted R-squared 0.914278 S.D. dependent var 0.009866 
   S.E. of regression 0.002889 Akaike info criterion -8.67918 
   Sum squared resid 6.68E-05 Schwarz criterion -8.61866 
   Log likelihood 45.39588 Hannan-Quinn criter. -8.74556 
   F-statistic 96.99102 Durbin-Watson stat 1.23621 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0.00001       
 
Therefore Beijing’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 0.3132 percentage points. 
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Table A-14 Annual Urbanisation Rate of the Anhui Province 2005 - 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
60830 60300 59880 59680 59570 61310 61350 61180 61100 61200 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
29900 28860 27840 26740 25620 25810 24850 23680 22670 21730 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
30930 31440 32040 32940 33950 35500 36500 37500 38430 39470 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
49.15
% 
47.86
% 
46.49
% 
44.81
% 
43.01
% 
42.10
% 
40.51
% 
38.71
% 
37.10
% 
35.51
% 
 
 
  Anhui  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151514  
2014 49.15%  Dependent Variable: ANHUI     
2013 47.86%  Method: Least Squares     
2012 46.49%  Date: 07/07/15Time: 09:13     
2011 44.81%  Sample: 2005 2014      
2010 43.01%  Included observations: 10     
2009 42.10%        
2008 40.51%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 38.71%         
2006 37.10%  C -30.1179 0.478133 -62.9907 0 
2005 35.51%  YEAR 0.015199 0.000238 63.88015 0 
          
   R-squared 0.998043 Mean dependent var 0.42525 
   
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.997799 S.D. dependent var 
0.04606
4 
   S.E. of regression 0.002161 Akaike info criterion -9.25949 
   Sum squared resid 3.74E-05 Schwarz criterion -9.19897 
   Log likelihood 48.29742 Hannan-Quinn criter. -9.32587 
   F-statistic 4080.673 Durbin-Watson stat 
1.73369
7 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0       
 
Therefore Anhui’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 1.5199 percentage points. 
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Table A-15 Annual Urbanisation Rate of Inner Mongolia 2005 - 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
25050 24980 24900 24820 24720 24580 24440 24290 24150 24030 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
14910 14660 14380 14050 13720 13130 12640 12180 11750 11340 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
10140 10310 10520 10770 11000 11460 11800 12110 12400 12690 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
59.52
% 
58.69
% 
57.75
% 
56.61
% 
55.50
% 
53.42
% 
51.72
% 
50.14
% 
48.65
% 
47.19
% 
 
 
  
Inner 
Mongolia 
 Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151515  
2014 59.52%  Dependent Variable: INNER_MONGOLIA   
2013 58.69%  Method: Least Squares      
2012 57.75%  Date: 07/07/15Time: 10:35     
2011 56.61%  Sample: 2005 2014      
2010 55.50%  Included observations: 10     
2009 53.42%         
2008 51.72%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 50.14%         
2006 48.65%  C -28.2088 1.136533 -24.8201 0 
2005 47.19%  YEAR 0.014306 0.000566 25.29451 0 
          
   R-squared 0.987651 Mean dependent var 0.53919 
   Adjusted R-squared 0.986107 S.D. dependent var 0.043584 
   S.E. of regression 0.005137 Akaike info criterion -7.52779 
   Sum squared resid 0.000211 Schwarz criterion -7.46727 
   Log likelihood 39.63894 Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.59417 
   F-statistic 639.8124 Durbin-Watson stat 0.620335 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0       
 
Therefore Inner Mongolia’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 1.4306 percentage 
points. 
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Table A-16 Annual Urbanisation Rate of the Heilongjiang Province 2005 - 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
38330 38350 38340 38340 38330 38260 38250 38240 38230 38200 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
22240 22010 21820 21660 21340 21230 21190 20610 20450 20280 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
16090 16340 16520 16680 17000 17030 17060 17630 17780 17920 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
58.02
% 
57.39
% 
56.91
% 
56.49
% 
55.67
% 
55.49
% 
55.40
% 
53.90
% 
53.49
% 
53.09
% 
 
 
  Heilongjiang  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151516  
2014 58.02%  Dependent Variable: HEILONGJIANG   
2013 57.39%  Method: Least Squares     
2012 56.91%  Date: 07/07/15Time: 10:34     
2011 56.49%  Sample: 2005 2014     
2010 55.67%  Included observations: 10     
2009 55.49%         
2008 55.40%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 53.90%         
2006 53.49%  C -10.4258 0.619558 -16.8277 0 
2005 53.09%  YEAR 0.005465 0.000308 17.72493 0 
          
   R-squared 0.975169 Mean dependent var 0.55585 
   Adjusted R-squared 0.972065 S.D. dependent var 0.016755 
   S.E. of regression 0.0028 Akaike info criterion -8.74125 
   Sum squared resid 6.27E-05 Schwarz criterion -8.68073 
   Log likelihood 45.70625 Hannan-Quinn criter. -8.80764 
   F-statistic 314.1732 Durbin-Watson stat 2.222209 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0       
 
Therefore Heilongjiang’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 0.5456 percentage points. 
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Table A-17 Annual Urbanisation Rate of the Shannxi Province 2005 - 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
37750 37640 37530 37430 37350 37270 37180 37080 36990 36900 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
19850 19310 18770 17700 17090 16210 15650 15060 14470 13740 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
17910 18330 18760 19730 20260 21060 21530 22020 22520 23160 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
52.58
% 
51.30
% 
50.01
% 
47.29
% 
45.76
% 
43.49
% 
42.09
% 
40.61
% 
39.12
% 
37.24
% 
 
 
  Shaanxi  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151517  
2014 52.58%  Dependent Variable: SHANNXI   
2013 51.30%  Method: Least Squares      
2012 50.01%  Date: 07/07/15Time: 11:19     
2011 47.29%  Sample: 2005 2014      
2010 45.76%  Included observations: 10      
2009 43.49%         
2008 42.09%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 40.61%         
2006 39.12%  C -26.7818 1.01093 -26.4922 0 
2005 37.24%  YEAR 0.013564 0.000503 26.96268 0 
          
   R-squared 0.989115 Mean dependent var 0.47557 
   Adjusted R-squared 0.987755 S.D. dependent var 0.041293 
   S.E. of regression 0.004569 Akaike info criterion -7.76201 
   Sum squared resid 0.000167 Schwarz criterion -7.7015 
   Log likelihood 40.81006 Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.8284 
   F-statistic 726.9863 Durbin-Watson stat 0.764848 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0       
 
Therefore Shannxi’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 1.3564 percentage points. 
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Table A-18 Annual Urbanisation Rate of the Guangxi Province 2005 - 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
47540 47190 46820 46450 46100 48560 48160 47680 47190 46600 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
21870 21150 20380 19420 18440 19040 18380 17280 16350 15670 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
25670 26040 26440 27030 27660 29520 29780 30400 30840 30930 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
46.00
% 
44.82
% 
43.53
% 
41.81
% 
40.00
% 
39.21
% 
38.16
% 
36.24
% 
34.65
% 
33.63
% 
 
 
  Guangxi  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151518  
2014 46.00%  Dependent Variable: GUANGXI   
2013 44.82%  Method: Least Squares     
2012 43.53%  Date: 07/07/15Time: 10:31     
2011 41.81%  Sample: 2005 2014      
2010 40.00%  Included observations: 10     
2009 39.21%         
2008 38.16%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 36.24%         
2006 34.65%  C -27.6996 0.626537 -44.2107 0 
2005 33.63%  YEAR 0.013982 0.000312 44.84602 0 
          
   R-squared 0.996038 Mean dependent var 0.39805 
   
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.995543 S.D. dependent var 0.042418 
   S.E. of regression 0.002832 Akaike info criterion -8.71885 
   Sum squared resid 6.42E-05 Schwarz criterion -8.65833 
   Log likelihood 45.59423 Hannan-Quinn criter. -8.78523 
   F-statistic 2011.166 Durbin-Watson stat 1.988356 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0       
 
Therefore Guangxi’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 1.3982 percentage points. 
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Table A-19 Annual Urbanisation Rate of the Jiangxi Province 2005 - 2014 
 
  
201
4 
2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
454
20 
45220 45040 44880 44620 44320 44000 43680 43390 43110 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
228
10 
22100 21400 20510 19660 19140 18200 17390 16780 15950 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
226
10 
23120 23640 24370 24960 25180 25800 26300 26610 27160 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
50.2
2% 
48.87
% 
47.51
% 
45.70
% 
44.06
% 
43.19
% 
41.36
% 
39.81
% 
38.67
% 
37.00
% 
 
 
  Jiangxi  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151519  
2014 50.22%  Dependent Variable: JIANGXI   
2013 48.87%  Method: Least Squares      
2012 47.51%  Date: 07/07/15Time: 11:11     
2011 45.70%  Sample: 2005 2014      
2010 44.06%  Included observations: 10     
2009 43.19%         
2008 41.36%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 39.81%         
2006 38.67%  C -29.1301 0.43459 -67.0288 0 
2005 37.00%  YEAR 0.014713 0.000216 68.03297 0 
          
   R-squared 0.998275 Mean dependent var 0.43639 
   
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.998059 S.D. dependent var 0.044585 
   S.E. of regression 0.001964 Akaike info criterion -9.45046 
   Sum squared resid 3.09E-05 Schwarz criterion -9.38994 
   Log likelihood 49.25228 Hannan-Quinn criter. -9.51684 
   F-statistic 4628.485 Durbin-Watson stat 2.643214 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0       
 
Therefore Jiangxi’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 1.4713 percentage points. 
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Table A-20 Annual Urbanisation Rate of Tianjin 2005 - 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
15170 14720 14130 13550 12990 12280 11760 11150 10750 10430 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
12480 12070 11520 10900 10340 9580 9080 8510 8140 7830 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
2690 2650 2610 2640 2660 2700 2680 2640 2610 2590 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
82.27
% 
82.00
% 
81.53
% 
80.44
% 
79.60
% 
78.01
% 
77.21
% 
76.32
% 
75.72
% 
75.07
% 
 
 
  Tianjin  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151520   
2014 82.27%  Dependent Variable: TIANJIN   
2013 82.00%  Method: Least Squares      
2012 81.53%  Date: 07/07/15Time: 11:20      
2011 80.44%  Sample: 2005 2014      
2010 79.60%  Included observations: 10      
2009 78.01%         
2008 77.21%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 76.32%         
2006 75.72%  C -17.0038 0.816192 -20.8331 0 
2005 75.07%  YEAR 0.008854 0.000406 21.7988 0 
          
   R-squared 0.983443 Mean dependent var 0.78817 
   Adjusted R-squared 0.981374 S.D. dependent var 0.027031 
   S.E. of regression 0.003689 Akaike info criterion -8.18996 
   Sum squared resid 0.000109 Schwarz criterion -8.12945 
   Log likelihood 42.94982 Hannan-Quinn criter. -8.25635 
   F-statistic 475.1875 Durbin-Watson stat 1.135028 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0       
 
Therefore Tianjin’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 0.8854 percentage points. 
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Table A-21 Annual Urbanisation Rate of the Shanxi Province 2005 - 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
36480 36300 36110 35930 35740 34270 34110 33930 33750 33550 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
19620 19080 18510 17850 17170 15760 15390 14940 14510 14130 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
16860 17220 17600 18080 18570 18510 18720 18990 19230 19420 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
53.78
% 
52.56
% 
51.26
% 
49.68
% 
48.04
% 
45.99
% 
45.12
% 
44.03
% 
42.99
% 
42.12
% 
 
 
  Shanxi  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151521  
2014 53.78%  Dependent Variable: SHANXI     
2013 52.56%  Method: Least Squares     
2012 51.26%  Date: 07/07/15Time: 11:19     
2011 49.68%  Sample: 2005 2014      
2010 48.04%  Included observations: 10     
2009 45.99%         
2008 45.12%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 44.03%         
2006 42.99%  C -26.7818 1.01093 -26.4922 0 
2005 42.12%  YEAR 0.013564 0.000503 26.96268 0 
          
   R-squared 0.989115 Mean dependent var 0.47557 
   Adjusted R-squared 0.987755 S.D. dependent var 0.041293 
   S.E. of regression 0.004569  Akaike info criterion -7.76201 
   Sum squared resid 0.000167 Schwarz criterion -7.7015 
   Log likelihood 40.81006 Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.8284 
   F-statistic 726.9863 Durbin-Watson stat 0.764848 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0       
 
Therefore Shanxi’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 1.3564 percentage points. 
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Table A-22 Annual Urbanisation Rate of the Jilin Province 2005 - 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
27520 27510 27500 27490 27470 27400 27340 27300 27230 27160 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
15090 14910 14770 14680 14650 14610 14550 14510 14420 14260 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
12440 12600 12730 12810 12810 12790 12790 12790 12810 12900 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
54.83
% 
54.20
% 
53.71
% 
53.40
% 
53.33
% 
53.32
% 
53.22
% 
53.15
% 
52.96
% 
52.50
% 
 
 
  Jilin  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151522 
2014 54.83%  Dependent Variable: JILIN     
2013 54.20%  Method: Least Squares      
2012 53.71%  Date: 07/07/15Time: 11:11      
2011 53.40%  Sample: 2005 2014      
2010 53.33%  Included observations: 10      
2009 53.32%         
2008 53.22%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 53.15%         
2006 52.96%  C -3.48438 0.581337 -5.99374 0.0003 
2005 52.50%  YEAR 0.002 0.000289 6.913387 0.0001 
          
   R-squared 0.856618 Mean dependent var 0.53462 
   Adjusted R-squared 0.838695 S.D. dependent var 
0.00654
2 
   S.E. of regression 0.002628 Akaike info criterion -8.8686 
   Sum squared resid 5.52E-05 Schwarz criterion -8.80809 
   Log likelihood 46.34302 Hannan-Quinn criter. -8.93499 
   F-statistic 47.79492 Durbin-Watson stat 
0.77612
4 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0.000123       
 
Therefore Jilin’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 0.2 percentage points. 
                                                 
1522 Statistical Analysis from EViews 
336 
 
Table A-23 Annual Urbanisation Rate of Chongqing 2005 - 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
29910 29700 29450 29190 28850 28590 28390 28160 28080 27980 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
17830 17330 16780 16060 15290 14750 14190 13600 13110 12650 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
12090 12370 12670 13130 13550 13840 14200 14560 14970 15330 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
59.61
% 
58.35
% 
56.98
% 
55.02
% 
53.00
% 
51.59
% 
49.98
% 
48.30
% 
46.69
% 
45.21
% 
 
 
  Chongqing  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151523   
2014 59.61%  Dependent Variable: CHONGQING   
2013 58.35%  Method: Least Squares      
2012 56.98%  Date: 07/07/15Time: 10:29     
2011 55.02%  Sample: 2005 2014      
2010 53.00%  Included observations: 10      
2009 51.59%         
2008 49.98%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 48.30%         
2006 46.69%  C -32.4981 0.470551 -69.0638 0 
2005 45.21%  YEAR 0.016433 0.000234 70.17903 0 
          
   R-squared 0.998378 Mean dependent var 0.52473 
   Adjusted R-squared 0.998176 S.D. dependent var 0.049795 
   S.E. of regression 0.002127 Akaike info criterion -9.29145 
   Sum squared resid 3.62E-05 Schwarz criterion -9.23094 
   Log likelihood 48.45727 Hannan-Quinn criter. -9.35784 
   F-statistic 4925.096 Durbin-Watson stat 1.51564 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0       
 
Therefore Chongqing’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 1.6433 percentage points. 
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Table A-24 Annual Urbanisation Rate of the Yunnan Province 2005 - 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
47140 46870 46590 46310 46020 45710 45430 45140 44830 44500 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
19670 18970 18310 17040 15970 15540 14990 14260 13670 13130 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
27470 27890 28280 29270 30050 30170 30440 30880 31160 31380 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
41.73
% 
40.47
% 
39.30
% 
36.80
% 
34.70
% 
34.00
% 
33.00
% 
31.59
% 
30.49
% 
29.51
% 
 
 
  Yunnan  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151524  
2014 41.73%  Dependent Variable: YUNNAN     
2013 40.47%  Method: Least Squares      
2012 39.30%  Date: 07/07/15Time: 11:20     
2011 36.80%  Sample: 2005 2014      
2010 34.70%  Included observations: 10     
2009 34.00%         
2008 33.00%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 31.59%         
2006 30.49%  C -27.7193 1.332609 -20.8008 0 
2005 29.51%  YEAR 0.013969 0.000663 21.06463 0 
          
   R-squared 0.98229 Mean dependent var 0.35159 
   
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.980076 S.D. dependent var 0.042673 
   S.E. of regression 0.006023 Akaike info criterion -7.20948 
   Sum squared resid 0.00029 Schwarz criterion -7.14896 
   Log likelihood 38.04738 Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.27586 
   F-statistic 443.7187 Durbin-Watson stat 0.925662 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0       
 
Therefore Yunnan’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 1.3969 percentage points. 
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Table A-25 Annual Urbanisation Rate of Xinjiang 2005 - 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
22980 22640 22330 22090 21850 21590 21310 20950 20500 20100 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
10590 10070 9820 9620 9400 8600 8450 8200 7780 7470 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
12400 12570 12510 12470 12450 12980 12860 12750 12720 12640 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
46.08
% 
44.48
% 
43.98
% 
43.55
% 
43.02
% 
39.83
% 
39.65
% 
39.14
% 
37.95
% 
37.16
% 
 
 
  Xinjiang  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151525  
2014 46.08%  Dependent Variable: XINJIANG   
2013 44.48%  Method: Least Squares      
2012 43.98%  Date: 07/07/15Time: 11:08     
2011 43.55%  Sample: 2005 2014      
2010 43.02%  Included observations: 10     
2009 39.83%         
2008 39.65%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 39.14%         
2006 37.95%  C -19.6899 1.389721 -14.1682 0 
2005 37.16%  YEAR 0.010005 0.000692 14.46676 0 
          
   R-squared 0.963182 Mean dependent var 0.41484 
   
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.95858 S.D. dependent var 0.030865 
   S.E. of regression 0.006282 Akaike info criterion -7.12555 
   Sum squared resid 0.000316 Schwarz criterion -7.06503 
   Log likelihood 37.62773 
Hannan-Quinn 
criter. 
-7.19193 
   F-statistic 209.2872 Durbin-Watson stat 2.200036 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001       
 
Therefore Xinjiang’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 1.0005 percentage points. 
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Table A-26 Annual Urbanisation Rate of the Guizhou Province 2005 - 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
35080 35020 34840 34690 34790 35370 35960 36320 36900 37300 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
14040 13250 12690 12130 11760 10570 10470 10260 10130 10020 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
21040 21770 22160 22560 23030 24800 25490 26060 26770 27280 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
40.02
% 
37.84
% 
36.42
% 
34.97
% 
33.80
% 
29.88
% 
29.12
% 
28.25
% 
27.45
% 
26.86
% 
 
 
  Guizhou  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151526  
2014 40.02%  Dependent Variable: GUIZHOU   
2013 37.84%  Method: Least Squares      
2012 36.42%  Date: 07/07/15Time: 10:32     
2011 34.97%  Sample: 2005 2014      
2010 33.80%  Included observations: 10      
2009 29.88%         
2008 29.12%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 28.25%         
2006 27.45%  C -30.5474 2.09196 -14.6023 0 
2005 26.86%  YEAR 0.015363 0.001041 14.75747 0 
          
   R-squared 0.964568 Mean dependent var 0.32461 
   Adjusted R-squared 0.960139 S.D. dependent var 0.04736 
   S.E. of regression 0.009456 Akaike info criterion -6.30755 
   Sum squared resid 0.000715 Schwarz criterion -6.24703 
   Log likelihood 33.53775 Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.37394 
   F-statistic 217.783 Durbin-Watson stat 1.221311 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0       
 
Therefore Guizhou’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 1.5363 percentage points. 
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Table A-27 Annual Urbanisation Rate of the Gansu Province 2005 - 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
25910 25820 25780 25640 25600 25550 25510 25480 25470 25450 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
10800 10360 9990 9530 9250 8910 8560 8220 7920 7640 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
15110 15460 15790 16120 16350 16640 16950 17260 17550 17810 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
41.68
% 
40.12
% 
38.75
% 
37.17
% 
36.13
% 
34.87
% 
33.56
% 
32.26
% 
31.10
% 
30.02
% 
 
 
  Gansu  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151527  
2014 41.68%  Dependent Variable: GANSU     
2013 40.12%  Method: Least Squares      
2012 38.75%  Date: 07/07/15Time: 10:31     
2011 37.17%  Sample: 2005 2014      
2010 36.13%  Included observations: 10     
2009 34.87%         
2008 33.56%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 32.26%         
2006 31.10%  C -25.5389 0.427233 -59.7774 0 
2005 30.02%  YEAR 0.012886 0.000213 60.60995 0 
          
   R-squared 0.997827 Mean dependent var 0.35566 
   
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.997555 S.D. dependent var 0.039057 
   
S.E. of 
regression 
0.001931 Akaike info criterion -9.4846 
   
Sum squared 
resid 
2.98E-05 Schwarz criterion -9.42409 
   Log likelihood 49.42302 Hannan-Quinn criter. -9.55099 
   F-statistic 3673.566 Durbin-Watson stat 0.966906 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0       
 
Therefore Gansu’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 1.2886 percentage points. 
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Table A-28 Annual Urbanisation Rate of the Hainan Province 2005 - 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
9030 8950 8870 8770 8690 8640 8540 8450 8360 8280 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
4860 4720 4570 4430 4330 4250 4100 3990 3850 3740 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
4180 4230 4290 4340 4360 4400 4440 4460 4510 4540 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
53.82
% 
52.74
% 
51.52
% 
50.51
% 
49.83
% 
49.19
% 
48.01
% 
47.22
% 
46.05
% 
45.17
% 
 
 
  Hainan  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151528  
2014 53.82%  Dependent Variable: HAINAN     
2013 52.74%  Method: Least Squares     
2012 51.52%  Date: 07/07/15Time: 10:32     
2011 50.51%  Sample: 2005 2014      
2010 49.83%  Included observations: 10     
2009 49.19%         
2008 48.01%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 47.22%         
2006 46.05%  C -18.3003 0.414931 -44.1043 0 
2005 45.17%  YEAR 0.009353 0.000206 45.29508 0 
          
   R-squared 0.996116 Mean dependent var 0.49406 
   
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.99563 S.D. dependent var 0.028372 
   
S.E. of 
regression 
0.001875 Akaike info criterion -9.54304 
   
Sum squared 
resid 
2.81E-05 Schwarz criterion -9.48252 
   Log likelihood 49.7152 Hannan-Quinn criter. -9.60943 
   F-statistic 2051.644 Durbin-Watson stat 1.418275 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0       
 
Therefore Hainan’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 0.9353 percentage points. 
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Table A-29 Annual Urbanisation Rate of Ningxia 2005 - 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
6620 6540 6470 6390 6330 6250 6180 6100 6040 5960 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
3550 3400 3280 3190 3030 2880 2780 2690 2600 2520 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
3070 3140 3190 3210 3300 3370 3400 3420 3440 3440 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
53.63
% 
51.99
% 
50.70
% 
49.92
% 
47.87
% 
46.08
% 
44.98
% 
44.10
% 
43.05
% 
42.28
% 
 
 
  Ningxia  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151529  
2014 53.63%  Dependent Variable: NINGXIA   
2013 51.99%  Method: Least Squares      
2012 50.70%  Date: 07/07/15Time: 11:18     
2011 49.92%  Sample: 2005 2014      
2010 47.87%  Included observations: 10      
2009 46.08%         
2008 44.98%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 44.10%         
2006 43.05%  C -25.6294 1.024327 -25.0207 0 
2005 42.28%  YEAR 0.01299 0.00051 25.48408 0 
          
   R-squared 0.987832 Mean dependent var 0.4746 
   Adjusted R-squared 0.986311 S.D. dependent var 0.039572 
   S.E. of regression 0.00463 Akaike info criterion -7.73568 
   Sum squared resid 0.000171 Schwarz criterion -7.67516 
   Log likelihood 40.6784 Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.80207 
   F-statistic 649.4385 Durbin-Watson stat 1.019189 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0       
 
Therefore Ningxia’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 1.299 percentage points. 
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Table A-30 Annual Urbanisation Rate of the Qinghai Province 2005 - 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
5830 5780 5730 5680 5630 5570 5540 5520 5480 5430 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
2900 2800 2720 2630 2520 2340 2260 2210 2150 2130 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
2930 2980 3010 3060 3110 3240 3280 3310 3330 3300 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
49.74
% 
48.44
% 
47.47
% 
46.30
% 
44.76
% 
42.01
% 
40.79
% 
40.04
% 
39.23
% 
39.23
% 
 
 
  Qinghai  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151530  
2014 49.74%  Dependent Variable: QINGHAI   
2013 48.44%  Method: Least Squares      
2012 47.47%  Date: 07/07/15Time: 11:18      
2011 46.30%  Sample: 2005 2014      
2010 44.76%  Included observations: 10      
2009 42.01%         
2008 40.79%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 40.04%         
2006 39.23%  C -25.8061 1.733291 -14.8885 0 
2005 39.23%  YEAR 0.01306 0.000863 15.1412 0 
          
   R-squared 0.966281 Mean dependent var 0.43801 
   Adjusted R-squared 0.962066 S.D. dependent var 0.040225 
   S.E. of regression 0.007834 Akaike info criterion -6.68371 
   Sum squared resid 0.000491 Schwarz criterion -6.62319 
   Log likelihood 35.41855 Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.7501 
   F-statistic 229.2559 Durbin-Watson stat 0.924482 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0       
 
Therefore Qinghai’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 1.306 percentage points. 
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Table A-31 Annual Urbanisation Rate of Tibet 2005 - 2014 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
End of Year 
Usual 
Residents 
('000) 
3180 3120 3080 3030 3000 2960 2920 2890 2850 2800 
Urban 
Population 
('000) 
820 740 700 690 680 660 640 620 600 580 
Rural 
Population 
('000) 
2360 2380 2380 2340 2320 2300 2280 2270 2250 2220 
Urbanisation 
Rate 
25.79
% 
23.72
% 
22.73
% 
22.77
% 
22.67
% 
22.30
% 
21.92
% 
21.45
% 
21.05
% 
20.71
% 
 
 
  Tibet  Urbanisation Growth Rate 2004-20151531  
2014 25.79%  Dependent Variable: TIBET     
2013 23.72%  Method: Least Squares      
2012 22.73%  Date: 07/06/15Time: 12:57     
2011 22.77%  Sample: 2005 2014      
2010 22.67%  Included observations: 10     
2009 22.30%         
2008 21.92%  Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
2007 21.45%         
2006 21.05%  C -8.75431 1.303814 -6.71439 0.0002 
2005 20.71%  YEAR 0.004468 0.000649 6.88705 0.0001 
          
   R-squared 0.855678 Mean dependent var 0.22511 
   Adjusted R-squared 0.837637 S.D. dependent var 0.014626 
   S.E. of regression 0.005893 Akaike info criterion -7.25317 
   Sum squared resid 0.000278 Schwarz criterion -7.19265 
   Log likelihood 38.26583 Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.31955 
   F-statistic 47.43146 Durbin-Watson stat 1.191858 
   Prob(F-statistic) 0.000126       
 
Therefore Tibet’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 0.4468 percentage points. 
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A.3 10-year Average Urbanisation Growth Rate (trend) of the PRC and its 31 Provinces 2005-2014 
Table A-32 Annual Urbanisation Rate of the PRC and its provinces 2005 - 2014  
Year National Guangdong Jiangsu Shandong Zhejiang Henan Hebei Liaoning Sichuan Shanghai Hunan Hubei Fujian 
2014 54.77% 68.00% 65.21% 55.01% 64.87% 45.20% 49.32% 67.05% 46.30% 89.57% 49.28% 55.67% 61.80% 
2013 53.73% 67.76% 64.11% 53.76% 64.01% 43.80% 48.11% 66.45% 44.90% 89.61% 47.96% 54.51% 60.76% 
2012 52.57% 67.40% 63.01% 52.43% 63.19% 42.43% 46.80% 65.64% 43.54% 89.33% 46.65% 53.50% 59.61% 
2011 51.27% 66.50% 61.89% 50.95% 62.29% 40.57% 45.60% 64.04% 41.83% 89.31% 45.10% 51.82% 58.09% 
2010 49.95% 66.18% 60.58% 49.70% 61.61% 38.50% 44.50% 62.10% 40.17% 89.27% 43.30% 49.70% 57.11% 
2009 48.34% 63.41% 55.61% 48.32% 57.90% 37.70% 43.74% 60.35% 38.70% 88.60% 43.19% 46.00% 55.10% 
2008 46.99% 63.37% 54.30% 47.61% 57.60% 36.03% 41.89% 60.05% 37.40% 88.60% 42.15% 45.19% 53.01% 
2007 45.89% 63.14% 53.20% 46.75% 57.21% 34.34% 40.26% 59.19% 35.60% 88.66% 40.46% 44.31% 51.41% 
2006 44.34% 63.01% 51.89% 46.10% 56.51% 32.47% 38.76% 58.98% 34.30% 88.70% 38.71% 43.81% 50.40% 
2005 42.99% 60.68% 50.50% 45.00% 56.02% 30.65% 37.69% 58.71% 33.00% 89.10% 37.01% 43.20% 49.40% 
 
Year National Beijing Anhui 
Inner 
Mongolia 
Heilong -
jiang 
Shaanxi 
（陕西） 
Guangx
i 
Jiangxi Tianjin 
Shanxi 
(山西） 
Jilin 
Chongqin
g 
Yunnan 
2014 54.77% 86.34% 49.15% 59.52% 58.02% 52.58% 46.00% 50.22% 82.27% 53.78% 54.83% 59.61% 41.73% 
2013 53.73% 86.29% 47.86% 58.69% 57.39% 51.30% 44.82% 48.87% 82.00% 52.56% 54.20% 58.35% 40.47% 
2012 52.57% 86.23% 46.49% 57.75% 56.91% 50.01% 43.53% 47.51% 81.53% 51.26% 53.71% 56.98% 39.30% 
2011 51.27% 86.18% 44.81% 56.61% 56.49% 47.29% 41.81% 45.70% 80.44% 49.68% 53.40% 55.02% 36.80% 
2010 49.95% 85.93% 43.01% 55.50% 55.67% 45.76% 40.00% 44.06% 79.60% 48.04% 53.33% 53.00% 34.70% 
2009 48.34% 85.00% 42.10% 53.42% 55.49% 43.49% 39.21% 43.19% 78.01% 45.99% 53.32% 51.59% 34.00% 
2008 46.99% 84.92% 40.51% 51.72% 55.40% 42.09% 38.16% 41.36% 77.21% 45.12% 53.22% 49.98% 33.00% 
2007 45.89% 84.49% 38.71% 50.14% 53.90% 40.61% 36.24% 39.81% 76.32% 44.03% 53.15% 48.30% 31.59% 
2006 44.34% 84.32% 37.10% 48.65% 53.49% 39.12% 34.65% 38.67% 75.72% 42.99% 52.96% 46.69% 30.49% 
2005 42.99% 83.62% 35.51% 47.19% 53.09% 37.24% 33.63% 37.00% 75.07% 42.12% 52.50% 45.21% 29.51% 
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Year National Xinjiang Guizhou Gansu Hainan Ningxia Qinghai Tibet 
2014 54.77% 46.08% 40.02% 41.68% 53.82% 53.63% 49.74% 25.79% 
2013 53.73% 44.48% 37.84% 40.12% 52.74% 51.99% 48.44% 23.72% 
2012 52.57% 43.98% 36.42% 38.75% 51.52% 50.70% 47.47% 22.73% 
2011 51.27% 43.55% 34.97% 37.17% 50.51% 49.92% 46.30% 22.77% 
2010 49.95% 43.02% 33.80% 36.13% 49.83% 47.87% 44.76% 22.67% 
2009 48.34% 39.83% 29.88% 34.87% 49.19% 46.08% 42.01% 22.30% 
2008 46.99% 39.65% 29.12% 33.56% 48.01% 44.98% 40.79% 21.92% 
2007 45.89% 39.14% 28.25% 32.26% 47.22% 44.10% 40.04% 21.45% 
2006 44.34% 37.95% 27.45% 31.10% 46.05% 43.05% 39.23% 21.05% 
2005 42.99% 37.16% 26.86% 30.02% 45.17% 42.28% 39.23% 20.71% 
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A.4 Urbanisation Growth Rate 2005 - 20141532 
 
Dependent Variable: NATIONAL   
Method: Least Squares    
Date: 07/06/15Time: 12:52   
Sample: 2005 2014     
Included observations: 10    
       
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
       
C -26.2538 0.387343 -67.7791 0 
YEAR 0.013309 0.000193 69.04636 0 
       
R-squared 0.998325 Mean dependent var 0.49084 
Adjusted R-squared 0.998115 S.D. dependent var 0.040329 
S.E. of regression 0.001751 Akaike info criterion -9.68064 
Sum squared resid 2.45E-05 Schwarz criterion -9.62012 
Log likelihood 50.4032 Hannan-Quinn criter. -9.74703 
F-statistic 4767.4 Durbin-Watson stat 1.202393 
Prob(F-statistic) 0     
          
 
Therefore the PRC’s annual urbanisation growth rate is 1.3309 percentage points. 
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Figure A-1 Scatter Graph Showing the Last 10 year Average Urbanisation Growth Rates 
(in percentage points) of the PRC and a few representative Provinces.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A-1 presents urbanisation growth of the PRC and its representative provinces in the 10 
years from 2005 to 2014. It shows the urbanisation trend.  
The representative provinces were selected based on the following criteria: GDP level, nature 
of the economy, whether there is a dominant industry, urbanisation rate, whether the province 
is a major contributor of migrant workers to the more developed provinces, and whether the 
province has a dominant minority ethnic group. The representative provinces chosen are 
Guangdong, Jiangsu, Tibet, Jilin, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Henan, and Sichuan.  
Guangdong was chosen because it had the highest GDP in 2014. Its GDP was much higher 
than the national average of RMB 2.2 Trillion. Its urbanisation rate was 68% and ranked 3rd 
nationally in 2014. Its 10 year urbanisation growth trend was 0.804 percentage points per 
annum, slower than the national urbanisation growth trend.  
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Jiangsu was chosen because it was the second richest province and it exhibited the highest 
urbanisation growth, at a 10 year urbanisation growth trend of 1.786 percentage points per 
annum. Its urbanisation growth was 0.455 percentage points faster than the national average of 
1.331 percentage points per annum. Its urbanisation rate was 65.21% and ranked 4th nationally 
in 2014.  
Tibet was chosen because it was the poorest province. Its main residents are from the Tibetan 
ethnic group, and its urbanisation rate was the lowest. Its urbanisation growth was very slow, 
but its population size was only 0.234% of the national population in 2014, which is negligible 
for the purposes of this research. Its 10 year urbanisation growth trend was 0.447 percentage 
points per annum. 
Jilin was chosen because it is one of the old industrial areas,1533 its economy moves at a very 
slow pace, its GDP of RMB 1.38 Trillion1534 in 2014 was only approximately 62.5% of the 
national average of RMB 2.2 Trillion. Its urbanisation growth was also very slow. Its 10 year 
urbanisation growth trend was 0.200 percentage points per annum. 
Inner Mongolia was chosen because it is a western province. The central government directs 
beneficial development policies towards western provinces. Inner Mongolia has a large 
population of the Mongolian ethnic group. It is also a relatively rich western province. Its 10 
year urbanisation growth trend was 1.431 percentage points per annum. 
Shanxi was chosen because it is a relatively poor western province. It has difficult corruption 
problems, especially with regard to the coal mining industry. Since the current leadership began 
to crack down on corruption, Shanxi is one of the provinces that had the most corruption 
                                                 
1533 An old industrial area is one that is accounted for as an industrial area before 1949. The Thirteenth Five-year Plan 
targets these old industrial areas as one of its thematic policy goals. 网易财经,《十三五”规划最全梳理》, 163 Money, 
‘The Most Comprehensive Summary of the Thirteenth Five-year Plan’, 163 Money, 
<http://money.163.com/15/1015/13/B5VK7HFR00253B0H.html> (2 Nov. 2015). 
1534 RMB 1,380.38 Billion. This is approximately AUD 276.08 Billion. 
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investigations and convictions. Its 10 year urbanisation growth trend was 1.356 percentage 
points per annum. 
Henan was chosen because it is one of the provinces in central China that exhibit the following 
characteristics: large population size, source of rural emigrant workers, lower urbanisation rates 
(nationally, Henan ranked 24 in 2014) and a source of the higher urbanisation rates of the 
wealthier provinces. Other similar provinces are Hebei, Hunan, Hubei and Shandong. Henan 
had the highest GDP out of these provinces in 2014, nationally, its GDP ranked No. 5. Its 10 
year urbanisation growth trend was 1.607 percentage points per annum. 
Sichuan was chosen because it is a south western province that exports many rural migrant 
workers, its population is mainly of the Han majority ethnic group. Other similar provinces are 
Yunnan, Chongqing, Guizhou, and Guangxi. Chongqing is a provincial level Municipality 
Directly under the Central Government. Yunnan, Guizhou and Guangxi have large populations 
of people of minority ethnic groups. These south western provinces differ from the population 
mix of the rest of the PRC because more beneficial development policies are directed towards 
these provinces. Sichuan’s 10 year urbanisation growth trend was 1.505 percentage points per 
annum. 
Internationally, the urbanisation rate of developed economies is approximately 80%. 1535 
Beijing and Shanghai were chosen because they are developed, and they have a very high 
urbanisation rate. As urbanisation continues to increase in the PRC, the Old-Age Pensions 
policies for the urban population will grow in importance in the PRC’s welfare state. 
Consequently, the scheme for the rural population will decrease in importance.  
  
                                                 
1535 World Bank Database, Online <http://data.worldbank.org/topic/urban-development> (18 Apr. 2016). 
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Appendix B Dependency Ratio of the PRC 
Table B-1 Population and Dependency Ratio 2005-20141536 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Total Population 
(year-end)(Million 
Persons) 
1,367.82 1,360.72 1,354.04 1,347.35 1,340.91 1,334.50 1,328.02 1,321.29 1,314.48 1,307.56 
Population Aged 0-
14 (Million persons) 
225.69 223.16 223.42 222.31 222.59 246.88 252.32 256.33 260.27 265.43 
Population Aged 15-
64 (Million persons) 
1,003.98 1,005.57 1,003.34 1,002.43 998.98 974.19 965.47 957.94 950.37 941.44 
Population Aged 65 
and Over(Million 
persons) 
138.15 131.99 127.28 122.61 119.34 113.43 110.23 107.02 103.84 100.68 
Gross Dependency 
Ratio (%) 
36.1 35.3 34.9 34.4 34.2 36.9 37.4 37.9 38.3 38.8 
Children 
Dependency Ratio 
(%) 
22.5 22.2 22.2 22.1 22.3 25.3 26 26.8 27.3 28.1 
Old Age Dependency 
Ratio (%) 
13.7 13.1 12.7 12.3 11.9 11.6 11.3 11.1 11 10.7 
                                                 
1536 National Bureau of Statistics of China, ‘Population and Dependency Ratio of the PRC for the 10 Years of 2005 – 2014’, <http://data.stats.gov.cn/> (25 Aug 2015). A limited English 
version of the data are available at: http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/. Data assessed for this research came from the Chinese version. 
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Appendix C Excerpts of Law-Documents 
C.1 Sources of Law 
C.1.1 Constitutional Provisions 
This section includes the Articles from the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China that 
are discussed in Chapter III and Chapter V. 
Preamble  
Paragraph 5 
The victory in China's New-Democratic Revolution and the successes in its socialist cause have 
been achieved by the Chinese people of all nationalities, under the leadership of the Communist 
Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, by 
upholding truth, correcting errors and surmounting numerous difficulties and hardships. China 
will be in the primary stage of socialism for a long time to come. The basic task of the nation 
is to concentrate its effort on socialist modernization along the road of Chinese-style socialism. 
Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, 
Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of Three Represents, 
the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to adhere to the people's democratic 
dictatorship and the socialist road, persevere in reform and opening to the outside world, 
steadily improve socialist institutions, develop the socialist market economy, develop socialist 
democracy, improve the socialist legal system and work hard and self-reliantly to modernize 
the country's industry, agriculture, national defence and science and technology step by step 
and promote the coordinated development of the material, political and spiritual civilizations, 
to turn China into a socialist country that is prosperous, powerful, democratic and culturally 
advanced. 
Paragraphs 11 and 12 
In building socialism it is essential to rely on workers, peasants and intellectuals and to unite 
all forces that can be united. In the long years of revolution and construction, there has been 
formed under the leadership of the Communist Party of China a broad patriotic united front 
which is composed of the democratic parties and people's organizations and which embraces 
all socialist working people, all builders of socialism, all patriots who support socialism, and 
all patriots who stand for the reunification of the motherland. This united front will continue to 
be consolidated and developed. The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, a 
broadly based representative organization of the united front which has played a significant 
historical role, will play a still more important role in the country's political and social life, in 
promoting friendship with other countries and in the struggle for socialist modernization and 
for the reunification and unity of the country. The system of the multi-party cooperation and 
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political consultation led by the Communist Party of China will exist and develop for a long 
time to come.  
The People's Republic of China is a unitary multi-national State created jointly by the people 
of all its nationalities. Socialist relations of equality, unity and mutual assistance have been 
established among the nationalities and will continue to be strengthened. In the struggle to 
safeguard the unity of the nationalities, it is necessary to combat big-nation chauvinism, mainly 
Han chauvinism, and to combat local national chauvinism. The State will do its utmost to 
promote the common prosperity of all the nationalities.  
Chapter I General Principles 
Article 3 The State organs of the People's Republic of China apply the principle of democratic 
centralism. 
The National People's Congress and the local people's congresses at various levels are 
constituted through democratic elections. They are responsible to the people and subject to 
their supervision. 
All administrative, judicial and procuratorial organs of the State are created by the people's 
congresses to which they are responsible and by which they are supervised. 
The division of functions and powers between the central and local State organs is guided by 
the principle of giving full scope to the initiative and enthusiasm of the local authorities under 
the unified leadership of the central authorities. 
Article 5 The People's Republic of China governs the country according to law and makes it a 
socialist country under rule of law. 
The State upholds the uniformity and dignity of the socialist legal system. 
No laws or administrative or local regulations may contravene the Constitution. 
All State organs, the armed forces, all political parties and public organizations and all 
enterprises and institutions must abide by the Constitution and other laws. All acts in violation 
of the Constitution or other laws must be investigated. 
No organization or individual is privileged to be beyond the Constitution or other laws. 
Chapter III The Structure of the State 
Section 1 The National People's Congress 
Article 57 The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China is the highest 
organ of state power. Its permanent body is the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress. 
Article 58 The National People's Congress and its Standing Committee exercise the legislative 
power of the State. 
Article 59 The National People's Congress is composed of deputies elected from the provinces, 
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autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the Central Government, and special 
administrative regions, and of deputies elected from the armed forces. All the minority 
nationalities are entitled to appropriate representation. 
Election of deputies to the National People's Congress is conducted by the Standing Committee 
of the National People's Congress. 
The number of deputies to the National People's Congress and the procedure of their election 
are prescribed by law. 
Article 60 The National People's Congress is elected for a term of five years. 
The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress must ensure the completion of 
election of deputies to the succeeding National People's Congress two months prior to the 
expiration of the term of office of the current National People's Congress. Should extraordinary 
circumstances prevent such an election, it may be postponed and the term of office of the 
current National People's Congress extended by the decision of a vote of more than two-thirds 
of all those on the Standing Committee of the current National People's Congress. The election 
of deputies to the succeeding National People's Congress must be completed within one year 
after the termination of such extraordinary circumstances. 
Article 61 The National People's Congress meets in session once a year and is convened by its 
Standing Committee. A session of the National People's Congress may be convened at any time 
the Standing Committee deems it necessary or when more than one-fifth of the deputies to the 
National People's Congress so propose. 
When the National People's Congress meets, it elects a Presidium to conduct its session. 
Article 62 The National People's Congress exercises the following functions and powers: 
(1) to amend the Constitution; 
(2) to supervise the enforcement of the Constitution; 
(3) to enact and amend basic laws governing criminal offences, civil affairs, the State organs 
and other matters; 
(4) to elect the President and the Vice-President of the People's Republic of China; 
(5) to decide on the choice of the Premier of the State Council upon nomination by the President 
of the People's Republic of China, and on the choice of the Vice-Premiers, State Councillors, 
Ministers in charge of ministries or commissions, the Auditor-General and the Secretary-
General of the State Council upon nomination by the Premier; 
(6) to elect the Chairman of the Central Military Commission and, upon nomination by the 
Chairman, to decide on the choice of all other members of the Central Military Commission; 
(7) to elect the President of the Supreme People's Court; 
(8) to elect the Procurator-General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate; 
(9) to examine and approve the plan for national economic and social development and the 
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report on its implementation; 
(10) to examine and approve the State budget and the report on its implementation; 
(11) to alter or annul inappropriate decisions of the Standing Committee of the National 
People's Congress; 
(12) to approve the establishment of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities 
directly under the Central Government; 
(13) to decide on the establishment of special administrative regions and the systems to be 
instituted there; 
(14) to decide on questions of war and peace; and 
(15) to exercise such other functions and powers as the highest organ of state power should 
exercise. 
Article 63 The National People's Congress has the power to remove from office the following 
persons: 
(1) the President and the Vice-President of the People's Republic of China; 
(2) the Premier, Vice-Premiers, State Councillors, Ministers in charge of ministries or 
commissions, the Auditor-General and the Secretary-General of the State Council; 
(3) the Chairman of the Central Military Commission and other members of the Commission; 
(4) the President of the Supreme People's Court; and 
(5) the Procurator-General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate. 
Article 64 Amendments to the Constitution are to be proposed by the Standing Committee of 
the National People's Congress or by more than one-fifth of the deputies to the National 
People's Congress and adopted by a vote of more than two-thirds of all the deputies to the 
Congress. 
Laws and resolutions are to be adopted by a majority vote of all the deputies to the National 
People's Congress. 
Article 65 The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress is composed of the 
following: 
the Chairman; 
the Vice-Chairmen; 
the Secretary-General; and  
the members. 
Minority nationalities are entitled to appropriate representation on the Standing Committee of 
the National People's Congress. 
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The National People's Congress elects, and has the power to recall, members of its Standing 
Committee. 
No one on the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress shall hold office in any 
of the administrative, judicial or procuratorial organs of the State. 
Article 66 The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress is elected for the same 
term as the National People's Congress; it shall exercise its functions and powers until a new 
Standing Committee is elected by the succeeding National People's Congress. 
The Chairman and Vice-Chairmen of the Standing Committee shall serve no more than two 
consecutive terms. 
Article 67 The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress exercises the following 
functions and powers: 
(1) to interpret the Constitution and supervise its enforcement; 
(2) to enact and amend laws, with the exception of those which should be enacted by the 
National People's Congress; 
(3) to partially supplement and amend, when the National People's Congress is not in session, 
laws enacted by the National People's Congress, provided that the basic principles of these laws 
are not contravened; 
(4) to interpret laws; 
(5) to review and approve, when the National People's Congress is not in session, partial 
adjustments to the plan for national economic and social development or to the State budget 
that prove necessary in the course of their implementation; 
(6) to supervise the work of the State Council, the Central Military Commission, the Supreme 
People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate; 
(7) to annul those administrative regulations, decisions or orders of the State Council that 
contravene the Constitution or other laws; 
(8) to annul those local regulations or decisions of the organs of state power of provinces, 
autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government that contravene 
the Constitution, other laws or administrative regulations; 
(9) to decide, when the National People's Congress is not in session, on the choice of Ministers 
in charge of ministries or commissions, the Auditor-General or the Secretary-General of the 
State Council upon nomination by the Premier of the State Council; 
(10) to decide, when the National People's Congress is not in session, on the choice of other 
members of the Central Military Commission upon nomination by the Chairman of the 
Commission; 
(11) to appoint or remove, at the recommendation of the President of the Supreme People's 
Court, the Vice-Presidents and Judges of the Supreme People's Court, members of its Judicial 
Committee and the President of the Military Court; 
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(12) to appoint or remove, at the recommendation of the Procurator-General of the Supreme 
People's Procuratorate, the Deputy Procurators-General and procurators of the Supreme 
People's Procuratorate, members of its Procuratorial Committee and the Chief Procurator of 
the Military Procuratorate, and to approve the appointment or removal of the chief procurators 
of the people's procuratorates of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly 
under the Central Government; 
(13) to decide on the appointment or recall of plenipotentiary representatives abroad; 
(14) to decide on the ratification or abrogation of treaties and important agreements concluded 
with foreign states; 
(15) to institute systems of titles and ranks for military and diplomatic personnel and of other 
specific titles and ranks; 
(16) to institute State medals and titles of honour and decide on their conferment; 
(17) to decide on the granting of special pardons; 
(18) to decide, when the National People's Congress is not in session, on the proclamation of a 
state of war in the event of an armed attack on the country or in fulfillment of international 
treaty obligations concerning common defence against aggression; 
(19) to decide on general or partial mobilization; 
(20) to decide on entering into the state of emergency throughout the country or in particular 
provinces, autonomous regions, or municipalities directly under the Central Government; and  
(21) to exercise such other functions and powers as the National People's Congress may assign 
to it. 
Article 68 The Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress directs 
the work of the Standing Committee and convenes its meetings. The Vice-Chairmen and the 
Secretary-General assist the Chairman in his work. 
The Chairman, the Vice-Chairmen and the Secretary-General constitute the Council of 
Chairmen which handles the important day-to-day work of the Standing Committee of the 
National People's Congress. 
Article 69 The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress is responsible to the 
National People's Congress and reports on its work to the Congress. 
Section 3 The State Council 
Article 86 The State Council is composed of the following: 
the Premier; 
the Vice-Premiers; 
the State Councillors;  
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the Ministers in charge of ministries;  
the Ministers in charge of commissions; 
the Auditor-General; and 
the Secretary-General. 
The Premier assumes overall responsibility for the work of the State Council. The ministers 
assume overall responsibility for the work of the ministries and commissions.  
The organization of the State Council is prescribed by law. 
Article 89 The State Council exercises the following functions and powers: 
(1) to adopt administrative measures, enact administrative regulations and issue decisions and 
orders in accordance with the Constitution and other laws; 
(2) to submit proposals to the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee; 
(3) to formulate the tasks and responsibilities of the ministries and commissions of the State 
Council, to exercise unified leadership over the work of the ministries and commissions and to 
direct all other administrative work of a national character that does not fall within the 
jurisdiction of the ministries and commissions; 
(4) to exercise unified leadership over the work of local organs of State administration at 
various levels throughout the country, and toformulate the detailed division of functions and 
powers between the Central Government and the organs of State administration of provinces, 
autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government; 
(5) to draw up and implement the plan for national economic and social development and the 
State budget; 
(6) to direct and administer economic affairs and urban and rural development; 
(7) to direct and administer the affairs of education, science, culture, public health, physical 
culture and family planning; 
(8) to direct and administer civil affairs, public security, judicial administration, supervision 
and other related matters; 
(9) to conduct foreign affairs and conclude treaties and agreements with foreign states; 
(10) to direct and administer the building of national defence; 
(11) to direct and administer affairs concerning the nationalities and to safeguard the equal 
rights of minority nationalities and the right to autonomy of the national autonomous areas; 
(12) to protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese nationals residing abroad and 
protect the lawful rights and interests of returned overseas Chinese and of the family members 
of Chinese nationals residing abroad; 
(13) to alter or annul inappropriate orders, directives and regulations issued by the ministries 
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or commissions; 
(14) to alter or annul inappropriate decisions and orders issued by local organs of State 
administration at various levels; 
(15) to approve the geographic division of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities 
directly under the Central Government, and to approve the establishment and geographic 
division of autonomous prefectures, counties, autonomous counties, and cities; 
(16) in accordance with the provisions of law, to decide on entering into the state of emergency 
in parts of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central 
Government; 
(17) to examine and decide on the size of administrative organs and, in accordance with the 
provisions of law, to appoint or remove administrative officials, train them, appraise their 
performance andreward or punish them; and 
(18) to exercise such other functions and powers as the National People's Congress or its 
Standing Committee may assign to it. 
Article 90 Ministers in charge of the ministries or commissions of the State Council are 
responsible for the work of their respective departments and they convene and preside over 
ministerial meetings or general and executive meetings of the commissions to discuss and 
decide on major issues in the work of their respective departments. 
The ministries and commissions issue orders, directives and regulations within the jurisdiction 
of their respective departments and in accordance with law and the administrative regulations, 
decisions and orders issued by the State Council. 
Section 5 The Local People's Congresses and Local People's Governments at 
Various Levels 
Article 95 People's congresses and people's governments are established in provinces, 
municipalities directly under the Central Government, counties, cities, municipal districts, 
townships, nationality townships, and towns. 
The organization of local people's congresses and local people's governments at various levels 
is prescribed by law. 
Organs of self-government are established in autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures and 
autonomous counties. The organization and working procedures of organs of self-government 
are prescribed by law in accordance with the basic principles laid down in Sections 5 and 6 of 
Chapter III of the Constitution. 
Article 96 Local people's congresses at various levels are local organs of state power. 
Local people's congresses at or above the county level establish standing committees. 
Article 97 Deputies to the people's congresses of provinces, municipalities directly under the 
Central Government and cities divided into districts are elected by the people's congresses at 
the next lower level; deputies to the people's congresses of counties, cities not divided into 
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districts, municipal districts, townships, nationality townships, and towns are elected directly 
by their constituencies. 
The number of deputies to local people's congresses at various levels and the manner of their 
election are prescribed by law. 
Article 100 The people's congresses of provinces, and municipalities directly under the Central 
Government, and their standing committees may adopt local regulations, which must not 
contravene the Constitution and other laws and administrative regulations, and they shall report 
such local regulations to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for the 
record. 
Section 6 The Organs of Self-Government of National Autonomous Areas 
Article 112 The organs of self-government of national autonomous areas are the people's 
congresses and people's governments of autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures and 
autonomous counties. 
Article 113 In the people's congress of an autonomous region, autonomous prefecture or 
autonomous county, in addition to the deputies of the nationality exercising regional autonomy 
in the administrative area, the other nationalities inhabiting the area are also entitled to 
appropriate representation. 
Among the chairman and vice-chairmen of the standing committee of the people's congress of 
an autonomous region, autonomous prefecture or autonomous county there shall be one or 
more citizens of the nationality or nationalities exercising regional autonomy in the area 
concerned. 
Article 114 The chairman of an autonomous region, the prefect of an autonomous prefecture 
or the head of an autonomous county shall be a citizen of the nationality exercising regional 
autonomy in the area concerned. 
Article 116 The people's congresses of national autonomous areas have the power to enact 
regulations on the exercise of autonomy and other separate regulations in the light of the 
political, economic and cultural characteristics of the nationality or nationalities in the areas 
concerned. The regulations on the exercise of autonomy and other separate regulations of 
autonomous regions shall be submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress for approval before they go into effect. Those of autonomous prefectures and counties 
shall be submitted to the standing committees of the people's congresses of provinces or 
autonomous regions for approval before they go into effect, and they shall be reported to the 
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for the record. 
C.1.2 Legislation Law  
This section includes the Articles from the Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China 
that are discussed in Chapter III and Chapter V. 
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Chapter II: Laws 
Section 1: Limits of Legislative Power 
Article 8 The following affairs shall only be governed by law: 
(1) affairs concerning State sovereignty; 
(2) formation, organization, and the functions and powers of the people's congresses, the 
people's governments, the people's courts and the people's procuratorates at all levels; 
(3) the system of regional national autonomy, the system of special administrative region, the 
system of self-government among people at the grassroots level; 
(4) criminal offences and their punishment; 
(5) mandatory measures and penalties involving deprivation of citizens of their political rights 
or restriction of the freedom of their person; 
(6) basic taxation systems, such as the institution of taxable items, the determination of tax 
rates, tax collection and administration, etc.; 
(7) expropriation and requisition of non-State-owned assets; 
(8) basic civil system; 
(9) fundamental economic systems and basic fiscal, customs, financial and foreign trade 
systems; 
(10) systems of litigation and arbitration; and 
(11) other affairs on which laws must be made by the National People's Congress or its 
Standing Committee. 
Article 9 If laws have not been enacted on the affairs specified in Article 8 of this Law, the 
National People's Congress or its Standing Committee has the power to make a decision to 
authorize the State Council to formulate, according to actual needs, administrative regulations 
first on part of those affairs, except for the affairs concerning criminal offences and their 
punishment, mandatory measures and penalties involving deprivation of citizens of their 
political rights or restriction of the freedom of their person, and the judicial system.  
Article 10 An authorization decision shall specify the purposes, matters, scope and period of 
authorization, as well as the principles that the authorized organ shall adhere to when executing 
the authorization decision. 
The period of authorization shall not exceed five years, except as otherwise prescribed in the 
authorization decision. 
The authorized organ shall, six months prior to the expiry of the period of authorization, report 
to the authorizing organ the execution of the authorization decision, and issue opinions on 
whether relevant laws need to be formulated. Where continued authorization is needed, the 
authorized organ may propose relevant opinions for decision by the National People's Congress 
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("NPC") and its Standing Committee. 
Article 11 After the administrative regulations on an affair formulated under authorization 
have been tested in parctice and when the conditions are ripe for making a law on the affair, 
the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee shall make a law on it in a timely 
manner. As soon as the law is made, the authorization with regard to that matter shall be 
terminated accordingly. 
Section 4: Legal Interpretation 
Article 45 The power of legal interpretation belongs to the Standing Committee of the National 
People's Congress. 
A law shall be interpreted by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress if: 
(1) the specific meaning of a provision needs to be further defined; or 
(2) after its enactment, new developments make it necessary to define the basis on which to 
apply the law. 
Article 46 The State Council, the Central Military Commission, the Supreme People's Court, 
the Supreme People's Procuratorate, a special committee of the National People's Congress and 
the standing committee of the people's congress of a province, autonomous region or 
municipality directly under the Central Government may request the Standing Committee of 
the National People's Congress to give legal interpretation. 
Article 47 The working offices of the Standing Committee shall study and work out a draft for 
the legal interpretation, which shall be put on the agenda of the Standing Committee meeting 
by decision of the Council of Chairmen. 
Article 48 After a draft for legal interpretation has been deliberated by the Standing Committee 
at its meeting, the Law Committee shall, on the basis of the deliberated opinions of members 
of the Standing Committee, deliberate on the draft and revise it before working out a draft legal 
interpretation for vote. 
Article 49 The draft legal interpretation for vote shall be subject to adoption by a simple 
majority of the total membership of the Standing Committee and be promulgated by the 
Standing Committee in an announcement. 
Article 50 The legal interpretation adopted by the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress has the same effect as the laws enacted by it. 
Article 51 The NPC and its Standing Committee shall strengthen the organization and 
coordination of legislative work, and play their leading role in legislative work. 
Article 52 The Standing Committee of the NPC shall enhance coordinated arrangements for 
legislative work by preparing legislative planning, annual legislative plans and other means. 
When preparing legislative planning and annual legislative plans, the Standing Committee of 
the NPC shall carefully study the motions and suggestions submitted by delegates, extensively 
solicit opinions, conduct scientific panel discussion and assessment, and determine legislative 
projects according to the needs of economic and social development and the development of 
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democracy and rule of law, so as to make legislative activities more timely, targeted and 
systematic. Legislative planning and annual legislative plans shall be adopted by the 
Chairman's Meeting, and be announced to the public. 
The working bodies of the Standing Committee of the NPC shall be responsible for preparing 
legislative planning and drafting annual legislative plans, and shall, in accordance with the 
requirements of the Standing Committee of the NPC, supervise the implementation of 
legislative planning and annual legislative plans. 
Article 53 Relevant special committees of the NPC and/or the working bodies of the Standing 
Committee of the NPC shall participate in the drafting of the draft laws of relevant parties in 
advance, and may organize the drafting of important draft laws that regulate comprehensive or 
fundamental issues or issues concerning overall national development. 
Experts engaging in related fields may be invited to participate in the drafting of draft laws that 
are highly technical. Alternatively, relevant experts, teaching and research institutions, and 
social organizations may be entrusted with the drafting of such draft laws. 
Section 5: Other Provisions 
Article 61 According to the need of the contents, a law may consists of parts, chapters, sections, 
articles, paragraphs, subparagraphs and items.  
The sequence of the different parts, chapters, sections and articles shall be marked in the order 
of Chinese numerals, the sequence of the paragraphs shall not be marked, that of subparagraphs 
shall be marked in the order of bracketed Chinese numerals and that of items marked with 
Arabic numerals. 
The title credit line of a law shall specify the organ formulating the law and the date when the 
law is passed. The title credit line of a law that has gone through revisions shall specify the 
organs revising the law and the dates of revision in the order of revision. 
ChapterIII: Administrative Regulations 
Article 65 The State Council shall, in accordance with the Constitution and laws, formulate 
administrative regulations. 
The administrative regulations may be formulated to govern the following matters: 
(1) matters requiring the formulation of administrative regulations in order to implement the 
provisions of law; and 
(2) matters within the administrative functions and powers of the State Council as provided for 
in Article 89 of the Constitution. 
When the administrative regulations governing an affair which has been formulated first by the 
State Council under authorization decided on by the National People's Congress or its Standing 
Committee, an affair on which the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee is 
responsible to make a law, have been tested in practice and when the conditions are ripe for 
making a law on the affair, the State Council shall, in a timely manner, request the National 
People's Congress or its Standing Committee to make the law. 
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Article 66 The legislative organ of the State Council shall draft the annual legislative plan of 
the State Council based on the overall work arrangements of the State, and submit the same to 
the State Council for examination and approval. Legal projects included in the annual 
legislative plans of the State Council shall be aligned with the legislative planning and annual 
legislative plans of the Standing Committee of the NPC. The legislative organ of the State 
Council shall promptly follow up with and learn about the implementation of the legislative 
plans by various departments of the State Council, and enhance organization, coordination, 
supervision and guidance. 
Where relevant departments of the State Council consider it necessary to formulate 
administrative regulations, they shall report to the State Council for the establishment of 
relevant projects. 
Article 67 Administrative regulations shall be drafted by relevant departments of the State 
Council or the legislative organ of the State Council, while drafts of important laws and 
administrative regulations governing administration shall be drafted by the legislative organ of 
the State Council. During the drafting of administrative regulations, the opinions of relevant 
organs, organizations, NPC delegates and the general public shall be extensively listened to by 
holding forums, panel discussions or hearings and by other various means. 
Draft administrative regulations shall be promulgated to the public for comments, unless non-
promulgation is decided by the State Council. 
Article 68 When the drafting of the administrative regulations is completed, the drafting unit 
shall submit the draft, its explanation, differing opinions from the various quarters on major 
questions in the draft and other relevant information to the legislative affairs department under 
the State Council for examination. 
The legislative affairs department under the State Council shall submit an examination report 
and a revised draft to the State Council and in its examination report explain the major questions 
in the draft. 
Article 69 The decision-making procedures for administrative regulations shall comply with 
the relevant provisions in the Organic Law of the State Council of the People's Republic of 
China. 
Article 70 Administrative regulations shall be promulgated by Order of the State Council 
signed by the Premier of the State Council. 
Administrative regulations relating to national defense development may be promulgated by 
the order of the State Council and the order of the Central Military Commission as jointly 
signed by the Premier of the State Council and the Chairman of the Central Military 
Commission 
Article 71 After being signed and promulgated, administrative regulations shall be promptly 
published on the Gazette of the State Council, the Chinese government legal information 
network (http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/) and nationally circulated newspapers. 
The text of the administrative regulations published in the Bulletin of the State Council shall 
be the standard text. 
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Chapter IV: Local Regulations, Autonomous Regulations,Separate 
Regulations, and Rules 
Section 1: Local Regulations, Autonomous Regulations and Separate 
Regulations 
Article 72 The people's congresses or their standing committees of the provinces, autonomous 
regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government may, in light of the specific 
conditions and actual needs of their respective administrative areas, formulate local regulations, 
provided that such regulations do not contradict the Constitution, the laws and the 
administrative regulations. 
In light of the specific circumstances and actual needs of a city with districts, the people's 
congress of the city with districts and its standing committee may formulate local regulations 
concerning matters of urban and rural construction and management, environmental protection, 
historical and cultural protection, etc., provided that such local regulations are not in conflict 
with the Constitution, laws, administrative regulations and the local regulations of the province 
or autonomous region in which the city with districts is located. The provisions otherwise 
prescribed by law on the matters for which cities with districts may formulate local regulations 
shall prevail. The local regulations of a city with districts shall be implemented after being 
reported to the standing committee of the people's congress of the province or autonomous 
region in which the said city is located for approval. The standing committee of the people's 
congress of the said province or autonomous region shall review the legality of the local 
regulations submitted thereto for approval, and grant approval within four months as long as 
such local regulations are not in conflict with the Constitution, laws, administrative regulations 
and the local regulations of the province or autonomous region. 
The standing committee of the people's congress of the province or autonomous region in 
which a city with districts is located shall, when reviewing the local regulations of the said city 
that are submitted thereto for approval, make a handling decision if it finds that such local 
regulations are in conflict with the rules issued by the people's government of the province or 
autonomous region. 
Except for cities where the people's governments of provinces and autonomous regions are 
located, cities where special economic zones are located, and relatively large cities approved 
by the State Council, the specific steps and time for other cities with districts to begin 
formulating local regulations shall be determined by the standing committees of the people's 
congresses of the provinces and autonomous regions in which such cities with districts are 
located by taking into comprehensive consideration the population, geographic areas, 
economic and social development as well as legislative needs, legislative capability and other 
factors of the cities with districts under the respective jurisdictions of the relevant provinces 
and autonomous regions, and be reported to the Standing Committee of the NPC and the State 
Council for record-filing. 
The people's congress of an autonomous prefecture and its standing committee may exercise 
the authority to formulate local regulations as a city with districts in accordance with Paragraph 
2 of this Article. The specific steps and time for an autonomous prefecture to begin formulating 
local regulations shall be determined in accordance with the preceding Paragraph. 
Local regulations already formulated by cities where the people's governments of provinces 
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and autonomous regions are located, cities where special economic zones are located, and 
relatively large cities approved by the State Council shall remain valid if they involve matters 
other than those prescribed under Paragraph 2 of this Article. 
Article 73 Local regulations may be formulated to govern the following matters: 
(1) matters requiring the formulation of specific provisions in light of the actual conditions of 
an respective administrative area for implementing the provisions of laws or administrative 
regulations; and 
(2) matters of local character that require the formulation of local regulations. 
In respect of any matters other than those prescribed by Article 8 herein for which the State has 
not yet formulated any law or administrative regulations, a province, autonomous region or 
municipality directly under the Central Government, a city with districts or an autonomous 
prefecture may first formulate local regulations in light of its specific circumstances and actual 
needs. After applicable laws or administrative regulations formulated by the State come into 
effect, any provision in the local regulations that is in conflict with the laws or administrative 
regulations shall be invalid, and the organs formulating the local regulations shall promptly 
revise or repeal such provisions. 
Local regulations formulated by a city with districts or an autonomous prefecture under 
Paragraph 1 or Paragraph 2 of this Article shall be limited to matters prescribed by Paragraph 
2 of Article 72 herein. 
During the formulation of local regulations, repetitive provisions shall generally not be 
formulated with regard to contents already specified in superior laws. 
Article 74 The people's congresses or their standing committees of the provinces and cities 
where special economic zones are located may, upon authorization by decision of the National 
People's Congress, formulate regulations and enforce them within the limits of the special 
economic zones. 
Article 75 The people's congresses of the national autonomous areas have the power to 
formulate autonomous regulations and separate regulations on the basis of the political, 
economic and cultural characteristics of the local nationality (nationalities). The autonomous 
regulations and separate regulations of the autonomous regions shall be submitted to the 
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for approval and shall go into effect 
upon approval. The autonomous regulations and separate regulations of the autonomous 
prefectures or counties shall be submitted to the standing committees of the people's congresses 
of the relevant provinces, autonomous regions or municipalities directly under the Central 
Government for approval and shall go into effect upon approval. 
Where certain provisions of the laws and administrative regulations are concerned, adaptation 
on the basis of the characteristics of the local nationality (nationalities) may be made in 
autonomous regulations and separate regulations, but such adaptation may not contradict the 
basis principles of the laws and administrative regulations; where the provisions of the 
Constitution and the Law on Regional National Autonomy as well as the provisions in other 
laws and administrative regulations specially formulated to govern the national autonomous 
areas are concerned, no adaptation may be made. 
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Article 76 Local regulations governing especially important matters of an administrative area 
shall be subject to adoption by the people's congress of the area. 
Article 77 The procedures for submission, deliberation and voting of bills of local regulations, 
autonomous regulations or separate regulations shall be enacted by the people's congress at the 
corresponding level in accordance with the Organic Law of the People's Republic of China on 
Local People's Congresses and Local People's Governments and with reference to the 
provisions of Sections 2, 3 and 5 in Chapter II of this Law. 
The organ in charge of unified deliberation of a draft of local regulations shall prepare a report 
on the result of its a conclusive report on deliberation and a revised draft of the regulations. 
Article 78 Local regulations formulated by the people's congress of a province, autonomous 
region or municipality directly under the Central Government shall be promulgated by the 
presidium of the congress in an announcement. 
Local regulations formulated by the standing committee of the people's congress of a province, 
autonomous region or municipality directly under the Central Government shall be 
promulgated by the standing committee in an announcement. 
After the local regulations formulated by the people's congress of a city with districts or an 
autonomous prefecture and its standing committee are approved, the standing committee of the 
people's congress of the city with districts or autonomous prefecture shall issue an 
announcement to promulgate the local regulations. 
Autonomous regulations or separate regulations shall, upon approval, be promulgated by the 
standing committee of the local people's congressof the autonomous region, autonomous 
prefecture or autonomous county in an announcement. 
Article 79 Upon promulgation, local regulations, and the autonomous regulations and special 
regulations of an autonomous region shall be promptly published in the bulletin of the standing 
committee of the people's congress at the same level, the official website of the NPC 
((www.npc.gov.cn), the website of the local people's congress and the newspapers circulated 
within the local administrative regions. 
The text of local regulations or autonomous regulations and special regulations published in 
the gazette of the standing committee of the people's congress shall be the standard text. 
Section 2: Rules 
Article 80 The ministries and commissions of the State Council, the People's Bank of China, 
the State Audit Administration as well as the other organs endowed with administrative 
functions directly under the State Council may, in accordance with the laws as well as the 
administrative regulations, decisions and orders of the State Council and within the limits of 
their power, formulate rules.  
Matters prescribed by department rules shall be matters for the application of laws or the 
administrative regulations, decisions or orders of the State Council. Without the bases 
prescribed by laws or the administrative regulations, decisions or orders of the State Council, 
department rules shall not contain provisions that reduce the rights or increase the obligations 
of citizens, legal persons and other organizations, and shall not contain provisions that enhance 
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the power or reduce the statutory duties of the department concerned." 
Article 81 With regard to a matter that falls within the limits of power of two or more 
departments under the State Council, the State Council shall be requested to formulate 
administrative regulations, or the departments concerned under the State Council shall jointly 
formulate rules. 
Article 82 The people's government of a province, autonomous region or municipality directly 
under the Central Government, a city with districts or an autonomous prefecture may formulate 
rules in accordance with laws, administrative regulations and local regulations of the relevant 
province, autonomous region or municipality directly under the Central Government. 
Local governments may formulate rules to govern the following matters: 
(1) matters requiring the formulation of rules to implement the provisions of laws, 
administrative regulations and local regulations; and 
(2) specific administrative matters pertaining to their respective administrative areas. 
Local government rules prescribed by the people's government of a city with districts or an 
autonomous prefecture pursuant to Paragraph 1 or Paragraph 2 of this Article shall be limited 
to matters of urban and rural construction and management, environmental protection, 
historical and cultural protection, etc. Local government rules already formulated shall remain 
valid if they involve matters other than the foregoing ones. 
Except for cities where the people's governments of provinces and autonomous regions are 
located, cities where special economic zones are located, and relatively large cities approved 
by the State Council, the time for the people's governments of other cities with districts and 
autonomous prefectures to begin formulating rules shall be synchronized with the time for such 
cities and autonomous prefectures to begin formulating local regulations as determined by the 
standing committees of the people's congresses of the provinces and autonomous regions in 
which such cities with districts and autonomous prefectures are located. 
Where local regulations shall be formulated, but relevant conditions are not ripe, local 
government rules may first be formulated due to urgent needs of administration. Where 
continued implementation of the administrative measures prescribed by the local government 
rules is needed two years after the implementation of the said rules, a request shall be submitted 
to the people's congress at the same level or its standing committee for formulating local 
regulations. 
Without the bases prescribed by laws, administrative regulations and local regulations, local 
government rules shall not contain provisions that reduce the rights or increase the obligations 
of citizens, legal persons and other organizations. 
Article 83 The procedures for formulating the rules of departments under the State Council 
and rules of local governments shall be enacted by the State Council with reference to the 
provisions in Chapter III of this Law. 
Article 84 The Rules of departments shall be subject to decision by the executive meetings of 
ministries or meetings of commissions. 
The rules of local governments shall be subject to decision by the executive meetings or plenary 
369 
 
meetings of the respective governments. 
Article 85 The department rules shall be promulgated by orders signed by the heads of the 
departments. 
Local government rules shall be promulgated by an order signed by the governor of the relevant 
province, the chairman of the relevant autonomous region, the mayor of the relevant city with 
districts or the governor of the relevant autonomous prefecture. 
Article 86 After being signed and promulgated, department rules shall be promptly published 
in the Gazette of the State Council or the gazette of relevant departments, the Chinese 
government legal information network (http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/) and nationally 
circulated newspapers." 
After being signed and promulgated, local government rules shall be promptly published in the 
Gazette of the people's governments at the same level, the Chinese government legal 
information network (http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/) and newspapers circulated within the 
administrative regions of the people's governments. 
The text of rules published in the gazette of the State Council or of the department and in the 
gazette of the local people's government shall be the standard text. 
C.1.3 Administrative Procedure Law of the PRC 
ChapterI: General Provisions 
Article2If a citizen, a legal person or any other organization considers that his or its lawful 
rights and interests have been infringed upon by a specific administrative act of an 
administrative organ or its personnel, he or it shall have the right to bring a suit before a people's 
court in accordance with this Law. 
C.2 Urban Old-Age Pensions Policies 
C.2.1 Constitutional Provisions 
Chapter I General Principles 
Article 14 
… 
The State establishes a sound social security system compatible with the level of economic 
development. 
Chapter II The Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens 
Article 45 Citizens of the People's Republic of China have the right to material assistance from 
the State and society when they are old, ill or disabled. The State develops social insurance, 
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social relief and medical and health services that are required for citizens to enjoy this right. 
The State and society ensure the livelihood of disabled members of the armed forces, provide 
pensions to the families of martyrs and give preferential treatment to the families of military 
personnel. 
The State and society help make arrangements for the work, livelihood and education of the 
blind, deaf-mutes and other handicapped citizens. 
C.2.2 Social Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China 20101537  
Chapter 1 General Provisions 
Article 1 This Law is formulated in accordance with the Constitution for the purposes of 
regulating social insurance relationship, protecting the legal right and interest of citizens in 
participating in social insurance and enjoying social insurance benefits, enabling citizens to 
share the development achievements and promoting social harmony and stability. 
Article 2 The State establishes social insurance systems such as basic pension insurance, basic 
medical insurance, work-related injury insurance, unemployment insurance and maternity 
insurance so as to protect the right of citizens in receiving material assistance from the State 
and the society in accordance with the law when getting old, sick, injured at work, unemployed 
and giving birth. 
Article 3 The social insurance system adheres to the principles of wide coverage, basic 
protection, multi-level and sustainability and the level of social insurance shall correspond to 
the level of economic and social development. 
Article 5 People's governments above the county level shall include social insurance 
undertaking in the national economic and social development plans. 
The State raises Social Insurance Funds through multiple channels. People's governments 
above the county level shall provide necessary outlay support for social insurance undertaking. 
The State supports social insurance undertaking through tax incentive policies. 
Article 6 The State strictly regulates the Social Insurance Funds. 
The State Council and the people's governments of the provinces, autonomous regions and 
municipalities directly under the Central Government establish and improve the supervision 
and administration system of the Social Insurance Funds, protect the security of the Social 
Insurance Funds and ensure their effective operation. 
People's governments above the county level adopt measures to encourage and support all 
sectors of the society to participate in the supervision of the Social Insurance Funds. 
Article 7 The social insurance administration departments of the State Council are responsible 
for the work with respect to the administration of social insurance throughout the country. 
                                                 
1537 《中华人民共和国社会保险法》[Social Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China], National People’s 
Congress Standing Committee, 28 October 2010. 
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Other relevant departments of the State Council are responsible for the relevant social insurance 
work within their respective scope of duties. 
Social insurance administration departments of the local people's governments above the 
county level are responsible for the work with respect to the administration of social insurance 
within their own administration regions. Other relevant departments of the local people's 
government above the county level are responsible for the relevant social insurance work 
within their respective scope of duties. 
Article 8 Social insurance agencies provide social insurance services and are responsible for 
work such as social insurance registration, personal interest records and payment of social 
insurance benefits. 
Article 9 The trade unions protect the legal interest of the workers in accordance with the law 
and are entitled to participate in the study of major social insurance issues, join the social 
insurance supervision commissions and supervise issues relating to the social insurance interest 
of the workers. 
Chapter 2 Basic Pension Insurance 
Article 10 Workers shall participate in basic pension insurance and the basic pension insurance 
premiums shall be paid jointly by the employing entities and the workers. 
Sole proprietors who are not employed, non-full time practitioners and other workers in flexible 
employment who have not participated in the basic pension insurance in the employing entities 
may participate in basic pension insurance and pay the basic pension insurance premiums on 
their own. 
Measures for the pension insurance of civil servants and staff governed by the civil servant 
laws shall be prescribed by the State Council. 
Article 11 Basic pension insurance involves both social coordination and personal accounts. 
The basic pension insurance fund is made up of payment from the employing entities and 
individuals and government subsidies. 
Article 12 An employing entity shall pay the basic pension insurance premium, which shall be 
included and recorded in the basic pension insurance coordination fund, according to a ratio of 
the total wage of the worker of the entity that is stipulated by the State. 
A worker shall pay the basic pension insurance premium, which shall be included and recorded 
in the personal account, according to a ratio of the wage of the worker that is stipulated by the 
State. 
Sole proprietors who are not employed or non-full time practitioners and other workers in 
flexible employment who have not participated in the basic pension insurance in the employing 
entities but have participated in basic pension insurance shall pay the basic pension insurance 
premiums in accordance with the provisions of the State and such premiums shall be included 
and recorded in the basic pension insurance coordination fund and the personal accounts 
respectively. 
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Article 14 The amount in the personal account shall not be withdrawn in advance. The interest 
rate for the amount in the account shall not be lower than the bank's interest rate for time 
deposits. Interest rate tax is exempted. The balance in the personal account may be inherited 
after the death of the individual. 
Article 19 The basic pension insurance relationship of an individual shall be transferred along 
with the shift of his/her employment away from the coordinated region but the premium 
payment period shall be accumulated. When an individual reaches the statutory retirement age, 
the basic pension will be calculated by phases but will be paid together. The specific measures 
shall be prescribed by the State Council. 
Chapter 8 Social Insurance Funds 
Article 64 The Social Insurance Funds include the basic pension insurance fund, the basic 
medical insurance fund, the work-related injury insurance fund, the unemployment insurance 
fund and the maternity insurance fund. Each of the Social Insurance Funds shall establish 
separate accounts based on the lines of social insurance and shall conduct accounting for 
separate accounts and implement the uniform accounting system of the State. 
The Social Insurance Funds are earmarked for specific purposes and any organization and 
individual shall not embezzle or misappropriate the funds. 
The basic pension insurance fund will be coordinated on a national basis gradually and the 
other Social Insurance Funds will be coordinated on a provincial basis gradually. The specific 
time frame and steps will be prescribed by the State Council. 
Article 65 The Social Insurance Funds normally adopt balanced budgets. 
When the amount in the Social Insurance Funds is insufficient to make payments, the people's 
governments above the county level will grant subsidy. 
Article 66 The Social Insurance Funds establish budgets based on the coordination levels. The 
budgets of the Social Insurance Funds are prepared separately based on the social insurance 
items. 
Article 67 The preparation, examination and approval of the drafts of the budgets and final 
accounts of the Social Insurance Funds shall follow the provisions of the laws and the State 
Council. 
Article 68 The specific administrative measures governing the deposit of Social Insurance 
Funds into the special financial accounts shall be prescribed by the State Council. 
Article 69 The Social Insurance Funds shall engage in investment operation in accordance with 
the provisions of the State Council to preserve and add value under the premise of guaranteeing 
the safety of the funds. 
The Social Insurance Funds shall not engage in investment operation in violation of the rules, 
shall not be used to balance other government budgets, shall not be used to construct or convert 
office premises and pay the outlay for staff, the operation fee and management fee or used for 
other purposes in violation of the provisions of the laws and administrative regulations. 
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Article 70 A social insurance agency shall regular make known to the public the status of 
participation in social insurance and the income, expenditure, balance and gain of the Social 
Insurance Funds. 
Article 71 The national social security fund established by the State shall comprise the funds 
allocated from the budget of the central treasury and the funds raised by other methods 
approved by the State Council and shall be used as replenishment and adjustment for social 
security expenditure. The national social protection fund shall be managed and operated by the 
management and operation institution for national social security fund and shall seek to 
preserve and add value under the premise of guaranteeing the safety of the fund. 
The national social security fund shall announce to the public the status of its revenue and 
expenditure, management and investment operation on a regular basis. The finance 
departments, social insurance administration departments and audit departments under the 
State Council shall supervise the revenue and expenditure, management and investment 
operation of the national social security fund. 
C.2.3 Budget Law of the People’s Republic of China 
Chapter I: General Provisions 
Article 3 The State shall establish budget at each level of the government, namely, at the five 
levels: the Central Government; the provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly 
under the Central Government; the cities divided into districts and autonomous prefectures; the 
counties, autonomous counties, cities not divided into districts, and municipal districts; the 
townships, nationality townships and towns. 
The national budget consists of the central budget and the local budget. The local budget 
consists of the general budgets of all provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly 
under the Central Government. 
A local general budget at any level consists of the budget of the government at the 
corresponding level and the consolidated general budget at the next lower level. Where the next 
lower level has only the budget of the government at the corresponding level, the consolidated 
general budget at the next lower level means the corresponding-level budget at the next lower 
level. In the absence of the budget at the next lower level, the general budget means the budget 
at the corresponding level. 
Article 5 Budgets shall include the general public budgets, the budgets for government-
managed funds, the budgets for State capital operations and the budgets for Social Insurance 
Funds. 
 The general public budgets, the budgets for government-managed funds, the budgets for State 
capital operations and the budgets for Social Insurance Funds shall be complete and 
independent. The budgets for government-managed funds, the budgets for State capital 
operations and the budgets for Social Insurance Funds shall be connected with the general 
public budgets. 
Article 6 The general public budget is the budget for revenues and expenditures whereby the 
fiscal revenues with taxes as main source are arranged to be used for guaranteeing and 
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improving people's wellbeing, promoting economic and social development, safeguarding 
national security, maintaining the normal functioning of government organs and other aspects. 
The central general public budget includes the budgets of various departments of the Central 
Government (including the units directly under them, similarly hereinafter) and the budgets for 
tax rebates and transfer payments from the Central Government to local governments. 
The revenues of the central general public budget include the revenues at the central level and 
the revenues turned over by the local governments to the Central Government. The 
expenditures of the central general public budget include the expenditures at the central level 
and the tax rebates and transfer payments from the Central Government to local governments. 
Article 7 The local general public budgets at any level include the budgets as well as the 
budgets for tax rebates and transfer payments of the various departments at the corresponding 
level (including the units directly under them, similarly hereinafter). 
The revenues of the local general public budget at any level include the revenues at the 
corresponding level, the tax rebates and transfer payments from the government at higher levels 
to the government at the corresponding level, and the revenues turned over by the governments 
at lower levels. The expenditures of the local general public budget at any level include the 
expenditures at the corresponding level, the expenditures turned over to the governments at 
higher levels as well as the tax rebates and transfer payments to the governments at lower levels. 
Article 8 The budget of a department consists of the budgets of the department and the units 
subordinate to it. 
Article 9 The budgets for government-managed funds are the budgets for revenues and 
expenditures whereby the funds collected, gathered or otherwise raised from specific parties 
within a specific period of time in accordance with laws and administrative regulations are used 
specifically for the development of specific public utilities. 
The budgets for government-managed funds shall be compiled according to the fund projects 
based on the revenues and actual expenditure demand of the fund projects and ensure the 
expenditures are determined by revenues. 
Article 10 The budgets for State capital operations are the budgets for revenues and 
expenditures whereby the expenditure arrangement is made for the State capital gains. 
The budgets for State capital operations shall be compiled according to the principle of balance 
between revenues and expenditures, shall not contain deficit and shall arrange for the transfer 
of funds to general public budgets. 
Article 11 The budgets for Social Insurance Funds are the budgets for revenues and 
expenditures whereby the funds from social insurance payments, arranged by the general public 
budgets and raised in other methods are used specifically for social insurance. 
The budgets for Social Insurance Funds shall be compiled respectively according to the level 
of overall planning and items of social insurance and ensure the balance between revenues and 
expenditures.  
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C.3 Tax Laws 
Table C-1 Formal Taxes and Type of Regulating Law-document  
Formal Tax Primary Law-Document Type 
Value added tax State Council Administrative Regulation 
Business tax State Council Administrative Regulation 
Consumption tax State Council Administrative Regulation 
Customs duty State Council Administrative Regulation 
Resources tax State Council Administrative Regulation 
Urban area maintenance 
development tax 
State Council Administrative Regulation 
Tobacco tax Legislation made by the Standing Committee of 
the National People's Congress 
Vehicle purchase tax State Council Administrative Regulation 
Individual Income Tax Legislation made by the Standing Committee of 
the National People's Congress 
Enterprise income tax National People's Congress made Legislation 
Social insurance contributions State Council Administrative Regulation 
Real estate tax State Council Administrative Regulation 
Deed tax State Council Administrative Regulation 
Stamp duty State Council Administrative Regulation 
Land appreciation tax State Council Administrative Regulation 
Urban land usage tax State Council Administrative Regulation 
Arable land occupancy tax State Council Administrative Regulation 
Ship tonnage tax State Council Administrative Regulation 
Vehicle and shipping tax Legislation made by the Standing Committee of 
the National People's Congress 
Pollutant discharge fee State Council Administrative Regulation   
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Table C-2 Sundry Levies in the PRC -- National Government Funds 2009  
Number Fund name Levy Right Fund 
Management 
1 Rural Power 
Repayment Fund 
State Council Authorised, Cai 
Qi [2001] No.820, Cai Zong 
[2007]No.3 
Pay to Central 
and Local 
Coffers 
2 Three Gorges 
Project 
Development Fund 
Guo Fa Ban[1993] No.34, 
CaiQi [2002]No.651,Cai Qi 
[2003]No.155 
Pay to Central 
Government 
Coffers 
3 New Wall 
Construction 
Material Fund 
Guo Fa[1992]No.66, Cai Zong 
[2007]No.3, Cai Zong 
[2007]No.77 
Pay to Local 
Government 
Coffers  
4 Harbour 
Development Fund 
Guo Fa[1985]No.124, Jiao Cai 
Fa[1993]No.456, Cai Zong 
[2007]No.3 
Pay to Central 
Government 
Coffers 
5 Civil Aviation 
Airport 
Management and 
Development Fund 
GuoYue[1991]No.144, Guo 
Ban Fa[1995]No.57, Cai Zong 
Zi [1999] No.147, Cai Gui 
[2000] No.28, Cai Zong [2004] 
No.51, Cai Zong [2007] No.3, 
Cai Zong [2007]No.78 
Pay to Central 
Government 
Coffers 
6 Civil Aviation 
Infrastructure Fund 
Guo Fa[2002] No.6, Cai Zong 
[2004] No.38, Cai Kuai 
[2004]No.8 
Pay to Central 
Government 
Coffers 
7 Railway 
Construction Fund 
Guo Fa[1992]No.37, Cai Gong 
Zi [1996] No.371, Cai Zong 
[2007]No.3 
Pay to Central 
Government 
Coffers 
8 Railroad 
Construction 
Additional Fee 
(Fujian Province) 
Guo Fa[1998] No.17, Cai Zong 
[2001] No.26, Cai Zong [2007] 
No.3 
Pay to Local 
Provincial 
Government 
Coffers 
9 Bulk Cement Fund Guo Han [1997] No.8, Cai 
Zong [2002] No.23, Cai Zong 
[2007]No.3 
Pay to Local 
Government 
Coffers 
10 Silviculture Fund Forestry Law, Cai Shi Zi [1972] 
No.250, QingZong [1988] 
No.122, Lin Cai Zi [1991] 
No.74, [1991] Cai Nong 
No.333, [1993]Cai Nong Zi 
No.144 
Pay to Central 
and Local 
Coffers 
10-1 Collective 
Silviculture and 
Variation Fund 
Si Chuan Province Lin Cai 
[1986] No.20 
Pay to Local 
Government 
Coffers 
10-2 National Silviculture 
and Variation Fund 
Si Chuan Province Lin 
Cai[1986] No.20 
Pay to Local 
Government 
Coffers 
10-3 Continual Simple 
Reproduction fee 
[1993] Cai Nong Zi No. 144 Pay to Local 
Government 
Coffers 
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10-4 Forestry Continual 
Simple 
Reproduction fee 
[1993] Cai Nong Zi No.144, 
Qian Fu Ban [1989] No.39 
Pay to Local 
Government 
Coffers 
11 Forestry Fund 
(Shanxi Province) 
Forestry Law, Cai Zong Han 
[2003] No.1 
Pay to Local 
Government 
Coffers 
12 Forestry Vegetation 
Regrowth Fund 
Forestry Law, Cai Zong [2002] 
No.73 
Pay to Central 
and Local 
Coffers 
13 Water Conservancy 
Construction Fund 
Guo Fa [1997] No.7, Cai Zong 
Zi [1998]No.117 － No.145 
Pay to Central 
and Local 
Coffers 
14 Large and Medium 
Dam Post Migration 
Assistance Fund 
Guo Fa [2006]No.17,Cai Zong 
[2006]No.29, Jian Cha Bu, Ren 
Shi Bu, Cai Zheng Bu Ling 
No.13  
Pay to Central 
Government 
Coffers 
15 Large and Medium 
Dam Fund 
(Qinghai, 
Guangdong, 
Chongqing, Sichuan, 
Jilin, Shanxi, Hebei, 
Shanxi, Anhui, 
Hubei, Hunan, 
Guizhou, Hainan, 
Fujian, Guangxi, 
Liaoning, Yunnan 
Provinces) 
Guo Fa [2006] No.17, Cai Zong 
[2007] No.26, Cai Zong [2008] 
No.17, Cai Zong [2008] No.29, 
No.30, No.31, No.32, No.33, 
No.34, No.35, Cai Zong [2008] 
No.64, No.65, No.66, No.67, 
No.68, Cai Zong [2008] No.85, 
No.86, No.87, No.88, No.89, 
No.90 
Pay to Central 
and Local 
Coffers 
16 Three Gorges Dam 
Area Fund 
State Council Order No.299, 
Guo Fa [2006] No.1, Cai Zong 
[2007] No.69 
Pay to Central 
Government 
Coffers 
17 South Water to 
North Project Fund 
(Beijing, Tianjin, 
Hebei, Jiangsu, 
Shandong and 
Henan) 
Guo Han [2002]No.17, Guo 
Ban Fa [2004] No.86 
Pay to Central 
Government 
Coffers 
18 New Vegetable 
Patch Development 
Fund 
Land Law, National 
Construction Land Acquisition 
Regulation, [1985] Nong Tu 
ZhiNo.11 
Pay to Local 
Government 
Coffers 
19 Urban Public 
Services Additional 
Fee 
Cai Yu Wang Zi No.380, Cai Yu 
No.26, [1978] Jian Fa Cheng 
No.584, Cai Zong [2007]No.3 
Pay to Local 
Government 
Coffers 
20 Cultural 
Development Fee 
Guo Fa [1996] No.37, Cai Shui 
Fa [1997] No.95, Guo Fa Ban 
[2006]No.43 
Pay to Central 
and Local 
Coffers 
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21 National Film 
Industry 
Development Fund 
Guo Fa Ban[2006]No.43, Cai 
Jiao[2006]No.115 
Pay to Central 
and Local 
Coffers 
22 Urban Education 
Additional Fee 
Education Law, State Council 
OrderNo.60, Guo Fa [1986] 
No.50, Guo Fa Ming Dian 
[1994] No.2, No.23, [1992] Cai 
Yu Zi No.11 
Pay to Central 
and Local 
Coffers 
23 Local Education 
Additional Fee 
(Liaoning, Anhui, 
Fujian, Sichuan, 
Jiangsu, Guangxi, 
Ningxia, Guizhou, 
Qinghai, Hebei, 
Shandong, Zhejiang, 
Inner Mongolia, 
Yunnan, 
Heilongjiang, 
Hunan, Hubei) 
Education Law, Cai Zong Han 
[2003] No.2, No.9, No.10, 
No.12, No.13, No.14, No.15, 
No.16, No.18,Cai Zong [2001] 
No.58, Cai Zong [2004] No.73, 
Cai Zong Han [2005]No.33, Cai 
Zong Han [2005]No.9, Cai 
Zong Han[2006]No.2, 
No.61,Cai Zong Han [2007] 
No.45, Cai Zong Han [2008] 
No.7 
Pay to Local 
Government 
Coffers 
24 Local Education 
Fund (Beijing, 
Jiangsu) 
Education Law,Cai Zong Han 
[2002] No.31, Cai Zong Han 
[2003] No.12 
Pay to Local 
Government 
Coffers 
25 Tourism 
Development Fund 
Guo Fa [1995]No.57, Lv Fa 
Ban [1991] No.124, Cai Wai 
Zhi[1996] No.396, Cai Han 
[2001]No.24, Cai Zong 
［2006］No.3 
Pay to Central 
Government 
Coffers 
26 Disabled Persons 
Employment 
Guarantee Fund 
Disabled Person Guarantee 
Law, Cai Zong Zi [1995] No.5, 
Cai Zong [2001] No.16 
Pay to Local 
Government 
Coffers 
27 Coal Sustainable 
Development Fund 
(Shanxi) 
Guo Han［2006］No.52, Cai 
Zong Han [2007] No.3, Fa Gai 
Ban Nen Yuan [2007] No.1805, 
Jin Cai Mei [2007] No.8 
Pay to Local 
Government 
Coffers 
28 Water Resource 
Compensation Fee 
(Shanxi) 
State Council Agreement, Ji Ji 
Chu [2001] No.349,Cai Zong 
[2001] No.62, Cai Zong 
[2007]No.3, Cai Ban Zong 
[2009] No.5 
Pay to Local 
Government 
Coffers 
29 Electricity Base 
Construction Fund 
(Shanxi) 
State Council Agreement, Ji Jia 
Guan [1997] No.440,Zai Zong 
[2002] No.33, Cai Zong
［2007］No.3 
Pay to Local 
Government 
Coffers 
30 Highway Vehicle 
Passage Additional 
Fee (Hainan) 
Cai Zong [2008] No.84 Pay to Local 
Government 
Coffers 
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31 National Silk 
Development Risk 
Fund 
Guoyue [1996] No.151, Guo 
Jian Xie [1997] No.11, Cai 
Zong[2004] No.40, Cai Zong 
[2007] No.3 
Pay to Central 
Government 
Coffers 
32 Central 
International Trade 
Development Fund 
Guo Han [1996] No.17, Cai 
Zong [2007]No.3 
Pay to Central 
Government 
Coffers 
33 Urban 
Infrastructure 
Associated Fee 
Ji Jia Ge [2001] No.58, Cai 
Zong Han [2002] No.3 
Pay to Local 
Government 
Coffers 
34 Small Dam Post 
Migration 
Assistance Fund 
Guo Fa [2006] No.17 Pay to Local 
Government 
Coffers 
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Table C-3 Sundry Levies of the PRC -- National Government Funds 2012 
Number Fund name Levy Right Fund 
Management 
1 Rural electricityre-
networking loans 
repayment fund  
State Council Agreement, Cai 
Qi [2001]No.820, Cai Zong 
[2007]No.3 
Pay to Central 
and Local 
Coffers 
2 National Major Water 
Conservancy Project 
Development fund 
Cai Zong [2009]No.90, Cai 
Zong [2010]No.97, Cai Shui 
[2010]No.44 
Pay to Central 
and Local 
Coffers 
3 New wall material 
Fund 
Guo Fa[1992]No.66, Cai 
Zong[2007]No.3, Cai 
Zong[2007]No.77 
Pay to Local 
Government 
Coffers  
4 Harbour 
Development Fund 
Cai Zong [2011]No.29, Cai 
Zong [2011]No.100, Cai Zong 
[2012]No.40 
Pay to Central 
and Local 
Coffers 
5 Civil Aviation 
Development Fund 
Cai Zong [2012]No.17 Pay to Central 
Government 
Coffers 
6 Vessel-included Oil 
Pollution 
Compensation Fund 
Cai Zong [2012]No.33 Pay to Central 
Government 
Coffers 
7 Railway Construction 
Fund 
Guo Fa[1992]No.37,Cai Gong 
Zhi [1996] No.371,Cai Zong 
[2007]No.3 
Pay to Central 
Government 
Coffers 
8 Bulk Cement Fund Guo Han [1997] No.8, Cai 
Zong [2002] No.23,Cai Zong 
[2007]No.3 
Pay to Local 
Government 
Coffers 
9 Silviculture Fund Forestry Law, Jing Zong 
[1988] No.122, Lin Cai Zhi 
[1991] No.74, (91) Cai Nong 
ZhiNo.333, [1993]Cai Nong 
Zhi No.144, Cai Zong [2009] 
No.3 
Pay to Central 
and Local 
Coffers 
10 Nuclear Power Plant 
Spent Fuel Processing 
Disposal Fund 
Cai Zong [2010] No. 58 Pay to Central 
Government 
Coffers 
11 Forestry Vegetation 
Regrowth Fund 
Forestry Law, Cai Zong [2002] 
No.73 
Pay to Central 
and Local 
Coffers 
12 Water Conservation 
Construction Fund 
Cai Zong [2011] No. 2, Cai 
Zong Han [2011] No. 33, Cai 
Ban Zong [2011] No. 111 
Pay to Central 
and Local 
Coffers 
13 Large and Medium 
Dam Post Migration 
Assistance Fund 
Guo Fa [2006]No.17, Cai 
Zong [2006]No.29, Jian Cha 
Bu, Ren Shi Bu, Cai Zheng Bu 
Ling No.13, Cai Qi [2011] No. 
303, Cai Qi [2012] No. 315 
Pay to Central 
Government 
Coffers 
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14 Large and Medium 
Dam Fund (Qinghai, 
Guangdong, 
Chongqing, Sichuan, 
Jilin, Shanxi, Hebei, 
Shaanxi, Anhui, 
Hubei, Hunan, 
Guizhou, Hainan, 
Fujian, Guangxi, 
Liaoning, 
Yunnan ,Heilongjiang 
, Ningxia, Zhejiang, 
Henan Provinces) 
Guo Fa [2006] No.17,Cai 
Zong [2007] No.26,CaiZong 
[2008] No.17, Cai Zong [2008] 
No.29, No.30, No.31, No.32, 
No.33, No.34, No.35, Cai 
Zong[2008] No.64, No.65, 
No.66, No.67, No.68, Cai 
Zong [2008] No.85, No.86, 
No.87, No.88, No.89, No.90, 
Cai Zong [2009] No.51, 
No.59, Cai Zong [2010] 
No.15, No.16, No.43, No.113, 
Cai Zong Han [2010] No.10, 
No.39 
Pay to Central 
and Local 
Coffers 
15 Three Gorges Dam 
Area Fund 
The State Council Ruling 
No.299, Guo Fa [2006] 
No.17,Cai Zong [2007] No.69 
Pay to Central 
Government 
Coffers 
16 South Water to North 
Project Fund (Beijing, 
Tinjin, Hebei, Jiangsu, 
Shandong and Henan) 
Guo Han [2002]No.17, Guo 
Ban Fa [2004] No.86 
Pay to Central 
Government 
Coffers 
17 New Vegetable Patch 
Development Fund 
Land Law, National 
Construction Land Acquisition 
Regulation, [1985] Nong Tu 
ZhiNo.11 
Pay to Local 
Government 
Coffers 
18 City Public Services 
Additional Fee 
[1964] Cai Yu Wang Zhi 
No.380, (78)Cai Yu No.26, 
[1978] Jian Fa Cheng No.584, 
Cai Zong [2007]No.3 
Pay to Local 
Government 
Coffers 
19 Cultural Development 
Fee 
Guo Fa [1996] No.37, Cai Shui 
Fa [1997] No.95, Guo Fa 
Ban[2006] No.43, Cai Zong 
[2012] No. 68, Cai Zong 
[2012] No. 96 
Pay to Central 
and Local 
Coffers 
20 National Film 
Industry Development 
Fund 
Guo Fa Ban [2006] No.43, Cai 
Jiao[2006] No.115 
Pay to 
CentralCoffer
s 
21 Education Surcharge Education Law, the State 
Council Ruling No.60, GuoFa 
[1986] No.50, GuoFa Ming 
Dian [1994] No.2, No.23, Guo 
Fa [2010] No. 35, CaiShui 
[2010] No. 103 
Pay to Central 
and Local 
Coffers 
22 Local Education 
Surcharge  
Education Law, CaiZong Han 
[2003] No.2, No.9, No.10, 
No.12, No.13, No.14, 
No.15、No.16, No.18, Cai 
Zong [2001] No.58, Cai Zong 
[2004] No.73, Cai Zong 
Han[2005] No.33, Cai Zong 
Han[2006] No.9, Cai Zong 
Pay to 
LocalCoffers 
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Han[2006] No.2, No.61, Cai 
Zong Han [2007] No.45, Cai 
Zong Han [2008] No.7, Cai 
Zong Han [2010] No.2, No.3, 
No.7, No.8, No.11, No.71, 
No.72, No.73, No.75, No.76, 
No.78, No.79, No.80, Cai 
Zong [2010] No.98, Cai Zong 
Han [2011] No. 1, No.2, No.3, 
No.4, No.5, No.6, No.7, No.8, 
No.9, No.10, No.11, No.12, 
No.13, No.15, No.16, No.17, 
No.57 
23 Tourism Development 
Fund 
Guo Ban Fa [1995] No.57, Lv 
Ban Fa [1991] No.124, Cai Wai 
Zhi [1996] No.396,Cai Han 
[2001]No.24, Cai Zong 
[2007]No.3, Cai Zong [2010] 
No. 123 
Pay to 
CentralCoffer
s 
24 Disabled Persons 
Employment 
Guarantee Fund 
Disabled Person Guarantee 
Law, Cai Zong Zhi [1995] 
No.5, CaiZong [2001] No.16 
Pay to 
LocalCoffers 
25 Coal Sustainable 
Development Fund 
(Shanxi) 
Guo Han [2006] No.52, Cai 
Zong Han [2007] No.3, Fa Gai 
Ban Neng Yuan [2007] 
No.1805, Jin Cai Mei [2007] 
No.8, Cai Zong Han [2011] 
No. 18 
Pay to 
LocalCoffers 
26 Highway Vehicle 
Passage Surcharge 
(Hainan) 
Cai Zong [2008] No.84 Pay to 
LocalCoffers 
27 City Infrastructure 
Associated Fee 
Ji Jia Ge [2001] No.58, Cai 
Zong Han [2002] No.3 
Pay to 
LocalCoffers 
28 Small DamMigration 
Assistance Fund 
Guo Fa [2006] No.17 Pay to 
LocalCoffers 
29 Renewable Energy 
Development Fund 
Cai Zong [2011] No. 115, Cai 
Jian [2012] No. 102 
Pay to 
CentralCoffer
s 
30 Waste Electrical & 
Electronic Products 
Processing Fund 
Cai Zong [2012] No. 34, Cai 
Zong [2012] No. 48, Cai Zong 
[2012] No. 80 
Pay to 
CentralCoffer
s 
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C.3.1 Individual Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China1538 
This section includes the Articles discussed in Chapter V 
Article 1 Individual Income Tax shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Law 
by individuals who have domiciles in the People's Republic of China, or who have no domicile 
in China but have resided in the country for one year or more on their income gained within or 
outside China. 
Individuals who have no domiciles and do not reside in the People's Republic of China or who 
have no domiciles but have resided in China for less than one year shall, in accordance with 
the provisions of this Law, pay Individual Income Tax on their income gained within China. 
Article 2 Individual Income Tax shall be paid on the following categories of individual income: 
(1) Income from wages and salaries; 
(2) Income from production or business operation conducted by self-employed industrial and 
commercial households; 
(3) Income from contracted or leased operation of enterprises or institutions; 
(4) Income from remuneration for personal services; 
(5) Income from author's remuneration; 
(6) Income from royalties; 
(7) Income from interest, dividends and bonuses; 
(8) Income from the lease of property; 
(9) Income from the transfer of property; 
(10) Incidental income; and 
(11) Income from other sources specified as taxable by the department of finance under the 
State Council. 
Article 6 The amount of taxable income shall be computed as follows: 
(1) With respect to income from wages and salaries, the amount of taxable income shall be the 
part remaining after the deduction of RMB 3,500 for expenses from the monthly income. 
(2) With respect to income from production or business operation gained by self-employed 
industrial and commercial households, the amount of taxable income shall be the part 
remaining after the deduction of the costs, expenses and losses from the gross income in a tax 
year. 
                                                 
1538《中华人民共和国个人所得税法》 [Individual Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China], Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress, 12/29/2007. 
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(3) With respect to income from contracted or leased operation of enterprises or institutions, 
the amount of taxable income shall be the part remaining after the deduction of the necessary 
expenses from the gross income in a tax year. 
(4) With respect to income from remuneration for personal services, author's remuneration, 
royalties and lease of property, the amount of taxable income shall be the part remaining after 
the deduction of RMB 800 for expenses from the amount received in a single payment not 
exceeding RMB 4,000, or the part remaining after the deduction of 20 percent from the amount 
for a single payment of RMB 4,000 or more; 
(5) With respect to income from the transfer of property, the amount of taxable income shall 
be the part remaining after the deduction of the original value of the property and the reasonable 
expenses from the income gained from such transfer; and 
(6) With respect to interest, dividends, bonuses, incidental income and income from other 
sources, the amount of taxable income shall be the full amount received in each payment. 
The part of individual income donated to educational and other public welfare undertakings 
shall be deducted from the amount of taxable income in accordance with the relevant 
regulations of the State Council. 
With respect to a taxpayer who has no domicile in China but obtains wages or salaries within 
China, or who has domicile in China but obtains wages or salaries outside China, an additional 
deduction of expenses may be determined on the basis of his/her average income level, living 
standard and the changes in exchange rates. The applicable scope and standard of the additional 
deduction of expenses shall be prescribed by the State Council. 
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Appendix D Fiscal Structure of the PRC 
D.1 Fiscal Revenue Structure of the PRC 
Table D-1 collates the fiscal revenue data of 2005 – 2014. Note that 2014 data is incomplete 
as at October 2015.1539 
National Fiscal Income includes revenue from formal taxes and sundry levies. A few sums are 
calculated to better illustrate the different tax bases: 
 Sum of Value Added Tax (VAT) and Business Tax is calculated because currently the 
two taxes are being merged. The Business Tax will cease to exist and its tax base 
included in the VAT. 
 Sum of Turnover Taxes is the sum of the revenue from VAT, Consumption Tax, 
Customs Duty and Business Tax. The ultimate tax base for these taxes is consumption. 
 Sum of Individual Income Tax and Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions 
takes into consideration the Individual Income Tax tax-base for the urban population. 
 
                                                 
1539 Database of the National Bureau of Statistics of China (Chinese Version), Online <http://data.stats.gov.cn/> (25 Aug. 
2015). 
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Table D-1 Fiscal Revenue Structure of the PRC 
Unit: RMB Billion 
Data Base: Annual Data          
Time Period: 10 years 
between 2005 and 2014          
    2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total National Income 
National Fiscal 
Income 
3,164.93 3,876.02 5,132.18 6,133.04  6,851.83 8,310.15 10,387.44 11,725.35 12,920.96 14,034.97 
National Tax 
Income 
2,877.85 3,480.44 4,562.20  5,422.38  5,952.16  7,321.08  8,973.84  10,061.43  11,053.07  
 
11,915.81  
Indirect 
Taxes 
Turnover 
Taxes 
Domestic VAT 1,079.21 1,278.48 1,547.02 1,799.69  1,848.12  2,109.35  2,426.66  2,641.55  2,881.01  3,084.98  
Consumption Tax 163.38 188.57  220.68  256.83  476.12  607.16  693.62  787.56  823.13  890.68  
Customs Duty 106.62 114.18  143.26  177.00  148.38  202.78  255.91  278.39  263.06  284.32  
Business Tax 423.25  512.87  658.22  762.64  901.40  1,115.79  1,367.90  1,574.76  1,723.30  1,778.16  
Sum of VAT and 
Business Tax 
1,502.46  1,791.35  2,205.24  2,562.33  2,749.52  3,225.14  3,794.56  4,216.32  4,604.32  4,863.14  
VAT and 
Business Tax as 
percentage of 
Total Revenue 
45.70% 44.75% 33.24% 33.01% 31.15% 31.07% 28.97% 28.14% 27.48%   
Sum of Turnover 
Tax 
1,772.46  2,094.10  2,569.18  2,996.16  3,374.02  4,035.08  4,744.10  5,282.27  5,690.51  6,038.14  
Turnover Tax as 
percentage of 
Total Revenue 
53.92% 52.31% 38.73% 38.59% 38.22% 38.88% 36.22% 35.26% 33.96%   
Other Indirect 
Taxes 
City and rural area 
maintenance 
development tax 
 79.57   93.97  115.64  134.41  154.41  188.71  277.93  312.56  341.99    
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Tobacco Leaf Tax   4.16  4.78  6.75  8.08  7.84  9.14   13.18   15.03    
Vehicle Purchase 
Tax 
    6.82   14.42   18.65   24.16   30.20   39.30   47.40    
Sum of 
Indirect 
Taxes 
Total Indirect 
Tax 
1,852.02  2,192.23  2,696.42  3,151.73  3,555.17  4,255.79  5,061.36  5,647.31  6,094.92  6,038.14  
Imports 
and 
Exports 
Consumption 
taxes on 
Imports and 
Exports  
VAT, 
Consumption tax 
on Imported 
Goods 
421.18  496.26  615.34  739.11  772.98  1,049.06  1,356.04  1,480.22  1,400.46    
VAT, 
Consumption tax 
on Exported 
Goods 
(404.89) (487.72) (563.50) (586.59) (648.66) (732.73) (920.48) (1,042.89) (1,051.89)   
Net VAT, 
Consumption tax 
on Import and 
Export 
 16.28  8.55   51.84  152.52  124.32  316.33  435.57  437.33  348.57  - 
Income 
Tax 
Types of 
Income Taxes 
Enterprise Income 
Tax 
534.39  703.96  877.93  1,117.56  1,153.68  1,284.35  1,676.96  1,965.45  2,242.72  2,463.25  
Individual Income 
Tax 
209.49  245.37  318.56  372.23  394.94  483.73  605.41  582.03  653.15  737.66  
Pension Insurance 
Contribution 
(Revenue 
Collected) 
509.33  630.98  783.42  974.02  1,149.08  1,341.95  1,689.47  2,000.10  2,268.04    
Sum of 
Income 
Taxes 
Sum of Individual 
Income Tax and 
Pension 
Insurance 
Contribution 
718.821 876.351 1101.978 1346.251 1544.015 1825.677 2294.881 2582.128 2921.193 737.66  
Individual 
Income Tax and 
Pension 
contribution as a 
21.87% 21.89% 16.61% 17.34% 17.49% 17.59% 17.52% 17.23% 17.43%   
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Percentage of 
Total Revenue 
Total Income 
Taxes 
1,253.21  1,580.31  1,979.90  2,463.81  2,697.70  3,110.03  3,971.85  4,547.58  5,163.91  3,200.91  
Total Income Tax 
as Percentage of 
Total Revenue 
38.12% 39.48% 29.84% 31.74% 30.56% 29.96% 30.32% 30.35% 30.82%   
Individual and 
Enterprise 
Income Taxes as 
a Percentage of 
Formal Taxes 
25.85% 27.28% 26.23% 27.47% 26.02% 24.15% 25.43% 25.32% 26.20%   
Wealth and Activity 
Taxes 
Real Estate Tax      57.55   68.03   80.37   89.41  110.24  137.25  158.15    
Deed Tax  73.51   86.77  120.63  130.75  173.51  246.49  276.57  287.40  384.40    
Arable Land 
Occupancy Tax 
 14.19   17.11   18.50   31.44   63.31   88.86  107.55  162.07  180.82    
Urban Area Land 
Usage Tax 
 13.73   17.68   38.55   81.69   92.10  100.40  122.23  154.17  171.88    
Land Capital Gains 
Tax 
     40.31   53.74   71.96  127.83  206.26  271.91  329.39    
Ship Tonnage Tax 1.38  1.57  1.82  2.01  2.38  2.66  2.98  4.10  4.36    
Vehicle and 
Shipping Tax 
 58.33   68.75   87.69   98.99  116.39  179.26  204.49  222.89  259.63    
Stamp Duty     226.18  131.13   89.75  104.03  104.22   98.56  124.44    
Other tax type   0.12  0.37  0.48  0.18  0.42  0.52  0.07    
Total Wealth and 
Activity Taxes 
161.14  191.88  591.34  598.16  690.23  939.12  1,134.95  1,338.87  1,613.14    
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Formal Taxes 
Total Formal 
Taxes 
2,757.05  3,333.44  4,484.24  5,239.68  5,794.02  6,962.99  8,478.69  9,533.66  10,603.93  9,239.05  
Total Formal 
Taxes Plus 
Pension 
Insurance 
Contribution 
3,266.38  3,964.42  5,267.66  6,213.70  6,943.10  8,304.94  
 
10,168.16  
11,533.76  12,871.97  9,239.05  
Other Fiscal 
Revenue1540 
Resources Tax  14.22   20.71   26.12   30.18   33.82   41.76   59.59   90.44  100.57    
Deed Tax from 
Securities 
Transactions 
6.73   17.95  200.53   97.92   51.04   54.42   43.85   30.35   46.97    
Non-tax revenue     569.98  710.66  899.67  989.07  1,413.60  1,663.92  1,867.89    
National Dedicated 
Revenue 
(Earmarked) 
    124.19  155.41  163.70  204.07  305.64  323.26  352.86    
National 
Administrations 
Fees 
    189.74  213.49  231.70  299.64  403.94  457.95  477.58    
Penalty Revenue      84.03   89.84   97.39  107.46  130.14  155.98  165.88    
Other revenue     172.04  251.92  406.88  377.90  573.89  726.73  871.57    
Total 
Total 3,287.33  4,003.08  6,634.27  7,763.11  8,827.30  10,379.26  13,098.80  14,982.40  16,755.29  9,239.05  
Proportion of 
Formal Tax 
99.36% 99.03% 79.40% 80.04% 78.65% 80.01% 77.63% 76.98% 76.82%   
Note: National Fiscal Income does not Include Domestic and Foreign Debt Incomes 
Total government 
expenditure    3393.028 4042.273 4978.135 6259.266 7629.993 8987.416 10924.779 12595.297 14021.21 15166.154 
                                                 
1540 Other Fiscal Revenue refers to Sundry Levies. 
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Table D-2 Total Government Revenue (RMB Billion) 
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D.2 Revenue Types as a Percentage of Total Fiscal Revenue 
The following pie charts illustrate the make-up of fiscal revenue for the years of 2005 to 2013. 
For each year, the fiscal revenue is divided into eight categories: total other indirect taxes, sum 
of VAT and Business Tax, total income taxes (including Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance 
Contributions), net VAT, Consumption Tax on Import and Export (fiscal revenue from 
international trade, consumption tax, customs duty and other revenue). Other revenue 
represents revenue from Sundry Levies. 
In each pie chart, the amounts are in RMB Billions. 
Revenue trends are illustrated in column and line graphs.
392 
 
Figure D-1 Revenue Proportions 2005 – 2013 (RMB Billion)1541 
 
                                                 
1541 Pension Contributions is short for Urban Old-age Pension Insurance Contributions. Other revenue refers to Sundry Levies. 
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Figure D-2 Trend in VAT and Business Tax Revenue (RMB Billion) 
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Figure D-3 Trend in Total Turnover Taxes Revenue (RMB Billion) 
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Figure D-3 Trend in Income Tax Revenue -- including Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions Figure D-3 Trend in Total 
Turnover Taxes Revenue (RMB Billion) 
 
  
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total Income Tax 1,253.21 1,580.31 1,979.90 2,463.81 2,697.70 3,110.03 3,971.85 4,547.58 5,163.91
Total Income Tax as Percentage of Total Revenue 38.12% 39.48% 29.84% 31.74% 30.56% 29.96% 30.32% 30.35% 30.82%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
 -
 1,000.00
 2,000.00
 3,000.00
 4,000.00
 5,000.00
 6,000.00
Total Income Tax Total Income Tax as Percentage of Total Revenue
404 
 
Figure D-4 Trend in Formal Taxes Revenue (RMB Billion) 
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Appendix E A Note on Income Tax Theory 
The tax incidence and tax burden analysis in Chapter VI is performed based on an income tax 
that is designed to have progressive marginal tax rates within a partial equilibrium model. The 
research of Edgeworth, 1542  Stern1543  and Mirrlees 1544  are significant contributions to the 
understanding the economic impacts of a progressive income tax in a country. This appendix 
contains a brief summary of these three significant theories.  
E.1 Edgeworth Progressive Marginal Rate Income Tax Theory 
At the end of the 19th century, based on utilitarian social welfare theories, Edgeworth thought 
the aim of taxation is to maximise social welfare, that is, maximising total individual utility.1545 
He made the following assumptions: each person has the same utility function; the level of 
utility only depended on people’s income levels; the marginal utility of income diminishes, and 
the diminishing rate exceeds the rate of increases in income; total income possibilities is 
constant, that is, even if the tax rate is 100%, there is no impact on production. With these 
assumptions, in order to maximise social welfare, each individual’s marginal utility of income 
should be aligned. As each individual has the same marginal utility functions, the marginal 
utility of income would only be the same when income levels are aligned. This marginal utility 
alignment requires the designed tax system to allow total income inequity after taxes. Therefore 
the income of the wealthy should be taxed at a higher rate, because the marginal utility loss of 
the rich is smaller than that of the poor. If income redistribution is completely equitable, when 
the government wants to increase revenue, the extra tax should be evenly distributed to each 
individual. Edgeworth’s research shows that income tax should be levied at multiple levels 
                                                 
1542 Edgeworth FY, ‘The Pure Theory of Taxation’, (1897) 7 The Economic Journal (25) 46. 
1543 Stern NH, ‘On the Specification of Models of Optimum Income Taxation’, (1976) 6 Journal of Public Economics 123. 
1544 See Mirrlees JA, ‘An exploration in the theory of optimal income taxation’, (1971) 38 Review of Economic Studies 175; 
and Mirrlees JA, ‘Optimal tax theory: A synthesis’, (1976) 6 Journal of Public Economics 327. 
1545 Above note 1542.  
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with high progressive marginal rates, and the marginal rates of the highest bracket of income 
should be levied at 100%. 
Edgeworth based his conclusion on the presumption that income tax will not affect production. 
In reality, due to the existence of leisure, income tax does effect the preference between work 
and leisure. An income tax with high rates will have a restrictive effect on labour supply, thus 
lead to excessive tax burden. The assumption that individuals have the same utility function is 
also unrealistic, because the marginal utility of income for each individual cannot be 
represented by data; but as an analytical tool, Edgeworth’s research contributes to the analysis 
of treating Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions in the PRC as a form of income 
tax that has the same tax base as the Individual Income Tax for the target segment of the 
population. 
E.3 Stern’s Linear Income Tax Model 
Stern took into consideration the effect income tax has on labour supply. Combining this with 
the idea of a negative tax, he proposed a linear income tax model.1546 This is a linear tax model 
with constant marginal tax rates and constant income brackets. That is,  
T ＝－G  + t Y , 
Where G = the total lump sum grant the government pays to each individual (a constant rate of 
deductions); 
T= Tax Revenue; 
t = tax rate, 
Y = an individual’s total income. 
In the above formula, 
                                                 
1546 Above note 1543. 
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At Y = 0, tax is a negative number, that is, the individual receives $G as subsidies; 
At 
t
G
≥Y >0, when the taxpayer receives $1 of income, he/she must pay $t as taxes to the 
government. Therefore, t is the marginal tax rate, which is the taxable proportion of the last $1 
of income, this is a constant.  
Stern’s research shows that, when the elasticity of labour supply is higher, the marginal tax rate 
t should be smaller. He also calculated with regard to certain presumptions, that in order to 
maximise social welfare, the marginal tax rate t should be 19%. Stern’s research denied the 
conclusion that the progressive tax rate should increase as income increases, until it gets to 
100%. It is, however, uncertain whether the 19% marginal tax rate proposed by Stern is 
plausible, because Stern’s conclusion was based on strict presumptions. These presumptions 
were that the substitution elasticity between income (labour) and leisure is 0.6; and the choice 
of social welfare function was based on a Rawlsian function, that is, focusing on the welfare 
improvement of the worst-off individual in society. As it is rare in real life, that the substitution 
elasticity between labour and leisure is 0.6, if this number changes, the 19% optimal marginal 
income tax rate is not plausible. The standards people use to judge social welfare are not the 
same. When other social welfare functions are chosen, this conclusion also does not stand. 
Furthermore linear income taxes are also bases on a one off government lump sum grant, 
implementing such a lump sum grant is difficult.1547 The average income tax rate analysis in 
Chapter VI is based on this linear income tax model. 
                                                 
1547 See Yang B & Huang E, Taxation in China (Sydney: Thomeson Reuters, 2015 Forthcoming), ch 5. 
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E.4 The Optimal Income Tax Theory of Mirrlees1548 
Some scholars focus on researching a non-linear income tax. Different to a linear income tax, 
it has many marginal tax rates, and a different tax rate is applied for different income levels, 
that is, the tax rate is progressive (or regressive). The central question for optimal non-linear 
income tax is how to ascertain the level of progressivity (regressivity). In other words, how 
best to set the marginal tax rates of income tax.  
Mirrlees1549 made important contributions to the research of optimal non-linear income taxes. 
The following were his assumptions:1550  
 There is no timing considerations, that is, assuming the economy is static, taxes have no 
effect on savings, and taxes can only affect labour supply;  
 take into consideration only labour income, not income from capital; 
 there are no differences in the preferences of individuals; individuals rationally decide on 
the quantity and type of labour they are willing to supply; each individual has the same 
utilities function, and after choosing the individual utilities function, total welfare can be 
represented by the sum of individual utility;  
 the quantity of labour provided by individuals do not affect price (wage levels); the only 
difference between individuals are on the before tax income they receive or their 
productivity (levels of skill); 
 there is only one type of labour, labour of any one person is a complete substitute for 
another’s labour; 
                                                 
1548 See above note 1544. 
1549 See above note 1544. 
1550 See above note 1544. 
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 labour supply is continuous;  
 migration does not occur;  
 the government has perfect information on individual utilities and individual activities in 
the economy; and  
 the cost to implement optimal income tax can be ignored.  
Mirrlees then reached the following conclusions1551: 
 A near linear income tax that has administrative benefits is most suitable. A near linear 
income tax is where the marginal tax rate is almost uniform, and individuals who receives 
an income that is below the tax free threshold should be subsidised by the government. 
 Income tax, contrary to general perception, is not an effective tool to restrict inequity, 
because low tax rates do not necessarily lead to more jobs. When consumption level and 
skills level are at the optimal, working a full day will allow the individual to receive wages 
equal to their consumption level. Those people who do not have the level of skill will not 
choose to work, their preference for leisure is higher, and therefore even low tax rates 
would not encourage employment. There is no evidence that lower income earners should 
be taxed at a lower rate. Similarly, due to differences in skill levels, for efficiency reasons, 
individuals with the lowest level of skill should work less, and individuals who have higher 
levels of skill should work more. The labour supply of those with higher skill levels may 
be extremely scarce (assuming there is no possibility of migration), for the benefits of the 
poorer groups, levying higher taxes on people who have higher skill levels and who receive 
higher levels of income may sacrifice more production.  
                                                 
1551 See above note 1544. 
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 There is a need to design taxes that complement the income tax. If a tax policy that relied 
both on working hours and labour income, considerations of how to counteract the innate 
advantages of some individuals due to genetic and family reasons are also required. 
Stern summarised the conclusions of Mirrlees and later related research into three points, and 
called it the Mirrlees model:1552 
1) The marginal tax rate needs to be between 0 and 1; 
2) The marginal tax rate for the individual with the highest income should be 0; and, 
3) If the individual receiving the lowest wage rage is working under optimal conditions, their 
marginal tax rate should also be 0.1553 
Only the first point could be found in the writings of Mirrlees.1554 It obviously does not have 
much real meaning as it covers all possibilities. In most situations, the tax rate will not be lower 
than 0 (expect when a negative income tax is used). If the marginal tax rate is 0, the government 
does not have additional tax revenue. The marginal tax rate cannot exceed 100%. If the 
marginal tax rate equals 100%, then all income received from extra labour would be spent on 
paying taxes. A rational individual will lower the supply of labour, and increase the 
consumption of leisure, thus leading to decreases in social welfare. This conclusion also differs 
from Stern’s own proposal of using near linear income taxes. Even Mirrlees thought this 
conclusion was not strong.1555 The latter two conclusions are Stern’s summary of the research 
of Mirrlees and later scholars.  
                                                 
1552 尼古拉斯·斯特恩著,《发展中国家的税收理论》, 大卫·纽伯里、尼古拉斯·斯特恩编, 许善达等译《最优商品税
和所得税理论入门》 Stern N, ‘Introduction to the Theory of Optimal Commodity and Income Taxes’, in Newbury D & 
Stern N, eds, Xu S, trans, Tax Theory for Developing Nations, (Beijing: China Finance and Economics Press,1992), at 54. 
See also Deaton A & Stern N, ‘Optimally Uniform Commodity Taxes, Taste Differences and Lump-sum Grants”, (1986) 20 
Economics Letters 263. 
1553 Ibid. 
1554 See Yang B & Huang E, Taxation in China (Sydney: Thomeson Reuters, 2015 Forthcoming), ch 5. 
1555 Mirrlees JA, ‘An exploration in the theory of optimal income taxation’, (1971) 38 Review of Economic Studies 175.  
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The second conclusion illustrated that, assuming individuals with higher natural endowments 
or labour skills also receive higher income, as the labour elasticity of supply for individuals 
with higher levels of skill is relatively higher; according to the Ramsey inverse elasticity 
rule,1556 in order to improve efficiency, a lower rate of tax should be levied on their income. 
When they arrive at top income levels, however, the marginal tax rate should be zero, that is, 
the marginal income of individuals with highest natural endowments or skills level should have 
a marginal tax rate of zero, thereby encouraging them to contribute more, at the same time not 
affecting fiscal revenue and the marginal tax rate of other individuals (here the obvious 
assumption is that the supply of labour is continuous).  
Assume a person with the highest skill level receives before tax income of $Y, and the marginal 
tax rate in the rates table is a positive number. The rates table is now recalculated, any income 
before Y will have a positive marginal tax rate; for any amounts of income after Y, the marginal 
tax rate is zero. Assuming his labour supply has no biological limits (that is, the labour supply 
is continuous), then as the marginal hourly compensation rises, this person will choose to work 
more, because the total tax revenue from Y’s income did not change. For the government, tax 
revenue did not decrease; for other individuals, their utilities did not decrease. For this person 
who receives the highest level of income, utility was increased. From a Pareto efficiency 
angle,1557 social welfare increases, and no individual’s welfare was decreased, leading to a 
Pareto improvement. So, the original tax table was not optimal; the marginal tax rate for the 
highest income should be changed to 0.1558  
The third conclusion illustrates that for individuals with relatively lower natural endowments 
and skill levels, as they have worked to their best ability (that is, optimal circumstances is 
                                                 
1556 Zajac EE, ‘Note on an Extension of the Ramsey Inverse Elasticity of Demand Pricing or Taxation Formula’, (1974) 3 
Journal of Public Economics 181. 
1557 Stiglitz JE, Economics of the Public Sector, (New York: W.W.Norton & Company, 3rd ed, 2000), at 57-78. 
1558 Above note 1552. 
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achieved), even if the tax rate is lowered, they could not contribute more, their marginal tax 
rate should also be 0. Therefore progressive tax rates that have higher rates for higher income 
levels are not reasonable from an efficiency angle.  
E.4.1 The Contribution and Defects of Mirrlees’ Theory 
The major contribution of Mirrlees is that he attempted to find a way for the Individual Income 
Tax to only tax the individual’s natural endowments (skill levels), but not their levels of 
exertion. Since natural endowments (skill levels) do not change as the level of tax changes 
(similar to commodities that have zero elasticity),1559 taxing only natural endowments and skill 
levels would not affect production, therefore minimising the excess burden of taxation, at the 
end achieving the goals of optimal taxation. In real life it is difficult to accurately measure each 
individual’s natural endowments or skill level, the only observable fact is income (that is, there 
is an issue of information asymmetry), but income is the combined result of individual exertion 
and level of skill. 1560  Furthermore, whether the relationship between income, natural 
endowments and skill levels is completely positively correlated is uncertain. Under many 
circumstances, a person with very high natural endowments may receive relatively low income 
(that is, there is unfair income distribution in society), but some individuals who do not have 
high levels of natural endowments or even have very low skill levels can receive high levels of 
income through property or other avenues; therefore an assumption that it is only appropriate 
to tax on skill levels will lead to inequity. When a known level of fiscal revenue is required, 
the efficiency and equity issues of income taxes cannot be solved at the same time. Following 
                                                 
1559 This follows from Ramsey’s research on optimal commodities tax theory, Ramsey FP, ‘A contribution to the Theory of 
Taxation’, (1927) 37 Economic Journal 47. 
1560 平新乔《后记》, 哈维·S·罗森著, 平新乔、董勤发等译, 《财政学》, Ping X, ‘Postcript’, in Rosen HS, Public 
Finance, Ping X & Dong Q, trans, (Beijing: Renmin University Press, 4th ed, 2000), at 599 - 605. 
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Ramsey’s analytical process, the difficulties arising from balancing efficiency and equity in an 
income tax are similar to those Ramsey faced when analysing optimal consumption taxes.1561  
A further contribution of Mirrlees’ research (including Stern) is that it negates the general 
perception of the traditional point of view. That traditional point of view was, in order to 
achieve equity, a marginal tax rate table should be designed where the marginal tax rate should 
rise as income rises. Mirrlees and Stern pointed out that under the unique circumstances they 
are analysing, the argument that marginal tax rates should rise as income rises does not stand, 
and the income tax is not an effective rule to decrease the level of inequity under all 
circumstances. Similarly, the conclusion of Mirrlees (or Stern) also could not be seen as a 
principle that has general applications, their arguments cannot be simply applied to tax system 
design.  
  
                                                 
1561 Ramsey FP, “A contribution to the Theory of Taxation”, (1927) 37 Economic Journal 47. 
414 
 
Appendix F Feasibility Study Detailed Results 
F.1 Summary of Results 
Table F-1 Summary of Feasibility Study Results 
Measure Assumption 1 Assumption 2 Assumption 3 
M2 = Actual Urban Old-Age Pensions Expenditure Yes Yes Yes 
M3A: pension replacement rate @ 59.2%  No No Yes 
M3B: pension replacement rate @ actual levels=M3 Yes Yes Yes 
M3C: pension replacement rate @ 45%  No No Yes 
M3Da:pension replacement rate @ 50%  No No Yes 
M3Db: pension replacement rate @ 40% No No Yes 
M3Dc: pension replacement rate @37.86% No No Yes 
 
“Yes” means the pool of funds covers Urban Old-Age Pensions expenditure when pensions are paid at the level of the measure.  
“No” means the pool of funds does not cover Urban Old-Age Pensions expenditure when pensions are paid at the level of the measure.  
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Table F-2 Actual Urban Old-Age Pensions Expenditure1562 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Total government 
expenditure (RMBm) 3,393,028.  4,042,273.00  4,978,135.00  7,629,993.00  8,987,416.00  6,259,266.00  
 
10,924,779.00  
 
12,595,297.00  
 
14,021,210.00  
Urban Pension 
Insurance Policy 
Holders ('000) 174,879.00  187,663.00  201,369.00  218,911.00  235,499.00  257,073.00  283,913.00  304,268.00  322,184.00  
Expenditure from 
Basic Pension 
Insurance Fund 
(RMBm) 404,030.00  489,670.00  596,490.00  738,960.00  889,440.00  1,055,490.00  1,276,490.00  1,556,180.00  1,847,040.00  
Average per Capita 
Expenditure  2,310.34   2,609.30   2,962.17   3,375.62   3,776.83   4,105.80   4,496.06   5,114.50   5,732.87  
If urbanisation rate is 
80% ('000)                 479,708.17  
Expenditure from 
Basic Pension 
Insurance Fund 
(RMBm)                  2,750,106.09  
This table collates data and results on total government expenditure, numbers of Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance contributors, (insurance 
policy holders), and expenditure for Urban Old-Age Pensions, for the years 2005 to 2013.  
Average per capita Urban Old-Age Pensions expenditure is comparable to monthly civil benefits standards. Please see Tables F-2 and F-3 below. 
For example, the monthly average per capita Urban Old-Age Pensions expenditure in 2010 was RMB 342.15, and in 2013 was RMB 477.73. The 
monthly national civil benefits standard for December 2010 was RMB 179, for July 2015 was RMB 291.43. 
                                                 
1562 Database of the National Bureau of Statistics of China (Chinese Version), Online <http://data.stats.gov.cn/> (25 Aug. 2015). 
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Table F-3 National and Provincial Civil Benefits Standards of the PRC for July 
20151563 
 
Number of Urban 
Persons receiving 
Civil Benefits 
Number of Urban 
Families Receiving 
Civil Benefits 
Cumulative 
Urban Civil 
Benefits 
Expenditure 
(RMB '000) 
Urban Civil 
Benefits 
Standard 
(RMB) 
National 17,830,142 9,903,126 39,121,935 291.43 
Beijing 85,590 50,482 436,478 702.37 
Shanghai 180,352 124,188 911,780 638.21 
Tianjin 134,754 78,859 581,628 560.53 
Tibet Autonomous 
Region 
46,643 27,450 159,458 419.81 
Zhejiang Province 62,647 41,582 229,037 410.83 
Guangdong Province 302,516 153,390 891,673 398.18 
Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region 
660,356 393,501 1,840,797 385.68 
Jiangsu Province 293,061 160,308 827,390 344.79 
Anhui Province 679,309.00 413,466 1,647,337 327.21 
Liaoning Province 749,794.00 423,508 1,937,420 325.16 
Heilongjiang Province 1,275,812 725,432 3,193,322 310.83 
Jilin Province 732,119 475,013 1,727,283 307.96 
Shandong Province 412,018 215,912 941,465 301.14 
Jiangxi Province 981,018 457,334 2,068,455 297.27 
Chongqing 376,484 225,545 859,150 295.32 
Yunnan Province 989,525 614,946 2,066,049 293.55 
Gansu Province 785,219 328,774 1,627,551 292.35 
                                                 
1563 Adapted from 《2015 年 7 月份全国县以上城市低保情况》‘Civil Benefits Standards of Government 
Levels above the County Level, July 2015’, Ministry of Civil Affairs, Online 
<http://files2.mca.gov.cn/www/201508/20150827132448567.htm> (6 Sep. 2015). 
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Fujian Province 134,850 77,925 310,412 288.48 
Shanxi Province 620,198 320,654 1,331,842 286.33 
Guizhou Province 425,542 235,599 948,156 279.07 
Shannxi Province 547,335 270,466 1,169,303 276.00 
Xinjiang Autonomous 
Region 
838,368 399,717 1,697,084 268.19 
Qinghai Province 182,480 88,388 408,847 266.91 
Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region 
427,656 219,436 817,461 266.53 
Ningxia Hui 
Autonomous Region 
157,343 81,570 312,579 260.79 
Hubei Province 996,324 565,909 2,060,407 258.94 
Hunan Province 1,309,551 752,703 2,415,893 257.07 
Hebei Province 574,584 322,139 1,067,187 253.39 
Hainan Province 98,796 44,402 193,585 249.98 
Sichuan Province 1,633,421 956,964 2,682,011 227.15 
Henan Province 1,136,477 657,564 1,760,895 213.36 
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Table F-4 National and Provincial Civil Benefits Standards of the PRC for 
December 2010.1564 
Provincial Areas December average per capita expense (RMB) 
National 179 
Beijing 366 
Tianjin 428 
Hebei 163 
Shanxi 164 
Liaoning 180 
Jilin 192 
Inner Mongolia 257 
Heilongjiang 176 
Shanghai 309 
Jiangsu 185 
Zhejiang 286 
Anhui 175 
Fujian 142 
Jiangxi 174 
Shandong 195 
Henan 152 
Hubei 163 
Hunan 153 
Guangdong 150 
Guangxi 158 
Hainan 183 
Chongqing 173 
Sichuan 152 
Guizhou 148 
Yunnan 154 
Tibet 212 
Shanxi 218 
Gansu 164 
Qinghai 195 
Ningxia 146 
Xinjiang 197 
                                                 
1564 《2010 年 12 月份全国县以上低保情况(城市)》‘2010 December Safety Net of Urban Government Areas 
Above County Level’, Ministry of Civil Affairs, Online <http://cws.mca.gov.cn/article/tjsj/dbsj/index1.shtml?3> 
(21 Feb. 2012). 
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F.2 Detailed Results 
F.2.1 Assumption 1: The current Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions made according to the Social 
Insurance Law1565 is adequate to fund Urban Old-Age Pensions. 
S =  R − M … (1) 
Table F-5 Equation (1M2) 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
2013 @ 
80%UR 
R (RMB m)  509,330   630,980   783,420   974,020  1,149,080  1,341,950  1,689,470  2,000,100  2,268,040  3,376,944  
𝑃𝑢𝑟('000)  174,879   187,663   201,369   218,911   235,499   257,073   283,913   304,268   322,184   479,708  
𝑒𝑢𝑝(RMB m) = 
M2  404,030   489,670   596,490   738,960   889,440  1,055,490  1,276,490  1,556,180  1,847,040  2,750,106  
S (M2) (RMB m)  105,300   141,310   186,930   235,060   259,640   286,460   412,980   443,920   421,000   626,838  
W =Urban 
Average 
Wage1566 (RMB) 18,200  20,856  24,721  28,898  32,244  36,539  41,799  46,769  51,483    
𝑒𝑢𝑝 / 𝑃𝑢𝑟 2,310  2,609  2,962  3,376  3,777  4,106  4,496  5,115  5,733    
Replacement 
Rate (actual) 12.69% 12.51% 11.98% 11.68% 11.71% 11.24% 10.76% 10.94% 11.14%   
                                                 
1565 《中华人民共和国社会保险法》Social Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China 2010 (Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress). 
1566《城镇单位就业人员平均工资 2005-2014》, ‘Urban average wages 2005-2014’, Database of the National Bureau of Statistics of China (Chinese Version), Online 
<http://data.stats.gov.cn/> (25 Aug. 2015). 
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The more significant calculation for equation (1M2) is the actual Urban Old-Age Pension replacement rate, as highlighted. The average 
replacement rate for the 9 years is 11.63%. 
 
Table F-6 Equation (1M3) 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2013 @ 80%UR 
R (RMB m)  509,330  630,980 783,420 974,020 1149,080 1,341,950 1,689,470 2,000,100 2,268,040 3,376,944  
𝑃𝑢𝑟('000)  174,879   187,663   201,369   218,911   235,499   257,073   283,913   304,268   322,184   479,708  
W𝑃𝑢𝑟 
(RMB m) 3,182,798  3,913,900  4,978,043  6,326,090  7,593,430  9,393,190   11,867,279   14,230,310   16,586,999   24,696,816  
S (3A) -1,374,886  -1,686,049  -2,163,581  -2,771,025  -3,346,230  -4,218,819  -5,335,959  -6,424,244  -7,551,463  -11,243,571  
S (3C) -922,929  -1,130,275  -1,456,699  -1,872,721  -2,267,963  -2,884,986  -3,650,806  -4,403,540  -5,196,109  -7,736,623  
S (3Da) -1,082,069  -1,325,970  -1,705,602  -2,189,025  -2,647,635  -3,354,645  -4,244,170  -5,115,055  -6,025,459  -8,971,464  
S (3Db) -763,789  - 934,580  -1,207,797  -1,556,416  -1,888,292  -2,415,326  -3,057,442  -3,692,024  -4,366,760  -6,501,782  
S (3Dc) -695,677  -850,822  -1,101,267  -1,421,038  -1,725,793  -2,214,312  -2,803,482  -3,387,495  -4,011,798  -5,973,270  
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Figure F-1 Subsidies required for Measure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The graphs are created by eviews. 
 
  
Equation (1M3)      
S (3A) S (3C) S (3Da) S (3Db) S (3Dc) 
2005 -1374886.30 -922929.01 -1082068.90 -763789.12 -695677.25 
2006 -1686048.52 -1130274.79 -1325969.76 -934579.81 -850822.36 
2007 -2163581.49 -1456699.37 -1705601.52 -1207797.22 -1101267.10 
2008 -2771025.33 -1872720.54 -2189025.04 -1556416.03 -1421037.70 
2009 -3346230.42 -2267963.39 -2647634.88 -1888291.90 -1725792.51 
2010 -4218818.69 -2884985.66 -3354645.17 -2415326.14 -2214311.87 
2011 -5335959.46 -3650805.77 -4244169.74 -3057441.79 -2803482.01 
2012 -6424243.57 -4403539.54 -5115055.05 -3692024.04 -3387495.40 
2013 -7551463.33 -5196109.49 -6025459.44 -4366759.55 -4011797.77 
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Assumption 2: Revenue from the Individual Income Tax tax-base is adequate to Fund Urban Old-Age Pensions. 
Table F-7 Equation (1M3) 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
2013 @ 
80%UR 
C (RMB m) 509,330 630,980  783,420  974,020  1,149,080  1,341,950  1,689,470  2,000,100  2,268,040  3,376,944  
C+𝑇y (RMB 
m) 718,821  876,351  1,101,978  1,346,251  1,544,015  1,825,677  2,294,881  2,582,128  2,921,193  4,349,441  
𝑃𝑢𝑟('000) 174,879  187,663  201,369  218,911  235,499  257,073  283,913  304,268  322,184  479,708  
W𝑃𝑢𝑟(RMB m) 3,182,798  3,913,900  4,978,043  6,326,090  7,593,430  9,393,190  11,867,279  14,230,310  16,586,999  24,696,816  
S (3A) -1,165,395  -1,440,678  -1,845,023  -2,398,794  -2,951,295  -3,735,092  -4,730,548  -5,842,216  -6,898,310  -10,271,074  
S (3C) -713,438  -884,904  -1,138,141  -1,500,490  -1,873,028  -2,401,259  -3,045,395  -3,821,512  -4,542,956  -6,764,127  
S (3Da) -872,578  -1,080,599  -1,387,044  -1,816,794  -2,252,700  -2,870,918  -3,638,759  -4,533,027  -5,372,306  -7,998,967  
S (3Db) -554,298  -689,209  -889,239  -1,184,185  -1,493,357  -1,931,599  -2,452,031  -3,109,996  -3,713,607  -5,529,286  
S (3Dc) -486,186  -605,451  -782,709  -1,048,807  -1,330,858  -1,730,585  -2,198,071  -2,805,467  -3,358,645  -5,000,774  
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Figure F-2 Subsidies required for Measure 3 
Equation (1M3)     
  S (4A) S (4C) S (4Da) S (4Db) S (4Dc) 
2005 -1,165,395.30  -713,438.01  -872,577.90  -554,298.12  -486,186.25  
2006 -1,440,677.52  -884,903.79  -1,080,598.76  -689,208.81  -605,451.36  
2007 -1,845,023.49  -1,138,141.37  -1,387,043.52  -889,239.22  -782,709.10  
2008 -2,398,794.33  -1,500,489.54  -1,816,794.04  -1,184,185.03  -1,048,806.70  
2009 -2,951,295.42  -1,873,028.39  -2,252,699.88  -1,493,356.90  -1,330,857.51  
2010 -3,735,091.69  -2,401,258.66  -2,870,918.17  -1,931,599.14  -1,730,584.87  
2011 -4,730,548.46  -3,045,394.77  -3,638,758.74  -2,452,030.79  -2,198,071.01  
2012 -5,842,215.57  -3,821,511.54  -4,533,027.05  -3,109,996.04  -2,805,467.40  
2013 -6,898,310.33  -4,542,956.49  -5,372,306.44  -3,713,606.55  -3,358,644.77  
  
The graphs are created by eviews.  
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Assumption 3: The PRC’s fiscal transfer system can sustainably fund Urban Old-Age Pensions.  
Table F-8 Equation (1M3) 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
2013 @ 
80%UR 
C (RMB m) 509,330  630,980  783,420  974,020  1,149,080  1,341,950  1,689,470  2,000,100  2,268,040  3,376,944  
F 3,287,326  4,003,079  6,634,269  7,763,107  8,827,301  10,379,256  13,098,795  14,982,400  16,755,292  24,947,392  
𝑃𝑢𝑟 ('000) 174,879  187,663  201,369  218,911  235,499  257,073  283,913  304,268  322,184  479,708  
W𝑃𝑢𝑟 (RMB m) 3,182,798  3,913,900  4,978,043  6,326,090  7,593,430  9,393,190  11,867,279  14,230,310  16,586,999  24,696,816  
S (4A) 1,403,110  1,686,050  3,687,268  4,018,062  4,331,991  4,818,487  6,073,366  6,558,056  6,935,789  10,326,877  
S (4C) 1,855,067  2,241,824  4,394,150  4,916,366  5,410,258  6,152,320  7,758,519  8,578,760  9,291,143  13,833,825  
S (4Da) 1,695,927  2,046,129  4,145,247  4,600,062  5,030,586  5,682,661  7,165,155  7,867,245  8,461,793  12,598,984  
S (4Db) 2,014,207  2,437,519  4,643,052  5,232,671  5,789,929  6,621,980  8,351,883  9,290,276  10,120,492  15,068,665  
S (4Dc) 2,082,319  2,521,277  4,749,582  5,368,049  5,952,428  6,822,994  8,605,843  9,594,805  10,475,454  15,597,177  
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Figure F-3 Surplus after Measure 4 
 
Equation (3M4)             
              
  S (4A) S (4C) S (4Da) S (4Db) S (4Dc) 
 
2005 1,403,110  1,855,067  1,695,927  2,014,207  2,082,319  
2006 1,686,050  2,241,824  2,046,129  2,437,519  2,521,277  
2007 3,687,268  4,394,150  4,145,247  4,643,052  4,749,582  
2008 4,018,062  
 
4,916,366  4,600,062  5,232,671  5,368,049  
2009 4,331,991  
 
5,410,258  5,030,586  5,789,929  5,952,428  
2010 4,818,487  
 
6,152,320  5,682,661  6,621,980  6,822,994  
2011 6,073,366  
 
7,758,519  7,165,155  8,351,883  8,605,843  
2012 6,558,056  
 
8,578,760  7,867,245  9,290,276  9,594,805  
2013 6,935,789  
 
9,291,143  8,461,793  10,120,492  10,475,454  
      
 
 -
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 4,000,000
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Table F-9 Results on hypothetical 2013 data with 80% urbanisation rate  
  2013 @ 80%UR 
C (RMB m) 3,376,943.98 
PUR ('000) 479,708.17 
M1a (RMB m) 316,607.39 
M1b (RMB m) 402,954.86 
S(M1a) (RMB m) 3,060,336.59 
S(M1b)(RMB m) 2,973,989.12 
expUP (RMB m) = M3 2,750,106.09 
S (M3) (RMB m) 626,837.89 
S (1M4A) -11,243,570.94 
S (1M4C) -7,736,623.10 
S (1M4Da) -8,971,463.89 
S (1M4Db) -6,501,782.32 
S (1M4Dc) -5,973,270.46 
S (2M4A) -1,0271,074.38 
S (2M4C) -6,764,126.55 
S (2M4Da) -7,998,967.33 
S (2M4Db) -5,529,285.76 
S (2M4Dc) -5,000,773.90 
S (3M4A) 10,326,876.86 
S (3M4C) 13,833,824.69 
S (3M4Da) 12,598,983.90 
S (3M4Db) 15,068,665.48 
S (3M4Dc) 15,597,177.33 
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Table F-10 Sustainability: Urban Old-Age Pensions Expenditure as a Percentage of Total Government Expenditure 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2013 @ 80%UR 
EXP 3,393,028  4,042,273  4,978,135  6,259,266  7,629,993  8,987,416   10,924,779   12,595,297   14,021,210    
expUP (RMB m) = M3  404,030   489,670   596,490   738,960   889,440  1,055,490  1,276,490  1,556,180  1,847,040  2,750,106  
W xPUR (RMB m) 3,182,798  3,913,900  4,978,043  6,326,090  7,593,430  9,393,190   11,867,279   14,230,310   16,586,999   24,696,816  
W xPUR (4A) 1,884,216  2,317,029  2,947,001  3,745,045  4,495,310  5,560,769  7,025,429  8,424,344  9,819,503    
W xPUR (4C) 1,432,259  1,761,255  2,240,119  2,846,741  3,417,043  4,226,936  5,340,276  6,403,640  7,464,149    
W xPUR (4Da) 1,591,399  1,956,950  2,489,022  3,163,045  3,796,715  4,696,595  5,933,640  7,115,155  8,293,499    
W xPUR (4Db) 1,273,119  1,565,560  1,991,217  2,530,436  3,037,372  3,757,276  4,746,912  5,692,124  6,634,800    
W xPUR (4Dc) 1,205,007  1,481,802  1,884,687  2,395,058  2,874,873  3,556,262  4,492,952  5,387,595  6,279,838    
expUP /EXP 11.91% 12.11% 11.98% 11.81% 11.66% 11.74% 11.68% 12.36% 13.17%   
W xPUR (4A)/EXP 55.53% 57.32% 59.20% 59.83% 58.92% 61.87% 64.31% 66.88% 70.03%   
W xPUR (4C)/EXP 42.21% 43.57% 45.00% 45.48% 44.78% 47.03% 48.88% 50.84% 53.23%   
W xPUR (4Da)/EXP 46.90% 48.41% 50.00% 50.53% 49.76% 52.26% 54.31% 56.49% 59.15%   
W xPUR (4Db)/EXP 37.52% 38.73% 40.00% 40.43% 39.81% 41.81% 43.45% 45.19% 47.32%   
W xPUR (4Dc)/EXP 35.51% 36.66% 37.86% 38.26% 37.68% 39.57% 41.13% 42.77% 44.79%   
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Figure F-4 Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions vs Expenditure 
In order to find the growth trend of Urban Old-Age Pensions expenditure and Urban Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions, log C and 
log expUP are calculated. The results below show that expenditure is growing at a slightly faster rate than contributions. 
  C (RMB m) 
expUP(RMB 
m) = M3 logC logexpUP 
 
 
         
2005 509,330  404,030  13.14085142 12.90924441          
2006 630,980  489,670  13.35502945 13.10148697          
2007 783,420  596,490  13.57142423 13.29881776          
2008 974,020  738,960  13.78918712 13.51299907          
2009 1,149,080  889,440  13.95447218 13.69834733          
2010 1,341,950   1,055,490  14.10963434 13.86951567          
2011 1,689,470   1,276,490  14.33992543 14.05962468          
2012 2,000,100   1,556,180  14.50870774 14.25774466          
2013 2,268,040   1,847,040  14.63442658 14.42909492          
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Figure F-5 Funding Sustainability 
This figure illustrates the relationship between the growth of current Urban Old-Age Pensions expenditure and Urban Old-Age Pensions Social 
Insurance Contributions, and the trend in the proportion of total government expenditure that is made towards Urban Old-Age Pensions.  
  logC expUP expUP /EXP 
 
          
2005 13.14% 12.91% 11.91%  
 
        
2006 13.36% 13.10% 12.11%           
2007 13.57% 13.30% 11.98%           
2008 13.79% 13.51% 11.81%           
2009 13.95% 13.70% 11.66%           
2010 14.11% 13.87% 11.74%           
2011 14.34% 14.06% 11.68%           
2012 14.51% 14.26% 12.36%           
2013 14.63% 14.43% 13.17%           
Ave 
  
12.05%           
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Appendix G Analysis of the PRC’s Tax System Structure 
Theoretically, tax system structure looks at the structure of the tax system in a country. 
When designing or reforming a tax system, in order to most appropriately distribute the 
tax burden through different tax types, a tax system structure analysis is performed. Tax 
system structure design considerations are necessary for the legislation, administration 
and implementation of tax policies and laws.  
Tax system structure refers to how much revenue is collected from the different types 
of taxes for a tax jurisdiction.1567 The taxes in the structure are usually what would be 
referred to as “formal taxes” in the PRC. Tax system structure 1568  is a systemic 
structure that includes several types of taxes that have different characteristics and 
functions. It represents the internal structure1569 of a jurisdiction’s tax system at each 
given time. In order to optimise revenue collection, the tax types are of different 
importance in relation to revenue contribution, levied at different levels, and are 
complementary.1570  
Countries usually have a composite tax system structure, as opposed to a single-tax tax 
system structure, because the single-tax tax system structure is a theoretical construct. 
A composite tax system structure is a tax system structure that has multiple tax 
                                                 
1567 Yang B & Huang E, Taxation in China (Sydney: Thomeson Reuters, 2016 Forthcoming), ch 8. 
1568 For a detailed explanation of tax system structure, please see above note 1567. 
1569 Tax jurisdiction is used instead of countries because some jurisdictions are not sovereign entities, for example 
Hong Kong and the States of Australia. 
1570 OECD Database, Online <http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/oecdtaxdatabase.htm> (6 Sep. 2015). 
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types.1571 Taxes exist at the same time with different priorities, each in support of the 
other and rely on each other, but one or more types of taxes dominate in their 
contribution to fiscal revenue. The tax system structure should have certain functions, 
and in order to have these functions, they have to first be appropriate for the realities of 
the country and satisfy each tax principle. One tax type cannot satisfy all tax principles 
such as those promulgated by Adam Smith.1572  
The implementations of tax principles and their intent at all levels necessarily require 
multiple tax types to exist at the same time. The balance of these taxes facilitate tax 
collection, save on efficiency loss and complement each other, thereby allowing the tax 
system structure to be able to collect sufficient revenue for the government, and also 
promote sustainable economic growth.  
The composite tax system structure with the right balance of tax types could allow the 
appropriate allocation of resources, as well as achieve ability to pay by taxpayers to 
adjust the income redistribution relationship to promote social equity.  
The formal taxes in the PRC form a composite tax system structure, where income taxes 
and turnover taxes together contribute the most amount of fiscal revenue. The PRC’s 
formal taxes are listed below according to tax base: 
                                                 
1571 Gordon RK & Thuronyi V, ‘Tax Legislative Process’, in Thuronyi V, ed, Tax Law Design and Drafting, 
(Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 1996), at 1-14; see also, above note 1567. 
1572 Certainty, simplicity, efficiency and equity. As noted in Coleman C, & others, Australian Tax Analysis: 
Cases, Commentary, Commercial Applications and Questions, (Sydney: Thomson Reuters, 8th ed, 2011), at 6-7. 
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 Indirect taxes (taxes on goods and services, or on consumption): Value Added 
Tax1573 (VAT), Consumption Tax,1574  Business Tax,1575  Customs Duty,1576 
Resource Tax,1577 Urban Area Maintenance Development Tax,1578 Tobacco 
Tax,1579 and Vehicle Purchase Tax.1580 
 Income taxes: Individual Income Tax, 1581  Enterprise Income Tax, 1582  and 
Social Insurance Contributions. The PRC’s income tax is designed following 
the classical system, 1583  where the incidence of Individual Income Tax, 
Enterprise Income Tax and the Social Insurance Contribution1584 are separate.  
 Wealth and activity taxes: Real Estate Tax,1585 Deed Tax,1586 Stamp Duty,1587 
Land Appreciation Tax,1588 Urban Land Usage Tax,1589 Farmland Occupation 
                                                 
1573 《中华人民共和国增值税暂行条例》Temporary Regulation of the People's Republic of China on Value 
Added Tax 2008 (State Council). 
1574 《中华人民共和国消费税暂行条例》Temporary Regulation of the People's Republic of China on 
Consumption Tax 2008 (State Council). 
1575 《中华人民共和国营业税暂行条例》Temporary Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on Business 
Tax 2008 (State Council). See also above note 1567, cha 16 for a discussion of the current reform pilot to change 
from business tax to the VAT. 
1576 《中华人民共和国进出口关税条例》Regulation of the People's Republic of China on Import and Export 
Duties 2003 (State Council).  
1577 《中华人民共和国资源税暂行条例》Temporary Regulation of the People's Republic of China on 
Resources Tax 1993 (State Council).  
1578 《中华人民共和国城市维护建设税暂行条例》Temporary Regulation of the People's Republic of China on 
Urban Area Maintenance Development Tax 1985 (State Council). 
1579 《中华人民共和国烟草专卖法》Law of the People's Republic of China on Tobacco Monopoly 2015 
(Standing Committee). 
1580 《中华人民共和国车辆购置税暂行条例》Temporary Regulation of the People's Republic of China on 
Motor Vehicles Purchase Tax 2000 (State Council). 
1581 《中华人民共和国个人所得税法》Individual Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China 2011 
(Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress). 
1582 《中华人民共和国企业所得税法》Law of the People's Republic of China on Enterprise Income Tax 2007 
(National People's Congress). 
1583 Above note 1571, vol 2, at 822 - 848. 
1584 The incidences of Social Insurance Contributions are discussed later in the chapter when analysing the 
incidence of Urban Old-age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions. 
1585 《中华人民共和国房产税暂行条例》Temporary Regulation of The People's Republic of China on Real 
Estate Tax 2011 (State Council).  
1586 《中华人民共和国契税暂行条例》Temporary Regulation of the People's Republic of China on the Deed 
Tax 1997 (State Council). 
1587 《中华人民共和国印花税暂行条例》Temporary Regulation of the People's Republic of China on Stamp 
Duties 2011 (State Council). 
1588 《中华人民共和国土地增值税暂行条例》Temporary Regulation of the People's Republic of China on Land 
Appreciation Tax 1993 (State Council). 
1589 《中华人民共和国城镇土地使用税暂行条例》Temporary Regulation of the People's Republic of China on 
Urban and Town Land Use Tax 2006 (State Council). 
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Tax,1590 Ship Tonnage Tax,1591 Vehicle and Shipping tax,1592 and Pollutant 
Discharge Fee.1593 
Since the PRC has a composite formal tax system structure dominated by turnover taxes 
and income taxes, the following briefly explains the characteristics of the tax system 
structure based on these tax types and their impact on revenue. This explanation 
illustrates where the PRC government could source its revenue to subsidise the funding 
of Urban Old-Age Pensions.  
The tax system structure of the PRC demonstrates characteristics of tax system 
structures dominated by turnover taxes, and tax system structures dominated by income 
taxes. The characteristics of tax system structures dominated by turnover taxes, and 
dominated by income taxes are explained below according to efficiency, equity, 
simplicity of collection and appropriateness. 
Efficiency, equity and simplicity of collection are three of the four criteria nominated 
by Adam Smith1594 in his Wealth of Nations1595 as requirements for good tax system 
design, the fourth criterion is certainty. Certainty is determined by the existence of laws 
that collect taxes, it requires an analysis of the compliance and administration of laws 
                                                 
1590 《中华人民共和国耕地占用税暂行条例》Temporary Regulation of the People's Republic of China on 
Farmland Occupation Tax 2007 (State Council). 
1591 《中华人民共和国船舶吨税暂行条例》Temporary Regulation of the People's Republic of China on Vessel 
Tonnage Tax 2011 (State Council). 
1592 《中华人民共和国车船税法》Law of the People’s Republic of China on Motor Vehicle and Vessel Taxes 
2011 (Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress). 
1593 《排污费征收使用管理条例》Administrative Regulation on the Levy and Use of Pollutant Discharge Fee 
2003 (State Council). 
1594 Coleman C, & others, Australian Tax Analysis: Cases, Commentary, Commercial Applications and Questions, 
(Sydney: Thomson Reuters, 8th ed, 2011), at 6-7. 
1595 Book V, in Smith A, The Wealth of Nations, Skinner AS, ed, (London: Penguin Books, 1999), at 277-551. 
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in the PRC, this study assumes certainty is met in the PRC’s tax system structure as 
taxes are levied by the PRC’s tax laws. 
Appropriateness1596 is a traditional Chinese criterion to analyse tax systems. For the 
purposes of fully funding Urban Old-Age Pension in the PRC, this section briefly 
explains this criterion.  
China has a tradition of requiring the sovereign to govern benevolently because he is 
the ultimate property owner. Welfare policies targeting the elderly is a part of this 
tradition. Therefore historically in ancient China, even more so than in the western 
tradition, taxation is raised when the government need for revenue is taken as given. 
The emperor-centric society allowed by a social contract1597 drawn based on the body 
of Li rules meant taxation was a “way to gather wealth”1598 by the emperor. 
One of the most common proposals by ancient Chinese thinkers is for the emperor to 
“Gather with limit”, where the thinkers oppose extorting excessive taxes and levies, 
and likens policies that do so to drying the pond to gather fish.1599 In Guanzi,1600 
GUAN Zhong,1601 a famous Prime Minister of the Dukedom of Qi in the Spring and 
Autumn Period, and a political thinker of his time, gave a profound discussion on what 
it is meant by “gather with limit”. He opined that  
                                                 
1596 Yang B & Huang E, Taxation in China (Sydney: Thomeson Reuters, 2016 Forthcoming), ch1. 
1597 Roussau JJ, ‘The Social Contract That We Must Always Go Back to an Original Compact’, excerpt in 
Freeman MDA, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 8th ed, 2008), at 147-150. 
1598 《管子》Guanzi, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_34.aspx> (2 Nov. 2015). 
1599 Ibid.  
1600 Ibid. 
1601 719BC-645BC. 
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(T)he land supplies wealth in its own time, men tires with exertion, but the 
monarch’s wants are unlimited……gather without limit from the people and 
spend nonstop, although the country is large, it would be in danger of ruin. 1602  
The idea of DONG Zhongshu’s comment is that the production capacity of the land is 
limited at any point in time – and more generally, productive capacity is limited. There 
should be a reasonable line drawn for the government to gather revenue, levying taxes 
excessively beyond this limit would greatly damage the economy, leading to the ruin 
of the reign.  
To ancient Confucian thinkers, “light taxes” is an important component of “limit”, it is 
also a component in the ideal of Hiding Wealth with the People.1603 Confucius himself 
proposed no excessive levies, and that the tax burden should be light. 1604 Mencius 
proposed “thin” taxes1605 in order to allow the people to accumulate wealth. GUAN 
Zhong in Guanzi1606 argued that if a tax does not have to be levied, or it is possible to 
not levy it, then it should not be levied. Xunzi suggested that the sovereign should lower 
taxes to allow the people a chance to produce, and improve production capacity.1607 
According to Xunzi, when taxes are heavy, the nation will be poor, and when taxes are 
light and forced labour exempt, the nation would be wealthier as the people are 
                                                 
1602 “地之生财有时, 民之用力有倦, 而人君之欲无穷……取于民无度, 用之不止, 国虽大必危。”《权修》, 
‘Quan Xiu’, in above note 1598. 
1603 藏富于民. 
1604 《尧曰》, ‘Rao Yue’, in 《论语》Confucius, Analects, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_2.aspx> (2 
Nov.2015); and “百姓足,君孰与不足；百姓不足,君孰与足”《颜渊》, ‘Yan Yuan’ in 《论语》Confucius, 
Analects, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_2.aspx> (2 Nov.2015). 
1605 “薄其税敛”. Means lower the tax. “易其田畴, 薄其税敛, 民可使富也”. 《尽心上》, ‘Jin Xin I’ in 《孟
子》Mencius, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_11.aspx> (2.Nov 2015). 
1606 Above note 1598. 
1607 XUN was the family name of XUN Kuang. Students of the Confucian tradition will put “zi” after the family 
name of an important thinker. It is similar to putting “ius” at the end of a person’s name in Latin. See “家五亩 宅, 
百亩田, 务其业而勿夺其时, 所以富之也”, and “裕民则民富, 民富则田肥以易”《富国》, ‘Fu Guo’ in 《荀
子》Xunzi, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_30.aspx> (2 Nov. 2015). 
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engaging in productive activities. 1608  The light taxes proposals of Confucianism 
focused on calming the social conflict between the ruling class and the people, and 
maintaining social order in a ruler-centric society.1609  
The light taxes ideas of LI Ao in the Tang Dynasty focused purely on fiscal revenue.1610 
LI also argued that lighter taxes are better at growing fiscal revenue than heavier taxes. 
LI’s ideas were a much earlier iteration of the Laffer Curve.1611 To LI, heavy taxes led 
to poverty, because people could not afford the burden.1612 They would then escape the 
land, and the land would become barren. There is in effect no material tax base, leading 
to falling fiscal revenue. In contrast, light taxes attract people, and allow people to lead 
stable lives, thereby stimulating farming labour productivity, which leads to wealth 
accumulation at a faster pace. When the people are better off, the material tax base 
improves, resulting in more fiscal revenue.  
The Ming Dynasty thinker QIU Xun reiterated this view.1613 QIU Xun1614 took the 
idea of light taxes and “gather with limit” further. His view on “limit” is that the 
government should not levy too much taxes, but they also should not levy too little. 
“Limit” is the key and it acts on both ends of the scale. He pointed out that the ruler 
                                                 
1608 See “家五亩 宅, 百亩田, 务其业而勿夺其时, 所以富之也”, and “裕民则民富, 民富则田肥以易”《富
国》, ‘Fu Guo’, in 《荀子》Xunzi, <http://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/book_30.aspx> (2 Nov. 2015). 
1609 Above note 1567, ch 2. 
1610 Above note 1567, ch 2. 
1611 Laffer AB, ‘The Laffer Curve: Past, Present, and Future’ (2004) Backgrounder #1765 on Taxes, 
<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/06/the-laffer-curve-past-present-and-future> (9 Feb. 2016). 
1612 Above note 1567, ch 2. 
1613 《经制之义》, Vol 24 “Jing Zhi Zhi Yi” in 丘浚, 《大学衍义补》, Qiu X, Da Xue Yan Yi Bu, 
<http://guji.artx.cn/article/48139.html> (10 Nov. 2015). 
1614 《贡赋之常》,Vol 22 “Gong Fu Zhi Chang”, in 丘浚, 《大学衍义补》, Qiu X, Da Xue Yan Yi Bu, 
<http://guji.artx.cn/article/48139.html> (10 Nov. 2015). 
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should not aim to gather nothing from the people, and that he does need to gather 
something from the people. If he does not gather from the people, he would have 
nothing to govern the nation with; if he gathers too much from the people, it would be 
difficult for him to think on behalf of the people and be benevolent. Benevolence to 
provide for people’s livelihoods is therefore key to measuring the tax system according 
to appropriateness.1615  
These thoughts on appropriateness have their counterparts in western economic theories. 
For example, according to Adam Smith: 
“High taxes, sometimes by diminishing the consumption of the taxed 
commodities, and sometimes by encouraging smuggling, frequently afford 
smaller revenue to government than what might be drawn from more moderate 
taxes.”1616  
Appropriateness is as important in the tax system design process in the PRC as the other 
criteria proposed by Adam Smith. This research analyses Urban Old-Age Pensions 
Social Insurance Contributions within the PRC’s fiscal revenue structure. Therefore 
whether levels of Social Insurance Contributions were appropriate is also important.  
Tax System Structure Dominated by a Full Volume Turnover Tax 
The ultimate tax base for turnover taxes is consumption. Turnover taxes in the form of 
the VAT and Business Tax, and the Consumption Tax have traditionally contributed a 
significant proportion of the PRC’s fiscal revenue. Its influence, however, is gradually 
                                                 
1615 Ibid.  
1616 Smith A, The Wealth of Nations, Skinner AS, ed, (London: Penguin Books, 1999). 
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reducing as the PRC’s economy develops to a point to rely more on direct taxes, that is, 
income taxes for fiscal revenue needs.  
As part of the turnover tax tax-base, the VAT contributes to revenue differently to the 
Business Tax, which is a full value turnover tax. The tax incidence of the VAT is on 
the value add in each stage of the supply chain. The incidence of the Business Tax is 
on full turnover, that is, the full transaction value of goods and services. The tax rate 
design of these taxes takes into consideration this difference, and full value turnover 
taxes often have much lower tax rates than the VAT. Currently, the general VAT tax 
rate in the PRC is 17%,1617 and the general Business Tax tax-rates are 3-5%.1618  
The following are some of the characteristics of a tax system structure dominated by 
full value turnover taxes. 
In terms of efficiency and simplicity, whether the full value turnover tax is levied with 
a general tax base or a selective tax base,1619 its tax base is the full transaction value of 
goods or services. Since there is no need for deductions and offsets, tax administration 
is simple - the process is convenient and the administrative cost is low.  
Full value turnover taxes can be implemented, in order to better achieve the industry 
policy goals of the nation, improve the economic structure and improve macroeconomic 
                                                 
1617 Above note 1573, Art 2. 
1618 Above note 1575. 
1619 See Above note 1567, ch 8; and Burgess P, Cooper GS, Stewart M and Vann RJ, Cooper, Krever & Vann’s 
Income Taxation Commentary and Materials, (Sydney: Thomson Reuters, 7th ed, 2012), at 6-7. 
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efficiency. These policy goals are often important for developing countries in the earlier 
stages of development.  
Policies can include applying stringent tax restrictions or higher tax rates on products, 
enterprises and industries that should not continue to develop; and implement low tax 
rates on the production of high technology or other priority development products,1620 
and enterprises and industries that support their development. The PRC has applied full 
value turnover taxes in its post Open Door Policy era to promote the development of 
many industries.  
In a tax system structure based on a full value turnover tax, with complementary tax 
types such as the selective transaction tax, the redistributive effects of taxes are also 
strengthened. For example, the PRC has implemented a consumption tax on luxury 
goods, tobacco products and alcoholic products to restrict their consumption; it has 
debated implementing a gift tax and inheritance tax to restricted inheritance of wealth 
in order to encourage spending and to encourage hard work to improve living standards, 
thereby improving social efficiency in terms of income redistribution. 
Depending on the frequency of transactions in relation to the good, full value turnover 
taxes levied at multiple stages, and multiple sales points will (to different extents) affect 
the tax burden of each good. The less often the good changes hands, the lighter the tax 
burden and vice versa. For products produced by one producer who engages in all 
                                                 
1620 Priority development products in the PRC are products chosen by the government to be produced at a large 
quantity. This is a remnant of planned economy days. 
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production processes, since the product was produced in the same enterprise without 
transactions that will attract a taxable event, the whole tax burden is light. When there 
is specialist division of labour between enterprises, since the throughput has to be 
outsourced, there would be transactions between enterprises, the output then contains a 
heavier tax burden. As such, selling at the same price with specialisation yields lower 
profits.  
This tax system structure discriminates against specialisation and increases the 
economic cost of tax administration, thereby preventing the improvement of 
macroeconomic efficiency. This disadvantage is fundamental since it affects the 
regularity in the development of the market economy, especially in a developing 
economy such as that of the PRC, but the limited scope and single stage selective 
turnover tax similar to a VAT does not have this disadvantage. 
In terms of equity, the full value turnover tax does not ask whether the taxpayer actually 
profits from selling goods or services or how much the profit was. As long as there was 
a taxable transaction, the whole transaction becomes taxable. This goes against the 
taxpayer’s real ability to pay taxes, because only the net income after deducting costs 
and losses can reflect the person’s ability to pay taxes.  
Normally it is only possible to choose an incremental tax rate (sometimes only one fix 
tax rate) for full value turnover taxes; comparing with the progressive tax rate, it is less 
able to balance tax ability to pay.  
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In a tax system structure based on taxes that have consumption as their tax base, where 
the tax base is the transaction value of all or the majority of consumer goods, social 
inequality is an obvious disadvantage. In a society where income is unevenly distributed, 
the income consumption ratio of each class in the society differ greatly. Therefore, 
consumption as a proportion of income is greater for low income earners than higher 
income earners. Although the rich with higher income has higher levels of consumption, 
that consumption is only a small part of their total income.  
Proportionally, the broad base consumption tax means, each taxpayer paid the same 
proportion of tax from income, but the absolute effect the tax has on their living 
standards is different.1621 Selective consumption tax on luxury goods does not give rise 
to this inequality, and it improves the fairness of the whole tax system structure. Further, 
complemented by the taxes that play a major role in income redistribution such as the 
Individual Income Tax and Social Insurance Contributions; and taxes that regulate the 
uneven ownership of wealth such as the wealth tax, inheritance tax and gift tax, the 
unfairness in this tax system structure can be softened. This is the choice made by the 
PRC. 
From the point of view of appropriateness, when the dominant tax is a full value 
turnover tax, the tax base is broad. As long as the tax rate is appropriate, enough revenue 
could be collected to satisfy public finance needs. If complemented by tax types such 
                                                 
1621 Stiglitz JE, Economics of the Public Sector, (New York: W.W.Norton & Company, 3rd ed, 2000), at 159. 
443 
 
as the Enterprise Income Tax in the PRC, the source of tax revenue will be even broader, 
thereby reaching fiscal revenue goals.  
The full value turnover tax mainly taxes business income from the sales of goods or 
services, where the tax is realised when sales is realised. As long as there are sales 
income and business income, the nation has sources of tax revenue. Also, taxing total 
turnover means taxing the gross income of a taxpayer, regardless of the costs of goods 
or services, or profitability. As long as the tax rate is set at a point that balances revenue 
and income redistribution needs, tax revenue will fluctuate as the income from goods 
and services fluctuates. Therefore this tax system structure has the advantage of 
providing a timely and stable source of fiscal revenue.  
In summary, the tax system structure with full value turnover tax as the dominant tax 
has fundamental flaw in efficiency, on the point of fairness it is not commendable, but 
it achieves fiscal revenue goals, thus making it a suitable tax system structure for a pro-
revenue tax design model. The PRC chose to include Business Tax for this purpose. 
The current reform to merge Business Tax with the VAT meant the PRC government 
now has other policy goals than simply collecting revenue efficiently. 
Tax System Structure Dominated by the VAT 
The following are some of the characteristics of a tax system structure dominated by 
the VAT. The VAT will be increasingly important because it would be the only major 
444 
 
turnover tax in the PRC’s tax system structure. As a non-earmarked tax, the government 
could source subsidies from the VAT tax base to fund Old-Age Pensions. 
The collection mechanism of the VAT is a cross between full value turnover taxes and 
income taxes. The incidence is not directly on income, but it makes sure the final 
consumer bears the burden of the tax.1622 
In terms of efficiency and simplicity of collection, under a standard VAT system, the 
economic effects of levying a VAT is neutral, that is, there is no distortion on the 
decisions of producers or consumers; especially when making decisions on enterprise 
organisational structure. Objectively, a standard VAT promotes specialist division of 
labour, thereby improving economic efficiency.  
A standard VAT has six characteristics: it is a consumption type turnover tax; it is 
comprehensive in coverage; there is no distinction between the types of taxpayer; there 
is a single or few levels of tax rates, there is invoice input-credit,1623 and there is tax 
exclusive pricing.1624 Since VAT is levied on the value-add, that is, the newly created 
value by an enterprise which was not already taxed, the design of the tax should include 
input-credits to offset taxes paid at purchases. For a good or service, as long as the sales 
price is the same, the tax burden is the same regardless of how many stages in the supply 
chain the product has gone through, so the all processes producers are not at an 
                                                 
1622 For a detailed discussion on how VAT’s work in a tax system structure, see Ebrill L, & others, The Modern 
VAT, (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 2001); and above note 1567, chs 9 & 13. 
1623 Ebrill L, & others, The Modern VAT, (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 2001). Input-credits are 
the input taxes a withholding taxpayer in the supply chain could receive from the tax authorities at the end of the 
tax period. 
1624 Tax exclusive pricing is where the price shows taxes as a separate amount. 
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advantage and the specialist producers are not discriminated against. The VAT solves 
the issues of tax discrimination from increased burdens that are caused by multiple 
transactions by specialist producers, as would happen with a full value turnover tax. 
Objectively this is advantageous because the enterprise is able to choose a business 
organisation structure solely based on business decisions. 
The direct collection cost of VAT is higher than traditional full value turnover taxes, 
because a standard VAT normally is linked with a unified invoice system. In practice, 
a computer network usually needs to be established for reasons such as: cross audit and 
automatic control of VAT avoidance or evasion from the input credit system through 
invoices; and to effectively stop fraudulent input-credit claims and VAT avoidance or 
evasion through falsifying invoices or wrongful filling of invoices. Also, tax file 
numbers need to be in place, and training needs to be implemented, this leads to large 
compliance costs. Further, the standard VAT generally requires either a single tax rate 
or very few tax rates in the system.  
In terms of equity, since all input tax paid by non-final consumers in a general VAT 
can be credited (claimed back by the input tax payer), businesses are taxpayers, but not 
tax bearers. They withhold tax on the government’s behalf, and the final tax burden 
falls on the consumer. For the VAT, whether the taxpayer is a high income earner or a 
lower income earner, as long as the consumption quantity and value are the same, their 
tax burden is approximately the same.  
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The VAT, like the general consumption tax does not distinguish the ability to pay by 
taxpayers. If a single tax rate is implemented, where necessities and luxuries are taxed 
in the same way, people who can bear a higher burden would be paying less taxes. 
People who are less able to bear a higher burden would be paying more taxes. This 
means the VAT, like other turnover taxes is regressive.  
In order to soften the regressive nature in the VAT, necessities can be zero rated, 
thereby exempt from VAT; and luxury goods should be taxed at higher rates. Multiple 
rates however, necessarily lead to administrative complexity. In order to avoid this 
problem, the gap between different rates should not be too large.  
Since the VAT does not have scope to internally solve inequality, support tax types are 
necessary to improve fairness in the tax system structure. Policies such as levying an 
Individual Income Tax and Social Insurance Tax that regulate the redistribution of 
income; levying a higher rate consumption tax or sales tax on tobacco, alcohol and 
luxury goods on top of the VAT; and implementing gift and inheritance taxes 
significantly improves the fairness in a tax system structure based on the VAT. This is 
what is done in the PRC. Increasingly direct taxes are playing a more important role to 
collect revenue in the PRC. 
The scope of VAT adequately provides for the government’s major public finance 
needs. The VAT is a tax on value add, which means it is taxing the final consumption 
value of a good or a service. Revenue grows with economic development and increases 
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in consumption. Assuming an invoice input-credit system and computerised tax 
administration of the VAT, social integrity would improve through voluntary 
compliance of the tax. Taxpayers could cross monitor each other through a chain of 
control mechanisms, such as demanding a tax invoice for input-credit purposes. These 
mechanisms effectively prevent tax avoidance and evasion, which then promote total 
collection of fiscal revenue. 
The revenue collection ability of a tax system structure based on the VAT as the 
dominant tax is strong, when the VAT is supported by entity income tax (for example, 
the Enterprise Income Tax in the PRC), Individual Income Tax, Social Insurance Tax, 
Customs Duty and Selective Turnover Taxes on goods that are price inelastic in demand, 
such as tobacco and alcohol. 
In summary, the tax system structure based on the VAT as the Dominant tax in terms 
of fairness and fiscal revenue collection competes well with the tax system structure 
based on full value turnover tax as the dominant tax. In terms of efficiency it 
fundamentally solves the defects of the tax system structure based on full value turnover 
tax as the dominant tax. These reasons led the PRC’s choice to merge the full value 
turnover tax, that is, Business Tax into the VAT. 
Tax System Structure Dominated by Income Taxes 
An income tax’s tax base and tax incidence are income. Income is a difficult concept 
to define for tax purposes. One of the earliest and best known definitions of income for 
448 
 
tax purposes is by Henry Simons in 1938.1625 Simons’ definition was formulated on 
the basis that income is a problem of fiscal policy, that “personal income connotes…the 
exercise of control over the use of society’s scarce resources”. Its calculation is the 
algebraic sum of the accumulation of personal property in a defined period, and the 
possibility of consumption in that period. This periodic nature of the calculation of 
income is the key for it to be ascertained then taxed.1626 This is a concept based on a 
gain to the income earner. Simons’ definition is the basis for the comprehensive1627 or 
global design of income tax; that is, including all types of income in the income tax law. 
Australia is an example for taxing income in a global fashion.1628  
Another method to tax income is a scheduler income tax, where income is divided into 
different categories and taxed separately.1629 The PRC has a scheduler income tax 
system with two income taxes, the Individual Income Tax1630  (including Old-Age 
Pensions Social Insurance Contributions) 1631  and the Enterprise Income Tax. 1632 
Within the two taxes, income from different sources are treated differently. This 
research focuses on the Individual Income Tax for the purposes of analysing Urban 
                                                 
1625 Simons H, Personal Income Taxation: the Definition of Income as a Problem of Fiscal Policy, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1938), as extracted in above note Burgess P, Cooper GS, Stewart M and Vann RJ, 
Cooper, Krever & Vann’s Income Taxation Commentary and Materials, (Sydney: Thomson Reuters, 7th ed, 2012), 
at 7-11. 
1626 For example, ss 4-10 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 in Australia. 
1627 Burgess P, Cooper GS, Stewart M and Vann RJ, Cooper, Krever & Vann’s Income Taxation Commentary and 
Materials, (Sydney: Thomson Reuters, 7th ed, 2012), at 12. 
1628 Auldt HJ & Arnald BJ, Comparative Income Taxation A Structural Analysis, (Chicago: Aspen Publishers, 3rd 
ed, 2010), at197-199. 
1629 Above note 1627, at 12; and above note 1628, at 197-199. 
1630 Above note 1581 
1631 《中华人民共和国社会保险法》Social Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China 2010 (Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress). 
1632 Above note 1582. 
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Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions. The following are some of the 
characteristics of a tax system structure dominated by income taxes.1633 
When the government chooses to implement a progressive tax rate scale for income 
taxes, income distribution between citizens is made possible. In terms of efficiency and 
collection simplicity, income taxes tax net income, the policies usually include 
deductions and offsets. Theoretically it does not affect the production choices of 
taxpayers, and it does not tax productive capital.1634 On the other hand, progressive tax 
rates mean the income tax system is price elastic, so tax revenue grows as taxpayers’ 
income grows, and decreases as taxpayers’ income decreases. The price elastic nature 
of income taxes make it an ideal tax system structure that automatically stabilises the 
economy. 
Tax administration of income taxes require sound administrative practices, because the 
calculation of income tax is complex. Its collection cost tops all taxes. In developed 
economies, income taxes, especially Individual Income Taxes have a broad tax base; at 
the same time it requires a relatively high integrity social cultural environment, and a 
democratic budgeting process.1635 
In terms of equity, income tax is difficult to shift, the taxpayer and tax bearer are 
relatively consistent; expenditures incurred were deducted in the tax calculation process. 
                                                 
1633 For more detail on the characteristics of income taxes, please see above note 1627, at 12; above note 1567, chs 
8 &10, and above note 1628, at197-199. 
1634 Productive capital are things that are used to earn income. 
1635 Yang B and Huang E, ‘Characteristics of the Chinese tax system and its cultural Underpinnings: a comparison 
with the west’, (2011) 1 Journal of Chinese Tax and Policy 13. 
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There is often a tax free threshold,1636 and progressive rate scales allow the taxpayer to 
pay according to their ability.  
In summary, a tax system structure based on income tax1637 as the dominant tax has a 
strong revenue collection ability, it can achieve fiscal revenue goals sufficiently and 
sustainably. In terms of achieving the fairness and efficiency goals, there are some 
conflicts, and the focal point of that conflict is the choice of tax rate structure. Choosing 
a progressive rate system with high tax rates and more brackets may affect economy 
efficiency. To the contrary, choosing a flat tax rate system or a progressive rate system 
with fewer brackets that is close to a flat rate system will decrease fairness of the whole 
tax system, but economic efficiency will increase.  
The PRC’s tax system structure is currently balancing between ease of revenue 
collection and equity. The phasing out of the Business Tax means the revenue policy 
goal is moving away from collecting as much as the government can. The economy and 
legal structures have developed enough to allow income taxes to play a more dominant 
role in the fiscal revenue structure of the PRC. For the purposes of analysing Urban 
Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance Contributions, the more dominant role played by 
income taxes allows for more justification for the government to source subsidies from 
consolidated revenue.  
                                                 
1636 In the PRC, this is RMB3,500 per month. 
1637 See Wan Y, ‘An Empirical Study of Income Distribution by the Individual Income Tax in the PRC’, 
International Conference of Chinese Tax and Policy, 2015 (Xiamen, 2015); Du L, ‘Measuring the Redistributive 
Effect of Personal Income Tax Using Generalized Entropy Indexes with an Application to China’, International 
Conference of Chinese Tax and Policy, 2015 (Xiamen, 2015); and Sawyer A, ‘Individual Income Tax Reform in 
China, New Zealand Experience’, International Conference of Chinese Tax and Policy, 2015 (Xiamen, 2015).  
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(Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security). 
《关于女工作人员生育假期的通知》Circular on Maternity Leave 1955 (State 
Council). 
《关于全国各级人民政府、党派、团体及所属事业单位的国家工作人员实行公
费医 疗预防措施的指示》Direction for Implementation of Publicly Funded Health 
and Immunisation Policies for Public Servants working for the People’s Governments 
at All Levels, Parties and Groups, and Agencies 1952 (Previously Ministry of 
Government, now State Council).  
《关于深化企业职工养老保险制度改革的通知》Circular on Increasing the 
Efforts to Reform Employee Old-Age Pensions Insurance 1995 (State Council). 
《关于授权国务院在经济体制改革和对外开放方面制定暂行规定决定》Decision 
to Delegate to the State Council the Power to Make Provisional Regulation during the 
Systemic Reform to the Economy and about Issues Arising from the Implementation of 
the Open Door Policy 1985 (National People’s Congress). 
《关于修改<中华人民共和国个人所得税法>的决定》Decision to Amend the 
Individual Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China 2011 (National 
People’s Congress). 
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《关于印发〈征收个人所得税若干问题的规定〉的通知》Announcement to 
Circulate the ‘Decision on A Few Issues Relating to the Collection of Individual 
Income Tax’ 1994 (State Administration of Taxation).  
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Circular on the Liability for Individual Income Tax on Wages and Salaries Received 
by Individuals Who Do Not Have a Residence in the People’s Republic of China 1994 
(State Administration of Taxation). 
《广东省社会养老保险条例》Social Insurance Regulation of the Guangdong 
Province 2014 (The People’s Congress of the Guangdong Province and the Standing 
Committee of the People’s Congress of the Guangdong Province). 
《广东省劳动和社会保障厅、广东省地方税务局关于印发广东省社会保险费地
税全责征收实施办法（暂行）的通知》Circular to Issue the Temporary 
Implementation Rule of Administration and Collection of Social Insurances by Local 
Tax Bureaus in the Guangdong Province 2008 (Guangdong Provincial Department of 
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《国家工作人员公费医疗预防实施办法》Implementation Rules of Publicly 
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Government, now State Council).  
《国家机关工作人员退休处理暂行办法》Temporary Regulations on the 
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the State Council on Carrying out the Pilot Program of Old-Age Pension Insurance 
for Urban Residents 2011 (State Council). 
《国务院关于加强预算外资金管理的决定》Decision on Improving Management 
of Extra-budgetary Funds 1996 (State Council). 
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《国务院关于建立城镇职工基本医疗保险制度的决定》Decision by the State 
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1998 (State Council). 
《国务院关于建设统一的企业职工基本养老保险制度的决定》State Council 
Decision on Unifying the Enterprise Employee Basic Old-Age Pension Insurance 
Systems 1997 (State Council). 
《国务院关于深化企业职工养老保险制度改革的通知》Circular from the State 
Council on Deepening the Reform of the Urban Enterprise Employee Old-Age 
Pensions Insurance System 1995 (State Council). 
《国务院关于实行分税制财政管理体制的决定》The Decision of the State Council 
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Council). 
《国务院关于实行企业职工基本养老保险省级统筹和行业统筹移交地方管理有
关问题的通知》Circular from the State Council on the Administration of Provincial 
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《国务院关于实行社会保险基金预算的意见》Guiding Opinion of the State 
Council on Implementing a Social Insurance Funds Budget 2010 (State Council).  
《国务院关于完善企业职工基本养老保险制度的决定》Decision of the State 
Council on Improving the System of Basic Old-Age Pensions Social Insurance for 
Enterprise Employees 2005 (State Council). 
《国务院关于在各地建立城市居民最低生活保障制度的通知》Announcement on 
Establishing Systems of Urban Resident Low Income Safety Net by Local Government 
Authorities 1997 (State Council). 
《国营企业实行劳动合同制暂行规定》Temporary Ruling of Labour Contracts of 
State Owned Enterprises 1986 (State Council). 
《军人抚恤优待条例》Military Personnel Priority Treatment and Compensation 
Regulation 1988 (State Council and the Central Military Committee). 
《劳动保险条例实施细则》Workforce Insurance Regulation Detailed 
Implementation Rule of the People’s Republic of China 1953 (Previously Ministry of 
Labor, Now Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security) 1953. 
《民兵民工伤亡抚恤暂行条例》Temporary Implementation Rule on Priority 
Treatment and Compensation for Militiaman 1950 (Ministry of Internal Affairs). 
《农民工参加基本养老保险办法》Mechanism to Participate in Old-Age Pensions 
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Human Resources and Social Security). 
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Council). 
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《排污费征收使用管理条例》Administrative Regulation on the Levy and Use of 
Pollutant Discharge Fee 2003 (State Council). 
《企业职工工伤保险试行办法》Pilot Implementation Rules on Enterprise 
Employee Workers Compensation Insurance 1996, (Previously Ministry of Labor, 
now Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security). 
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Human Resources and Social Security).  
《上海市开展对部分个人住房征收房产税试点的暂行办法》Temporary 
Implementation Rule for the Shanghai Pilot on the Levying of Real Estate Tax for 
Selected Individual Residential Real Estate 2011 (Shanghai People’s Government). 
《社会保险费征缴暂行条例》Temporary Regulations on the Collection of Social 
Insurance Contributions 1999 (State Council). 
《深圳市宝安龙岗城市化土地管理办法》Shenzhen Baoan & Longgang Urban 
Land Management Rule 2004 (Shenzhen Prefecture Government). 
《失业保险条例》Unemployment Insurance Regulation 1999 (State Council). 
《实施〈中华人民共和国社会保险法〉若干规定》Implementation Rule to the 
Social Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China 2011 (Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security). 
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《完善城镇社会保障体系试点方案》Pilot Proposal on Improvements to the Urban 
Social Security System 2000 (State Council). 
《中国人民政治协商会议共同纲领》The Common Creed of the National 
Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 1949 (National 
Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference). 
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《中华人民共和国城市维护建设税暂行条例》Temporary Regulation of the 
People's Republic of China on Urban Area Maintenance Development Tax 1985 
(State Council). 
《中华人民共和国城镇土地使用税暂行条例》Temporary Regulation of the 
People's Republic of China on Urban and Town Land Use Tax 2006 (State Council). 
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《中华人民共和国进出口关税条例》Regulation of the People's Republic of China 
on Import and Export Duties 2003 (State Council).  
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Germany 
Sickness Insurance Law 1883. 
Accident Insurance Law 1884. 
Old Age and Disability Insurance Law 1889. 
Australia 
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act. 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936.  
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997. 
International Convention 
Convention concerning Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors' Benefits 1967 
(International Labor Organization). 
